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Recent research has shown that moral character judgments are prone to the liking bias-well-liked people are seen as morally superior to disliked or neutral ones. However, whether moral information about their past behavior would moderate the liking bias is still an open empirical question addressed in present studies. In Study 1 (N = 653), participants updated their biased moral character impressions when moral information about the target was introduced after the liking induction. In preregistered Study 2 (N = 601), when moral information about the target was presented before the liking induction, moral information had a stronger impact on moral character judgments than liking. Study 3 (N = 398) showed that moral character impression updating was three times greater when moral information was presented after (vs. before) the attitude induction. Further analyses of changes in participants' moral judgments certainty revealed that moral information reduced their uncertainty stronger than attitudes. In effect, the latter were more amenable to updating than information-based judgments. Thus, we present evidence that moral information updates moral character impressions biased by liking. Nevertheless, liking also, but to a lesser extent, updates moral character impressions initially grounded on moral information. We propose that certainty about others' moral character explains when and how moral information limits the impact of attitudinal influences on moral character judgments., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Previous research found evidence for a liking bias in moral character judgments because judgments of liked people are higher than those of disliked or neutral ones. This article sought conditions moderating this effect. In Study 1 ( N = 792), the impact of the liking bias on moral character judgments was strongly attenuated when participants were educated that attitudes bias moral judgments. In Study 2 ( N = 376), the influence of liking on moral character attributions was eliminated when participants were accountable for the justification of their moral judgments. Overall, these results suggest that although liking biases moral character attributions, this bias might be reduced or eliminated when deeper information processing is required to generate judgments of others' moral character.