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This paper compares Belgian law pertaining to the granting of security interests in movables to US law on this subject. The Belgian system is currently still in the implementation stage, leaving it less detailed but benefiting from stronger coherence and a fresh start. The US system, set forth in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), is much older and highly detailed and, therefore, better equipped to deal with the intricacies of practice, but at the cost of a loss of clarity and second-best solutions largely caused by path dependence. This study tries to identify the areas where one system might learn from the other. As the UCC system was a major source of inspiration for the Belgian reform, leading to the shared basic foundation of a functional approach to security interests, which are to be made publicly knowable by way of register publicity, the systems are ideally suited for a straight comparison. As the basic premises are identical, the focus can be shifted to their implementation. After setting out the boundaries within which security interests operate in terms of assets and debts covered, this paper follows the lifetime of the security interest, from the way they are set up between the parties, to how they are made enforceable against third parties, down to the way they meet their end in a possible bona fide purchase or foreclosure, comparing the two systems every step of the way. Given that the Belgian government is currently designing how the system will actually work and the difficulty of making changes to such a vast system once it is in place, this kind of analysis is of key importance for the future proper functioning of secured lending in Belgium. The lessons taken from this comparative analysis are therefore translated into actionable proposals and best practices for the implementation and application of the Belgian Pledge law. These range from the judicial adoption of similar guidelines on what constitutes a sufficient description of collateral, over the freedom to negotiate default clauses and the limitations to that freedom, to a broad conception of forced dispositions of collateral. This study anticipates judicial interpretation of the new Pledge law in order to provide Belgian practitioners and judges with the necessary tools ahead of time. From the other point of view, it shows those weaknesses of the UCC system that could be remedied through an overhaul of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two recent court decisions may impact the right of original lenders seeking to exercise the right to credit bid in order to maximize their recovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares German and Belgian laws with regard to security interests in corporeal movables, economically analysing the differences to reach a normative conclusion. Belgium is currently implementing a major reform in this field, which, combined with the different stance of both regimes on transparency of security interests, begs the question of whether the Belgian reform could serve as an example to Germany. This article starts by comparing the evolutions both legal systems have undergone in the last century and which have started from opposite positions. While Belgium principally opposed non-possessory security interests for fear that this would annihilate transparency, Germany allowed for a broad system of non-possessory security interests through retentions or transfers of title, without any kind of publicity. Both systems underwent significant changes, which can roughly be divided into two categories: allowing for a floating charge on the business and reacting to business' legal innovations. These evolutions brought into focus the trade-off that used to exist between transparency and extension of the collateral base. These legal evolutions have set the stage for reform in Belgium, a reform that is based on the principle of register publicity of security interests. Next, this article explores the threat posed to non-possessory security interests by the possibility of acquisitions in good faith, in both regimes. Following the legal comparison, this article analyses the identified differences from an economic point of view, finding three key areas in which transparency can be beneficial. First, transparency reduces the social cost of using secured credit. Second, it makes collateral more effective in performing its function by reducing the scope for acquisitions in good faith taking precedence over security interests. Finally, transparency can also make collateral more effective by optimizing the functioning of the floating charge. In its final part, the article briefly goes into the challenges posed by setting up register publicity, more specifically with regard to privacy issues and gatekeeping. This article concludes that now that technology allows for transparency and the collateral base to be complements, economically speaking, Germany could, in fact, benefit from a reform following the Belgian model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the risk retention requirement of European Union with the U.S. collateral loan obligations. Topics include investors, investment firms, and the original lender of securitization. Also provided is information regarding credit institutions, industrial marketing in Europe, and the regulatory technical standards (RTS) of European Banking Authority (EBA).