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In this article, the authors look at the supposed causal role of progressive labor legislation on union organizing. As an extension of the Wagner Act debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the authors argue—contrary to the accepted wisdom of virtually all established scholarship—that "progressive" labor legislation is not generally the impetus for worker organization, a necessary prerequisite without which mass unionization would be impossible. Rather, this legislation is often consciously co-optive, with the explicit goal of diffusing worker militancy, denuding and undermining radical leadership while simultaneously placating popular discontent. The theoretical and methodological shortcomings of the former position are analyzed in the context of the passage of Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The authors argue that if the unionization of coal miners—the supposed primary beneficiaries of the stimulus attributed to the legislation—occurred prior to the passage of the NIRA, Section 7(a) could not have acted as a catalyst to unionization in the coalfields. The authors show, using archival and secondary accounts, that nearly all the nation's coal miners were organized before the passage of the NIRA. In light of this empirical data, the authors propose an alternative model of union growth that rejects the methodological individualist assumptions that tacitly undergird the existing literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first months of 1904, in a context of intense labor unrest, the Argentine executive branch presented to Congress a bill that became known as the 'National Labor Law' (Ley Nacional del Trabajo). It comprised a very extensive set of rules designed to regulate the labor market, the labor process and workers' organizations. By that time, Argentina had a growing capitalist economy, a young and radical labor movement and no labor regulations whatsoever – in this context, the bill was the first attempt of regulating the relations between capital and labor and, not surprisingly, it sparked an important debate. Although it never became a law, the bill became an iconic reference in the history of labor regulations in Argentina. This article introduces the main characteristics of the proposed bill and focuses on the reactions that working-class organizations developed toward it. While anarchist-oriented groups and unions made clear its complete rejection toward an initiative that was seen as another intervention of an authoritarian state, the Socialist Party found itself in a much more complicated position. This article addresses these debates and tensions in order to better understand the reactions of working-class organizations with regard to the first attempt of labor regulation made by the Argentine state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze FOCh political position in presentation of Labor Code project to National Congress, a Liberal Alliance initiative. Between 1920 and 1922, FOCh considered social legislation as a point of support for workers to negotiate their demands in a better conditions with their employers. Trade union center, through its "federated deputies", attempted to approved and to dispatch the Labor Code bill, participating from inside of Congressional Social Legislation Permanent Committee. However, the opposition and no concurrency of oligarchic deputies within the Commission, blocked the bill discussion. The result was the interruption of legislative debate and resign of federated deputies of the parliamentary body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article has the objective to analyze the historical experience of the Chilean workers organized in the FOCh in their struggle to defend right of association and strike during the situation of terminal crisis of the oligarchic liberal State. From 1921 to 1924, the employers' organizations made a strong offensive strategy against the trade unions. In this way, the FOCh resisted with strikes demanding right of association, collective bargaining, right to strike and freedom of press in a time when a modern system of labor relationships regulated by a labor legislation didn't exist. The struggle of recognize this democratic rights doesn't amount a loss of political autonomy facing the State. On the contrary, this contributed to fortify the federated workers trade union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primarily based on fieldwork conducted in Shandong province, this paper attempts to explore the social and political implications of the presence of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)--particularly those funded by entrepreneurs from other East Asian countries--in China and specifically the impact that these enterprises have on the role of the Chinese state & the field of labor. Major findings are as follows. The presence of FIEs has changed the landscape of Chinese industrial relations by introducing a new and typical wage labor relationship, which has been characterized by conflict between labor and management. Such conflict has helped reshape the state's role in the field of labor relations. Instead of relying on direct arbitrary administrative intervention as it did in handling labor relations in the pre-reform years, the Chinese state has since been compelled to establish and use new labor institutions such as labor laws and trade unions to regulate labor relations in FIEs. With new labor institutions emerging, the state gradually came to play the role of referee rather than player or intruder in the domain of labor-capital relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]