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Immanuel Kant se bavio mnogim moralnim problemima, a među njima se nalazi i oduzimanje ljudskog života u obliku ubojstva, smrtne kazne, samoubojstva i eutanazije. Kant smatra da država može dodijeliti i provesti smrtnu kaznu, a taj stav se temelji na načelu odmazde ili principu jednakosti, odnosno ius talionis. Načelo odmazde zahtjeva da onaj koji ubije bude kažnjen smrću jer je smrtna kazna jedina koja se može mjeriti s takvim zločinom. Prema njemu, smrtna kazna je posljedica kršenja zakona, odnosno ubojstva, te rezultat dobrovoljnih činova zlobe. Kant se smatra protivnikom samoubojstva. Samoubojstvo se protivi dužnosti samoodržanja i proturječi prirodnoj tendenciji samoljublja.. Kategorički imperativ ne dopušta samoubojstvo jer njegova maksima ne može postati univerzalna te zato što je to čin u kojem ljudi sebe tretiraju samo kao sredstvo. Kanta se često interpretira kao zagovornika eutanazije u slučaju gubitka racionalnosti, odnosno demencije. On veliki naglasak stavlja na autonomiju, dostojanstvo, čast i racionalnost, koje osobe gube napretkom demencije, pa se zbog toga smatra da dementne osobe trebaju pristati na eutanaziju.

Kantova središnja etička studija razmatra mogućnost uspostave deontologijske etike prema kojoj subjekt autonomijom volje sebi propisuje moralni zakon s ciljem da može važiti univerzalno.

Ova studija nudi obuhvatnu interpretaciju Kantovih stavova o uslovima mogućnosti moralnog napretka i moralizacije čovečanstva, kao ostvarenja krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode. Iako je vaspitanje pojedinaca i nacija uslov koji najviše doprinosi moralizaciji čovečanstva, njen jedini nužan uslov mogućnosti je transcendentalno zasnovano javno pravo. Takvo pravo zadovoljava uslove opšteg i nužnog važenja, jer se zasniva isključivo na slobodi. U tom smislu moralni napredak čovečanstva zahteva strogo ograničavanje samovolje ljudi putem apriornih juridičkih principa i učestaliju determinaciju njihove volje samom predstavom moralnog zakona. Osnovna teza studije jeste da juridička sloboda čovečanstva može u potpunosti biti garantovana ukoliko se uspostavi svetska federativna republika, dok se etička sloboda čovečanstva osvaja kroz stalnu borbu sa radikalnim zlom, koja ima više izgleda na uspeh ako ljudi osnuju carstvo vrline, pa je ostvarenje krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode zamislivo tek pod pretpostavkom konstitucije svetske juridičke i etičke države. Povrh toga, studija pruža detaljan prikaz najvažnijih ideja Kantove filozofije javnog prava, kako transcendentalnih, tako i empirijskih principa. Uloga empirijske pravne i političke teorije je da pokaže na koji je način moguće u što većoj meri realizovati metafizičke principe prava, dok Kantove antropološke teorije i refleksije o istorijskom razvoju čovečanstva treba da pokažu na koji način ljudska priroda ide u prilog ostvarivanju najviših principa javnog prava, ponekad čak i protiv namera ljudi. Ove teorije, zajedno sa njegovom filozofijom vaspitanja, pokazuju koje smernice ljudi treba da prate na putu ka transcendentalnom javnom pravu, ne bi li čovečanstvo moglo u moralnom (juridičkom i etičkom) smislu efikasnije i lakše napredovati. This dissertation provides a comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s views on the conditions of possibility of moral progress and moralization, understood as the achievement of the final purpose of nature. Although education of people and nations is the condition that contributes the most to the achievement of moralization, its only necessary condition of possibility is transcendentally grounded public right. This form of law meets the conditions of universality and necessity, because it is based solely on freedom. In this sense, moral progress of humanity requires strict restrictions on every person’s freedom of choice in accordance with a priori juridical principles and a more frequent determination of their will merely by the representation of the moral law. The main thesis of this dissertation is that juridical freedom of humanity could only be fully guaranteed if the world federal republic is established, while the ethical freedom of humanity could be attained only through constant struggle against the radical evil, which is more likely to succeed if people establish the ethical community; thus, the achievement of the final purpose of nature is conceivable only under the presumption of the constitution of the legal world state and the ethical world state. Additionally, this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the most important ideas of Kant's philosophy of public right, both its transcendental and empirical side. The role of the empirical legal and political theory is to explain how metaphysical principles of right could be realized to the greatest possible extent, while Kant's anthropological theories and his reflections on the historical development of humanity should show the way human nature works in favour of the implementation of the pure principles of public right, sometimes even against people's intentions. These theories, together with his philosophy of education, show what guidelines people should follow on the way towards transcendental public right, so that humanity’s moral (legal and ethical) progress would be more efficient and less difficult.

Ova disertacija pruža detaljnu analizu Kantovog shvatanja slobode u kritičkom periodu. Polazeći od Kritike čistog uma i analize treće antinomije i transcendentalnog pojma slobode, dolazimo do zaključka da je nemoguće pružiti dokaz postojanja transcendentalne slobode, ali da je moguće pokazati da je ona logički zamisliva i da nije suprotstavljena prirodnim zakonima. Dokazivanje zamislivosti transcendentalne slobode i opravdanosti njenog pretpostavljanja uprkos neupitnom postojanju prirodne uzročnosti, ostavilo je Kantu dovoljno prostora da sedam godina kasnije, u svojoj Kritici praktičkog uma, iznese dokaz realnosti slobode, shvaćene u praktičnom smislu. Kant izvodi postojanje praktične slobode iz moralnog zakona kao činjenice uma. Međutim, Kant se nije zaustavio na ovome, nego je u svojoj Metafizici morala i kraćim spisima iz filozofije istorije otišao i korak dalje, pokušavajući da pokaže da nam ovaj dokaz realnosti praktične slobode nameće zadatak da uspostavimo društveni sistem koji će svakom pojedincu omogućiti njeno neometano ispoljavanje. Glavna teza koju ćemo zastupati u ovom radu jeste da su transcendentalni, praktični i pravno-politički pojam slobode međusobno konzistentni i da proizlaze jedan iz drugog. Pokazaćemo da dokazivanje logičke zamislivosti transcendentalnog pojma slobode omogućava Kantu da kasnije pripiše realno postojanje praktičnoj slobodi, a na kraju i da tvrdi da je sloboda, shvaćena u pravno-političkom smislu, osnovno pravo koje pripada svakom pojedincu kao građaninu jedne države. Kant je razvijao svoje shvatanje slobode uporedno sa razvojem svoje doktrine transcendentalnog idealizma, a videćemo da su ova dva procesa međusobno usko isprepletena. Pored argumentativnog, doprinos ove teze sastoji se i u činjenici da ona nudi jednu sistematičnu studiju o Kantovom shvatanju slobode iz kritičkog perioda This dissertation provides a detailed analysis of Kant's understanding of freedom in the critical period. Starting from the Critique of Pure Reason and the analysis of the third antinomy and the transcendental notion of freedom, we come to the conclusion that it is impossible to provide proof of the existence of transcendental freedom, but that it is possible to show that this concept is logically conceivable and is not opposed to natural laws. Demonstrating the conceivability of transcendental freedom and the justification of its presumption despite the indisputable existence of natural causality, left Kant ample room to present, seven years later, in his Critique of Practical Reason, proof of the reality of freedom, understood in practical terms. Kant derives the existence of practical freedom from moral law as a fact of reason. Kant did not dwell on this, but in his Metaphysics of Morals and in short writings on the philosophy of history, he went a step further, trying to show that this proof of the reality of practical freedom imposes the task of establishing a social system that will allow each individual to have an undisturbed expression of freedom. The main thesis we will defend in this dissertation is that the transcendental, practical, and legal-political notions of freedom are mutually consistent and derive from one another. We will show that proving the logical conceivability of the transcendental notion of freedom allows Kant to later ascribe a real existence to practical freedom, and finally to claim that freedom, understood in legal and political terms, is a fundamental right that belongs to every individual as a citizen of a state. Kant developed his understanding of freedom in parallel with the development of his doctrine of transcendental idealism, and we will see that these two processes are closely intertwined. In addition to argumentative, the contribution of this thesis also lies in the fact that it offers a systematic study of Kant's conception of freedom from the critical period

The paper addresses the issues of euthanasia and thoroughly analyses Kantian response to the practice in question. In reference to Kant’s views on many related issues, such as murder, suicide, autonomy, rationality, honor and the value of human life, the main goal of this paper is to offer an explanation for one probable Kantian view on euthanasia in general, as well as an explanation for a specific form of euthanasia with regard to those patients suffering from dementia. The author’s arguments, according to which Kant could even argue that those persons who have begun suffering from dementia have a duty to die, have all been given special importance in this paper. The question is could and should this specific moral ever be allowed to become universal when considering the patients’ willingness to commit suicide once they start suffering from dementia or perhaps once they start experiencing a loss of rationality? Should suicide even become a patient’s duty? Furthermore, if a patient shows absolutely no intention or willingness of taking her/his own life, ‘should’ the doctor perform a non-voluntary euthanasia over the patient? This paper analyses the author’s arguments which are actually in favor of aforementioned questions, and aims to examine the plausibility of the act as well as to criticize it. The issue of euthanasia is very important, because the key question is what in fact constitutes the fundamental value of human life, which lies at the heart of this problem. U radu se obrađuju pitanja eutanazije i detaljno se analizira kantovski odgovor na dotičnu praksu. U vezi s Kantovim stajalištima o mnogim srodnim pitanjima, kao što su ubistvo, samoubistvo, autonomija, racionalnost, čast i vrednost ljudskog života, glavni cilj ovoga rada jeste da se pruži objašnjenje za jedan uopšteno mogući kantovski pogled na eutanaziju, kao i objašnjenje za jedan određeni oblik eutanazije s obzirom na one pacijente koji pate od demencije. Argumenti autora, prema kojima je Kant čak mogao da tvrdi da su osobe koje su počele patiti od demencije imale dužnost da umru, u ovom radu su bili od posebne važnosti. Pitanje je da li bi se moglo i trebalo ikada dozvoliti da ovaj specifični moral postane univerzalan kada se razmatra želja pacijenata da počini samoubistvo, kada počnu patiti od demencije ili možda jednom kada počnu doživljavati gubitak racionalnosti? Da li bi samoubistvo trebalo čak da postane pacijentova dužnost? Nadalje, ako pacijent ne pokazuje apsolutno nikakvu nameru ili spremnost da oduzme sebi život, „treba li“ doktor obaviti nedobrovoljnu eutanaziju nad pacijentom? Ovaj rad analizira argumente autora koji zapravo podržavaju navedena pitanja i ima za cilj ispitivanje verodostojnosti tog čina kao i njegovo kritikovanje. Problem eutanazije je vrlo važan, jer je ključno pitanje šta u stvari konstituiše temeljnu vrednost ljudskog života, koja leži u srcu ovog problema,idrugihformičovekovogpravanaživot.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos XIX a. lenkų kilmės filosofo, daugelio tyrinėtojų laikomo Schellingo šalininku, Juozapo Goluchovskio traktato, kurį jis pateikė Vilniaus universiteto paskelbtam konkursui filosofijos profesoriaus etatui užimti, dalys apie moralės filosofiją. Goluchovskio traktato idėjos lyginamos su Aristotelio, stoikų ir krikščioniškosios etikos tradicija, britų moralės jausmo teoretikų, Kanto, Fichte’s, Schellingo, Hegelio mintimis. Analizuojamas Goluchovskio sudarytas moralės filosofijai skirtų veikalų sąrašas, nagrinėjamos traktato recenzijoje iškeltos problemos. Tyrimo rezultatai leidžia daryti išvadą, kad Goluchovskio traktate susipina tradicinės etikos elementai ir Kanto moralumo samprata, o kitų teoretikų, net ir Schellingo, įtaka traktate pateiktai moralės filosofijos sampratai yra minimali. Article examines the moral philosophy portions of the Tractate of Józef Gołuchowski, a philosopher of Polish origin ascertained by many scholars to be a follower of Schelling. The Tractate was submitted in 1821 to contest the seat of professor of philosophy at Vilnius University. The ideas in this Tractate are compared with Aristotelian, Stoical and Christian ethical tradition, to the thinking of British theoreticians of moral sense, and to the ideas of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. An index of works devoted to moral philosophy composed by Gołuchowski is analyzed here, together with some problems expressed in the critical review of the Tractate. We may conclude that elements of traditional ethics in the Tractate are intertwined with Kantian concept of morality, while the influence of other theoreticians, not excluding Schelling, is minimal.

U radu se kritički osvjetljava pojam slobode u okviru filozofske misli Immanuela Kanta. Ovime se prvenstveno misli na njegov etički nauk, pa posredno i na epistemološki i estetički, koji na njega upućuju i kroz njega se utemeljuju. Cilj rada je pokazati da se sloboda, tumačena u oba svoja aspekta (pozitivnom i negativnom), dade izjednačiti s konceptima autonomije i spontaniteta. Ovim se pak putem, obzirom da je sloboda ratio essendi moralnoga zakona, može argumentirati i u korist teze o praktičkom jedinstvu slobode i moralnog zakona. Dodatno, u radu se analiziraju interpretativne implikacije kao i teškoće koje se javljaju čak i u tumačenjima eminentnih poznavatelja Kantove misli, poput L. W. Becka i N. Hartmanna., This paper aims to critically examine and evaluate the whole of Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of the notion of freedom. Freedom, both in its negative and positive capacity, as well as in it’s purely practical sense, serves as a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophical enquiry and the one true medium of the mind both in the practical and theoretical sense. Along with the aforementioned negative-positive dichotomy, freedom can further be distinguished as being one with the concept of the autonomy of the mind. Through this connection, freedom becomes, as its ratio essendi, practically one with the moral law itself, the latter being a form of the former. From the idea of freedom, various implications emerge, which have been dealt with through the course of the essay. In this respect, particular attention is paid to Kant’s notion of will and some of the misunderstandings it managed to create among notable Kant scholars like L. W. Beck and N. Hartmann.

Straipsnyje analizuojami demokratijos sąvokoje glūdintys „prima facie“ nesutaikomi prieštaravimai, interpretuojant I. Kanto ir P. Tillicho moralės ir religijos filosofijos idėjas. Pagrindinis dėmesys skiriamas autonomijos reikalavimui. Kanto kategorinio imperatyvo formuluotės nepritaria demokratijai, nes ši tapatina individualią valią su kolektyvine. Parodoma, kad autonomijos ir paklusimo antinomija neišsprendžiama Apšvietos ir Romantizmo kontroversijos įtampoje. Moderni sekuliari demokratijos teorija, paremta optimistine antropologija, nuolat švytavo tarp individualizmo ir kolektyvizmo kraštutinumų. Tillicho atsakymas yra teonomija – religingumo ir racionalaus kriticizmo sintezė. Tačiau tai, kad demokratijos idėjai nuolat akomponuoja kita antikinė mikrokosmo ir makrokosmoso idėja, leidžia tikėtis prieštaringų rezultatų – konformistinio pritarimo horizontaliam progresui arba teonominio mąstymo kaip heteronomijos ir autonomijos sintezės, kuri leistų naujai pažvelgti į sekuliarios ir sakralios sferos sambūvį šiuolaikinėje kultūroje. Notion of democracy, after a long history of transformation and rebirths from different sources, is so vast today that under this heading we can speak about prima facie incoherent values. The aim of the paper is not only to uncover some of the antinomies spreading from the paradoxical nature of democracy itself, but also to point the trajectories of possible solutions to these paradoxes. First we must realize the processual and ideal character of democracy. For these purposes, it is essential to analyze the basic notions and tensions accompanying democracy, which cannot be resolved appealing to logical (autonomy–heteronomy) or historical (Enlightenment–Romanticism) controversies. The arguments for one or another side of these eventually lead to new forms of radical individualism or neocollectivism which does no good to the adaptability of democratic ideals in today’s world. After examining the implications of I. Kant’s moral philosophy for discussing democracy, we face P. Tillich’s thought which formulated the notion of theonomy as the answer to the negativity of autonomy and tensions regarding democracy and, moreover, strains between secular and religious spheres.

Šio straipsnio tikslas - aptarti šiuolaikinę orumo sampratą ir atskleisti žmogaus orumo apsaugos bei ugdymo ypatumus demokratinėje visuomenėje. Tyrimo objektu pasirinkta orumo sklaida socialinėje-edukacinėje erdvėje. Keliamą tikslą bandoma pagrįsti analitiniu-interpretaciniu metodu. Orumas yra pakankamai sudėtingas dalykas, todėl jį konceptualizuoti nėra paprasta. Tokią situaciją lėmė daugelis priežasčių bei aplinkybių ir pirmiausia orumo sąvokos interpretacija. Dabartinės lietuvių kalbos žodynas šią sąvoką įvardija ir jos sinonimiką apibrėžia taip: „orus - tai turintis vidinės pagarbos, iškilnus, didus, solidus". Orumo pavyzdžiais nurodomos tokios formuluotės: „orios išvaizdos žmogus", „oriai atrodo", „graži apranga teikia orumo" ir t. t. The concept of dignity is a socio-ethical category, closely connected with the most essential and profound problem of human existence. That is why in the course of history thinkers were permanently occupied in the explication of its content. Kant constituted a new concept of morality which inspired a new interpretation of dignity, according to which human dignity was autonomous, independent of external factors and self-legislative. Kant’s ideas concerning human dignity play a significant role in the contemporary understanding of personal dignity and democracy. Contemporary psychology makes attempts to ascertain mechanisms and methods by means of which a dignified person could be educated. These attempts and their results are very important for contemporary educational theory and practice.

Autor prikazuje duhovno okruženje u kojem se pojavilo Rawlsovo djelo A Theory of Justice (1971.) i opisuje golemi utjecaj koje je ono izvršilo u političkoj filozofiji 20. stoljeća. Potom se koncentrira na analizu Rawlsove recepcije Kanta. Najprije pokazuje kako je Rawls koncipirao izvorni položaj u analogiji s Kantovom idejom autonomije individuuma i kategoričkoga imperativa. Autor vidi teškoće u mogućoj suglasnosti Rawlsova ekonomizma i Kantova moralnog stajališta. Prema Rawlsu, stranke izvornog položaja mogu izraziti svoju prirodu, ali one su istodobno pripadnici inteligibilnoga svijeta. Ovu neusklađenost s Kantovom koncepcijom nastoji Rawls u spisu Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory prevladati razlikovanjem racionalne i pune autonomije. Autor smatra da se Rawls priklonio određenoj verziji utilitarizma. Pokušaj Rawlsa da osjećajem pravednosti premosti Kantovu rigoroznu diobu prava i morala autor smatra potpuno stranim Kantu. Stoga između Kanta i Rawlsa zjapi nepremostiv ponor, što ni u kojem slučaju ne znači da Rawlsov pokušaj korištenja Kantovih kategorija u razvijanju demokratskih društava nije potpuno legitiman., The author describes the spiritual climate at the time of the publication of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and describes its huge impact on the political philosophy of the 20th century. Then he analyses Rawls’ acknowledgement of Kant. First he depicts Rawls’ formulation of his original position along the lines of Kant’s idea of the autonomy of the individual and the categorical imperative. There might be some problems with the possible convergence of Rawls’ economism and Kant’s moral position. According to Rawls, the original position parties may express their nature, but at the same time they belong to the intelligible world. Raws has tried to overcome this divergence from Kant’s concept in his paper Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory by means of distinguishing between the rational and the full autonomy, from which the author concludes that Rawls was inclined to adopt a certain version of utilitarianism. According to the author, Rawls’ attempt to bridge Kant’s rigorous distinction between the law and the morality by means of his sense of justice is entirely alien to Kant. Hence there is an unbridgable chasm between Kant and Rawls, which does not mean that Rawls’ attempt at using Kant’s categories in the design of democratic societies is insufficiently legitimate.

Ova studija nudi obuhvatnu interpretaciju Kantovih stavova o uslovima mogućnosti moralnog napretka i moralizacije čovečanstva, kao ostvarenja krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode. Iako je vaspitanje pojedinaca i nacija uslov koji najviše doprinosi moralizaciji čovečanstva, njen jedini nužan uslov mogućnosti je transcendentalno zasnovano javno pravo. Takvo pravo zadovoljava uslove opšteg i nužnog važenja, jer se zasniva isključivo na slobodi. U tom smislu moralni napredak čovečanstva zahteva strogo ograničavanje samovolje ljudi putem apriornih juridičkih principa i učestaliju determinaciju njihove volje samom predstavom moralnog zakona. Osnovna teza studije jeste da juridička sloboda čovečanstva može u potpunosti biti garantovana ukoliko se uspostavi svetska federativna republika, dok se etička sloboda čovečanstva osvaja kroz stalnu borbu sa radikalnim zlom, koja ima više izgleda na uspeh ako ljudi osnuju carstvo vrline, pa je ostvarenje krajnje svrhe stvaranja prirode zamislivo tek pod pretpostavkom konstitucije svetske juridičke i etičke države. Povrh toga, studija pruža detaljan prikaz najvažnijih ideja Kantove filozofije javnog prava, kako transcendentalnih, tako i empirijskih principa. Uloga empirijske pravne i političke teorije je da pokaže na koji je način moguće u što većoj meri realizovati metafizičke principe prava, dok Kantove antropološke teorije i refleksije o istorijskom razvoju čovečanstva treba da pokažu na koji način ljudska priroda ide u prilog ostvarivanju najviših principa javnog prava, ponekad čak i protiv namera ljudi. Ove teorije, zajedno sa njegovom filozofijom vaspitanja, pokazuju koje smernice ljudi treba da prate na putu ka transcendentalnom javnom pravu, ne bi li čovečanstvo moglo u moralnom (juridičkom i etičkom) smislu efikasnije i lakše napredovati. This dissertation provides a comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s views on the conditions of possibility of moral progress and moralization, understood as the achievement of the final purpose of nature. Although education of people and nations is the condition that contributes the most to the achievement of moralization, its only necessary condition of possibility is transcendentally grounded public right. This form of law meets the conditions of universality and necessity, because it is based solely on freedom. In this sense, moral progress of humanity requires strict restrictions on every person’s freedom of choice in accordance with a priori juridical principles and a more frequent determination of their will merely by the representation of the moral law. The main thesis of this dissertation is that juridical freedom of humanity could only be fully guaranteed if the world federal republic is established, while the ethical freedom of humanity could be attained only through constant struggle against the radical evil, which is more likely to succeed if people establish the ethical community; thus, the achievement of the final purpose of nature is conceivable only under the presumption of the constitution of the legal world state and the ethical world state. Additionally, this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the most important ideas of Kant's philosophy of public right, both its transcendental and empirical side. The role of the empirical legal and political theory is to explain how metaphysical principles of right could be realized to the greatest possible extent, while Kant's anthropological theories and his reflections on the historical development of humanity should show the way human nature works in favour of the implementation of the pure principles of public right, sometimes even against people's intentions. These theories, together with his philosophy of education, show what guidelines people should follow on the way towards transcendental public right, so that humanity’s moral (legal and ethical) progress would be more efficient and less difficult.