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After learning about facts or outcomes of events, people overestimate in hindsight what they knew in foresight. Prior research has shown that this hindsight bias is more pronounced in older than in younger adults. However, this robust finding is based primarily on a specific paradigm that requires generating and recalling numerical judgments to general knowledge questions that deal with emotionally neutral content. As older and younger adults tend to process positive and negative information differently, they might also show differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes. Furthermore, hindsight bias can manifest itself as a bias in memory for prior given judgments, but also as retrospective impressions of inevitability and foreseeability. Currently, there is no research on age differences in all three manifestations of hindsight bias. In this study, younger (N = 46, 18-30 years) and older adults (N = 45, 64-90 years) listened to everyday-life scenarios that ended positively or negatively, recalled the expectation they previously held about the outcome (to measure the memory component of hindsight bias), and rated each outcome's foreseeability and inevitability. Compared with younger adults, older adults recalled their prior expectations as closer to the actual outcomes (i.e., they showed a larger memory component of hindsight bias), and this age difference was more pronounced for negative than for positive outcomes. Inevitability and foreseeability impressions, however, did not differ between the age groups. Thus, there are age differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes, but only with regard to memory for prior judgments., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Exemplar models are often used in research on multiple-cue judgments to describe the underlying process of participants' responses. In these experiments, participants are repeatedly presented with the same exemplars (e.g., poisonous bugs) and instructed to memorize these exemplars and their corresponding criterion values (e.g., the toxicity of a bug). We propose that there are two possible outcomes when participants judge one of the already learned exemplars in some later block of the experiment. They either have memorized the exemplar and their respective criterion value and are thus able to recall the exact value, or they have not learned the exemplar and thus have to judge its criterion value, as if it was a new stimulus. We argue that psychologically, the judgments of participants in a multiple-cue judgment experiment are a mixture of these two qualitatively distinct cognitive processes: judgment and recall. However, the cognitive modeling procedure usually applied does not make any distinction between these processes and the data generated by them. We investigated potential effects of disregarding the distinction between these two processes on the parameter recovery and the model fit of one exemplar model. We present results of a simulation as well as the reanalysis of five experimental data sets showing that the current combination of experimental design and modeling procedure can bias parameter estimates, impair their validity, and negatively affect the fit and predictive performance of the model. We also present a latent-mixture extension of the original model as a possible solution to these issues., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

The repetition-induced truth effect refers to a phenomenon where people rate repeated statements as more likely true than novel statements. In this paper, we document qualitative individual differences in the effect. While the overwhelming majority of participants display the usual positive truth effect, a minority are the opposite-they reliably discount the validity of repeated statements, what we refer to as negative truth effect. We examine eight truth-effect data sets where individual-level data are curated. These sets are composed of 1105 individuals performing 38,904 judgments. Through Bayes factor model comparison, we show that reliable negative truth effects occur in five of the eight data sets. The negative truth effect is informative because it seems unreasonable that the mechanisms mediating the positive truth effect are the same that lead to a discounting of repeated statements' validity. Moreover, the presence of qualitative differences motivates a different type of analysis of individual differences based on ordinal (i.e., Which sign does the effect have?) rather than metric measures. To our knowledge, this paper reports the first such reliable qualitative differences in a cognitive task.

Hindsight bias describes people's tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event's outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.

According to the principle of inverse effectiveness (PIE), weaker responses to information in one modality (i.e., unisensory) benefit more from additional information in a second modality (i.e., multisensory; Meredith & Stein, 1986). We suggest that the PIE may also inform whether perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). If JOLs follow the PIE, the differences in JOLs for multisensory and unisensory items should increase as the unisensory study items become harder to perceive. That is, an influence of perceptual fluency should prompt a similar, interactive pattern across perceptual responses and JOLs. In 3 experiments, we systematically varied the signal intensity or noise in 1 modality to examine how responses might change with the inclusion of information in a second modality. In Experiment 1, written words in several font sizes were sometimes accompanied by spoken equivalents. In Experiments 2 and 3, spoken words in various background noise levels were sometimes accompanied by visual speech articulations. Consistent with the PIE, the multisensory benefits in response time and/or correct identification increased as responses to unisensory information decreased. Also, the multisensory formats received higher JOLs than the unisensory formats; however, unlike the predictions from PIE, this difference did not increase as study items became harder to perceive. Experiment 3 extended this finding to participants' explicit beliefs. In multisensory settings, JOLs may rely more on theory- than data-driven processes. We suggest that broadly defined processing fluency may always contribute to JOLs, but, regarding perceptual information, JOLs appear to track perceptual attributes rather than perceptual fluency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

To better understand the spread of fake news in the Internet age, it is important to uncover the variables that influence the perceived truth of information. Although previous research identified several reliable predictors of truth judgments-such as source credibility, repeated information exposure, and presentation format-little is known about their simultaneous effects. In a series of four experiments, we investigated how the abovementioned factors jointly affect the perceived truth of statements (Experiments 1 and 2) and simulated social media postings (Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 1 explored the role of source credibility (high vs. low vs. no source information) and presentation format (with vs. without a picture). In Experiments 2 and 3, we additionally manipulated repeated exposure (yes vs. no). Finally, Experiment 4 examined the role of source credibility (high vs. low) and type of repetition (congruent vs. incongruent vs. no repetition) in further detail. In sum, we found no effect of presentation format on truth judgments, but strong, additive effects of source credibility and repetition. Truth judgments were higher for information presented by credible sources than non-credible sources and information without sources. Moreover, congruent (i.e., verbatim) repetition increased perceived truth whereas semantically incongruent repetition decreased perceived truth, irrespectively of the source. Our findings show that people do not rely on a single judgment cue when evaluating a statement's truth but take source credibility and their meta-cognitive feelings into account.

The finding that repeating a statement typically increases its perceived truth has been referred to as the truth effect. Previous research has found that warning participants about the truth effect can successfully reduce, but not eliminate the effect. We used a multinomial modeling approach to investigate how warnings affect the cognitive processes that are assumed to underlie judgments of truth. In a laboratory experiment (N = 167), half of the participants were warned about the truth effect before judging the truth of repeated and new statements. Importantly, whereas half of the presented statements were of relatively unknown validity, participants could likely identify the correct truth status for the other half of the statements by drawing on stored knowledge. Multinomial modeling analyses revealed that warning instructions did not affect the retrieval of knowledge or participants' guessing behavior relative to a control condition. Instead, warned participants exhibited a significantly reduced tendency to rely on experiential information such as processing fluency when judging a repeated statement's truth. However, this was only the case for statements for which participants held relevant knowledge. These results are consistent with the notion that it is possible to discount metacognitive experiences such as processing ease when their informational value is questioned. Specifically, our findings suggest that people are less likely to base their judgments of truth on experiential information and metacognitive experiences induced by repetition if (a) they are warned about the deceptive power of repetition, and (b) other valid cues are available to inform their judgments., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Michael S. Moore is among the most prominent normative theorists to argue that retributive justice, understood as the deserved suffering of offenders, justifies punishment. Moore claims that the principle of retributive justice is pervasively supported by our judgments of justice and sufficient to ground punishment. We offer an experimental assessment of these two claims, (1) the pervasiveness claim, according to which people are widely prone to endorse retributive judgments, and (2) the sufficiency claim, according to which no non-retributive principle is necessary for justifying punishment. We test these two claims in a survey and a related survey experiment in which we present participants (N = ~900) with the stylized description of a criminal case. Our results seem to invalidate claim (1) and provide mixed results concerning claim (2). We conclude that retributive justice theories which advance either of these two claims need to reassess their evidential support., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Ostracism-being ignored and excluded by others-is a ubiquitous experience with adverse effects on well-being. To prevent further exclusion and regain belonging, ostracized individuals are well advised to identify affiliation partners who are sincerely well-disposed. Humans' ability to detect lies, however, is generally not very high. Yet, veracity judgments can become more accurate with decreasing reliance on common stereotypic beliefs about the nonverbal behavior of liars and truth-tellers. We hypothesize that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on such stereotypical nonverbal cues if message content is affiliation-relevant. In line with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 shows that ostracized (vs. included) individuals are better at discriminating affiliation-relevant lies from truths. Experiments 2 and 3 further show that ostracized (vs. included) individuals base their veracity judgments less on stereotypical nonverbal cues if messages are of high (but not low) affiliation relevance.

Metamemory is crucial for monitoring, evaluating, and optimizing memory performance. The basis of metamemory, however, is a matter of considerable debate. In the present study, we examined the contribution of processing fluency-the ease of processing information during learning-to metamemory judgments. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants studied related and unrelated word pairs across two study-test cycles in a judgment of learning (JOL) task. In the first study-test cycle, related pairs were associated with better cued recall, higher JOLs, and a reduced N400 amplitude than unrelated pairs. Crucially, between- and within subject correlational analyses indicated that reduced N400 amplitudes, indexing more fluent processing, were associated with higher JOLs. Furthermore, single-trial N400 mediated a small but significant portion of the relatedness effect on JOLs. In the second study-test cycle, relatedness still increased recall and JOLs. However, related and unrelated pairs did not differ in N400 amplitude. Rather, unrelated pairs elicited a parietal positivity in a later time window that partially mediated the relatedness effect on JOLs. Together, these results suggest that processing fluency, indexed by the N400, contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs when novel word pairs are learned, but not when previously studied pairs are relearned. Our results also imply that aspects of fluency not captured by the N400 and/or explicit beliefs about memory contribute to JOLs. This study demonstrates the utility of ERPs in gaining new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of metamemory., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Preferences are often based on social information such as experiences and recommendations of other people. The reliance on social information is especially relevant in the case of online shopping, where buying decisions for products may often be based on online reviews by other customers. Recently, Powell, Yu, DeWolf, and Holyoak (2017, Psychological Science, 28, 1432-1442) showed that, when deciding between two products, people do not consider the number of product reviews in a statistically appropriate way as predicted by a Bayesian model but rather exhibit a bias for popular products (i.e., products with many reviews). In the present work, we propose a coherence model of the cognitive mechanism underlying this empirical phenomenon. The new model assumes that people strive for a coherent representation of the available information (i.e., the average review score and the number of reviews). To test this theoretical account, we reanalyzed the data of Powell and colleagues and ran an online study with 244 participants using a wider range of stimulus material than in the original study. Besides replicating the popularity bias, the study provided clear evidence for the predicted coherence effect, that is, decisions became more confident and faster when the available information about popularity and quality was congruent., (Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Metamemory research makes extensive use of judgments, such as judgments of learning (JOLs). In a JOL, people predict their chance of remembering a recently studied item in a memory test. There is a general agreement that JOLs rely on probabilistic cues that are combined in an inference process. Accuracy as measured by the gamma correlation between JOLs and actual performance is usually mediocre, suggesting limited metacognitive abilities. In judgment and decision-making research, Brunswik's lens model is often used to decompose judgmental accuracy: A matching index G measures how adequately people's cue weights match the optimal weights, two reliability indices assess the predictability of judgments and environment, respectively, and a nonlinear component measures systematic variance not captured by the cues. We employed the lens model equation for the first time to analyze four published and one new JOL data sets. There was considerable interindividual variance in metamemory monitoring. Although gamma was on average higher than the Pearson correlation, it still underestimated metacognitive ability in terms of matching (G). Also, the nonlinear component was considerably higher than in other judgment domains, pointing to substantial item-person-interactions that we interpret as idiosyncratic encoding strategies. An exploratory cluster analysis suggests different metacognitive strategies used by subgroups of participants. We suggest the lens model as a potentially promising tool in metacognition research., (Copyright © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

If the distributions of two binary variables are skewed, people erroneously perceive a correlation even if the variables are actually uncorrelated. Specifically, people perceive a correlation between the variables' infrequent (vs. frequent) levels. While such systematic Illusory Correlations (ICs) can account for important phenomena, including erroneous stereotypes linking minority groups with infrequent attributes, the theoretical explanation is still a matter of debate. As proposed in the distinctiveness-based account, ICs arise due to a memory advantage for infrequent events. Alternatively, it has been proposed that ICs reflect ad hoc inferences from univariate base rates. In two experiments, we tested the accounts' predictions using a standard IC paradigm followed by (1) a contingency judgment task, asking participants to directly report contingencies, and (2) a trial-by-trial source assignment task of group membership and attribute. Bayesian-hierarchical model analysis revealed that ICs in contingency judgments were positively correlated to ad hoc inferences, but uncorrelated to exemplar memory in participants' source assignments. Moreover, inducing a focus on infrequent events improved memory for distinct events, but did not result in stronger ICs. Thus, our results support the explanation of ICs as ad hoc inferences from base rates, rather than a memory advantage for distinctive item combinations.

Recent evidence suggests that judgment biases may diminish when a problem is presented in a foreign language. This foreign-language effect has primarily been examined with emotional materials such as risky-choice problems and moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of foreign-language processing on an emotionally neutral judgment bias: the repetition-based truth effect, the phenomenon that statement repetition enhances the perceived truth of statements. In Experiment 1, we found no evidence for the truth effect to be moderated by the language in which the statements were processed (native language: Hungarian; foreign language: English). In Experiment 2, in turn, we not only manipulated language (native language: German; foreign language: English), but also the retention interval between statement repetitions. Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, language did not moderate the truth effect for statements that were repeated within the same experimental session. However, after a two-week interval, the truth effect was significantly smaller in the foreign-language condition than in the native-language condition. Overall, our findings suggest a faster decay of semantic memory for foreign-language as compared to native-language statements., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Background and Aims: Pathological buying (PB) is often assumed to be related to deficits in impulse control. Distortions in judging elapsed time are one component of behavioral impulsivity. This study was set out to examine the hypothesis that PB propensity is associated with distorted time perception, such that time is perceived to pass more slowly., Methods: The study is based on a convenience sample of 78 adults. Symptom severity of PB and related problems/disorders (substance use, borderline, depression, mania, and obsessive-compulsive disorder) as well as four dimensions of trait impulsivity were assessed. A time-production task was employed that required participants to produce prespecified time intervals ranging from 1 to 60 s., Results: PB propensity was associated with the belief that time elapses more slowly, even when controlling for symptoms of related disorders and general trait impulsivity. Neither trait impulsivity nor symptoms of related disorders were predictive of distortions in judging elapsed time., Discussion and Conclusion: These results suggest that PB propensity is related with non-specific, general deficits in judging elapsed time as a specific component of behavioral impulsivity.

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.

When making inferences about pairs of objects, one of which is recognized and the other is not, the recognition heuristic states that participants choose the recognized object in a noncompensatory way without considering any further knowledge. In contrast, information-integration theories such as parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) assume that recognition is merely one of many cues that is integrated with further knowledge in a compensatory way. To test both process models against each other without manipulating recognition or further knowledge, we include response times into the r-model, a popular multinomial processing tree model for memory-based decisions. Essentially, this response-time-extended r-model allows to test a crucial prediction of PCS, namely, that the integration of recognition-congruent knowledge leads to faster decisions compared to the consideration of recognition only-even though more information is processed. In contrast, decisions due to recognition-heuristic use are predicted to be faster than decisions affected by any further knowledge. Using the classical German-cities example, simulations show that the novel measurement model discriminates between both process models based on choices, decision times, and recognition judgments only. In a reanalysis of 29 data sets including more than 400,000 individual trials, noncompensatory choices of the recognized option were estimated to be slower than choices due to recognition-congruent knowledge. This corroborates the parallel information-integration account of memory-based decisions, according to which decisions become faster when the coherence of the available information increases. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

Typically, people are more likely to consider a previously seen or heard statement as true compared to a novel statement. This repetition-based "truth effect" is thought to rely on fluency-truth attributions as the underlying cognitive mechanism. In two experiments, we tested the nature of the fluency-attribution mechanism by means of warning instructions, which informed participants about the truth effect and asked them to prevent it. In Experiment 1, we instructed warned participants to consider whether a statement had already been presented in the experiment to avoid the truth effect. However, warnings did not significantly reduce the truth effect. In Experiment 2, we introduced control questions and reminders to ensure that participants understood the warning instruction. This time, warning reduced, but did not eliminate the truth effect. Assuming that the truth effect relies on fluency-truth attributions, this finding suggests that warned participants could control their attributions but did not disregard fluency altogether when making truth judgments. Further, we found no evidence that participants overdiscount the influence of fluency on their truth judgments.

Experience-based cues, such as perceptual fluency, have long been thought to influence metacognitive judgments (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Koriat, 1997). Studies found that manipulations of perceptual fluency via changes in font and volume alter Judgments of Learning (JOLs) without influencing memory performance (Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). Nonetheless, recent research (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014, 2016) has challenged the notion that experience-based cues such as fluency are the primary basis for item-level JOLs, arguing instead that preexisting beliefs about these manipulations are responsible for these effects. For the first time, we compared global metacognitive judgments to item-level JOLs made during study to independently assess the contribution of beliefs and experience to volume-effects on JOLs. In 3 experiments, we found evidence for strong beliefs about volume-effects on memory, both before and after a study-test phase. However, these beliefs either did not account for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiment 3) or only partially accounted for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiments 1 and 2). Further, in Experiments 2 and 3 global performance estimates (before and after study) did not differ with respect to the volume dose whereas item-level JOLs generally varied with dose strength. Taken together, our findings suggest that both beliefs and experience-based cues contribute independently to the effects of volume on item-level JOLs, but that beliefs alone cannot fully account for the effects of volume on item-level JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory predicts that, in comparative judgment tasks, if one object is recognized and the other is not, the recognized one is chosen. The memory-state heuristic (MSH) extends the RH by assuming that choices are not affected by recognition judgments per se, but by the memory states underlying these judgments (i.e., recognition certainty, uncertainty, or rejection certainty). Specifically, the larger the discrepancy between memory states, the larger the probability of choosing the object in the higher state. The typical RH paradigm does not allow estimation of the underlying memory states because it is unknown whether the objects were previously experienced or not. Therefore, we extended the paradigm by repeating the recognition task twice. In line with high threshold models of recognition, we assumed that inconsistent recognition judgments result from uncertainty whereas consistent judgments most likely result from memory certainty. In Experiment 1, we fitted 2 nested multinomial models to the data: an MSH model that formalizes the relation between memory states and binary choices explicitly and an approximate model that ignores the (unlikely) possibility of consistent guesses. Both models provided converging results. As predicted, reliance on recognition increased with the discrepancy in the underlying memory states. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results and found support for choice consistency predictions of the MSH. Additionally, recognition and choice latencies were in agreement with the MSH in both experiments. Finally, we validated critical parameters of our MSH model through a cross-validation method and a third experiment. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

How are people who generally see others positively evaluated themselves? We propose that the answer to this question crucially hinges on the content domain: We hypothesize that Agency follows a "zero-sum principle" and therefore people who see others ashighin Agency are perceived aslowin Agency themselves. In contrast, we hypothesize that Communion follows a "non-zero-sum principle" and therefore people who see others ashighin Communion are perceived ashighin Communion themselves. We tested these hypotheses in a round-robin and a half-block study. Perceiving others as agentic was indeed linked to being perceived as low in Agency. To the contrary, perceiving others as communal was linked to being perceived as high in Communion, but only when people directly interacted with each other. These results help to clarify the nature of Agency and Communion and offer explanations for divergent findings in the literature., (© 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

We propose stronger halo effects in trait assessments from positive information relative to negative information. Due to positive information's higher similarity, positive information should foster both indirect (from a global impression to traits) and direct halo effects (from traits to traits). Negative information's relative distinctiveness should foster only direct halo effects, leading to weaker halo effects overall. Four experiments support these predictions using agency traits and communion traits and behaviors. Further supporting the predictions, halo effects from positive information were visible both within (i.e., from communion/agency information to communion/agency traits) and across (i.e., from agency/communion information to communion/agency traits) these fundamental dimensions of social perception. Halo effects from negative information were visible only within dimensions. The study thereby explains why halo effects from negative information are usually weaker; it supports different processes underlying halo effects; and it provides a case in person perception where positive information has more impact than negative information., (© 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

In recognition tests, participants claim that stimuli appear more familiar after an intervening task (e.g., solving an anagram) than without an intervening task-the revelation effect. In Experiment 1, we warned half of the participants about the revelation effect and asked them to prevent any judgment bias. However, compared to a control group without warning instructions, the revelation effect remained unaltered. In Experiment 2, participants who received warning instructions additionally received accuracy feedback for their recognition judgments. We assumed that feedback would aid participants in detecting any judgment bias. Again, warning instructions and feedback failed to reduce the revelation effect. In Experiment 3, participants demonstrated that they understood the warning instructions and generally believed that they were successful in suppressing the revelation effect. Yet, again, a revelation effect occurred. The experiments suggest that the revelation effect is a robust judgment bias that lies outside of the participants' control., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people's beliefs about memory may contribute to people's predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378-384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency--operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2--partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a "take-the-best" (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the "irrelevant" information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models., (Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more valid than statements one has never encountered before. This phenomenon has been referred to as the truth effect. We conducted two experiments to assess the plasticity of the truth effect under different contextual conditions. Surprisingly, we did not find a truth effect in the typical judgment design when using a ten minutes interval between statement repetitions. However, we replicated the truth effect when changing the judgment task at initial statement exposure or when using an interval of one week rather than ten minutes. Because none of the current truth effect theories can fully account for these context effects, we conclude that the cognitive processes underlying truth judgments are more complex than has hitherto been assumed. To close the theoretical gap, we propose a revised fluency attribution hypothesis as a possible explanation of our findings., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Achieving accurate judgment ('judgmental achievement') is of utmost importance in daily life across multiple domains. The lens model and the lens model equation provide useful frameworks for modeling components of judgmental achievement and for creating tools to help decision makers (e.g., physicians, teachers) reach better judgments (e.g., a correct diagnosis, an accurate estimation of intelligence). Previous meta-analyses of judgment and decision-making studies have attempted to evaluate overall judgmental achievement and have provided the basis for evaluating the success of bootstrapping (i.e., replacing judges by linear models that guide decision making). However, previous meta-analyses have failed to appropriately correct for a number of study design artifacts (e.g., measurement error, dichotomization), which may have potentially biased estimations (e.g., of the variability between studies) and led to erroneous interpretations (e.g., with regards to moderator variables). In the current study we therefore conduct the first psychometric meta-analysis of judgmental achievement studies that corrects for a number of study design artifacts. We identified 31 lens model studies (N = 1,151, k = 49) that met our inclusion criteria. We evaluated overall judgmental achievement as well as whether judgmental achievement depended on decision domain (e.g., medicine, education) and/or the level of expertise (expert vs. novice). We also evaluated whether using corrected estimates affected conclusions with regards to the success of bootstrapping with psychometrically-corrected models. Further, we introduce a new psychometric trim-and-fill method to estimate the effect sizes of potentially missing studies correct psychometric meta-analyses for effects of publication bias. Comparison of the results of the psychometric meta-analysis with the results of a traditional meta-analysis (which only corrected for sampling error) indicated that artifact correction leads to a) an increase in values of the lens model components, b) reduced heterogeneity between studies, and c) increases the success of bootstrapping. We argue that psychometric meta-analysis is useful for accurately evaluating human judgment and show the success of bootstrapping.

The capacity to identify cheaters is essential for maintaining balanced social relationships, yet humans have been shown to be generally poor deception detectors. In fact, a plethora of empirical findings holds that individuals are only slightly better than chance when discerning lies from truths. Here, we report 5 experiments showing that judges' ability to detect deception greatly increases after periods of unconscious processing. Specifically, judges who were kept from consciously deliberating outperformed judges who were encouraged to do so or who made a decision immediately; moreover, unconscious thinkers' detection accuracy was significantly above chance level. The reported experiments further show that this improvement comes about because unconscious thinking processes allow for integrating the particularly rich information basis necessary for accurate lie detection. These findings suggest that the human mind is not unfit to distinguish between truth and deception but that this ability resides in previously overlooked processes., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

Lay theories about the tell tale signs of deception include numerous nonverbal cues; empirically, however, a focus on message content results in better lie detection than a focus on nonverbal elements. Feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990, 2012) predicts that systematic processing of message content is more likely under sad than happy moods, whereas reliance on salient cues is more likely under happy than sad moods. If so, perceivers who are asked to evaluate the veracity of a message should (a) attend more to message content when they are in a negative mood, but (b) more to nonverbal cues when they are in a positive mood. This should (c) result in more accurate identification of true as well as false messages under sad mood, mediated by (d) mood-induced differences in processing style. Three experiments tested these predictions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in a negative mood achieved higher accuracy in classifying truthful as well as deceptive messages than participants in a positive mood. Experiment 3 crossed nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and message characteristics (low vs. high plausibility). Only the plausibility of the message influenced participants' credibility judgments under sad mood conditions, whereas only the nonverbal cues influenced participants' judgments of credibility under happy mood conditions. Implications for lie detection and the interplay of feeling and thinking are discussed.

Extending the well-established negativity bias in human cognition to truth judgments, it was recently shown that negatively framed statistical statements are more likely to be considered true than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the underlying processes responsible for this effect are insufficiently understood. Therefore, a multinomial processing tree model is herein proposed to distinguish between differences in (a) knowledge or (b) response bias that may account for the framing effect. Three model validation experiments supported the psychological interpretability of model parameters. Model application revealed that the framing effect can be considered a bias: Given insufficient knowledge, individuals more likely guessed "true" when faced with a negatively framed statistical statement. The probability of conclusive knowledge, however, remained constant across frames. In summary, this article puts forwards and validates a formal model that can be used more generally to investigate processes underlying truth judgments. Based on this model, it is herein shown that one particular phenomenon - framing effects observed for statistical statements - can be considered a response bias, rather than the upshot of differential knowledge., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The notion of adaptive decision making implies that strategy selection in both inferences and preferences is driven by a trade-off between accuracy and effort. A strategy for probabilistic inferences which is particularly attractive from this point of view is the recognition heuristic (RH). It proposes that judgments rely on recognition in isolation-ignoring any further information that might be available-and thereby allows for substantial effort-reduction. Consequently, it is herein hypothesized that and tested whether increased necessity of effort-reduction-as implemented via time pressure-fosters reliance on the RH. Two experiments corroborated that this was the case, even with relatively mild time pressure. In addition, this result held even when non-compliance with the response deadline did not yield negative monetary consequences. The current investigations are among the first to tackle the largely open question of whether effort-related factors influence the reliance on heuristics in memory-based decisions., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Younger adults' "remember" judgments are accompanied by better memory for the source of an item than "know" judgments. Furthermore, remember judgments are not merely associated with better memory for individual source features but also with bound memory for multiple source features. However, older adults, independent of their subjective memory experience, are generally less likely to "bind" source features to an item and to each other in memory (i.e., the associative deficit). In two experiments, we tested whether memory for perceptual source features, independently or bound, is also the basis for older adults' remember responses or if their associative deficit leads them to base their responses on other types of information. The results suggest that retrieval of perceptual source features, individually or bound, forms the basis for younger but not for older adults' remember judgments even when the overall level of memory for perceptual sources is closely equated (Experiment 1) and when attention is explicitly directed to the source information at encoding (Experiment 2)., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Recently, the general phenomenon of a positive-negative-asymmetry was extended to judgments of truth. That is, negatively framed statements were shown to receive substantially higher truth ratings than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect are unknown, so far. In the current work, two potential accounts are introduced and tested against each other in three experiments: On the one hand, negative framing may induce increased elaboration and thereby persuasion. Alternatively, negative framing could yield faster retrieval or generation of evidence and thus influence subjective veracity via experiential fluency. Two experiments drawing on response latencies and one manipulating the delay between information acquisition and judgment provide support for the fluency-based account. Overall, results replicate and extend the negatively-biased framing effect in truth judgments and show that processing fluency may account for it., (© 2011 Hogrefe Publishing)

In the present research, we tested the predictions of different accounts of context binding in "remember" judgements. Context binding, defined as the stochastically dependent retrieval of two different context features, has previously been suggested to be due to mechanisms operating at retrieval either by cueing among context features (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) or by cueing between item and context features (Starns & Hicks, 2008). These accounts, however, do not make specific assumptions regarding the underlying memory representation supporting context binding. By contrast, here we propose that a binding process at encoding integrates item and context information into a coherent memory representation. Varying the presentation of the context features during encoding either with both context features presented simultaneously or with features spread over two encoding episodes, data from two experiments corroborate the notion that binding is produced at encoding. This result suggests that a binding process integrating the context features at encoding is necessary for stochastically dependent retrieval of context features.

According to the ease-of-processing hypothesis, judgments of learning (JOLs) rely on the ease with which items are committed to memory during encoding--that is, encoding fluency. Conclusive evidence for this hypothesis does not yet exist because encoding fluency and item difficulty have been confounded in all previous studies. To disentangle the effects of encoding fluency and item difficulty on JOLs, we used a variant of the learner-observer-judge method in which participants observed the study phase of another participant and indicated his or her JOLs. At the same time, the to-be-studied word pairs were concealed by strings of symbols. Our experiment revealed that participants use self-paced study time as a cue for JOLs when they themselves have studied and recalled word pairs before. This metacognitive monitoring of study time provides strong support for the ease-of-processing hypothesis., ((c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved.)

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the influence of situational familiarity with the judgmental context on the process of lie detection. They predicted that high familiarity with a situation leads to a more pronounced use of content cues when making judgments of veracity. Therefore, they expected higher classification accuracy of truths and lies under high familiarity. Under low situational familiarity, they expected that people achieve lower accuracy rates because they use more nonverbal cues for their veracity judgments. In all 4 experiments, participants with high situational familiarity achieved higher accuracy rates in classifying both truthful and deceptive messages than participants with low situational familiarity. Moreover, mediational analyses demonstrated that higher classification accuracy in the high-familiarity condition was associated with more use of verbal content cues and less use of nonverbal cues., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved.)

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.

Although people have been shown to rely on feelings to make judgments, the conditions that moderate this reliance have not been systematically reviewed and conceptually integrated. This article addresses this gap by jointly reviewing moderators of the reliance on both subtle affective feelings and cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval. The review revealed that moderators of the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings are remarkably similar and can be grouped into five major categories: (a) the salience of the feelings, (b) the representativeness of the feelings for the target, (c) the relevance of the feelings to the judgment, (d) the evaluative malleability of the judgment, and (e) the level of processing intensity. Based on the reviewed evidence, it is concluded that the use of feelings as information is a frequent event and a generally sensible judgmental strategy rather than a constant source of error. Avenues for future research are discussed.

Procedural justice concerns play a critical role in economic settings, politics, and other domains of human life. Despite the vast evidence corroborating their relevance, considerably less is known about how procedural justice judgments are formed. Whereas earlier theorizing focused on the systematic integration of content information, the present contribution provides a new perspective on the formation of justice judgments by examining the influence of accessibility experiences. Specifically, we hypothesize that procedural justice judgments may be formed based on the ease or difficulty with which justice-relevant information comes to mind. Three experiments corroborate this prediction in that procedures were evaluated less positively when the retrieval of associated unfair aspects was easy compared to difficult. Presumably this is because when it feels easy (difficult) to retrieve unfair aspects, these are perceived as frequent (infrequent), and hence the procedure as unjust (just). In addition to demonstrating that ease-of-retrieval may influence justice judgments, the studies further revealed that reliance on accessibility experiences is high in conditions of personal certainty. We suggest that this is because personal uncertainty fosters systematic processing of content information, whereas personal certainty may invite less taxing judgmental strategies such as reliance on ease-of-retrieval.

Background: Motivational interference is defined as the amount of impairment in a target activity due to the incentives of a non-chosen attractive alternative. The amount to which pupils experience motivational interference while studying or while performing a leisure activity in a school-leisure conflict situation is seen as depending on the values they attach to achievement and well-being. At the same time, values may also be effects of frequent experience of motivational interference in the respective areas., Aims: The study is aimed at investigating the reciprocal relationship between personal value orientations and the experience of motivational interference during studying and leisure., Sample: A total of 363 pupils (sixth to eighth graders at the time of first measurement) completed the same questionnaire twice in a 2-year interval., Method: The questionnaire included measures of achievement and well-being value orientation and the experience of motivational interference during studying and during leisure in school-leisure conflicts. For this, two scenarios were created. In regression analyses, achievement and well-being value orientations as well as their interaction terms were used as predictors for experience of motivational interference at t(2) while controlling for experience of motivational interference at t(1), and vice versa. Additionally in path models, these relations were tested in an integrative way., Results: Pupils' achievement value orientations were connected to differential changes in experiencing motivational interference during leisure and during studying in one scenario but only for pupils low or medium in well-being value orientation. Conversely, experience of motivational interference at t(1) was related to changes in value orientations 2 years later. High motivational interference during studying led to an increase in well-being value orientation, while high motivational interference during leisure was followed by a decrease in well-being value orientation and an increase in achievement value orientation. Overall, path models supported these results., Conclusions: The results are discussed in terms of value change and are linked to self-control and motivation research.

The fast-and-frugal recognition heuristic (RH) theory provides a precise process description of comparative judgments. It claims that, in suitable domains, judgments between pairs of objects are based on recognition alone, whereas further knowledge is ignored. However, due to the confound between recognition and further knowledge, previous research lacked an unbiased measure of RH use. Also, model comparisons have not been based on goodness-of-fit and model complexity as criteria. To overcome both limitations we introduce and test a multinomial processing tree model showing that it fits empirical data and provides an unbiased measure of RH use. Analyses of 8 data sets reveal that the RH alone cannot account for the data, not even when it is implemented in a probabilistic way. That is, information integration beyond recognition plays a vital role and cannot merely account for empirical data better due to model flexibility. Also, we present several validations of the central model parameter and provide demonstrations of how the model can be applied to study the less-is-more effect as well as determinants of (and individual differences in) RH use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

According to part of the adaptive toolbox notion of decision making known as the recognition heuristic (RH), the decision process in comparative judgments-and its duration-is determined by whether recognition discriminates between objects. By contrast, some recently proposed alternative models predict that choices largely depend on the amount of evidence speaking for each of the objects and that decision times thus depend on the evidential difference between objects, or the degree of conflict between options. This article presents 3 experiments that tested predictions derived from the RH against those from alternative models. All experiments used naturally recognized objects without teaching participants any information and thus provided optimal conditions for application of the RH. However, results supported the alternative, evidence-based models and often conflicted with the RH. Recognition was not the key determinant of decision times, whereas differences between objects with respect to (both positive and negative) evidence predicted effects well. In sum, alternative models that allow for the integration of different pieces of information may well provide a better account of comparative judgments., ((c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved.)

Ten personality correlates of hindsight bias were tested in a study with 75 participants answering almanac-type knowledge questions. Participants showed hindsight bias when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates (memory condition), when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates of other participants (BS = between-subjects hypothetical condition), and when hindsight estimates were compared to foresight estimates in response to equally difficult control items (WS = within-subject hypothetical condition). The magnitude of hindsight bias in both hypothetical conditions was positively associated with the participant's field dependence and his or her tendency for favourable self-presentation (as measured by social desirability and impression management). Between-subjects hypothetical hindsight was associated with the participant's conscientiousness and need for predictability and control (as measured by a rigidity scale). In a multiple regression analysis, 39% of the variance in BS hypothetical hindsight, 24% of the variance in WS hypothetical hindsight, but no significant proportion of the variance in memory hindsight could be accounted for by personality measures. It is concluded that individual differences in hindsight bias exist and must be taken into account in a complete model of the effect.

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.