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In the twilight of the USA’s ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been an expanding shadow war of targeted killings and drone strikes outside conventional war zones, where violence is largely disappeared from media coverage and political accountability. While many attribute the growth in these shadowy operations to the use of new technologies and platforms such as drones, this article argues that the central transformation enabling these operations is the increasing emergence of network forms of organization within and across the US military and related agencies after 2001. Drawing upon evidence from unclassified reports, academic studies, and the work of investigative journalists, this article will show that elements within the US military and related agencies developed in the decade after 2001 a form of shadow warfare in which hybrid blends of hierarchies and networks combine through common information and self-synchronization to mount strike operations across transnational battle spaces. But, rather than a top-down transformation towards networks, this article will show how it was the evolution of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) from an elite strike force into a largely autonomous networked command that has been central to this process. Although drone strikes have received the bulk of critical attention in relation to this expanding shadow war of targeted killing, this often-lethal networked warfare increasingly resembles a global and possibly permanent policing operation in which targeted operations are used to manage populations and threats in lieu of addressing the social and political problems that produce the threats in the first place.

There is a good reason why the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is so often described as the "arms deal of the century." In a report published on the last day of 2010, the Pentagon estimated lifetime operating and sustainment costs for the US F-35 Aeet-then projected at 2,443 units, not counting the prototypes-at US$1.45 trillion.1 Cost analyses of this type are always much-debated: How many units will be sold in total? How does one define "lifetime"? How reliable will the system be once it enters service? What will be the nature of its deployment? And so on. Beyond dispute is that the F-35 constitutes one of the largest, if not the largest, weapons programs in modem history.The story of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) began in 1994, when the United States Congress decided to merge two separate Department of Defense fighter jet research projects. The idea was to produce a "fifth generation" fighter aircraft for the joint use of the US Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine Corps. Preliminary research contracts were divided mainly among McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Northrop Gmmman, and Lockheed Martin, which subsequently formed teams that also involved other contractors, like Dassault (partnered with Boeing) and BAE (forming a threesome with McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Gmmman). The JSF program was purposely internationalized: a memorandum of understanding was signed by the US and British governments in December 1995, specifying a 90-10 split for co-funding the aircraft's demonstration phase, or, as it was officially known, the Weapons System Concept Demonstration (WSCD) phase.4 In November 1996 the Pentagon selected Lockheed Martin and Boeing as lead contractors; in October 2001 a long and fierce competition to carry out System Development and Demonstration (SDD) was won by the former. The Lockheed demonstrator X-35 turned into the F-35 Lightning II, which carried out its maiden flight in 2006; the two Boeing X-32 prototypes ended up in museums in Ohio and Maryland.The JSF was conceived from the beginning as a multi-role aircraft that would be capable of replacing four or five separate aircraft in use by the US military. To that end, the program gave birth to three different warplanes: the F-35A or the Conventional Take-Off Landing (CTOL) version, which is intended to replace the F-16 Fighting Falcon and A-10 Thunderbolt; the F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL), replacing the AV-8B Harrier II; and the F-35C Carrier Version (CV), taking over from the F/A18 Hornet and possibly the Super Hornet. All three versions completed the critical design reviews and are now in the SDD phase. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft are rolling out from Lockheed Martin's assembly plant in Forth Worth, Texas, and the final Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) phase appears to be on the horizon. The US Marine Corps have established an "operational" squadron of F-35S at their Yuma, Arizona airbase, while instructor pilot training on the initial F-35S set to roll off the assembly line is progressing at a USAF base in Florida.5Globalized industrial partnerships propelled the JSF from the outset, but the multinational collaborative project took shape gradually. Most US allies were not "briefed" on the JSF until the beginning of the SDD phase, and it is unclear how the US government-specifically the nascent JSF office-decided which governments to engage.4 Canada joined in 1997, turning the US-UK collaboration into a multinational one. At that point, the JSF specified the conditions for different "levels" or "tiers" of partnership. Each level was mainly determined by the size of the partner's contribution. Level 1 partners contribute approximately 10 percent to the development of the aircraft. The UK is the only Level 1 partner and has committed $2.2 billion to the program. Level 2 partners, such as Italy and the Netherlands, contribute approximately $1 billion. Level 3 partners-Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Turkey-contribute $ioo-$2oo million. …

Almost a decade following the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, most Iraqi state documents stemming from Saddam Hussein's regime remain in the possession of the United States. U.S. military forces seized the majority of them in the invasion and occupation for intelligence exploitation, approximately a hundred pages of records and thousands of audio- and videotapes from Hussein's various bureaucracies of repression. Another 5.5 million pages of secret police files chronicling Hussein's Anfal genocidal campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan in the middle to late 1980s also are in American hands. These were seized by Kurdish forces in the uprising in northern Iraq in March 1991 and removed by the Pentagon in 1992 and 1993 to American soil for safe storage and analysis. Moreover, in 2005, an additional seven million pages that once belonged to the Ba'ath Party and security forces were also spirited out of Iraq by military transport with the assistance of the Iraqi Memory Foundation, a private Washington, D.C.-based group ...

The steady-state modeling of multiphase induction machines (IMs) with m phases under open-line fault conditions is usually carried out based on symmetrical component theory. Hence, the estimation of the machine characteristic curves usually involves complex mathematical calculations and inversion of high-order matrices, which complicates the analysis. Moreover, the effect of the different subspaces' impedances on the machine performance cannot be easily recognized using this modeling technique. Instead, this paper presents the first attempt to derive a simple equivalent circuit for a five-phase IM under open-line conditions that includes the effect of all subspaces in a single circuit. The derivation is carried out for both star and pentagon connections. The equivalent circuit can be a simple technique to explain the advantages obtained from a pentagon connection compared to the star connection under open-circuit faults. It can also be used to derive a simple expression for torque gain and torque ripple magnitude for different stator connections based on the circuit parameters. The derived equivalent circuits are verified using a 1-kW five-phase prototype machine. 2016 IEEE. This work was supported by the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of the Qatar Foundation) under NPRP Grant 6-213-2-090. The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors. Scopus

Weber argued that human suffering creates the demand for theodicies: cultural vocabularies, religious or secular, that explain perceived injustices. This article combines an interpretive analysis of rhetoric commemorating the events of September 11, 2001 with an effort to construct generalizable cultural theory, demonstrating how the Weberian concept of theodicy adds to our understanding of commemorative rhetoric. In the case of September 11 commemorations, the theodicies deployed exhibit a clear fracture. Speakers at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, have taken a dualistic approach to the problem of theodicy, while speakers in Manhattan have taken a tragic approach. This variation can be explained through a four-part model that argues theodicies are structured by (1) events, (2) carrier groups, (3) audiences, and (4) genre memory. More broadly, I argue for explicit attention to theodicy in cultural sociology, demonstrating that the quest for theodicy is a crucial driving force behind the impulse to commemorate in the first place.

This paper explores waves of xenophobic violence that have followed terrorist attacks in the United States from a value-added perspective. This work explores the applicability of Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behavior to these incidences of postattack violence, collectively characterizing these events as hostile outbursts. The history of postterrorism violence in the U.S. is detailed in this work, including a review of the first World Trade Center attack (1993), and the Oklahoma City bombing (1995). Special focus is placed on the immediate American response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This paper culminates with a discussion of future research directions and the benefits that may result from conceptualizing postterrorism xenophobic violence as a hostile outburst in terms of preventing unnecessary bloodshed in the wake of terrorist activity.

In the past few years, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a major center of geostrategic interest. The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set the tone by calling for a more “integrated a...

Three applications of memoir theory and reception—the ethics of betrayal, the calibration of transparency, and the unknown knowledge called "nescience"—illuminate the public reaction to state secrets, from the Pentagon Papers to WikiLeaks. The correlations between family secrets and state secrets yield new ways to understand the workings of secrecy in contemporary culture.

Duval pentagon is recently proposed interpretation technique of dissolved gas analysis (DGA) data for condition monitoring of oil-immersed transformer. This technique is the extension of well known Duval triangle method of DGA. Duval triangle method does not include Hydrogen (H2) and Ethane (C2H6) which are important gases for diagnosis of partial discharge and low thermal fault. Duval pentagon method includes all five hydrocarbon gases in one graphical representation. In this work, performance analysis of the technique is carried out using published fault database. The accuracy is found to be 87%. Further, Duval pentagon is implemented using ANN to enhance the diagnostic capability and to facilitate online monitoring. Proposed ANN is trained as per Duval pentagon method to detect transformers fault when data point belongs to some fault zone. The results presented in this paper show that the proposed ANN based model can reliably be used for transformer incipient fault diagnosis with enhanced diagnostic capability. The diagnostic accuracy of the proposed ANN based implementation is around 92%.

A novel probe feed dual polarized pentagon slot shaped planar antenna is designed and proposed supporting wireless local area network (WLAN) and worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) applications simultaneously. Structure comprises of pentagon shaped radiating element along with scaled down slot cut on center of patch, having overall compact size of 40×40mm2. The conventional pentagon patch resonates at 3.5GHz and the modified slot based structure resonates at tri bands of 2.4/3.5/5.2GHz. Effective comparison of antenna with and without pentagon slot is performed to obtain better impedance bandwidth, acceptable gain at operating frequencies and circular polarization at 2.4GHz. The simulated results exhibit the designed antenna operates over triple frequency ranges, fulfilling the standards of WiMAX and WLAN. Gain values obtained are 5.6, 3.2, 2.04dB respectively over respective tri bands. In addition, acceptable radiation characteristics are obtained over the operating bands.

Adee reviews The Imagineers of War: The untold story of DARPA, the Pentagon agency that changed the world by Sharon Weinberger.

This paper explores a broad range of ways in which anthropological research was linked to military and intelligence agencies during the Cold War, and it examines evidence and implications of the 1976 findings by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (chaired by Senator Frank Church) that during the 1950s and 1960s "massive" amounts of international research were covertly funded by the CIA. The reasons anthropologists did not more critically consider why or how their work aligned with the interests of the CIA and Pentagon are considered, and the implications of post—World War II disciplinary decisions to ignore political dimensions of research in favor of ethical considerations are discussed.

We have used a non-equilibrium surface Green's function matching formalism combined with a tight-binding Hamiltonian to consider the effect of different arrangements of pentagon rings on localization of density of states at the tip regions of semi-infinite capped carbon nanotubes. The transfer matrixes are obtained by an iterative procedure. The results demonstrate that the positions of the peaks near Fermi energy are remarkably affected by the relative locations of pentagons. It is observed that in thin nanotubes, carbon atoms belonging two neighboring pentagon rings have significant contribution in the localized states near fermi energy. From our calculations, it turns out that the metallic or semiconducting behavior of capped nanotubes in the tip regions depends on the metallic or semiconducting nature of their nanotube stems.

In March 2009, the Obama administration sent a message to senior Pentagon staff instructing them to refrain from using either of the terms ‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ and to replace these terms with ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’. The change in tone and, potentially, substance, from the Obama White House by ending the ‘war on terror’ at the rhetorical level suggests a need to shift our academic attention towards developing more appropriate analytical frameworks for examining alternative strategies for countering terrorism. This paper seeks to explore what it terms an emerging risk-based approach being deployed by states. Our framework proposed here deploys the twin concepts of ‘risk bureaucracies’ and risk regulatory regimes (RRRs) in examining terrorist financing and aviation security regulations.

In 2001, the United States government selected Lockheed Martin (over Boeing) to lead the development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft for the use by the United States’ Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Although assorted Congressional committees and Pentagon officials have continued to express no shortage of concerns over the project's overruns, delays and performance shortfalls of the F-35, the so-called “arms deal of the century” remains on track. Along with several other United States’ allies, Canada expressed interest early on by contributing funds toward the development of the F-35, and many Canadian companies have already been involved in the project. In 2010, the Harper government vowed to buy 65 F-35s. This special issue takes a second look at this proposed military procurement, and examines the main issues of concern for Canada.

The $1.3-billion renovation of the United States military headquarters, the most complex and challenging reconstruction effort in recent history, spanned 20 years and was interrupted by the catastrophic September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. However, it was completed ahead of schedule and under budget without disrupting operations. The renovation of this national icon stands as an eloquent testament to well-planned and well-executed collaboration involving an extensive field of participants.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantánamo, the high-profile US military detention and inter- rogation operation, was established in January 2002 to house the ‘worst of the worst’ of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It nevertheless became a public spectacle that was essen- tial for constituting the reality of a Global War on Terror. Through evolving media and VIP tours of the facilities coupled with the Bush administration’s military analyst programme (a system of reverse embeds used to promote Pentagon messages within the U.S. media), Guantánamo became a simulation essential for producing the real- ity of the war. It became a key way to convince the public that the war was real and necessary, but also that its conduct was just and humane, and therefore, by exten- sion, that the United States can be understood as ‘good’. Through a triple screen of the tours, the visitors and their mediation, the telegenic spectacle of Guantánamo was transmuted into a reality of Guantánamo as ‘safe, humane, legal and transparent’. The importance of this for producing understandings of the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) bears closer examination. Without this triple screen, Guantánamo does not exist.

In Arlington National Cemetery on September 12, 2002, the defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, presided over the burial with full military honors of a single casket containing unidentified remains intended to represent all 184 victims of the 9/11 Pentagon attack, a number that included civilian and military personnel on the ground and passengers on American Airlines Flight 77. Their collective grave, marked by a four-and-a-half-foot granite monument, sits within eyesight of the building where they died. The Pentagon Group Burial Marker, folded at the time of its dedication into Bush administration justifications for the planned invasion of Iraq, is today linked both in official and unofficial discourses to a set of monuments and graves scattered throughout the cemetery related to incidents of terrorism in the post-Vietnam era. The linkage gains fresh urgency as casualties mount from what has been defined as a war against terrorism. This article argues that these monuments are freighted with new historical meanings, justifications, and claims to legitimacy, drawn into a longer story of American victimization, Islamic aggression, reluctant empire, and triumphant U.S. nationalism and military virtue.

This article considers the truth value of the BBC's reporting of the invasion of Iraq in the context of Hannah Arendt's consideration of the US invasion of Vietnam. Arendt theorized that the ‘Pentagon Papers’ exposed a new approach to truth and lies – the ‘modern political lie’ at the heart of modern politics. In this article, Arendt's concept of the modern political lie is examined and comparisons made with Iraq. A case study of the BBC's coverage of the invasion is used to argue that its reporting did not necessarily lie about Iraq, nor did it necessarily create a discursive representation separate to the physical actions of the protagonists. Rather, it appears that strategic considerations on the part of the invading powers changed the factual texture on the ground, which reporting failed to keep up with.

Cooperation between civilian and military actors has become a catchphrase in international crisis management and development policy in the 21st century. This paper examines the crisis management policies adopted in Africa by the United States and the European Union (EU), respectively. It is hypothesised that both actors’ crisis management policies are likely to be path dependent, despite recent significant changes in policy preferences. It is shown that the priority combining civilian and military resources in American crisis management is only implemented to a limited degree. It is consistent with the persistent predominance of the Pentagon and of the military instruments in US Africa policy. It illustrates the conspicuous institutional path dependency of US Africa policy, which by some is described as ‘militarised’. The EU has been able to apply both civilian and military instruments in crisis management in Africa, suggesting the policy is not path dependent. The European situation is arguably attributable to the widespread consensus among European actors that it is necessary to combine civilian and military instruments in crisis management.

This essay undertakes a comparative review of radical innovation in the early Cold War, when UK jet propulsion development far outpaced any US efforts. British ingenuity created a series of jet engines which Americans adopted. One among these, which captures contrasting organisational formats for handling complexity and innovation, was the Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire, a tough, reliable propulsion system. The USAF’s licence assigned production to Curtiss-Wright, which had made piston engines for decades and which spectacularly botched the project, wasting millions. Eventually, the Pentagon shifted the J-65 American Sapphire to GM's Buick division, which finally fabricated adequate but obsolete engines in the mid-1950s.

In 1966, the social scientists of the Simulmatics Corporation arrived in Saigon. Tasked by the Pentagon with helping to pacify South Vietnam, they conducted political and social psychological research on Viet Cong defectors, government soldiers, and Vietnamese villagers. This essay argues that Simulmatics's work captures some of the ironies of Cold War social science: its tendency to mask militarization behind the rhetoric of peaceful nation-building, its blurring of data collection and intelligence gathering, and its ambitious dedication to revealing the unseen contents of hearts and minds while remaining ignorant of the historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts in which its subjects lived. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

It may finally be possible after more than 35 years of debate to form a consensus as to what John McNaughton really believed concerning U.S. involvement in Vietnam and when he believed it. The recent discovery of a diary in the possession of his family allows for an unfiltered look at his thoughts regarding the administration's commitment. This personal and confidential journal clarifies McNaughton's views and in doing so comes down strongly on the side of the recollections of his colleagues in government who contemplated, debated, and anguished over the issue with him. The log commences on January 1, 1966 and concludes in late April, 1967, just three months prior to the death of McNaughton, his wife, and their younger son in a plane crash. Within its 181 pages are John McNaughton's thoughts about the various issues on which he worked and the individuals with whom he dealt inside the Johnson White House, State Department, and Pentagon. The Vietnam passages among the 107 separate entries document his consistent and persistent opposition to U.S. policy.

Given the nature of global counterinsurgency operations, the demands of military expansion, and the need for cultural, linguistic, and regional expertise, the United States Army should evaluate the establishment of US-led foreign troop units for its evolving force structure. This article proposes the creation of an American foreign legion based upon the recruitment of US-led, ethnically homogeneous tribal force units to meet the grist mill of counterinsurgency operations. This structured approach would be more beneficial than the current reliance on a de facto American Foreign Legion, represented by private military contractors (PMCs), many of them comprised of foreigners. These PMCs carry a number of oversight, accountability, and legal risks not found in a fully integrated, and US-officered foreign legion. The British Brigade of Gurkhas, the South-West African Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (Koevoet), and the Kit Carson Scouts serve as relevant historical examples where foreign troops were used to suppl...

(By Irek Murtazin. Novaya gazeta, Oct. 10, 2016, p. 8. Condensed text:) Editors’ Note. - The UN is increasingly becoming a platform for vehement intransigence and reluctance to seek compromises. Sometimes one gets the impression that UN member states (above all Security Council members) no longer set much store by the organization and are even ready for its dissolution. The UN’s declining authority and its actual inability to influence conflicting parties have been laid bare in discussions on the situation in Syria and the Donetsk Basin. ... What is going on with the UN and what are its prospects? ... We put these questions to Anatoly Adamishin, who was Soviet deputy foreign minister from 1986 to 1990; Russian first deputy foreign minister from 1992 to 1994; and minister for cooperation with CIS states from 1997 to 1998. Since 2004, he has served as president of the Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation. ... * * * ... Question. - Anatoly Leonidovich [Adamishin], what is happening with the UN? Haven’t UN Security Council members been using their veto power a little too often recently? Why has the search for consensus become so difficult? Is there a sense that the UN in its present form has outlived its usefulness, and that the organization will either dissolve itself or will be seriously reformatted? ... Answer. - I will begin by going back a little. As long as humanity has been around, its best minds have constantly thought about how to avoid war. It was this aim that led to the creation of the League of Nations after World War I, thanks primarily to then-US president Woodrow Wilson - which, however, proved incapable of performing its missions for very long because, among other things, [the Soviet Union] attacked Finland at that time. ... However, after the horrible massacre that was World War II, with tens of millions of deaths, it finally became clear that there was a need for an organization that would be tasked mainly with preventing global war. ... The UN was "pushed through," so to speak, by [then-] president Franklin Roosevelt. He even concealed his disease to be elected for a fourth term and see his idea through to the end. ... Roosevelt’s idea was absolutely correct: Someone had to take charge, look after other countries, and pacify them. He believed that without the Soviet Union, an organization like that would be unviable. Today, Roosevelt is even being accused of sacrificing, say, Poland to pacify Stalin. However, it was clear to him right from the start: If there was no agreement between the USSR and the US, there would be no viable organization. So right from the outset, there was an idea of creating a Soviet-US cooperative agreement of sorts so that the Americans would contain the countries over which they had influence, while [the USSR] would contain those we had influence over. ... Thanks to this "co-op" of the two superpowers, the world avoided serious conflicts for four decades. ... Q. - Going back to the Cuban missile crisis, would you say that the UN played a decisive role? ... A. - The Cuban missile crisis? It was resolved by [John] Kennedy and [Nikita] Khrushchev - more so by Kennedy. Forget the UN: [Khrushchev and Kennedy] did not even have time to send encoded notes to each other, instead making announcements by telephone or on the radio. At that time, the world really was on the brink of war. And you know what? Khrushchev extricated himself from that situation thanks to Kennedy’s wisdom. When a blockade of Cuba was announced, one of our ships broke through, and the Pentagon strongly urged Kennedy to allow the ship to be attacked. Kennedy refused. In other words, the Cuban missile crisis was dealt with purely through Soviet-US contacts. It was only afterward that the UN approved steps to prevent the escalation of the conflict. ... Q. - Okay, so the Cuban missile crisis developed too rapidly and the UN was simply unable to respond in time. But what about Vietnam? Or Afghanistan? Both were instances of almost open confrontation between the USSR and the US. ... A. - That’s right. However, it would probably be more accurate to say that the world was saved from World War III. ... Q. - In other words, the UN has been fundamentally unable to stop local conflicts? Everyone understood very well who was fighting in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but pretended that the superpowers were not present there? ... A. - Yes, that is true: The events in Vietnam were a proxy war between [the USSR] and the Americans. The same goes for the war in Afghanistan. The confrontation continued at the diplomatic level too: During these 40 years, if we did not like something at the UN, we vetoed it. [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko once boasted: "With this hand, I cast 30 vetoes there." The Americans were no different: They also often used their veto power, albeit perhaps a little less often. For instance, the US never allowed a single resolution through that affected Israel.

This study examines the original language and revisions to two Department of Defense policies governing the Stars and Stripes, a unique American newspaper serving overseas military members and families. At times, some of those changes have increased Pentagon oversight and stripped freedoms from the journalists or the newspaper, which is intended to provide reliable news and original reporting to the troops. Despite the newspaper’s journalistic successes, the review finds that regular independent oversight is needed to protect the editorial freedoms of the newspaper.

The United States and other nations have taken numerous military, police and intelligence measures in order to counter terrorists’ threats in response to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia as well as the attempted attack on a target in Washington, D. C.

Stars and Stripes is a unique newspaper with a distinctive mission, ownership and journalistic staff unlike any in the USA. Despite its parentage in the US Department of Defense, directives give the newspaper editorial independence. Still, military commanders and Pentagon overseers have challenged and interfered with those rights since the newspaper's First World War beginnings in Europe. This study examines the published accounts of that struggle, finding that despite the newspaper's journalistic successes, the military has periodically engaged in control and interference, particularly because of the newspaper's logistical dependence upon the Department of Defense. Stars and Stripes' achievements have largely been dependent upon having the support of various military commanders in charge of US overseas military forces, having military editors or publishers who were resolute against military intrusion, or having the involvement of Congressional oversight committees and other news media willing to expose m...

In 1975 Gerald Ford became the first President bound by the War Powers Resolution. Enacted in 1973, members of Congress, still fuming over the revelations crystallized by the Pentagon Papers that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a sham, sought to prevent future Presidents from starting future Vietnam Wars. Though Ford voted against the measure twice as a Congressman, as President he respected the law and Congress enforcing it. This article explores Ford's efforts and actions as he complied with the law. Ford's attitude and acquiescence reflected his efforts he heal the nation.

Instructional technology, and the cognitivist and systems paradigms that underpin it, grew out of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War. Much as the Pentagon and this military complex defined the architecture of the Internet, they also essentially created, ex nihilo, the fields of instructional technology and instructional design. The results of the ongoing dominance or influence of the Pentagon in these specific disciplines have been traced in research that appeared during the final phases of the Cold War. But this research has not been updated to reflect circumstances now most definitive of the post–Cold War world: the rapid development of Internet infrastructures and applications, and the aggressive expansion of US military spending and activity. Tracing the imprint left by the US military on instructional technology and design, this paper considers how this influence may now extend, like the Internet itself, into schools and the university. It will conclude by stressing that the end of the Cold War, along with more recent developments concerning the US military, presents a juncture offering both opportunity and challenge to the evolving field of educational technology or “e-learning.”

Ever since 9/11, the nation has attempted to come to grips with the day and its commemoration. At each relevant site—the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania where Flight 93 crashed—memorials are either in place or in progress. Decisions about how to mark the events in which these locations figured, however, have proven anything but unifying for stakeholders. In particular, the people of New York have engaged in debates, often quite heated ones, concerning the future fate of the site of the World Trade Center bombings, an area at the north end of Manhattan’s financial district now known worldwide as Ground Zero. After a design competition in which applicants proposed plans for the land’s future use, a decision was made to go forward with Daniel Libeskind’s master site plan, which featured the Freedom Tower, an underground memorial, and Michael Arad’s plaza design for “Reflecting Absence,” a space of tribute including demarcation of the footprints of the original twin towers. Above all, placemakers at Ground Zero would do well to remain future-minded, taking into consideration how future generations will read the cultural landscape they construct. Will it remain legible, rich, and relevant for visitors fifty or one hundred years from now? This seems the greater stake in how historical memory takes shape at Ground Zero.

On September 11, 2001, nineteen Islamic terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners, crashing three of them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Fifteen of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, the rest from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon. The ensuing War on Terrorism not only deposed regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq but also implemented policies that deprived "detainees" of the protection of international law. This article questions the ethical and institutional legitimacy of such decisions.

This study argues that the strategic planning process of the Long War on Terror has been conducted in a manner that did not pay sufficient attention to the tenets of classical strategic theory. The article shows that the strategy encapsulated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Pentagon's initial responses to the challenges of irregular warfare departed from important principles associated with Clausewitz and other strategic theorists, undermining the prospects for successful counterterrorism. The reasons are partly the fault of the Bush administration, and partly a consequence of the American strategic culture and the preferred model of American civil–military relations. By turning back to strategic fundamentals, important improvements in strategic performance have been accomplished since 2006. The Obama administration can build upon the later successes of its predecessor in Iraq and in reshaping the US armed forces. In addition, the new president can refine and improve the Bush admi...

Cultural projects today are often unprecedented in their complexity, scale and collaborative effort. Keith Kaseman, partner of Kaseman Beckman Advanced Strategies (KBAS), describes how building information modelling (BIM) enabled the realisation of the Pentagon Memorial in Arlington, Virginia. Twenty-eight contractors and consultants were brought on board in the design and delivery of the monument's 184 ‘memorial units’, which collectively commemorate the individual lives lost at the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon introduced a program "embedding" journalists in military units. Embedded reporters have been widely criticized for allegedly failing to adequately cover effects of the war on Iraqi civilians, while over-emphasizing the personal lives of troops. Proponents of the embedding program argue that the program provides journalists with a detailed understanding of military culture and life on the frontline. In addition to the embedded reporters, some journalists were stationed in Baghdad and others were independent and free to roam. I argue that these three journalistic vantage points channeled reporters toward particular news content, while limiting their access to others. I hypothesize that while embedded reporters effectively presented the military experience of the war and the Baghdad-stationed reporters successfully covered the Iraqi experience of the war, the independent reporters were able to provide the most balanced coverage of the war. I demonstrate that despite the largely one-sided story presented, articles by embedded journalists were both more prominent and more widely available than coverage from other vantage points. Due to the dominance of embedded reporting, I conclude by noting that the majority of war coverage in print media heavily emphasized the soldier's experience of the war, while downplaying the effects of the invasion on the Iraqi people. By conducting a content analysis of 742 print news articles by 156 journalists from the major combat period of the war, this study offers one of the first systematic documentations of the substantive content of Iraq war coverage.

This chapter interrogates Hollywood film as a powerful public pedagogical machine and as an influential component of the broader media culture, that serves as a primary terrain where the authority of violence and the violence of authority expresses, justifies, and legitimates itself in the U.S. Allegiances to, identifications with, beliefs in, desires for, and attitudes about violence, authority, militarism, and power are largely constructed, imbued, directed and shaped through dominant media formations as they create images and spectacles of violence, either real or fabricated. During a time of continuing imperial aggression, expanding Pentagon budgets, increased international violence, growing authoritarian tendencies, and when an "imperially ambitious" United States has embarked on what Anatole Lieven calls a policy of "unilateral global domination through absolute military superiority," the inculcation into the mass consciousness of the justification for, identification with, acceptance and pursuit of mass violence through military aggression becomes all the more crucial.

During every national emergency, the system of checks and balances designed, as James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, to prevent a power grab by any of the three branches by giving each “the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others,” comes under great pressure.1 After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the public looked to the President to take extraordinary measures. Congress quickly moved to expand executive powers to meet the emergency, confirming the view of a leading textbook on the presidency that “it has become the dominant institution in a system designed for balanced government.”2

Behaviors of a single CO2 molecule on a clean pentagon at a tip of multiwall carbon nanotube (MWNT) were investigated by field emission microscopy (FEM). A CO2 admolecule was recognized as a gourd-shaped bright spot in an FEM image similar to the nitrogen admolecule previously reported. The shape of bright spot reflected an adsorption state that the molecular axis was parallel to substrate pentagon. The CO2 admolecule moved between five steady adsorption sites which were reflected in the geometrical five-fold symmetry of pentagon. From these experimental results, we propose an adsorption site model for a CO2 admolecule on a clean pentagon. By an Nd:YAG pulse laser irradiation, the CO2 admolecule successfully desorbed without any damage of the substrate pentagon whereas the end-atoms are oxygen. This suggests that a CO2 molecule on a pentagon is physisorbed and chemically inert for surfaces of MWNT. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The next Pentagon team will be faced with the dual challenge of advising on key current wartime decisions while also preparing the U.S. armed forces for a far different future. They must be stewards of the military, not just users of the instrument.

Catastrophic events often illustrate a nation’s preparedness in anticipating and preventing the extreme consequences of an intentional malicious attack. When terrorists hijacked four commercial aircraft for use as guided missiles against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the world’s population became aware of the human potential to inflict destruction and harm, and the vulnerability of transportation systems against preventing the occurrence of similar disasters. Through research, simulation, and system analysis, procedures may be formulated that limit or eradicate the possibility of future occurrences. Operations research encompasses the optimal allocation of resources subject to constraints, as well as providing techniques that evaluate the performance of security policies. This article provides a survey of operations research activities directed toward analyzing and enhancing the aviation security system, with the intent to be informative and motivate the continual improvement of our nation’s transportation security.

Thinking back on the globally televised images of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in which two airplanes flew into the World Trade Center, one aircraft hit the Pentagon in Washington, and another one crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, the questions “whose suicide?” and “the collapse of what?” appear unmistakably straightforward. Nineteen Islamic suicide bombers turned their deaths into weapons, causing the collapse of the World Trade Center. However, taking a broader perspective, it is much less clear who committed suicide and what collapsed on September 11, 2001. This article addresses the question of whether the attacks were a sign of strength, or rather a symptom of ultimate despair. The article first engages with and develops a critique of Baudrillard’s contention that the dominant Western order, which is based on the extrapolation of Good and the fostering of life, cannot survive an attack by radicals who utilize death as a weapon and turn Western globalization against itself. Secondly, the idea that the September 11 attacks are, conversely, a desperate attempt to escape structural crisis, signaling the prelude of Islamic neofundamentalist violence, will be assessed. It will be argued that, rather than the self-inflicted death of the global liberal order by means of irrational destructive terrorism, or the imminent collapse of Islamic fundamentalism, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the subsequent war on terror exhibit the tensions between a global order characterized by “destructive construction” and the “constructive destruction” that mark contemporary terrorist violence. Their mutual complex interrelations, their reciprocal fascination for one another and the intricate interconnections with processes of globalization – that prevent the death of either one – present a conflict that is of, against, within, and eluding the grasp of the dominant order in a continuous play of antagonism, destruction, mixture, tension, translation, and fissure.

This paper has described the issues on electronic circuits which are made for military equipments.The DoD of U.S. recently launched its most ambitious program yet to verify the integrity of the electronics that will underpin future additions to its arsenal. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon's R&D wing, and released details about a three-year initiative it calls the Trust in Integrated Circuits program. The findings from the program could give the military and defense contractors who make sensitive microelectronics like the weapons systems for the F-35 a guaranteed method of determining whether their chips have been compromised. The Trust program started its prequalifying rounds by sending to three contractors four identical versions of a chip that contained unspecified malicious circuitry, though U.S. military consumes only 1% of world's integrated circuits.

A first-principles study of single-walled carbon nanotubes with bamboo-shape (BS) and pentagon–pentagon fusion defects was conducted. Sharp resonances occur on the BS-nanotubes as strong density of electronic states (DOS) localized at carbon atoms adjacent to the partitions, while at the partition the localized DOS was greatly depleted. A strong defect state at −0.1 eV below the Fermi level was generated and the band gap was narrowed for BS-(10, 0) nanotube. Sharp resonant states are observed in the valence and conduction bands of BS-(12, 0) nanotube. The resonant states are attributed to the pentagon defects as exemplified by the study of a (5, 5) nanotube with pentagon–pentagon fusion ring. The high chemical reactivity of the topological defects of the BS-nanotubes is correlated to the presence of localized resonant states.

Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to “high-intensity” or “conventional” combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military ‘learning counterinsurgency’? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence – and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign – the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military.

THERE is a cartoon by Herbert Block, the legendary cartoonist of The Washington Post, which features two worried-looking officials seated at a desk. Holding up a file, one official says to the other: “Well, we certainly botched this job. What’ll we stamp it—secret or top secret?” If Block’s cartoon summarizes the concern that state secrecy can be used to hide evidence of wrongdoing, past and present events remind us that state secrecy can also be used to justify the scope and substance of controversial policies. As Daniel Ellsberg, the main protagonist in the Pentagon Papers episode, has recently reminded us, history shows that