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Economic espionage especially with regard to luxury goods has been known since Antiquity. A key event in economic history of late Antiquity is smuggling of the silk worms, described by the Byzantine historian Procopius of Caesarea in his eighth book of the Wars.

Empirical figures show that, especially in recent years, the frequency of industrial and economic espionage, and consequently its dangers and negative impact, has increased greatly worldwide. This has impacted not only the individual victims of the infringement of trade secrets, but also the national and global economies at large. This espionage cannot be tackled effectively through uncoordinated, stand-alone-actions of individual countries anymore. Instead, the global community must take a more holistic view and find universally acceptable strategies and standards, looking for best practices through the lens of comparative law. The paper compares and contrasts the legal approaches to the criminalisation of economic and industrial espionage in Switzerland and Austria. It aims to show the similarities and differences and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each jurisdiction. The results are meant to enrich and to contribute to the discussions regarding efficient and commonly acceptable solutions to fighting economic and industrial espionage.

Industrial and economic espionage are underestimated criminal offences. Although the phenomena are diffuse and ambiguous, they can result in enormous material and immaterial damage. Referring to results from the German research project WISKOS, the phenomenon of obtaining trade secrets (including the offenders, modi operandi, affected trade secrets, outflow of trade secrets and detection abilities) are described, as too are possible countermeasures and associated law enforcement difficulties. Considering the phenomenological results, potential preventive measures based on the situational crime prevention and deterrence strategies are listed. Legal regulations and sanctions in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are compared. Lastly, based on the outcomes of criminal proceedings, it is discussed whether the existing criminal law is an appropriate measure to deter potential offenders.

Transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage poses a threat to the economy of developed countries whose industry is largely reliant on the value of information. In the face of rapid technological development facilitating cyber economic espionage from afar on a massive scale, the law has not developed apace to effectively address this problem. Applicable United States domestic laws have been ineffective in addressing the problem due to lack of enforcement jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and inability to hold the state sponsor accountable. Customary international law principles offer little help in combatting the issue, as countermeasures are typically unavailable since espionage may not be ongoing by the time a victimized state can confidently attribute it to a state and retortions are a relatively weak response. Although existing treaties have not been effective in addressing this problem, a multilateral global treaty specifically addressing transnational state-sponsored cyber economic espionage may be a promising way forward.

Refereed/Peer-reviewed Digital (forensic) investigations will be increasingly important in both criminal investigations and civil litigations (e.g., corporate espionage, and intellectual property theft) as more of our communications take place over cyberspace (e.g., e-mail and social media platforms). In this paper, we present our proposed Natural Language Processing (NLP)-based digital investigation platform. The platform comprises the data collection and representation phase, the vectorization phase, the feature selection phase, and the classifier generation and evaluation phase. We then demonstrate the potential of our proposed approach using a real-world dataset, whose findings indicate that it outperforms two other competing approaches, namely: LogAnalysis (published in Expert Systems with Applications , 2014) and SIIMCO (published in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2016). Specifically, our proposed approach achieves 0.65 in F1-score and 0.83 in precision, whilst LogAnalysis and SIIMCO respectively achieve 0.51 and 0.59 in F1-score and 0.49 and 0.58 in precision.

Industrial Espionage (IE) is an umbrella term covering a complicated range of activities performed to gain competitive advantages, resulting in a huge amount of financial loss annually. Currently, techniques generated by rapid developments of Internet of Things (IOTs) and Data Science are enabling a massive increase of both frequency and power of IE related activities in our increasingly challenging global commercial environment. Thus, an in-depth understanding of IE is necessary. In this paper, we report a comprehensive Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of current English literature on IE. Particularly, we systematically: i) identify key features of IE by analysing its current definitions, and coin our own working definition; ii) discuss the current state of research on IE from different academic disciplines; iii) highlight some key challenges in the current state of research on IE; and iv) identify some possible trends in its future development. Further, based on our findings, we call for more multi-disciplinary/multi-agency research on IE in order to construct a comprehensive framework to combat IE.

Chapter 17 summarizes and analyzes US government investigations and prosecutions of economic espionage and trade secrets thefts. It directly confronts the issue of ethnic bias in investigation and prosecution, first by dissecting the methodological and empirical weaknesses of a Committee of 100 study, “Prosecuting Chinese ‘Spies’.” The chapter then offers an alternative line of analysis, concluding that nationality, not ethnicity, is the key variable in understanding China-related technology espionage and theft of trade secrets. The chapter moves on to analyze key commonalities in tradecraft through the cases in the appendix, highlighting trends and indicators. Based on extensive interviewing of US Department of Justice officials, prosecutors, FBI field office personnel, and counter-intelligence officials, it concludes with an analysis of key prosecutorial issues such as the “foreign instrumentality” dilemma, offers critiques of the existing system and recommendations for improvements to the investigative and prosecutorial systems.

It is well known that all electronic devices currently available on the market radiate unintentional electromagnetic waves during normal use, fact that may leak sensitive information, especially when such unshielded electronic devices are used for official (embassy, public institutions, etc) or private use (large tech companies, subject to industrial espionage). In this regard, our research aimed to study the electromagnetic emissions of two commercial LED monitors and one notebook. A number of 59 experimental scenarios have been identified and implemented inside an anechoic chamber (80 MHz - 40 GHz, 4x8x4 m3) so a clear undistorted frequency pattern was extracted experimentally for all three DUTs. The (far-field) experiments made use of three pictures (white, black and chess picture), two simple & shielded VGA to VGA cables, one desktop computer and a notebook, two calibrated antennas and one professional R&S spectrum analyzer (@7 GHz). According to our experiments, there is a clear interdependence between the spectrum emitted by the LED monitors and the pictures shown on their screen. In the same time, the notebook radiates a cleaner spectrum, less sensitive to visual information.

Victoria Cundiff litigates trade secrets disputes in state and Federal courts nationally, coordinates international trade secrets litigation, and helps clients develop alternatives to litigating trade secrets disputes. She is the Chair of AlPLA's Trade Secrets Litigation Subcommittee and is Co-Chair of the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Trade Secrets. Bradford Newman founded and leads Paul Hastings' International Employee Mobility and Trade Secret practice. He is the author of Protecting Intellectual Property in the Age of Employee Mobility: Forms and Analysis, a comprehensive treatise published by ALM that offers authoritative guidance on legal risks and practical steps companies can take to protect their IP and remedy IP theft. In connection with his national practice spanning many industries, Mr. Newman routinely serves as lead trial counsel in cases with potential eight and nine-figure liability, and has successfully litigated a broad spectrum of trade secret and employee mobility cases in state and federal courts throughout the country. Jeffrey A. Pade is an intellectual property litigator with over 20 years of experience in all phases of patent trade secrets, and other intellectual property laws. He has directed complex and international patent and trade secrets litigation strategies concerning mechanical, semiconductor, and many other technologies for clients around the globe, and actively represents international clients in intellectual property audits, investigations, and strategic initiatives. Anand B. Patel provides strategic business counseling on intellectual property disputes, investigations, and transactions, and has extensive trial and appellate experience in patent and trade secret matters. A former Federal Circuit clerk, he represents a diverse group of clients on technologies ranging from microprocessor fabrication to pharmaceuticals. ********** AS major regions across the world seek to harmonize trade secret law within and across jurisdictions, international companies now should focus on building their own uniform policies and procedures for protecting their intellectual property and defending against claims of misappropriation. Given the recent passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act ("DTSA") and the EU Trade Secrets Directive (the "Directive"), it is clear that both regions have recognized the substantial value of trade secrets to the global economy and have decided to take analogous stances on the basics of trade secret law, including what constitutes a trade secret and how a violation occurs. Although the similarities are not unexpected the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") (1) provides many foundational provisions there are important nuances in each locale's rules that affect how companies should consider enforcing trade secret rights and defending against misappropriation claims across those major international jurisdictions. I. Overview of the DTSA After several unsuccessful attempts over more than five years, (2) Congress in April overwhelmingly approved (3) and President Obama in May signed (4) the DTSA, which provides a Federal private right of action for trade secret misappropriation. The DTSA is incorporated into the previously-enacted Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), (5) which provides criminal penalties for misappropriation. (6) The DTSA pulls heavily from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), (7) already in force in some form in 48 states, (8) by providing similar definitions of key terms and remedies for misappropriation. (9) In addition to providing the right to sue in Federal court (importantly, without preempting parallel state law claims (10)), the DTSA provides an ex parte seizure mechanism and whistleblower immunity. II. Overview of the EU Directive In 2013, after studies (11) showed the importance of trade secrets to the economy, particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises, and the fears of many organizations that asserting claims for misappropriation would result in inadequate remedies and potentially place their trade secrets at risk of public disclosure, the European Commission proposed a Directive to address differences in the trade secret laws of the EU Member States. …

2015 was a year of countless data breaches. From the Ashley Madison hack in July 2015 to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Brennan's breach of his personal e-mail account, it is clear that people's privacy is no longer safe. However, one data breach stands out due to its size and scope—the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) hack. OPM fell victim to not only one, but two cybersecurity attacks on its secure information systems. Law enforcement officials conducted an investigation and arrested a group of Chinese hackers responsible for the theft of 21.5 million federal employee's background information and 5.6 million fingerprints. The names of federal employees, their addresses, social security numbers, and other personal records were stolen. By acquiring information about current and past federal employees, these criminals were now in possession of invaluable information to conduct economic espionage. As media outlets picked up on the story of this massive data breach, the que...

El paso de la imprenta manual a la mecánica fue gradual y se produjo desde finales del siglo XVIII hasta las primeras décadas del siglo XIX, siendo estas últimas las que marcan la transición. Se conocen las principales innovaciones técnicas realizadas en otros países, que llegaron a España a través de publicaciones o por el espionaje industrial, no así que en nuestro país hubiera diversos intentos de mejora de las prensas, de la tipografía e incluso de la composición, inspiradas por particulares o por las instituciones. En este artículo se muestran varias propuestas que se realizaron con descripciones e incluso con imágenes de los artilugios. Por razones varias no salieron adelante, pero alguna pudo ser pionera en la imprenta europea. The change from manual to mechanical printing was gradual and took place between the end of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century, being the latter the years that marked the transition. We know the main technical innovations made in other countries which arrived to Spain through publications or industrial espionage, but we are not aware that, in our country, there were several private and official attempts to improve the printing press, typography and typesetting. In this article, I show several of these attempts, their descriptions and even pictures of their devices. For several reasons they did not succeed, but some could have pioneered European mechanical printing.

A large proportion of China-originated cyberattacks are allegedly aimed at extracting high-value intellectual property such as trade secrets. Senior government officials from China and the US have made frequent verbal and written allegations that their countries are victimized by cyberattacks and that their counterparts in the other country don't cooperate in fighting cybercrimes. This paper sheds light into this cyber Cold war by examining Western and Chinese allegations and counter-allegations related to cyberattacks and cyberwarfare.

Cybercrime and economic espionage are increasing problems for firms. We build on US FBI policy to frame the interaction between a cybercrime victim firm and a government security agency. We bring together several strands in the literature to model the strategies of the firm, which has suffered a cyber breach and theft of trade secrets, and the government security agency, which must investigate and prosecute crimes. We investigate the interactions between these two players, in which the firm has private information about its cybersecurity investment. This investment level is unknown to the security agency, which must nonetheless decide how to prioritize reported crime. We model this asymmetric information problem within a game theoretic signaling framework derived from Becker's work in crime and punishment. We suggest that such a framework can inform policy to encourage security investments by firms and more efficient resource utilization by security agencies. We particularly focus on an illustrative stylized example to highlight how our modelling approach can be helpful. In this example we compare two worlds; one where all security breaches become public knowledge and another where only reported breaches become public knowledge. We then formulate two potentially testable Hypotheses and several implications of these Hypotheses. Case studies and a policy analysis further highlight how our framework plays out in reality.

The goal of this article is to examine the role of the media in the international fashion business between the wars. New York switched from a position of first importer of French fashions, to a contender of Paris hegemony. But despite a dramatic raise in tariffs and dwindling fashion exports, Paris managed to remain the main originator of women's fashions until the Second World War. In studying this situation, I will first examine the mechanisms of the diffusion of design innovation and set out the international fashion press networks of the interwar period. I will then examine the complex relationship that developed between fashion designers and the media, with a focus on the press, showing how during the 1920s the couturiers imposed an increasing number of restrictions to the shows' spectators, to photographers, and to the press, due to a growing concern for industrial espionage. Finally, I will examine specific cases of relationships of couturiers with the press, including the advertisement of tie-in p...

During the First World War The Netherlands were extremely important for espionage by the warring states. They used the neutral territory as spring-board for infiltration and propaganda, but they were interested in Holland itself too. This article deals with German espionage related to The Netherlands. German agents were active both to gather information on the Entente and to know more about the Dutch defence and the Dutch political and military intentions. The Dutch Military Intelligence used the police to observe and stay in touch with foreign spies. Through these channels information was exchanged, as it was also in Dutch interest to inform the warring states that the country would never choose sides and their defence was credible. Also, the Dutch wanted to avoid possible dangerous political complications as a result of foreign activities on their soil.

The paper offers a critical assessment of the notion of industrial espionage by examining the cultures of openness and secrecy in the context of silk manufacture in Enlightenment France. By analyzing the practices of dissimulation and secrecy employed by the abbe Nollet during his journey aimed at gathering technical information on the manufacture of silk in Italy, the author introduces the category of intelligent travel to provide a nuanced discussion of the relationship between technology transfer, state secrecy and academic openness.

With the passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, and the expected signing of the legislation by President Obama, trade secret law as we know it is changing. While the DTSA is largely based upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it raises a number of unique and interesting issues that will keep trade secrets scholars, like me, busy for years.To facilitate everyone's review and understanding of the new legislation, I have prepared a red lined version of the existing Economic Espionage Act of 1996 with the new DTSA provisions added and deleted as noted in the DTSA.

The primary question this study seeks to answer is: “Are people of Chinese descent disproportionately falsely prosecuted as spies?” The answer, this study finds, is yes. It uses PACER court filings from a random sampling of Economic Espionage Act cases to identify disparities in prosecutions. It finds that around a third of EEA prosecutions include Chinese defendants and that the average sentence for convicted Chinese defendants is over twice as long as that for Western defendants. Whether these findings reflect improper bias against Chinese defendants or simply reflect the magnitude of the problem of Chinese espionage is a question for further study. This study next finds that the DOJ likely is filing charges under the EEA against innocent Chinese in gross disproportion to other groups. When federal prosecutors file Economic Espionage Act charges against defendants with Western names, they prove their guilt with a conviction for espionage or similarly serious crimes in 95% of cases. When prosecutors file EEA charges against defendants with Chinese names, they only prove their guilt of espionage in 70% of cases. In 30% of cases, the defendant is acquitted at trial, prosecutors dismiss all charges, or the defendant is convicted only of minor, non-espionage charges such as false statements made to officials the course of the investigation. There are many reasons that prosecutors might not convict an accused spy of espionage charges other than their innocence. Nonetheless, given the stark disparities of these numbers, it appears that the Department of Justice is, as many suspect, disproportionately prosecuting innocent Chinese and innocent Chinese-Americans of being spies.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate fraud victimisation of Greek companies during the financial crisis years. Moreover, the paper seeks to encourage the implementation of proactive and reactive measures in an effort to minimize fraud victimisation. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on an extensive literature review and utilising a questionnaire administered by Krambia-Kapardis and Zopiatis (2010), auditors and management of companies who had fallen victim to fraud provided information on the typology of fraud and on proactive and reactive measures taken after a fraud incident had been reported to them. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were utilized to analyze the collected data and address the postulated research questions. Findings The survey has found that no industry or size of company is immune from fraud, with bigger companies and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) falling victim to industrial espionage and theft of cash and counterfeit, respectively. The banking and insurance sector appeared to be affected mainly by money laundering. Management fraud was mainly in the form of window dressing, whilst employee fraud involved predominately theft of cash and assets. Loss of reputation emerged as the main concern for the victim, and it had a determining impact on deciding not to report cases to the police. Research limitations/implications Because of the sensitive topic being investigated and despite having assured the respondents that their anonymity would be guaranteed, the respondents were hesitant in responding. Thus, the response rate was 16.4 per cent, slightly lower than a similar study carried out in Cyprus (Krambia-Kapardis and Zopiatis 2010). The findings, however, are considered to be reliable, given the fact that the respondents were individuals well versed with the topic under investigation and in a position to know if their company had fallen victim to fraud. Practical implications The findings have practical relevance to both industry stakeholders and academics who wish to further explore fraud victimization in the Greek business environment. Given that the financial crisis in Greece is continuing, fraud risk assessment ought to concentrate in the area of cash, and preventative measures need to be considered by the regulators and the victims. Originality/value Whilst fraud victimisation studies are becoming popular by the Big 4 accounting firms, there is no fraud victimisation study concentrating on the typology of fraud in Greece. With this survey, it will be possible to draw conclusions and make suggestions to the accounting profession on how to combat fraud, at a time, when the economic crisis is persisting and fraud is expected to escalate.

Üretim ve iş sırrı kavramı ile korunması ekonomik hayatın devamlılığı için oldukça önemlidir. Özellikle de bilginin öğrenilmesinin ve başkalarına aktarılmasının günümüzde çok daha hızlı bir şekilde yapıyor olması üretim ve iş sırrı niteliği taşıyan gizli bilgilerin korunmasının gerekliliğini gözler önüne sermektedir. Bu amaçla, 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu'nda haksız rekabete ilişkin hükümlerde üretim ve iş sırrın korunmasına ilişkin düzenlemelere yer vermiştir. Türk Ticaret Kanunu dışında 6098 sayılı Türk Borçlar Kanunu, 4857 sayılı İş Kanunu, 6100 sayılı Hukuk Muhakemeleri Kanunu, 6362 sayılı Sermaye Piyasası Kanunu ve 5237 sayılı Türk Ceza Kanunu gibi pek çok düzenleme de üretim ve iş sırrının korunmasına ilişkin hükümler bulunmaktadır. Türk Ticaret Kanunu m.55/1 b-3 ile 55/d bendinde, üretim ve iş sırrının ifşa edilmesi ele geçirilmesi ile gizlice ve izinsiz olarak ele geçirdiği veya başkaca hukuka aykırı bir şekilde öğrendiği bilgileri ve üretenin iş sırlarını değerlendiren veya başkalarına bildiren haksız rekabete sebebiyet vereceği düzenlenmiştir. The protection of business secrets and manufacturing concept is very important for the continuity of economic life. Especially reveals the necessity of knowledge and learning of the others today transferred much more quickly so confidental information must be protected. To this end, Turkish Commercial Code Nr. 6102 provisions relating to unfair competition, which took place regulations governing the protection of manufacturing and business secrets. Turkish Commercial Code except for Turkish Code of Obligations Nr.6098, Labour Code Nr.4857, Civil Procedure Law Nr. 6100, Capital Market Law Nr.6362 and Turkish Penal Code Nr.5237 the provisions relating to the protection of many regulations in the manufacturing and business secrets, such as the are available. Turkish Commercial Code Article 55/1 b-3 and Article 55/d in production and with the seizure of disclosure of manufacturing and business secrets and without permission are seize or otherwise unlawful manner learned the information and evaluate the business secrets of producing or unfair competition informing others it is arranged to cause 212

This article investigates the diffusion of military technology through the cyber theft of intellectual property (IP). During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union worried about illicit appropriation of military technology, some of which occurred through review of IP documents. Recently, these concerns have intensified, as the expanding use of IP has offered a window—sometimes one left wide open—for theft.

The NCP case On March 12 1993 there ended what The Times I described as Britain's biggest industrial espionage trial, R v. Layton & Others. The case was heard over a period of eight weeks at the Old Bailey. What this must have cost the parties and the taxpayer can only be guessed. The bill for the police investigation alone was estimated to be £4 million. Since the case ended in acquittals for all concerned it will not get into the law reports or the annals of crime and any lessons which might be learned from it are likely to be forgotten. The allegations in the case, which were not disputed at the trial, are a useful illustration of some of the machinations currently practised by business spies and saboteurs. The defendant, Mr. Layton, was the chief executive of National Car Parks (NCP). His co-defendant, Mr. Hewitt, was the manager ofKAS, described as a security agency. Their target was a rival car park company, Europarks. It appears that Europarks, a newcomer to the car parking scene, were scooping the most lucrative concessions, e.g. Heathrow Terminal 4 and the South Bank Centre, which until then NCP would have been able to command. Mr. Layton, disconcerted by this competition, thought that there might be a mole in his own company who was leaking information to Europarks. He therefore called in KAS. KAS was set up by the late Sir David Stirling, founder of the SAS, to be a sort of civilian equivalent. Many of its "operatives" were ex-SAS. Indeed, some were recalled to the colours for Desert Storm. KAS were unable to detect any mole in NCP. Mr. Layton therefore asked them to investigate Europarks. They went to work in military style. They managed to install one of their operatives as a car park manager wth Europarks for 3 months. He passed information, 36 reports in all, to NCP; obtained information about Europarks' customers and their cars; obtained the number of a safe; rifled the briefcase and wallet of a Europark executive; took files from their office which were copied and returned. He also tried to whip up unrest among Europark staff. Europark dustbins were searched and useful waste extracted. Europark directors were shadowed, their homes watched and their families photographed. By means of a false c.V., KAS got Jane Turpin

Large and highly successful companies all over the world have to deal with the problem of industrial espionage at one time or another. Encyclopedia Britannica defines Industrial Espionage as “acquisition of trade secrets from business competitors” and goes on to state that “... industrial espionage is a reaction to the efforts of many business to keep secret their designs, formulas, manufacturing processes, research and future plans in order to protect or expand their shares of the market.” Thus we can say that companies spy on other companies to obtain information related to trade secrets and intellectual property that can bring financial payoffs, market leadership, economic growth and, in some cases, political clout to the spying companies. It should be well understood that spying is an illegal and covert activity in almost every country in the world, where laws to deal with it have been enacted. Thus, industrial espionage qualifies as an illegal activity by virtue of its nature itself. Nevertheless, organizations and governments still engage in it because of the benefits it can bring and the fact that legal proceedings are extremely complicated and time consuming. Where specific laws do not exist, legal proceedings can still be initiated by framing charges of theft and unauthorized access. The United States enacted the Industrial Espionage Act of 1996, also called the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996 to deal with such espionage.

Multinational corporations lose billions of dollars worth of proprietary information every year due to international industrial espionage. The Unites States' response, the Economic Espionage Act, has failed to curtail the problem. This paper will consider the factors that hinder the effective enforcement of the EEA. These barriers include (a) shortcomings in the design of the law itself; (b) disinterest by victimized corporations and the government agencies charged with enforcing the law; and (c) the absence of international support to end espionage activity. After discussing the barriers, the paper will briefly discuss the viability and desirability of a potential international solution.

This article presents three reasons for states to use cyber warfare and shows that cyberspace is—and will continue to be—a decisive element in China's strategy to ascend in the international system. The three reasons are: deterrence through infiltration of critical infrastructure; military technological espionage to gain military knowledge; and industrial espionage to gain economic advantage. China has a greater interest in using cyberspace offensively than other actors, such as the United States, since it has more to gain from spying on and deterring the United States than the other way around. The article also documents China's progress in cyber warfare and shows how it works as an extension of its traditional strategic thinking and the current debate within the country. Several examples of cyber attacks traceable to China are also presented. This includes cyber intrusions on a nuclear arms laboratory, attacks on defense ministries (including the Joint Strike Fighter and an airbase) and the U.S. electric grid, as well as the current Google affair, which has proved to be a small part of a broader attack that also targeted the U.S. Government. There are, however, certain constraints that qualify the image of China as an aggressive actor in cyberspace. Some believe that China itself is the victim of just as many attacks from other states. Furthermore, certain actors in the United States and the West have an interest in overestimating China's capabilities in cyberspace in order to maintain their budgets.

The intersection between boundaries in intellectual property (IP) law and those in immigration policy is discussed. The US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) provides a case study of how IP law is used to police real world boundaries across which people and ideas move.

PurposeIntellectual capital's (IC's) rising value in the production of wealth has been mirrored by its increasing vulnerability to crime. Among these are the increasing frequency of cybercrime, the intangible nature of IC which facilitates theft and the lack of legal remedies for the theft of IC. Taken together, these factors have created a new environment in which IC is uniquely at risk from financial crime. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to examine the efficacy in current legal remedies and formulate suggestions for better protecting IC.Design/methodology/approachThe analysis is conceptual, using frameworks drawn from legal scholarship and traditional views of law‐enforcement practice.FindingsThis paper explores the risks of crime inherent in IC and a distributed cyber environment in greater detail in order to demonstrate that traditional legal remedies are largely ineffective to protect IC property rights and that, given this policy environment and the nature of IC itself, prevention is the only reasonable means for protecting IC.Research limitations/implicationsConceptual papers offer an intrinsically different form of evidence than empirical studies. Significant public debate prior to enacting legislation and subsequent empirical testing of the paper's propositions, if enacted into legislation, are strongly encouraged.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of legal protections based on guarding sensitive information at its source, rather than traditional reactive policing and legal actions after a theft has been committed.Originality/valueThis paper fulfils an identified need to propose useful and concrete legal solutions that deal with the increasing importance of IC and the concomitant frequency of crimes that involve its theft.

East Germany was one of the main actors in Cold War military and security policy intelligence. Due to the opening of the archives of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic it is possible today to analyse methods and goals of the East German civil and military intelligence services on this field in more detail. The article summarises the state of research on staff and sources of these services. Based on this information, main directions and operational fields are exemplified for military and international strategic intelligence in the era of detente of the 1970s. Contents and quality of intelligence results are focused with respect to their potential influence on East German and Warsaw Pact (i.e. Soviet) decision-making processes.

The Stasi continues to enjoy a reputation as one of the most effective espionage agencies in the world, especially in the area of foreign intelligence gathering. This article employs the case of Gerhardt Ronneberger, one of East Germany's most capable spies, to challenge assumptions about the Stasi's operational successes, economic relevance and methodological proficiency. In particular, it argues that East German intelligence gathering was undermined by an institutionalisd distinction between sight, or the work of observation, and vision, or the process of signification. In Ronneberger's case, the spy agency wasted considerable time and resources trying to make sense of his operational performance and political reliability. In the end, however, even his most spectacular successes, which included smuggling a laser-guided navigation system into the GDR and acquiring proscribed computer chip and microprocessor designs from Toshiba, did not matter, since they did not change East Germany's inability to narrow the technological gap with the West.

Dr Andrew Jones, Head of Security Technology Research, BT Security Research Centre, Adjunct, Edith Cowan University Dr Andy Jones looks at how espionage has never been easier. In the wake of UK intelligence services reportedly warning major British companies of Chinese sponsored spying, Computer Fraud & Security looks at the epidemic of electronic espionage. This month's issue features a six-page report on who the spies are, why they steal electronic data and what techniques they use. Dr Andy Jones, head of security technology research at BT, also speculates on what the potential costs of espionage could be to nations. Dr Jones predicts that nations that were once allies could turn into enemies because of electronic spying. China and the UK have publicly amiable relations, but this didn't stop MI5 from warning companies and government departments that Chinese spies may target them. According to a report in The Times, Jonathan Evans, the Director-General of MI5, sent a letter to 300 chief executives and security experts in firms alerting them to the dangers of electronic espionage. It is thought spies are seeking commercially sensitive data. The Chinese embassy in London denied the allegations. The US is also thought to have suffered cyber attacks originating from China. In September 2007 the Chinese military were blamed for a cyber attack, which targeted a Pentagon computer system serving the office of US defence secretary Robert Gates. Last month, Computer Fraud & Security reported that the US China Economic and Security Review Commission warned that China is likely planning cyber attacks against the US. It said that attacks on the US financial, economic, energy and communications infrastructure were possible. Dr Andy Jones warns that the long-term effects of economic espionage could be crippling. “The effects will not only be seen in terms of the migration of jobs from one region to another, but also in terms of lost corporate and tax revenues,” he says. “This, if it occurs on a large scale, has the potential to adversely affect a government's ability to maintain its spending programmes that may include the maintenance of military capability, social benefit or healthcare.”

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of remote surveillance or satellite imagery as they relate to trade secret law, knowledge management, and competitive intelligence.Design/methodology/approachThe paper approaches legal issues from the perspective of a trade secret holder.FindingsWhile conducting research for this paper, it was found that, while technological improvements relating to satellite imagery and remote sensing are increasingly more precise and ubiquitous, the laws protecting businesses that have an interest in protecting trade secrets are inconsistent. On the one hand, the US Government has given itself a powerful tool to protect trade secrets under the Economic Espionage Act. On the other hand, the Government has granted remote satellite companies licences under which they may sell satellite images to industrial competitors, consequently thwarting trade secret protection effortsOriginality/valueTrade secrets represent a valuable contribution to a nation's economy, particularly when some interventions do not meet the requirements necessary for more traditional intellectual property regime protection (e.g. copyright, trade mark, patents). A trade secret's value lies in it remaining hidden. There are few cases addressing trade secrets and satellite imagery. The stalwart case, E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Rolfe Christopher, represents a tentative foray into the subject, but only suggests the rights a trade secret holder may have when a commercial satellite company collects otherwise innocuous data and sells those to a competitor. A proper plaintiff to test the boundaries surrounding trade secret law, satellite imagery, and competitive intelligence remains at large.

A former US special agent specialising in cybercrime investigation tells of how companies do their best to cover up corporate espionage and insider theft. Jim Christy has 20 years of cybercrime investigation experience and is now Director of Futures Exploration for the Defence Cyber Crime Centre. He says: “Economic espionage and intellectual property theft is usually covered up for many good and cogent reasons by the private sector victims. I have seen entire corporate networks of over 100,000 systems completely compromised and hundreds of thousands of files exfiltrated.” In our profession, we usually cannot speak directly about the cases we are investigating or the projects we are working on. But there are some stories available in open source that highlight some of the important issues that our clients face day in and day out, year after year.

You're not alone. In fact, it's doubtful if many have. If, upon hearing the term "corporate spook," you picture a spy tiptoeing through a darkened office, armed with a tiny pen that shoots a deadly projectile into a counterspy extracting trade secrets from a computer, read on, because your image is not too different than that of William Klausman.For nearly thirty years, Klausman has led double lives as a businessman and an undercover spy in the shadowy world of international corporate espionage. He began his investigative career in the late sixties with the Multnomah County Sheriff 's Office in Portland, Oregon. He took a leave of absence to look over the Washington, D.C., intelligence community but, disillusioned, he returned to Portland to continue his career in finance, business ownership, and, finally, as a corporate spy.Most of his assignments are defensive. "When business clients are threatened by outside attack," he explains, "I am hired to determine who, what, where, when, and why and neutralize the attack. Subject matter includes theft of trade secrets, copyright infringement, embezzling, drug dealing, product diverting, and other activities. The list is long."On call around the clock, Klausman may be found entertaining in a target's night club some evening and hours later boarding a redeye flight to Washington, Frankfurt or Pusan. "With appropriate identification, a bit of nerve and a whole lot of luck," he says, "I've portrayed a computer programmer, accountant, chief financial officer, cartoonist, artist, writer, lecturer, master of ceremonies, advertising executive, cook's helper, warehouseman, entertainer, auditor, television newscaster, technician, race car driver, retailer, medical doctor, psychiatrist, attorney, bar tender, and countless others." He is the true chameleon.You won't find Klausman in the Yellow Pages, but he can be reached through the corporate grapevine. He also receives some assignments through advertisements in bar directories, through an attorney, and nationally renowned investigator who all maintain his secret identity.Corporate Espionage is a term that describes the arena within which he sneaks, mostly undetected, within and around the secret boardrooms and information systems of the world's major corporations, sometimes bumping against moles from different venues. And his work is, most certainly, dangerous. Oh yes, the cloak-and-dagger syndrome is commonplace in the after-hours work environment, as is a clear and present danger of being caught, especially for Klausman, a counterespionage operative.Specializing in information systems, he infiltrates a clothing manufacturer's business one day as an auditor to gain access to the books, and the next day as a janitor to find discarded documented proof in the trash. One moment he is a psychiatrist infiltrating a psychiatric hospital's records to find proof of patient abuse and the next day, a narc operating a sting operation to trap a druggist as he knowingly fills false prescriptions. From transportation director to cook's helper to television newscaster, he does them all and, as far as he knows, has only been caught once.Say, for instance, a huge American manufacturer of athletic apparel learns that their men's cross trainers are being sold by non-licensed retailers at a price less than their licensed retailers' costs. Klausman infiltrates the small company as a workers' comp auditor and, using their own system, discovers their source of the illegal shoes. With this data, he works his way to the transporter and finally to the Asian manufacturer who produces the shoes for Klausman's client during the day. But then he learns that on the other side of the clock, the socalled licensed manufacturer turns out the identical product line for someone else. Successfully, he infiltrates the "international network" and puts a stop to it, saving the apparel manufacturer money and grief.In most cases, the intruder is an infiltration specialist, and enters the workplace in one of many imaginable descriptions, for one reason, and will allow nothing to stand in his way-well, almost nothing. …

Film is one of the popular literary product that are produced to entertain. Film is the object material for this research study. This research analyzes about espionage in Salt film. It analyzes focus in Espionage that happen in the world. Espionage practices in Salt film are related closely to the espionage in the world. The aim of this research is to analyze why is the espionage still exist up to 21st century. A study of popular literature is chosen by the researcher in order to analyze the research problems. The results of the research are to show that United States is the winner of Cold War with its espionage activity. Salt is an espionage film that contains the high intelligence, secret cover, spy cases, and war of ideology. The development of espionage films where Hollywood always makes United States as the winner is the evident that espionage film is populer. The popularity of espionage films is influenced by the espionage practices in the real world. Espionage in the 21st century still occurs in some countries with difference motives. The purposes of the espionage activities are to show the superiority, power and existence of some countries especially United States as an international police in the world.

The Coca-Cola espionage case that the US Department of Justice is investigating shows the high level at which espionage occurs. The rotten core of espionage is often at the heart of an organisation – with its employees. But fraudster insiders can be blocked from getting into your organisation in the first place with the right personnel background checks. And employees who leave must be stripped of all intellectual property. Employees who are dismissed deserve extra caution and must be escorted from the building for fear of revenge. Potential employees must be checked comprehensively to make sure the employer knows exactly what it is hiring. All to often, skeletons can be unearthed without too much difficulty with a few routine checks. As we all move deeper and deeper into the global economy of the 21st Century, the spectre of economic espionage grows larger and larger. Consider some recent news stories from around the world

A welter of tabloid headlines in Detroit last month brought greed, industrial espionage, possible grand larceny and plain old-fashioned theft into the world of powder metallurgy. US patent attorney Harry Brown says that proper protection of intellectual property rights is an essential start in preventing criminal losses…

This article explores the question of whether effective scientific-technical intelligence can enhance an economic and technological level of a country. It opens with a general discussion of Eastern Bloc scientific-technical espionage, then presents some common elements of effective espionage and turns to the East German Ministry for State Security's Sector for Science and Technology in order to explore the question. Examples from the computer industry and three biographical cases of agents working in digital telephone switching, computers and military technology reveal the extent to which the espionage was integrated into the science system—the ultimate success of scientific-technical espionage.

The Internet has increasingly been used for communication between people. Most users have no problem relaying messages, which do not contain confidential information, over a network. Yet, for it to be accepted as a medium of conducting monetary transactions there will need to be a higher degree of confidence in the technology's reliability and security. No one will agree to send his or her financial information over the Internet if there is any doubt in the security of that medium. Likewise, companies involved in E-commerce must have a means to verify the customers using the Internet to order goods and services. Public Key Infrastructure, PKI, attempts to provide the answer to the reliability question, as a method of digital security. PKI provides the ability to verify the sender and the recipient of electronic messages, protecting against E-commerce fraud, corporate espionage, and the theft of intellectual property.

This article examines the threat of intellectual property (IP) theft and recommends ways to counteract and restrict losses.

(2003). Soviet Military-Industrial Espionage in the United States and the Emergence of an Espionage Paradigm in US-Soviet Relations, 1941-45. American Communist History: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 21-51.