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We organize image types by their substantive relationship with textual claims and discuss their impact on attention, comprehension, memory, and judgment. Photos do not need to be false (altered or generated) to mislead; real photos can create a slanted representation or be repurposed from different events. Even semantically related non-probative photos, merely inserted to attract eyeballs, can increase message acceptance through increased fluency. Messages with images receive more attention and reach a wider audience. Text-congruent images can scaffold the comprehension of true and false claims and support the formation of correct and false memories. Standard laboratory procedures may underestimate the impact of images in natural media contexts: by drawing all participants' attention to a message that may be ignored without an image, they inflate message effects in the control condition. Misleading images are difficult to identify and their influence often remains outside of awareness, making it hard to curb their influence through critical-thinking interventions. Current concerns about deep fakes may reduce trust in all images, potentially limiting their power to mislead as well as inform. More research is needed to understand how knowing that an image is misleading influences inferences, impressions, and judgments beyond immediate assessments of the image's credibility., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors report no known conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Objectives: Recent virtual court proceedings have seen a range of technological challenges, producing not only trial interruptions but also cognitive interruptions in processing evidence. Very little empirical research has focused on how the subjective experience of processing evidence affects evaluations of trial participants and trial decisions. Metacognitive research shows that the subjective ease or difficulty of processing information can affect evaluations of people, belief in information, and how a given piece of information is weighted in decision making., Hypotheses: We hypothesized that when people experienced technological challenges (e.g., poor audio quality) while listening to eyewitness accounts, the difficulty in processing evidence would lead them to evaluate a witness more negatively, influence their memory for key facts, and lead them to weigh that evidence less in final trial judgments., Method: Across three experiments (total N = 593), participants listened to audio clips of witnesses describing an event, one presented in high-quality audio and one presented in low-quality audio., Results: When people heard witnesses present evidence in low-quality audio, they rated the witnesses as less credible, reliable, and trustworthy (Experiment 1, d = 0.32; Experiment 3, d = 0.55); had poorer memory for key facts presented by the witness (Experiment 2, d = 0.44); and weighted witness evidence less in final guilt judgments (Experiment 3, η p ² = .05)., Conclusion: These results show that audio quality influences perceptions of witnesses and their evidence. Because these variables can contribute to trial outcomes, audio quality warrants consideration in trial proceedings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Ease of processing-cognitive fluency-is a central input in assessments of truth, but little is known about individual differences in susceptibility to fluency-based biases in truth assessment. Focusing on two paradigms-truthiness and the illusory truth effect-we consider the role of Need for Cognition (NFC), an individual difference variable capturing one's preference for elaborative thought. Across five experiments, we replicated basic truthiness and illusory truth effects. We found very little evidence that NFC moderates truthiness. However, we found some evidence that (without an experimental warning), people high on NFC may be more susceptible to the illusory truth effect. This may reflect that elaborative thought increases the fluency with which encoded statements are processed after a delay (thus increasing the illusory truth effect). Future research may fruitfully test whether the influence of NFC and other individual difference measures depends on whether people are making immediate or delayed truth judgments., (Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.

Some words tend to co-occur exclusively with a positive or negative context in natural language use, even though such valence patterns are not dictated by definitions or are part of the words' core meaning. These words contain semantic prosody, a subtle valenced meaning derived from co-occurrence in language. As language and thought are heavily intertwined, we hypothesized that semantic prosody can affect evaluative inferences about related ambiguous concepts. Participants inferred that an ambiguous medical outcome was more negative when it was caused, a verb with negative semantic prosody, than when it was produced, a synonymous verb with no semantic prosody (Studies 1a, 1b). Participants completed sentence fragments in a manner consistent with semantic prosody (Study 2), and semantic prosody affected various other judgments in line with evaluative inferences (estimates of an event's likelihood in Study 3). Finally, semantic prosody elicited both positive and negative evaluations of outcomes across a large set of semantically prosodic verbs (Study 4). Thus, semantic prosody can exert a strong influence on evaluative judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

People often use their own feelings as a basis to predict others' feelings. For example, when trying to gauge how much someone else enjoys a television show, people might think "How much do I enjoy it?" and use this answer as basis for estimating others' reactions. Although personal experience (such as actually watching the show oneself) often improves empathic accuracy, we found that gaining too much experience can impair it. Five experiments highlight a desensitization bias in emotional perspective taking, with consequences for social prediction, social judgment, and social behavior. Participants who viewed thrilling or shocking images many times predicted first-time viewers would react less intensely (Experiments 1 and 2); participants who heard the same funny joke or annoying noise many times estimated less intense reactions of first-time listeners (Experiments 3 and 4); and further, participants were less likely to actually share good jokes and felt less bad about blasting others with annoying noise after they themselves became desensitized to those events (Experiments 3-5). These effects were mediated by participants' own attenuated reactions. Moreover, observers failed to anticipate this bias, believing that overexposed participants (i.e., repeatedly exposed participants who became desensitized) would make better decisions on their behalf (Experiment 5). Taken together, these findings reveal a novel paradox in emotional perspective taking: If people experience an evocative event many times, they may not become wiser companions but worse, unable to disentangle self-change from other-oriented thinking. Just as lacking exposure to others' experiences can create gaps in empathy and understanding, so may gaining too much., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.)

Lay theories about the tell tale signs of deception include numerous nonverbal cues; empirically, however, a focus on message content results in better lie detection than a focus on nonverbal elements. Feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990, 2012) predicts that systematic processing of message content is more likely under sad than happy moods, whereas reliance on salient cues is more likely under happy than sad moods. If so, perceivers who are asked to evaluate the veracity of a message should (a) attend more to message content when they are in a negative mood, but (b) more to nonverbal cues when they are in a positive mood. This should (c) result in more accurate identification of true as well as false messages under sad mood, mediated by (d) mood-induced differences in processing style. Three experiments tested these predictions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in a negative mood achieved higher accuracy in classifying truthful as well as deceptive messages than participants in a positive mood. Experiment 3 crossed nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and message characteristics (low vs. high plausibility). Only the plausibility of the message influenced participants' credibility judgments under sad mood conditions, whereas only the nonverbal cues influenced participants' judgments of credibility under happy mood conditions. Implications for lie detection and the interplay of feeling and thinking are discussed.

Statements of the form "Osorno is in Chile" were presented in colors that made them easy or difficult to read against a white background and participants judged the truth of the statement. Moderately visible statements were judged as true at chance level, whereas highly visible statements were judged as true significantly above chance level. We conclude that perceptual fluency affects judgments of truth., (Copyright 1999 Academic Press.)