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No single person has had more of an impact on property thought in the English-speaking world than John Locke. Among contemporary theorists, however, Locke’s influence is felt most directly among property rights libertarians. This is somewhat ironic, because these libertarians are able to rely on Locke only by excising from his theory several of its foundational elements. In this chapter, we will describe the outlines of Locke’s theory and explore some of the debates over its cogency and meaning. LOCKE’S CONTEXT Locke’s theory of property is laid out in his Two Treatises of Government , with the bulk of the relatively brief discussion appearing in the fifth chapter of the second treatise. (There are, as we will see, important elements of his discussion in the first treatise as well.) In thinking about Locke’s theory, it is helpful to understand something about the debates in which he likely understood himself to be participating. Although the Two Treatises was not published until 1689, in the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, most commentators agree that the work was actually written several years earlier, between roughly 1679 and 1682, during the Exclusion Crisis, in which the Whigs, led by the First Earl of Shaftesbury (Locke’s patron), attempted to prevent the Catholic James, Duke of York, from inheriting the throne.

In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court, held (among other things) (1) that patent owners have an absolute right not to practice their patent and (2) that even these non practicing patent owners are entitled to the liberal use of injunctive relief against infringers. Both of these holdings have been very important to the viability of patent assertion entities, or so-called "patent trolls." In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the Supreme Court softened the injunction rule. In this essay, we argue that Congress or the Court should also reconsider Continental Paper Bag’s endorsement of a robust right not to use, not because patents are not property but because the considerations at work within both property and patent law do not support recognizing such an absolute right not to use patents. The Court's endorsement in Continental Paper Bag of a robust right not to use patents was based on an overly simplistic analogy to tangible property, which the Court characterized as recognizing "the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive." The Court's reasoning was flawed in two respects. First, the law of tangible property distinguishes among nonusers, penalizing owners whose derelict nonuse interferes with other owners’ use of their own property or induces others to waste time or effort appropriating the unused property. With respect to these derelict nonusers, the law employs numerous doctrines, such as nuisance, abandonment, adverse possession, and permissive waste, to ensure that owners' decision not to use their property does not inflict harm on others. Second, beyond its poor understanding of the law of nonuse as it relates to tangible property, the Court in Continental Paper Bag failed to consider the ways in which the reasons for recognizing a right not to use might differ in the contexts of patent and tangible property. Although the same basic considerations are at play in both contexts -- efficiency, autonomy, and personhood -- the implications of nonuse differ in the patent context because of information's nonrivalrous nature and because of the particularly powerful way that patent law constrains the freedom of nonowners. Taking these factors into account suggests that the normative case for recognizing a robust right not to use a patent is weaker than in the domain of tangible property. This is especially true when nonusing owners attempt to enforce their patents against independent inventors. As a consequence, in cases brought against independent inventors, we suggest making patent remedies contingent on a patent owner’s efforts to disseminate their inventions. Recognition of such an obligation to use in patents would significantly reduce the threats posed by so-called patent trolls and the high tech patent wars.

The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory, the theories of community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit. The dominant approaches to property in Anglophone scholarship, utilitarian and classical liberal theories, treat communities as agglomerations of individuals. Moreover, they eschew substantive accounts of justice, favoring what Charles Taylor has called "procedural" conceptions. In this Article, we offer an ontological conception of community that views the individual and community as mutually dependent. In contrast with the two competing theories we describe, we favor a substantive conception of justice built around the notion of human flourishing. Although we are reluctant to embrace any particular label for our view, it is broadly Aristotelian in its framework. Once we have sketched the outlines of our theory, we will describe how our ontological theory might operate, using State v. Shack and a prominent South African property case as our central examples.

The debate over the proper role of religion in public life has raged on for decades and shows little signs of slowing down. Proponents of restrictive accounts of public reason have proceeded under the assumption that religious and deep moral disagreement constitutes a threat to social stability that must be tamed. In contrast to this "scary story" linking pluralism with the threat of instability, there exists within political theory a competing, "happy story" according to which pluralism affirmatively contributes to stability by creating incentives for groups to moderate their demands. Whether the scary story or happy story is a more accurate reflection of our reality is a difficult empirical question, but one that ought to matter a great deal to discussions of public reason. Acting as if the scary story were true when the happy story is in fact operating will lead proponents of public reason to stifle the healthful effects of robust pluralism, degrading the quality of public deliberation and ultimately undermining stability. In other words, if the happy story turns out to be the right one, restrictive accounts of public reason may turn out to be counterproductive, hastening the very deliberative and social harms they aim to forestall.

Theories of property presuppose conceptions of community, and of the individual's relationship to community. In contrast to the dominant theories of community at work within most Anglo-American property theorizing, which view community obligations as fundamentally instrumental and contractual, we propose in this paper a theory that views the relationship between the individual and community as constitutive and substantive. Human beings' dependence on others to flourish imposes on political communities and their individual members a shared obligation to foster and contribute to the creation and maintenance of those structures necessary for that flourishing. This obligation in turn qualifies individual rights of property, empowering, and, under the right circumstances, compelling the state to take from some in order to safeguard access to needed resources for others.

Much of the popular outcry against the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. New London can be understood in terms of the public's commitment to the conception of the home as a castle. This familiar metaphor is typically viewed as aligned with libertarian conceptions of property and of the right to exclude. Taken to its logical conclusion, the metaphor's connotation of an owner's "absolute dominion" would seem to rule out the exercise of eminent domain altogether. A different understanding of the castle metaphor is possible, however, one rooted in notions of the dignity of home ownership. While such a dignitary understanding of the home as the castle remains true to the intuitions underlying the metaphor, it yields a far more flexible stance towards eminent domain.

Justice Stevens has sometimes been caricatured as the Supreme Court Justice who hates religion, but an exploration of the cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of religious claimants reveals that, rather than being moved by a reflexive hostility toward religion, Justice Stevens appears to respect religion as a powerful motivator of human action, though one that is largely able to look out for its own interests in the political process. Notwithstanding my rejection of the common view of Justice Stevens as hostile to religion, I argue in this paper that there are substantial problems with his actual approach. First, Justice Stevens has a tendency to treat religion as no more valuable than other valuable categories of expressive activity, a tendency that brings him into agreement with a great deal of recent scholarly commentary on the Religion Clauses. The protection he would afford religious practice is therefore largely coextensive with the protection afforded to expressive conduct more generally under the First Amendment, thereby rendering the Free Exercise Clause superfluous. Second, I argue that Justice Stevens places too much faith in the ability of legislatures to look out for the interests of minority religious groups, ignoring the important role that courts play in highlighting for legislatures the situations in which minority religions appear to be suffering disproportionately under generally applicable regulations. Accordingly, I propose a different approach, one that builds on Justice Stevens's views but that adequately acknowledges the unique value of religion in the lives of believers.