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In January 2012, a video depicting U.S. soldiers urinating on Afghan dead bodies was released. Mr George Little, a Pentagon spokesman, declared that the footage was “utterly deplorable”, and this was followed by similar statements by other high-ranking U.S. government officials (Bowley/Rosenberg 2012). The behavior of these soldiers had dramatic political consequences for the reputation of U.S. soldiers abroad and for their credibility and legitimacy in respect to military operations in Afghanistan.

I was waking up in the sunny California morning on September 11 , 2001. Instead of music playing on my radio alarm clock, I was hearing fragments of news broadcast about airplanes crashing into the Pentagon and the twin towers of the World Trade Center. I thought I was dreaming about waking up in an alternative universe.

Chapter 21 deals with the myth that it won’t happen to me. The reality is that belief a dust explosion will not happen in a given facility handling combustible powders is rooted in an inadequate safety culture. The end result of such a belief is inevitably the very thing it denies—a dust explosion.

As we near the end of the 20th century, U.S. politicians and the Pentagon tell us that war is becoming a phenomenon of the past. Yet how many people in the world can honestly claim that their lives are less violent and that justice prevails? As international war grows less popular as a means of confronting differences, what agenda does it provide for peace studies? We can consider one approach, built on feminist principles, for designing a pro‐active curriculum for peace studies in preparation for the 21st century.

Atomic models of two single joints connecting (a) (9, 0) to (5, 5) and (b) (10, 0) to (6, 6) nanotubes have been constructed and relaxed on the computer using a molecular-mechanics model. Each connection is based on a pair of diametrically opposed pentagon and heptagon which bend the structure. The electronic properties of these metal-metal and semiconductor-metal junctions are explored within a tight-binding description of the π bands of the carbon sp2 network.

This article takes a fresh look at Anglo-American nuclear relations between 1946 and 1958. It concentrates on the relationship between the military establishments of the two countries in general and the ties between the United States air force and the Royal Air Force in particular. The article argues that an understanding of military relations is essential for an understanding of the high politics of the nuclear relationship. It is shown that senior officers in the armed services were the main ‘functional elite’ dealing with nuclear delivery systems and the planning for their use. Relations between these groups were personally and institutionally close and on the whole cordial. In Britain the link sustained optimism about the possibility of close nuclear co-operation in the 1940s and early 1950s and suppressed fears about the loss of nuclear independence in the late 1950s. In the United States it was recognized that military relations were an important channel through which to influence British nuclear policy. The article offers accounts, based on new archival research, of the nuclear aspect of the October 1947 Pentagon talks on the Middle East, Churchill's visit to the United States in January 1952 and the first Anglo-American joint nuclear targeting agreement – the Wilson/Alexander agreement of 12 March 1954. It reveals for the first time details of Plans E and X which equipped the RAF with American atomic and thermonuclear weapons between 1955 and 1958. The article concludes that the British nuclear force was becoming subordinated to the United States even before negotiations about Thor, Skybolt and Polaris missiles became central to the relationship.

We present an experiment of densification of a 2D horizontal assembly made of regular pentagons. The annealing leads to a dense crystalline arrangement with quasisixfold symmetry in spite of the geometrical characteristics of the grains and of the a priori short-range correlation length in the packing. This configuration yields the maximum average number of side to side contacts between the grains and probably the maximum packing fraction.

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) has repeated its call for an independent investigation into last October’s attack on the charity’s hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, after a US military investigation ended with recommendations for administrative punishments against 16 unnamed servicemen, but no charges.1 “The investigation found that the incident resulted from a combination of unintentional human errors, process errors, and equipment failures, and that none of the personnel knew that they were striking a hospital,” said General Joseph Votel, who heads US Central Command and presented the report at a Pentagon press conference. “The label ‘war crimes’ is typically reserved for intentional acts—intentionally targeting civilians or intentionally targeting protected objects or locations,” …

(By Yekaterina Markhulia and Polina Khimshiashvili. RBC Daily, April 26, 2016, p. 2. Condensed text:). .. At a Feb. 25 [sic; April 25] press conference in Moscow, [Russian] Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called Washington’s proposal to divide Syria into zones of authorized military action "simplistic." According to the State Department’s plan, which US Secretary of State John Kerry presented to New York Times reporters on April 23, Russia would fight terrorists in one part of Syria, and the US would fight them in the other; meanwhile, both countries would jointly monitor the ceasefire. ... "John Kerry’s recent statement that we need to come to an agreement on where our respective troops are and what zones can and cannot be bombed***is a rather simplistic approach. Still, fighting terrorists is the main thing," RIA Novosti quotes Lavrov as saying. ... Kerry’s proposal followed the de facto failure of the latest round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva. On Thursday, April 21, the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), a delegation formed in Riyadh and supported by the West, suspended its participation in the consultations and left the city. It reportedly did so because Damascus refused to adhere to the initially stated goals of the talks and because of violations of the ceasefire that has been in effect since Feb. 27 [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 8, pp. 3 - 6].. . . ... The fate of the [Syrian] president remains a stumbling block in the negotiations. The HNC is demanding [Syrian President Bashar] Assad’s resignation. Damascus categorically rejects this scenario: Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad told the Associated Press on April 13 that such a scenario could lead to a coup d’etat, and so the opposition will have to abandon its "dream" of a transitional government. Omar Osi, a member of the [Syrian] government’s delegation, accused the oppositionists of not having their own opinions, and [said that] in reality the negotiations will be conducted "with the British, French and Americans.". . . ... A Russian official familiar with the course of the Syrian negotiations told RBC that Moscow does not see substantial progress in the intra-Syrian talks: "The irreconcilable opposition has failed to dissociate itself from terrorist groups," RBC’s interlocutor said. ... Moscow, too, sees no progress in negotiations with the US on enhancing coordination in Syria: The parties continue to share information, but not intelligence; the US military is not agreeing to coordinate with the Russian military. ... "We are not going to sit there and let [Putin] do his thing supporting the regime and hammer at the opposition and say ‘This is working.’ Obviously, we’re not stupid about it," Kerry said in an interview with the New York Times. [US] President Barack Obama announced on Monday in Hamburg that he will increase the number of special operations forces posted in Syria to fight ISIS from 50 to 300 people. ... The US is clearly concerned by the actions of Russian troops in Syria. In mid-March, President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of [Russia’s] military contingent [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 11, pp. 3 - 6], but Washington does not believe that Moscow has left there for good. Wall Street Journal sources in the US administration claim that Russia is moving artillery units to areas in northern Syria where government troops are concentrated, and they assume that Moscow and Damascus are prepared to resume full-scale fighting based on the tense situation at the negotiations in Geneva. ... The administration itself would prefer not to aggravate the Syrian issue: Back in October 2015, when the Russian operation in Syria had just begun, Obama said that he would not allow the situation to slowly turn into a "proxy war" with Moscow. But Washington has serious misgivings about the intentions of Moscow and its allies. Wall Street Journal sources at the Pentagon claim that the intensity of Russia’s air strikes against Assad’s opponents has increased in recent days, although they still number less than before the ceasefire was announced: about 10 strikes per day, instead of 100. ... It can’t be ruled out that by entering into confrontation, the Assad regime is forcing its ally Russia to take its side.. . . ... Following Lavrov’s lead, Russian parliamentarians from relevant committees rejected Kerry’s ideas about divvying up areas of responsibility. ... Leonid Kalashnikov, first deputy head of the State Duma’s international affairs committee, generally likened the division of areas of responsibility in Syria to the occupation and partition of postwar Germany, and this when the authorities in Damascus "have not invited the US to fight" on its territory. Such a division would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the country, believes former State Duma deputy Semyon Bagdasarov, director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia.

(By staff commentator Pavel Felgengauer. Novaya gazeta, April 20, 2016, p. 6. Condensed text:) A pair of Russian Su-24 bombers cruising over international waters of the Baltic Sea 70 kilometers from Kaliningrad Province flew within several meters of the USS Donald Cook’s deck. A day later, an Su-27 fighter intercepted a US Air Force RC-135U reconnaissance aircraft, reportedly flying within a dozen meters of it. A random gust of wind, and one of the Su-24s could have grazed the rigging, subsequently crashing into the water or onto the destroyer’s deck. The Su-24 would have been destroyed, the USS Donald Cook could also have sustained damage, and inevitably, there would have been casualties. If the Su-27 had collided with the RC-135U in midair, both aircraft and their crews could have been lost. With people killed and equipment destroyed, the smoldering regional conflict could have ignited into a very real war in the worst-case scenario. ... Thankfully, no one was killed, nothing crashed from the sky or burned down, and no one opened preemptive fire. Such incidents are not the first: They have happened before, but they are becoming more frequent, and it seems that Russian [military] commanders have no desire to rein in their subordinates in any way. Both the [Russian] Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin have formally distanced themselves from these [incidents], stating that the [Russian] Defense Ministry has already said everything that needed to be said. For its part, the Defense Ministry, while fully confirming the interception of both the RC-135U and the USS Donald Cook, denies any potential risk. Evidently, the assumption is that since Russia has the Kaliningrad enclave in the Baltic, where its main Baltic Fleet base is located, and Sevastopol in the Black Sea, foreign ships and aircraft must be intercepted and chased away even if they are in international waters. ... According to US military sources, the pair of Su-24s that intercepted the USS Donald Cook were not carrying any weapons. To all appearances, they were Su-24MP reconnaissance aircraft that may have been carrying pods with electronic countermeasures equipment (ECM). A Ka-27 Naval helicopter was also spotted near the destroyer. Evidently, the overflight of the USS Donald Cook was not accidental: This points to a special operation planned in advance that may have involved an attempt to make a direct impact on the USS Donald Cook’s Aegis integrated combat information and control system, and to register its response. ... Then again, the military’s needs extend beyond just technical ones: The Finance Ministry has announced a 10% sequestration of all budget expenditures with the exception of social programs, and if oil prices remain low, more cuts may be in the offing. The Defense Ministry is doing its best to resist, and it seems to have gotten assurances [from the government] that the extremely costly rearmament program will not end up on the chopping block. But there is no money, and something has to give. If the level of confrontation with the US goes up a notch, it would help [the Defense Ministry] in its struggle against the Finance Ministry. Of course, everyone understands that aggressive interception carries the risk of collision and crash, but such things happened in the old days and everything turned out okay - after all, it never came to a war. . . . ... Military acrobatics over the Baltic [Sea] look like madness only at first glance, since everything has been carefully calculated: A [successful] low overfly means the adversary has been put in its place. A crash is fine, too - the people will rally and agree to suffer deprivations for the sake of new arms. ... Hotbeds of armed conflict are proliferating along Russia’s borders: the Crimea and the Donetsk Basin; Syria and Turkey; Nagorno-Karabakh; and the Transcaucasus. And now the Baltic region. Granted, in the Baltic region, unlike those other places, so far there has been no exchange of fire and no casualties. However, the problem is that the situation in the Baltic region is particularly unstable in strategic terms: There are only a few US military groupings there with a few tanks on a rotational basis acting like a deterrence tripwire, so that Moscow understands that any potential conflict would immediately become intercontinental. So in the event of an incident in the Baltic region involving an airplane or a ship, US generals would urge their political leadership to begin the immediate redeployment of substantial reinforcements. Because the Russians can mobilize substantial forces and move them to the Baltic borders much quicker, [US military would insist that] reinforcements should be redeployed without waiting for any conflict to be resolved by diplomatic means. ... In Moscow, if the General Staff is put in a similar situation, it would also insist on immediate action. If the Pentagon is allowed to deploy a secure base in the Baltics, that would put both the St.

In this paper, a fault-tolerant control technique for five-phase permanent magnet machines with pentagon connection of stator windings is presented. Open-circuit faults in machine winding as well as inverter switches are analyzed by the proposed control technique. The proposed control technique ensures continuous operation of the machine while producing minimum stator ohmic loss and minimum torque ripple. In addition to single-phase and double-phase faults, triple-phase faults are also considered in pentagon connection. Experimental results for a five-phase PM machine are provided to demonstrate the proposed fault-tolerant control strategy.

The takraw ball is a very unique interwoven ball used in the action game of sepak takraw. The traditional takraw ball is manufactured by conventionally weaving split rattan strips into a spherical basket. Modern takraw balls are manufactured by forming strips of plastics materials into interwoven hoop. These interwoven hoops form 12 pentagon holes and 30 intersections. The purpose of this study is to construct a finite-element (FE) model of a takraw ball in particular for normal impact simulation on flat surfaces under low speed conditions. Two FE models were developed to observe the dynamic behavior including impact forces, contact time, coefficient of restitution and deformation of the ball. The first model consists of a single solid hollow ball with 12 pentagon holes and the second model consists of six center strips and 12 side edge strips of extrusion hoops to form 12 pentagon holes and 270 cross-sections. The models were also compared with results of experimental impact tests whereby the ball was impacted normal to a rigid plate at three different heights. The ball is described in the FE model as a linear elastic material. It was found that the FE analysis solution of the ball model was found to be reasonably close with the experimental results. However further improvement need to be done by taking into consideration the nonlinearity of the takraw ball under large deformation as well as at high impact velocity.

Making use of an applied mathematical model, we employ a calculus of variations technique to join two co-axial nanotubes. Due to the axial symmetry of the tubes, the three-dimensional problem can be reduced to a problem in two dimensions. The curvature squared for the join region is minimized for a prescribed join length and given tube radii. In this model, a certain non-dimensional parameter B arises, which approximately has the same numerical value when compared with the standard method for the joining between any two carbon nanotubes of different radii. This value occurs in consequence of adopting an angle of inclination of 9.594°, which occurs in the conventional method for joining two carbon nanotubes of different radii and which is necessary to accommodate a single pentagon. The simple calculus of variations model described here provides a general framework to connect nanotubes or other nanostructures. Refereed/Peer-reviewed

Whether tied around a tree, worn on a lapel or displayed in some other fashion, the yellow ribbon in America became a pervasive visible symbol associated with the Gulf War. It generated incredible sales, unprecedented usage and heated debate.Few symbols in recent times have been so quickly embraced by so many segments of society. Yellow ribbons cut across economic, religious, political, social, gender, regional, age and professional barriers. Military families used them, but so did individuals who had no relatives in the military. Politicians, companies, churches, retail businesses, advertisers, municipalities, school children and advocates on both sides of the war issue used them.Yellow ribbons were everywhere. Their presence across both rural and urban America before, during and after the war makes it hard to imagine that most Americans did not encounter them in some fashion. Few could escape seeing ribbons decorating something, reading references to them in newspapers and finding them for sale in stores and displayed on clothing and jewelry. No war in recent American history has seen a home front phenomenon of this type.This article examines the ribbon variants and sales, phases of utilization, widespread use and visibility, ambiguous meanings and controversies that surrounded its' use, and speculates on why it was so popular and the functional roles it played in the lives of the people and communities who displayed it.The Gulf War was neither the first nor the last time that yellow ribbons have been selected by individuals and groups to symbolize support for a cause or to welcome back loved ones. Since 1979, several different groups concerned with the release of Middle East hostages had popularized the ribbon as a symbol for their cause. And extending beyond the hostage context, yellow ribbons were worn in 1985 by non-striking United Airlines flight attendants and pilots to support striking colleagues who were considered held "hostage" by the company ("United" A5). And while not entirely yellow, a ribbon was symbolically tied around the Pentagon in August 1985, the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Composed of thousands of individually stitched banners, at least one of which had a yellow ribbon encircling the earth, the Pentagon ribbon supported peace and called for an end to nuclear weapons (Lark ). In 1988 pro-timber industry workers in the Pacific Northwest formed the Yellow Ribbon Coalition to promote an understanding of their cause--saving their jobs and rural lifestyle from being eliminated as forests become increasingly protected to preserve the habitat of the endangered northern spotted owl. Convoys of 1000 ribbon-decorated log trucks have rallied in Northwest cities, members have tied ribbons to trees and car antennas and have appropriated the ribbon as their solidarity symbol (Strycker 1A, McKenzie C1). In February 1992, several hundred Oregon timber workers wearing yellow ribbons chanted "Hey, Hey ESA, please don't take our jobs away," as they came to testify at government hearings on the Endangered Species Act (Durbin A1). Supporters of alleged Mafia leader John Gotti hung yellow ribbons outside his former social club during his Winter 1992 trial (Maykuth E15). While none of these instances reached the same proportion of use as was evident during the Gulf War, together they illustrate that the yellow ribbon had become fairly well disseminated as a support symbol across America by the early 1990s.RIBBON VARIANTS AND SALESDuring the Gulf War the yellow ribbon took many forms. In its most common manifestation, it appeared as a yellow plastic or fabric bow, streamer, banner or strip of ribbon, of varying widths and lengths, that was tied, pinned, folded, wrapped, draped, hung, glued or otherwise attached to or encircled around something else. One of the most common of all yellow ribbon usages was the tying of a bow around a trunk of a tree (Fig. 1). (Fig. …

The phenomenon of terrorism is not new: any authoritative history of terrorism (e.g., Laqueur 1977) would include, for example, references to anti-state terrorism of groups such as the Narodniki (Populists) in nineteenth-century Russia (e.g., assassination attempts on the tsars), the state terrorism of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security during the so-called Reign of Terror in the late eighteenth-century French Revolution, and anti-colonialist terrorism in Africa (e.g., Algeria) and elsewhere in the post-World War II period (Whittaker 2003). Moreover, counterterrorism, including police and military counterterrorism strategies, is a well-developed field of study (Hewitt 1984). However, the idea of a war against terrorism is quite recent. It has come into vogue primarily, it seems, as a consequence of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC by al-Qaeda operatives. The person most famously associated with prosecuting what he called a “war against terrorism” was US President George Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 (Coady and O'Keefe 2002). The idea brings together two prior notions, that of war and that of terrorism, both of which are somewhat vague and subject to ideological manipulation. Keywords: crime; ethics; terrorism; violence; war

On 21 October 1967 Allen Ginsberg, Abbie Hoffman, and Ed Sanders of the band The Fugs, and others, organized an “exorcism” of the Pentagon in which several thousand demonstrators participated. Most historians have regarded this event as “a put on” or at best as “performance art.” This article takes seriously the nominal status of the ritual as a “sacred” or “magical” event. It argues that the organizers were utilizing innovative strategies of social action to alter the terms of debate regarding the Vietnam War. Inasmuch as these strategies drew on “secret” insights into the nature of social reality, they were seen as “magical” and in continuity with pre-modern esoteric traditions. Finally, it is argued that the new left turned to such tactics out of a deep frustration with traditional forms of democratic political engagement.

Ensconced within the Pentagon is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). This assistant secretary, who is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, has responsibility for overseeing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, including its regulatory program, which annually issues permits for tens of thousands of activities affecting wetlands, the vast majority of which are on private property. Which begs the question: why does a military organization have the authority to dictate to civil-ians—a housing developer, Walmart, even your grandmother—what they can do on their own property?

Fullerenes and icosahedral virus particles share the underlying geometry applied by Buckminster Fuller in his geodesic dome designs. The basic plan involves the construction of polyhedra from 12 pentagons together with some number of hexagons, or the symmetrically equivalent construction of triangular faceted surface lattices (deltahedra) with 12 five-fold vertices and some number of six-fold vertices. All the possible designs for icosahedral viruses built according to this plan were enumerated according to the triangulation number T = ( h 2 + hk + k 2 of icosadelta-hedra formed by folding equilateral triangular nets with lattice vectors of indices h, k connecting neighbouring five-fold vertices. Lower symmetry deltahedra can be constructed in which the vectors connecting five-fold vertices are not all identical. Applying the pentagon isolation rule, the possible designs for fullerenes with more than 20 hexagonal facets can be defined by the set of vectors in the surface lattice net of the corresponding deltahedra. Surface lattice symmetry and geometrical relations among fullerene isomers can be displayed more directly in unfolded deltahedral nets than in projected views of the deltahedra or their hexagonally and pentagonally facted dual polyhedra.

The electronic structure of a single pentagon in a hexagonal carbon lattice has been revealed on an atomic scale by scanning tunneling microscopy. The pentagon is located at the apex of the conical protuberance of the graphitic particle. The enhanced charge density localized at each carbon atom in the pentagon is identified, and the ringlike pattern of the (∛×∛)R30° superstructure of graphite is clearly observed around the pentagon.

Israel’s space industry is the result of high-level R&D activities for defense and for business during the 1980s, when it became crucial to be independent for Earth observations, communications and broadcasting. Israel is autonomously developing spacecraft (with some cooperation from the European satellite industry) and launchers (with some partnership with South Africa and the United States). On 19th September 1988, Israel became the eighth country in the world to successfully launch a satellite (Ofeq-1) with its own vehicle (Shavit). The Ofeq series consists of compact mini-satellites with optical systems for high-resolution observations. Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) also developed the TechSAR radar satellite for military all-weather observations and proposed its use to the Pentagon.

Several years ago some concern was expressed in the Asia-Pacific region about the rapid rise in Indian defense expenditure. Even the Pentagon assessed that India was on an upward trajectory in terms of its rise to power in the region, a trajectory that would leave it positioned to exercise a significant degree of power throughout the Indian Ocean by 1995. In recent years, however, Indian defense spending has plateaued and even fallen in real terms, and regional leaders outside South Asia no longer express concern about India's potential role. But this fall in expenditure does not mean that the process of military modernization in India has ceased, or that New Delhi has assessed that it should dispense entirely with the acquisition of additional military power and instead direct resources to economic development. As well as imposing costs, the current period of stringency provides India with opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies and chart new directions in terms of force structure and capability. This article examines recent Indian defense spending in order to ascertain how the Indian government is approaching the problem of modernization in the context of difficult economic circumstances and tight budgets. By doing so we can expect to gain useful insights into attitudes among the governing elites toward any future role for the military in India's emergence as an Asia-Pacific power, once the current period of economic difficulty has passed.

Fighting for the Press: The Inside Story of the Pentagon Papers and Other Battles. James C. Goodale. New York: CUNY Journalism Press, 2013. 260 pp. $20 pbk.Reviewed by: Roy S. Gutterman, Syracuse University, NY, USA DOI: 10.1177/1077699013506342The day before James C. Goodale began his book tour with a luncheon at the Committee to Protect Journalists in New York City, news broke that the Department of Justice had secretly subpoenaed telephone records of the Associated Press. This news was the first in a summer of breaking news of secret government surveillance programs and gov- ernmental efforts targeting leakers and directly and indirectly the media.The onslaught of government prosecutions of leakers, the continued controversy of Wikileaks, and the explosion of the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance scandal and the Edward Snowden saga propelled Goodale's memoir, Fighting for the Press, to not only instantly relevant but also prescient.While the bulk of the book examines Goodale's role as an in-house lawyer at The New York Times during the "Pentagon Papers" litigation, he devotes two complete chapters to the Obama administration's "hardline" approach to dealing with leaks and leakers of the nation's security secrets. He also criticized the Bush administration's "War Against the Press."Goodale recites how as a candidate Obama was critical of Bush's dealings with the press and he advocated for the federal shield law. However, as president, Goodale believes Obama is "worse than Bush" in using criminal laws to plug leaks and asking reporters to disclose confidential sources. He concludes that the Obama administration may be even more malevolent toward press rights than the Nixon administration.Thus, the book comes full circle from Goodale's early days as a young general counsel at The New York Times to the birth of what is commonly known as the "First Amendment bar." In legal circles, Goodale is widely considered the dean of the First Amendment bar and one of its primary founders.Overall, Fighting for the Press is Goodale's contribution to the library of books on the Pentagon Papers, and the historic fight over censorship, national security, and the First Amendment. There is no shortage of books and memoirs on the topic-David Rudenstine's The Day the Presses Stopped, Floyd Abrams's Speaking Freely, and, of course, the Pentagon Papers author and leaker Daniel Ellsberg's two books on the topic, Secrets and Papers on the War.Goodale adds to the Pentagon Papers library by telling the story behind The New York Times' decision to take on the Nixon administration, standing firmly behind the First Amendment. The case, the United States v. New York Times, marked its fortieth anniversary in 2011, and is an important element of practically any First Amendment law course.How it got there is Goodale's story. Supported by his own encyclopedic legal knowledge and law that he helped develop, Goodale paints a picture using case law, transcripts of hearings, memos, and decades of files that only an insider could employ. …

This article provides an overview for the symposium while delving into specific facts about the development and implementation of the Pentagon's press policy during the Persian Gulf War. The article assesses the military-media relationship, and the Pentagon's own policy development, in the aftermath of the invasions of Grenada and Panama. It describes the power and authority of the President, and civilian and military leaders, at the time of the war, to supersede the best intentions and plans of Pentagon public affairs specialists. It reveals the inability of the media during war to perceive and impact how such policy is shaped. The article identifies, as a high priority, the independent, timely, and accurate reporting to the nation when America enters combat.

September 11, 2001, transformed the consciousness of this generation of Americans, just as December 7, 1941, did for what became the World War II generation. The attacks homicide bombers perpetrated on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shattered the illusions of the 1990s: that the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of history, with democracy irrevocably triumphant and catastrophic wars a relic of the past. Instead, Americans rudely discovered that the United States faced another existential threat to its freedom, reminiscent of the threats fascism and communism posed during the twentieth century.

This paper presents a critique of the claim in Gregory Hooks' Forging the Military-Industrial Complex (1991) that the industrial mobilization for Word War II led to autonomy for the Pentagon. It argues instead that a coalition of corporate leaders and military officers dominated decision-making on industrial mobilization, despite opposition from a New Deal, liberal/labor coalition rooted in unions, universities, government appointments, and the mass media. It criticizes the state autonomy theory group for adopting a style of theorizing that relies almost exclusively on secondary sources in making new and controversial claims.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 dramatically punctuated almost a century of efforts to make the leadership, management, and use of American armed forces more cohesive and efficient. The primary approach was an increasing centralization of civilian authority, including the creation and further strengthening of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments. Nonetheless, the armed services remained in a divisive and contentious framework under the intentionally emaciated authority of a weakly centralized collectivity on the uniformed side of the defense establishment. The Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to fix the problem by centralizing the uniformed side of the Pentagon in parallel with the civilian side, running the risk that this could lead to civil-military conflict instead of a smooth partnership between the defense secretary and the sharply enhanced Joint Chiefs of Staff's chairman immediately under him. This article analyzes the main consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the first four years since it was signed into law.

Never before has there been a war of such scope so scantily recorded. In the Persian Gulf, considerations of security overrode those of informed consent. Recording reality cannot guarantee that wars won't be undertaken again, but that they won't be undertaken in ignorance.

The Global War on Terror is a poor and misleading choice of words. Notwithstanding the gradual drift towards the term “the long war,” which is slightly more enlightening,1 it remains the description of choice for America’s counterpunch to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001. To date, two nations (one of which—Iraq—had no involvement in 9/11) have been assaulted by the United States and its coalition partners with the subsequent occupations of these lands by Western military forces. It is estimated in Iraq alone (not forgetting the almost 3000 casualties on 9/11)2 that around 600,000 people may have lost their lives and continue to do so on a daily basis,3 as a consequence of this military intervention and the emergence of the insurgency. In terms of cold analysis, the Global War on Terror appears to be an extraordinarily disproportionate counterterrorism response.

Was the Kennedy administration moving toward a military attack on Cuba in the fall of 1962, even before it discovered Soviet strategic missiles on the island? Recently declassified evidence and fresh controversy compel a new look at this infrequently examined question. While not offering a definitive answer, this chapter presents new information, interpretations and hypotheses regarding U.S. behavior in the period leading up to the Cuban missile crisis. It is now clear that throughout the first ten months of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the Kennedy administration’s secret program of covert operations against Cuba, was closely coordinated with enhanced Pentagon contingency planning for possible U.S. military intervention to bring about Castro’s downfall. During this period, U.S. officials actively considered the option of sparking an internal revolt in Cuba that would serve as a pretext for open, direct military action. Top officials in the U.S. government initially “shied away from” the idea of overt military involvement in Cuba prior to the missile crisis. But the Pentagon, acting at the direction of the president and the secretary of defense, dramatically accelerated contingency planning for military action against Cuba in late September and early October 1962, just as the president was ordering a sharp increase in anti-Castro covert operations. Although the ultimate purpose of these intensified military preparations remains unclear, the possibility that, under domestic political pressure and even before they learned in mid-October that Soviet nuclear-capable missiles were in Cuba, top U.S. policymakers seriously considered conventional military action—including, if necessary, a full-scale invasion—to overthrow the Castro regime, has to be considered.

Norman Mailer, well known as a novelist, is not commonly thought of as a contributor to American political thought. Yet in The Armies of the Night, a fictionalized autobiographical account of the 1967 march on the Pentagon, Mailer develops a theory of "symbolic/existential" politics embodied in the politics of the New Left. This article explores Mailer's theory, showing how the symbolic politics of the New Left differed from the politics of the center and radical Right and assesses it in terms of reason, power, and effect.

The fact that 15 of the 19 terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were Saudi citizens inevitably raised serious questions about the social conditions that have produced such violent personalities capable of the mass taking of innocent lives and devastating an entire city, if not a nation. Answers were quick to come by, as the U.S. media pointed to the Saudi culture. Charges were made that the youth were brainwashed by the most extremist school in Islam, namely, Wahhabism. The Saudi educational institutions were also blamed for promoting anti-Semitism, anti-Western attitudes, and intolerance of other religions. Saudi society was also condemned for having a corrupt and backward political system. Naturally, in this land of intolerance and authoritarianism, resorting to violence by its inhabitants became a foregone conclusion (Baer 2003; Gold 2003; Schwartz 2002).

According to the New York Times of April 12, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld “minimized the disorder [in Iraq] as inevitable as [the country] moves from a repressive to a freer system of government.” In the article, which reports the details of a Pentagon briefing held the previous day, Rumsfeld gives a very interesting definition of freedom. He says, “freedom’s untidy. And free people are free to make mistakes and to commit crimes and do bad things.”1 If freedom is the freedom to make mistakes and commit crimes, I suspect that the whole project of reconstructing Iraq will bring prison-building companies, who will be vying for contracts, to bring U.S.-style prisons to Iraq—as they’ve already come to Turkey.

Six pentagons located at a tip of MWNT and behavior of a single gas molecule on the pentagons can be observed by field emission microscopy (FEM) using multiwall carbon nanotube (MWNT) with clean surface. Pulse laser irradiation is effective method to obtain the clean surface, and desorption of molecule on a pentagon can be artificially and responsively controlled by this method. Adsorption of a gas molecule onto a pentagon brings about a change from a pentagonal ring image to a bright circular spot image with stepwise increase of V emission current, and vice versa. This switching action of emission current corresponding to adsorption and desorption of a single molecule with a good reproducibility makes to expect an application to monomolecular devices

Short-term military simulations of scenarios or conditions that U.S. military personnel might meet are generally the largest, in terms of cost and personnel, of all operational training events. That at least six such exercises were scheduled for September 11, 2001 raises serious questions about whether or not the events of 9/11 were at least partially orchestrated by U.S. command. In light of the aforementioned military exercises and the fact that the 9/11 Commission's Final Report barely mentions them, neither were they significantly discussed nor investigated during the hearings, this essay briefly explores four key questions that will hopefully stimulate further inquiries, investigations and perhaps subpoenas that will ultimately break the silence and force declassification of the information surrounding the war games.1.Has there been a high-level suppression of information about the military drills?2.Might the military drills have been a significant factor in the success of the attacks?3.Who was in charge of the military drills and what motives may have been operating for this person?4.In what way might Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person charged in the United States for the attacks, be a link that connects to the person in charge of the games to another tragedy that may have been “an inside job” – i.e. Senator Paul Wellstone's death, and how might Moussaoui connect all of this to the Pentagon?

Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, contending that Section 798 of the Espionage Act, prohibiting the publication of classified information regarding U.S. communications capabilities, can constitutionally be applied to the media, for several reasons: 1) A majority of the Justices in the Pentagon Papers case recognized that prior restraints on publication of highly sensitive, classified information regarding ongoing military and communications operations would be permissible; 2) The prospect of post-publication liability for violating the Espionage Act was also recognized by a majority of the Justices; and 3) The Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment is equally applicable to citizens and the institutional media.

During the Cold War period most European armed forces were structured on the same broad principle of defence against a common enemy within a bipolar structure premised on nuclear deterrence (Von Bredow, 2000: 51). The removal of the strategic certainties of the Cold War created huge pressures for reform of military structures and organisation, and these pressures have been both augmented and confused by the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks of September 2001 which introduced what has been described as a new Postmodern age, dominated above all by the ‘war on terrorism’ (Heyman, 2001; Posen, 2001; Cronin, 2002).1

Washington blundered into Iraq in 2003 and, bungling the aftermath, could not see a clear exit. The Tone superpower’, the ‘hyperpower’, the military master of the universe, has simply made the wrong decision. Moreover, its failures are self-inflicted. The White House and civilian Pentagon leadership persuaded themselves of a grand fantasy. They neglected — ignored, or spurned — intelligence fundamentals. They claimed as facts what they could not prove. They assumed all would go as they wished, and that their forces would be greeted as liberators. They had no doubt that US military power would prevail.

When the United States went to war in Iraq in March 2003, the professed goals were to end the repressive rule of Saddam Husayn's regime, uncover the long-hidden weapons of mass destruction that had eluded a decade of UN-led inspections, and prevent further cooperation between Baghdad and the Islamist extremists responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Less mentioned but by no means absent was the intention of introducing real democratic values and institutions to Iraq and making the fledgling successor government a beacon for the region to emulate. Advisers to George W. Bush's Administration dubbed the neoconservatives or neocons quickly became known for their claims that the war would be quick, that the Iraqis would welcome the Americans as liberators and not conquerors and shower them with rose petals and rice, and that the Iraqis as the region s staunchest democrats would quickly turn the New Iraq into a democratic showplace that was the envy of the region. In the Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was equally determined to make the war in Iraq the showcase of what a transformed military force could accomplish with smaller deployments and greater mission integration. The war of shock and awe was to usher in 21st century warfare against the new asymmetric kind of warfare of the future the war on terrorism.

It's late November 2002 on a drizzly, cold day in Washington, D.C., a little more than a year after four hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsyl vania killing more than 3,000 people. In one of the bewildering number of Starbucks ofFDupont Circle, Jeff Bezos, iconoclast lead er of the mega online e-tailer Amazon.com, and John Poindexter, then director of the Pentagon's Office of Information Awareness, meet. Bezos orders a low-fat latte. Poindexter, ex-Regan national security advisor and a convicted felon charged with lying to Con gress and obstruction of justice, takes an Americano (of course). Poindexter gets right to the point. Poindexter: "Jeff, we have a problem. The world has changed dramatically. During the years I was in the White House it was relatively simple to identify our intelligence collection targets. Today, the most serious asymmetric threat facing the United States is terrorism, a threat characterized by collections of people loose ly organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and define and whose goals are the destruction of our way of life. The intelligence collection targets are thousands of people whose iden tities and whereabouts we do not always know. It is somewhat analogous to the antisubmarine warfare problem of finding sub marines in an ocean of noise—we must find the terrorists in a world of noise, to understand what they are planning, and develop options for preventing their attacks. I think the solution is largely associated with information technology. We must become much

Most of the essential facts concerning the events of 11 September 2001 will be all too familiar to anyone likely to be reading this work: approaching 3,000 people died after four airliners were hijacked. Two airliners were deliberately piloted into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and one into part of the Pentagon in Washington. The fourth airliner, following resistance from the passengers, crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside. Its intended destination is still a matter for conjecture but either the White House or the US Capitol in Washington are considered the most likely. There were 19 direct perpetrators. From the outset it was known that those bent on thus committing suicide were of Middle Eastern origin, for they had thoughtfully allowed their intended victims on the airliners to make telephone calls. And soon the US Government was able to confidently indicate that al-Qaeda in general and bin Laden in particular held ultimate responsibility.1

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the spontaneous invocation and rapid popular acceptance of this freighted term mark a specific and potent return of repressed American history. While no critic or analyst has directly confronted this return, the genealogy of the term makes clear that the civilian victims and spectacular destruction of “9/11” triggered an unconscious discursive reenactment of the problem of U.S. guilt for the 300,000, mostly noncombatant victims of the first use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The world was stunned by the September ii bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. What is perhaps even more shocking is that this bombing was not that unusual. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh blew up the federal building in Oklahoma City. During the past few years, American authorities have identified and foiled other terrorist plots hatched by United States citizens. A Florida militia planned to destroy a nuclear power plant, while Michigan militia members made arrangements to bomb two federal buildings. A group in Missouri plotted to kill thousands at the opening of a military base in Fort Hood, Texas. Meanwhile, militia in northern Montana amassed machine guns and pipe bombs to be used to murder a score of local officials. Anticipating that the National Guard would be summoned to restore order, the militia planned a second attack on the rescuers. They apparently hoped that other right-wing militants would join them in a revolution to overthrow the United States government and establish a new regime controlled by white Christians.1

The ugly phenomenon of terrorism has a long history, it hit the world like a thunderstorm in the 1970s, especially with the 1972 Black Septembist kidnapping of Jewish athletes during the Munich Olympic, and the plane hijacking that led to the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport in 1976 to free Jewish hostages, however, it was the September 11, 2001 attacks by suicide bombers against the United States that transformed terrorism into a new kind of warfare: they hijacked three separate civil aircraft and turned them into instruments of mass destruction by crashing them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the July 7, 2005 multiple bombing of London confirms to a great extent this new thinking of about terrorism.In this article, Dr. Nwolise examines the terrorist phenomenon, providing a useful theoretical insight for understanding the concept in its various forms, including the politics surrounding the interpretation of the concept – what he refers to as the politics of nomenclature, the article perceives post-September 11 terrorism as a new kind of warfare, and a deadly threat to democracy, good governance, national development, and international peace and security.In addition to its informative exploration of the goals and consequences of terrorism, the paper presents a new timely and interesting insight into how corporate organizations can manage and combat terrorism, the data on the evolution of terrorism in Nigeria since the 1960s show that the phenomenon is not new in Nigeria, but, in the words of the author, has only graduated to a professional crescendo in contemporary times, they will be very useful for researchers interested in the evolution of terrorism in Nigeria.

During the first week of its new term in office, the administration of President Barack Obama not only surprised but also thrilled many progressives when the Pentagon rescinded its long-standing ba...

Two weeks after being sworn in as U.S. secretary of defense, Chuck Hagel made a surprise announcement on 15 March: the government would bolster its national missile defense system by buying $1 billion worth of new equipment. What Hagel didn9t stress is that the bulking up of U.S.-based defenses also appears to mark the end of an even more ambitious—and controversial—Obama administration plan to base interceptors in Europe that could protect the United States from a potential missile strike from nations such as Iran. As for the older U.S.-based system, critics say the Pentagon has seriously understated the time and money it will take to make it fully functional. But some scientists question whether the new plan is also deeply flawed.

On 6 November 1992 a group of young people gathered in the food court of the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia, USA for the monthly meeting of the '2600 Club' - a club which derived its name from the hertz frequency once used by telephone 'hackers'. During the course of the meeting, the group was approached by members of the mall security staff, and at least one Secret Service agent. The security personnel requested identifications, compiled a list of names of the participants, confiscated computer books and printouts, and asked the group to leave the premises.