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This paper was first published in Astronomy and Geophysics (December 1998, Vol. 39) by the Royal Astronomical Society and the Institute of Physics Publishing Ltd and is reproduced here, with minor amendments, by kind permission of the Editor, Dr Sue Bowler.William Wales (1734–1798) contributed to astronomy through his observations of the 1769 transit of Venus, and his studies of latitude and longitude on Captain James Cook's second voyage to the South Seas. During this voyage, Wales was responsible for monitoring the performance of the chronometers. After returning from the Pacific, Wales took charge of the Royal Mathematical School at Christ's Hospital in London and, over the next two decades, he taught a succession of budding officers the principles of navigation.

And so we come to the end of our main story in which, as well as seeing how radar was used at sea in war, we have learnt: how development of radar in the Royal Navy started so slowly in 1936, starved of resources and at low priority largely owing to lack of interest and perhaps ignorance at the top, despite the efforts of C. S. Wright, in contrast to the Royal Air Force; how there was a dramatic improvement in 1938 when C. E. Horton had taken charge of radar development at HM Signal School, so much so that the Navy was able to enter the war with operational radar at sea: thereafter, it became a race between operational thought and technical achievement; how, with Admiral Somerville’s initial encouragement during the first months of the war, so much was achieved in 1939, 1940 and 1941 in design and development by so few staff at Signal School working all hours God made; how those at sea learnt to use their new ‘eyes’ to the best advantage, and how those in authority ashore, stimulated by operational experience, began to give the highest priority to fitting ships with radar; how the Royal Navy owed a great debt to Canada — and to C.S. Wright, himself of Canadian origin, for arranging it — for the many Canadian physics graduates who kept so much of the British naval radar working at sea during the earlier years

The ‘Phoney War’ came to an end on 9 April 1940, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. For the Navy, the Norwegian campaign from April to June 1940 provided the first real trial for the Navy’s newly radar-fitted ships, all eight of whom took part. Ships already fitted at the beginning of the campaign were Rodney, Valiant, Sheffield, Suffolk, Curlew, Carlisle and Curacoa. Coventry completed her radar trials just in time to take part in the evacuation of Narvik in June. The four AA cruisers in particular learned the limitations of operating close inshore, radar results being very severely restricted by the high cliffs and surrounding high land in the fjords. Curacoa was severely damaged and Curlew sunk. This description of the latter’s last moments, by Mr F. E. Butcher, who was a telegraphist and radar operator on board at the time, reminds us how secret radar then was: A high-flying aircraft dropped a bomb which struck us on the starboard side aft, below the waterline … After about an hour, she capsized. My departure from the radar scene [he became a normal telegraphist after this] is fixed as a picture in my memory of Jimmy Green, the killick sparker [Leading Telegraphist] in charge of the office, going into it and smashing everything to pieces as much as he could with a heavy hammer, in an effort to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to gain information about it.1

Yeo returned from Orfordness on 9 October and DSD lost no time in calling a meeting at the Admiralty — attended by the Director of the Tactical Division, DSR and his deputy, and the Captain and Experimental Commander of the Signal School — to hear Yeo’s report and to decide what ought to be done next.

During 1940 and 1941, tremendous efforts were directed towards getting as many ships as possible fitted with some kind of radar. In deciding what alterations and additions had to be made to existing ships, the Admiralty had a system of priority categories lettered from A to D, the most important items being Classification A. In January 1941, priorities became such that a new superior Classification A* had to be created.1 In June, even that proved not to be strong enough for radar fitting. ‘Generally speaking,’ said the Admiralty, ‘RDF items are considered of the first importance among A* items.’2

At the beginning of 1941, the British Commonwealth had stood almost alone against the Axis powers: by the beginning of 1942, thanks to the aggression of Germany and Japan, it had two powerful allies, Russia and the United States. During 1942 and 1943, the Allied fortunes turned from almost uninterrupted disaster to almost unbroken success. This chapter tells the story of radar in the Royal Navy during the last of those years — when, thanks in no small measure to 10cm radar, airborne as well as seaborne, and to HF/DF, the Battle of the Atlantic turned in the Allies’ favour; when, thanks largely to British metric radar and the development of naval fighter direction, the German air force was denied air supremacy over the waters of the Mediterranean; when the Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean was greatly strengthened and the United States Navy in the Pacific began to push back the Japanese.

This contribution dealt with the need for international coordination between amateur astronomers and the failure of the IUAA (International Union of Amateur Astronomers) to meet this need. [The substance of this contribution was given in Sky & Telescope, 73, 482 (1987 November).The text was not received. — Eds.]

I have been asked to write a history of radar in the Royal Navy, 1935–45, to be based on existing archives and on recollections now being written by retired Admiralty scientists and naval officers. Eventually, all new archival material will be deposited in the Archive Centre at Churchill College, Cambridge, where it will be professionally cared for, together with the Churchill papers and a large collection of other naval papers.