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Cuba and the European signed a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) in December 2016. In the light of the changes in the domestic and international environment since then, the paper assesses current policy options.

Die Corona-Pandemie und der Krieg in der Ukraine sind auch für Kuba große Belastungen. Wirtschaftliche Probleme und zunehmende Ungleichheit sorgen für Unzufriedenheit. Zugleich könnte das Land erneut zur Projektionsfläche geopolitischer Machtkämpfe werden.

As infection rates decrease, much of Latin America seems to be taking a breather from the onslaught of COVID-19. However access to vaccines is unequal, both within and between individual countries, while vaccine coverage is heterogeneous. Combined with uneven infection rates and the arrival of the highly contagious Delta variant, new epidemiological and policy challenges must be addressed. With 45 million registered infections and almost one-third of all COVID-19-related deaths worldwide, Latin America has become a global hotspot in the pandemic. While Chile and Costa Rica have higher vaccination rates than Germany or the United States, half of Latin America's population has yet to receive their first jab. What may come to the rescue are the high numbers of people who have acquired some immunity from past COVID-19 infections beyond those identified in official statistics. Vaccine diplomacy has changed colours. Initially, Latin America depended on vaccine shipments from China, India, and Russia. By now, the US and the multilateral COVAX initiative have become the largest providers. Policies will need to adjust to the resulting mix of vaccines of varying efficacy and varying international recognition. To reduce external dependence, the region will need to build up its capacity to develop and mass-produce vaccines, diagnostic equipment, and mRNA technology. The vaccines developed in Cuba could become part of the vaccine portfolio the continent will need for many years to come. The pandemic has exposed the region's structural weaknesses. Public-health funding must be stepped up; ad hoc social-policy measures taken in the pandemic should be harnessed to make social safety nets more resilient and inclusive. A strong vaccination drive remains key to keeping the pandemic at bay. As immunity - whether from past infection or vaccination - will eventually wane, vaccination may need to be integrated into routine preventive healthcare. Cooperation transcending ideological left-right dichotomies in epidemiological diagnosis, research, vaccination, and healthcare provision must become a priority within the region as well as for international partners.

The COVID-19 pandemic is testing the societies of the world's most unequal continent, where many depend on informal work for their livelihood. Social-distancing measures directly affect their livelihoods, and make immediate social assistance imperative. The crisis is also testing political leadership, as some presidents are emerging as strong, unifying leaders, while others flounder, in a continent where historically trust in formal institutions is low. Decisive leadership has proven crucial for implementing wide-ranging lockdowns, and for the immediate commitment to social assistance. The presidents of Argentina and Peru stand out as examples of fast and coordinated responses. The potential abuse of extraordinary powers raises concerns for the medium run. In Chile and Bolivia, governments struggling with legitimacy after last year's massive protests have had to postpone a constitutional convention vote in the former and presidential elections in the latter. Many governments have quickly promised social assistance. An enormous economic rescue package in Chile stands out for its stinginess towards the most vulnerable. Where populist presidents from the right (Brazil) or left (Mexico) deny the seriousness of the pandemic, subnational and other authorities seek to fill the leadership vacuum - but policy implementation is harmed. The heaviest price will be paid by the most vulnerable. Latin America will suffer from post-crisis external shocks. With little aid coming from the United States or Europe, China emerges as a key hope for shipments of face masks, test kits, and protective gear. As COVID spreads - with higher or flatter curves - health systems will struggle to treat the severely affected. Lockdowns will be differentially respected, as promises of emergency social assistance need to be immediately delivered. Where the executive uses the moment at hand for narrow political gains, sharp political conflict is likely to ensue. Multilateral initiatives to secure social protection for vulnerable households in the region are needed.

Aside from the health challenge, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought an unprecedented social crisis to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To avoid a humanitarian disaster, governments across the region have responded with a marked expansion of social protection measures. These, however, vary greatly with regard to speed, breadth, and sufficiency. People cannot stay at home if they cannot feed their families. Governments recognised at varying speeds that income assistance measures are central to an effective epidemiological strategy. Both the lockdown measures and the associated economic crises have highlighted the gaps in existing social protections in Latin America, as half of the region's employed population works in the informal sector. Many of these workers lost their income virtually overnight. To cover the needs of informal workers, the most effective governments established relatively inclusive eligibility criteria for cash assistance that allowed low-income households to self-identify and apply. The result is an extended registry that has expanded state capacity, on which further social protection policies can build. The region's two largest economies, Mexico and Brazil, have both suffered high pandemic-related infection and mortality rates, but sharply differ in their social policy approach. The left-wing Mexican government stands out for not establishing any nationwide cash assistance programme in the wake of COVID-19. By contrast, Brazil underwent a massive, opposition-driven expansion of social protection coverage, which eventually boosted the right-wing government's approval ratings among the poor. This year's Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the World Food Programme on 9 October recognizes the fundamental human need for sustenance. The social protection floors that were established ad hoc in the course of the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America need to now be extended to ensure that families can continue to feed themselves. The policy expansion efforts of the crisis could be used as an opportunity to overcome the deficiencies of Latin America's social security schemes and to build a more universal social protection floor for the longer term.

Latin American and Caribbean states seek new relations with their emigrants. From external voting rights to co-funding schemes for remittances, states have introduced a range of cross-cutting policies in an attempt to reach out to their citizens abroad. Yet, these "emigrant policies" hold challenges for all parties involved: migrants, sending states, and receiving states. Latin American and Caribbean states have a long history of outmigration. About 18 million Latin American and Caribbean migrants reside in the United States alone. For some Latin American and Caribbean countries, over 15 per cent of their population live abroad. Migrant remittances are a key pillar of many economies, accounting for 20 per cent of GDP in El Salvador. Yet, these transfers are only the tip of the iceberg of broad transnational migrant networks. Emigrants engage with their home countries through many channels besides the economic. The region has become a pioneer of an emerging global trend: the development of state policies that explicitly target emigrants along social, economic, cultural, and other areas. Citizenship is the main area in which emigrant policies have developed, followed by social policies, which suggests a significant spillover beyond borders of basic state welfare functions. Policy Implications: Emigrant policies present new patterns of engagement of states of origin with emigrants. Receiving states should carefully consider the specificities of those patterns when developing integration strategies. Across Latin America and the Caribbean, some countries help their emigrants to remain abroad and to integrate, thus strengthening the continuation of emigration, while others seek their return and adopt policies that are more conducive to circular migration programmes. In both cases the emigrant policy approaches of states in the region lower the costs of integration for emigrants and receiving states, providing useful benchmarks for sending countries and venues for sending and receiving states to collaborate.

Nation-states are no longer contained by their borders. In times of mass migration and ever more dense transnational networks, states of all sizes and all migration profiles reach out to their emigrated citizens in wholly new ways. The variety of policies that target emigrants ("emigrant policies") is so vast that it seems to have become a new state function. For example, it is well known that states are expanding citizen participation beyond the nation's boundaries through voting rights and new modalities of representation and that they are opening channels for remittance transfer and offering specific investment opportunities to returning emigrants. However, other, less studied emigrant policies, comprise the symbolic incorporation of emigrants into the nation-state (e.g. through awards celebrating emigrants' achievements); social service provisions for non-residents (e.g. health and education); and the institutional inclusion of emigrants in consultative bodies, to name just a few. This book is the first to systematically take stock of the emigrant policies in place across 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries, as of 2015. By covering an entire geographical region and being based on rigorous data-collection, this will be a reference in a literature that has so far centered on a few specific cases. Also, our proposed definition of "emigrant policies" encompasses a wide range of policies that are aimed at emigrants beyond the "usual suspects" analyzed in the extant literature (electoral, citizenship, and economic policies), resulting in 112 different dimensions. This survey of such a broad sample of countries and policy dimensions will allow researchers to theorize and make comparisons on models of emigrant policy on a solid empirical and conceptual base.

Lateinamerika und die Karibik sind international Vorreiter für ein neues Verhältnis zwischen Staaten und Emigranten - von der Ausweitung des Auslandswahlrechts bis hin zur öffentlichen Kofinanzierung, wenn Rücküberweisungen aus dem Ausland in Entwicklungsprojekte investiert werden. Diese aktive Politik gegenüber den Ausgewanderten stellt jedoch Herkunfts- und Residenzstaaten vor erhebliche Herausforderungen. Allein in den USA leben rund 18 Millionen Emigranten aus Lateinamerika und der Karibik. Der Anteil der ausgewanderten Bürger beträgt in manchen Ländern der Region 15 Prozent der Bevölkerung. Abwanderung ist nicht nur Verlust. Rücküberweisungen der Emigranten sind zentrale Säulen vieler Volkswirtschaften - bis hin zu 20 Prozent des BSP in El Salvador. In Lateinamerika insgesamt erreichten sie im Jahr 2014 nicht weniger als 65 Mrd. USD. Emigranten sind heute in vielfältigen Formen mit den Herkunftsländern verbunden und in ihre Gesellschaften involviert. Geldüberweisungen sind nur die Spitze des Eisbergs dieser transnationalen Netzwerke. Die Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik entwickeln Politikansätze, die explizit auf die emigrierten Landsleute zielen, um deren soziale, wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und politische Bindungen an das Herkunftsland zu stärken. Bei diesen "Emigrant Policies" ist die Region Vorreiter eines zunehmend globalen Trends. Das wichtigste Politikfeld dabei sind staatsbürgerliche Rechte, gefolgt von sozialpolitischen Maßnahmen, die eine Ausweitung wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Funktionen über die Staatsgrenzen hinaus darstellen. Fazit: Auch für die Aufnahmestaaten der Migranten sind diese Entwicklungen wichtig. Manche Staaten helfen ihren emigrierten Bürgern aktiv dabei, sich in die dortige Gesellschaft zu integrieren. Solche Politikansätze können die Integrationskosten für Emigranten senken - und bieten ein bislang wenig genutztes Potenzial für die Kooperation von Herkunfts- und Zielstaaten.

Die im Dezember 2014 von US-Präsident Obama eingeleitete Entspannungspolitik stellt die Regierung in Havanna vor beträchtliche Herausforderungen. Inzwischen wurden auch die Verhandlungen mit der EU wieder aufgenommen. Am 23. und 24. März 2015 wird die EU-Außenbeauftragte Federica Mogherini als bislang hochrangigste Vertreterin der EU die Insel besuchen. Obama hat die US-Kuba-Politik der vergangenen 55 Jahre für gescheitert erklärt. Diplomatische Beziehungen sollen wieder aufgenommen, Sanktionen aufgehoben werden. Auch wenn dies für die Regierung Raúl Castros einen politischen Triumph darstellt, birgt die Normalisierung der Beziehungen für Havanna größere politische Risiken als für Washington. Die Frontstellung zu den USA war bislang zentral für die Legitimation des kubanischen Einparteiensystems. Die Annäherung beider Staaten markiert eine Zeitenwende. Die Regierung Castro ist allerdings bemüht, Erwartungen an einen weitergehenden Wandel zu dämpfen. Anfang April 2015 werden sich Obama und Raúl Castro beim "Gipfel der Amerikas" in Panama treffen, an dem erstmals sowohl Kuba als auch die USA teilnehmen werden. Angesichts der symbolischen Bedeutung Kubas für Lateinamerika bietet Washingtons Entspannungspolitik auch neue Chancen für die interamerikanischen Beziehungen insgesamt. Der Druck der US-amerikanischen Wirtschaft auf eine weitere Aushöhlung oder die völlige Aufhebung der Sanktionen gegen Kuba wächst spürbar. Schon die jetzt angekündigten Erleichterungen bedeuten einen Wachstumsimpuls für die kubanische Wirtschaft. Damit werden sich allerdings auch die neuen sozialen Ungleichheiten auf der Insel weiter vertiefen. Der von Raúl Castro seit 2006 eingeleitete wirtschaftliche Reformprozess geht in eine kritische Phase. Die Unterstützung aus Venezuela dürfte abnehmen, gleichzeitig stellt die Reform der ineffizienten Staatsbetriebe Hunderttausende Arbeitsplätze infrage. Mit der angekündigten Währungsreform droht zudem eine partielle Re-Dollarisierung der kubanischen Ökonomie.

Albert O. Hirschman's scheme of 'exit and voice', long a classic in the study of migration and its political implications, was conceived within the framework of 'methodological nationalism'. However, the rise of migrant transnationalism is eroding the classic migration paradigm. Combining theoretical considerations with empirical insights from Latin American cases, this paper argues that a critical reappraisal of Hirschman's scheme provides a helpful heuristic tool for conceptualizing the new character of today's transnational migration. Whereas in the traditional approach to international migration the options of exit, voice, and loyalty are considered to be mutually exclusive, transnational migration can be defined precisely by the overlapping and simultaneity of these categories. Albert O. Hirschmans Modell von 'Abwanderung und Widerspruch' ('exit and voice'), das lange ein klassischer Ansatz für Studien zu den politischen Implikationen von Migration war, wurde im Rahmen des 'methodologischen Nationalismus' entwickelt. Der zunehmend transnationale Charakter gegenwärtiger Migration unterhöhlt jedoch das klassische Migrationsparadigma. Der vorliegende Beitrag verbindet theoretische Überlegungen mit empirischen Erkenntnissen neuerer Migration aus Lateinamerika; auf dieser Grundlage argumentiert er, dass eine kritische Revision des Hirschman'schen Modells ein wertvolles heuristisches Werkzeug darstellt, um den neuen Charakter der transnationalen Migration konzeptionell zu fassen. Während im traditionellen Verständnis zwischenstaatlicher Migration die Optionen von Abwanderung, Widerspruch und Loyalität als sich wechselseitig ausschließend erscheinen, definiert sich transnationale Migration just durch die Überlappung und die Gleichzeitigkeit dieser Kategorien.

"Albert O. Hirschman's scheme of 'exit and voice', long a classic in the study of migration and its political implications, was conceived within the framework of 'methodological nationalism'. However, the rise of migrant transnationalism is eroding the distinction between domestic and foreign actors on which the postulate was based, that exit meant renouncing on voice. Combining theoretical considerations with empirical insights from Latin American migration, this paper calls for a critical reappraisal of Hirschman's scheme. In times of transnational migration, exit, voice, and loyalty are no longer exclusive categories; instead, transnational migration can be conceived of precisely a as a new and non-exclusive configuration of exit, voice, and loyalty, and the modalities of this reconfiguration become key to understanding the political implications of migration. With such a revised understanding, the Hirschmanian metaphor can indeed be a helpful heuristic tool for studies of current migration phenomena." (author's abstract)

"Mit dem ersten "Weltgipfel der Informationsgesellschaft" vom 10.-12. Dezember in Genf rückt die UNO eines der großen globalen Themen ins Rampenlicht: die sozialen und politischen Implikationen der neuen Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien. Im Zentrum steht dabei das dramatische Nord-Süd-Gefälle in der Nutzung von Internet und Co. (die so genannte digital divide), aber auch die Frage nach einer adäquaten internationalen Governance-Struktur für das Internet und die Verteidigung von Meinungs- und Medienfreiheit in den neuen computernetzwerk-basierten Medien. Die teils scharfen Konflikte um diese Themen unterstreichen sowohl die zentrale entwicklungspolitische Bedeutung als auch die weitreichenden Folgen für nationale und internationale Politik, die mit den neuen Technologien verbunden sind. Der Genfer "World Summit on the Information Society" (WSIS) forciert eine dringend notwendige Auseinandersetzung - die mit Sicherheit fortgesetzt wird." (Brennpunkt Lat.am/DÜI)

"Die neuesten Daten haben es offiziell besiegelt: Latinos sind zur größten Minderheit in den USA geworden, noch vor den Schwarzen. Und ihre Zuwachsraten sind weiter rasant. Diese Latinoisierung der USA verändert nicht nur Bild und Selbstverständnis der US-Gesellschaft, sie bringt auch grundlegende Veränderungen für die Politik der USA und für die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und den Staaten Lateinamerikas. Das "voto latino" wird von den Parteien umworben wie nie zuvor. In Lateinamerika sind die Überweisungen der Emigranten in den USA für viele Länder die wichtigste Devisenquelle geworden, noch vor allen Exporten. Einblicke in die Neue Welt "Latino-Amerikas"."(Brennpunkt Lat.am./DÜI)