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When people are required to indicate the vanishing location of a moving object, systematic biases forward, in the direction of motion, and downward, in the direction of gravity, are usually found. Both these displacements, called representational momentum and representational gravity, respectively, are thought to reflect anticipatory internal mechanisms aiming to overcome neural delays in the perception of motion. We challenge this view. There may not be such a single mechanism. Although both representational momentum and representational gravity follow a specific time-course, compatible with an anticipation of the object's dynamics, they do not seem to be commensurable with each other, as they are differentially modulated by relevant variables, such as eye movements and strength of motion signals. We found separate response components, one related to overt motor localization behaviour and one limited to purely perceptual judgement. Representational momentum emerged only for the motor localization task, revealing a motor overshoot. In contrast, representational gravity was mostly evident for spatial perceptual judgements. We interpret the results in support of a partial dissociation in the mechanisms that give rise to representational momentum and representational gravity, with the former but not the latter strongly modulated by the enrolment of the motor system.

Hills often appear to be steeper than they are. The unusual magnitude of this error has prompted extensive experimentation. The judgment mode, such as verbal vs. action-based measures, the state of the observer - whether exhausted or well rested - all can influence perceived geographical slant. We hold that slant perception is inherently shaky as soon as the slope in question is no longer palpable, that is if it is outside our personal space. To make this point, we have added symmetry, texture, and depression to the list of factors that might modulate slant perception. When the frontal slope of a hill is to be judged, it appears steeper when the side slopes are steep. We have used model hills close to the subject. Their slopes were judged most accurately when binocular stereoscopic vision was permitted. When closing one eye, observers grossly overestimated all slopes. This error was larger for verbal judgments than for judgments made by indicating the slope with their forearm, however, the pattern of the overestimation remained unchanged. Surface texture mattered surprisingly little. Depressed subjects produced exactly the same results as healthy controls. We conclude that in action space and in vista space (outside immediate personal space), slopes are overestimated because the visual system attempts to turn the 2D retinal stimulus into a regular 3D object, akin to the erection tendency (Aufrichtungstendenz) found in diminished or 2D-stimuli. This tendency is inherently instable and can be swayed by a large number of variables., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

When judging interior space, a dark ceiling is judged to be lower than a light ceiling. The method of metric judgments (e.g., on a centimetre scale) that has typically been used in such tasks may reflect a genuine perceptual effect or it may reflect a cognitively mediated impression. We employed a height-matching method in which perceived ceiling height had to be matched with an adjustable pillar, thus obtaining psychometric functions that allowed for an estimation of the point of subjective equality (PSE) and the difference limen (DL). The height-matching method developed in this paper allows for a direct visual match and does not require metric judgment. It has the added advantage of providing superior precision. Experiment 1 used ceiling heights between 2.90 m and 3.00 m. The PSE proved sensitive to slight changes in perceived ceiling height. The DL was about 3% of the physical ceiling height. Experiment 2 found similar results for lower (2.30 m to 2.50 m) and higher (3.30 m to 3.50 m) ceilings. In Experiment 3, we additionally varied ceiling lightness (light grey vs. dark grey). The height matches showed that the light ceiling appeared significantly higher than the darker ceiling. We therefore attribute the influence of ceiling lightness on perceived ceiling height to a direct perceptual rather than a cognitive effect.

We previously reported that time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of threatening scene pictures (e.g., frontal attacks) resulted in shortened estimations and were mediated by cognitive processes, and that judgments of threatening (e.g., angry) face pictures resulted in a smaller effect and did not seem cognitively mediated. In the present study, the effects of threatening scenes and faces were compared in two different tasks. An effect of threatening scene pictures occurred in a prediction-motion task, which putatively requires cognitive motion extrapolation, but not in a relative TTC judgment task, which was designed to be less reliant on cognitive processes. An effect of threatening face pictures did not occur in either task. We propose that an object's explicit potential of threat per se, and not only emotional valence, underlies the effect of threatening scenes on TTC judgments and that such an effect occurs only when the task allows sufficient cognitive processing. Results are consistent with distinctions between predator and social fear systems and different underlying physiological mechanisms. Not all threatening information elicits the same responses, and whether an effect occurs at all may depend on the task and the degree to which the task involves cognitive processes.

The overestimation of geographical slant is one of the most sizable visual illusions. However, in some cases estimates of close-by slopes within the range of the observer's personal space have been found to be rather accurate. We propose that the seemingly diverse findings can be reconciled when taking the viewing distance of the observer into account. The latter involves the distance of the observer from the slope (personal space, action space, and vista space) and also the eye-point relative to the slope. We separated these factors and compared outdoor judgments to those collected with a three-dimensional (3D) model of natural terrain, which was within arm's reach of the observer. Slope was overestimated in the outdoors at viewing distances between 2 m and 138 m. The 3D model reproduced the errors in monocular viewing; however, performance was accurate with stereoscopic viewing. We conclude that accurate slant perception breaks down as soon as the situation exits personal space, be it physically or be it by closing one eye.

Recently, responses to looming visual stimuli have been shown to depend on the emotional content of the stimulus. A threatening stimulus is judged to arrive sooner compared to a neutral stimulus, possibly buying the organism time to prepare defensive actions. Here, we explored the underlying mechanism. We found that time-to-contact judgments of threatening pictures did not differ from those of highly arousing pleasant pictures (Experiment 1), suggesting that arousal, not fear, modulates the perception of looming. Specific fear modulated the effects of arousal (Experiment 2): Spider-fearful participants' judgments showed a threat advantage effect, while non-fearful participants' judgments were less affected by emotional content. In Experiment 3, arrival times were less overestimated when pictures induced arousal. However, this effect interacted with the valence of the stimulus: For unpleasant stimuli, arousal induced shorter time-to-contact judgments, whereas for pleasant stimuli, an inverted U-shaped relation was found. We propose a general content effect to explain the overestimation with neutral pictures: Pictorial content may draw visual attention to inner contours instead of to the outer edges of the picture. This could delay time-to-contact judgments according to the known size-arrival effect. Our results add to the growing literature examining affective influences on visual perception.

How do road users decide whether or not they have enough time to cross a multiple-lane street with multiple approaching vehicles? Temporal judgments have been investigated for single cars approaching an intersection; however, close to nothing is known about how street crossing decisions are being made when several vehicles are simultaneously approaching in two adjacent lanes. This task is relatively common in urban environments. We report two simulator experiments in which drivers had to judge whether it would be safe to initiate street crossing in such cases. Matching traffic gaps (i.e., the temporal separation between two consecutive vehicles) were presented either with cars approaching on a single lane or with cars approaching on two adjacent lanes, either from the same side (Experiment 1) or from the opposite sides (Experiment 2). The stimuli were designed such that only the shortest gap was decision-relevant. The results showed that when the two gaps were in sight simultaneously (Experiment 1), street-crossing decisions were also influenced by the decision-irrelevant longer gap. Observers were more willing to cross the street when they had access to information about the irrelevant gap. However, when the two gaps could not be seen simultaneously but only sequentially (Experiment 2), only the shorter and relevant gap influenced the street-crossing decisions. The results are discussed within the framework of perceptual averaging processes, and practical implications for road safety are presented., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The ability to estimate the time remaining until collision occurs with an approaching object (time-to-collision, TTC) is crucial for any mobile animal. In the present study, we report three experiments examining whether higher level cognitive factors, represented by affective value of approaching objects, could affect judgments of TTC. A theory of TTC estimates based purely on the optical variable tau does not predict an influence of the affective value of an approaching object. In Experiments 1 and 2, we compared TTC estimates of threatening and neutral pictures that approached our participants on a screen and disappeared from view before a collision would have occurred. Images were taken from the International Affective Picture System. Threatening pictures-in particular, the picture of a frontal attack-were judged to collide earlier than neutral pictures. In Experiment 3, the approaching stimuli were faces with different emotional expressions. TTC tended to be underestimated for angry faces. We discuss these results, considering the roles of affective and cognitive mechanisms modulating TTC estimation and general time perception.

Being able to exploit features of the human face to predict health and fitness can serve as an evolutionary advantage. Surface features such as facial symmetry, averageness, and skin colour are known to influence attractiveness. We sought to determine whether observers are able to extract more complex features, namely body weight. If possible, it could be used as a predictor for health and fitness. For instance, facial adiposity could be taken to indicate a cardiovascular challenge or proneness to infections. Observers seem to be able to glean body weight information from frontal views of a face. Is weight estimation robust across different viewing angles? We showed that participants strongly overestimated body weight for faces photographed from a lower vantage point while underestimating it for faces photographed from a higher vantage point. The perspective distortions of simple facial measures (e.g., width-to-height ratio) that accompany changes in vantage point do not suffice to predict body weight. Instead, more complex patterns must be involved in the height-weight illusion.

We evaluated the relationship between conscious awareness and the ERN/Ne and Pe in a digit entering task. On each trial, participants rated the accuracy of their responses on a three-point scale (incorrect, unsure, correct). The ERN/Ne was present on incorrect trials judged as incorrect. The Pe was evident on the same trials but also on correct and incorrect trials judged as unsure. We propose that the ERN/Ne occurs when there is an incorrect execution of a correct motor plan and the representation of the correct response is available for comparison with the actual response. The mismatch information that results from this comparison can be transferred to the Pe process and conscious awareness. However, the Pe process and conscious awareness do not only depend on this transfer of information from the ERN/Ne process. The Pe also occurs when there is uncertainty about the correctness of the motor plan, whether or not the plan is, in fact, correct., (Copyright © 2011 Society for Psychophysiological Research.)

Judging distances is crucial when interacting with the environment. For short distances in action space (up to 30 m), both explicit verbal estimates and locomotor judgments are fairly accurate. For large distances, data have remained scarce. In two laboratory experiments, our observers judged distances to visual targets presented stereoscopically, either by giving a verbal estimate or by walking the distance to the target on a treadmill. While verbal judgments remained linearly scaled over the whole range of distances from 20 to 262 m, locomotor judgments fell short at distances above 100 m, indicating that observers overestimated the distance they had traveled and increasingly did so as a function of actual target distance. This pattern persisted when controlling for the potential confound of fatigue or reluctance to walk. We discuss different approaches to explain our findings and stress the importance of a differential use of distance cues. A model of leaky path integration showed a good fit with our locomotor data.

We investigated the effect of local texture motion on time-to-contact (TTC) estimation. In Experiment 1, observers estimated the TTC of a looming disk with a spiral texture pattern in a prediction-motion task. Rotation of the spiral texture in a direction causing illusory contraction resulted in a significant TTC overestimation, relative to a condition without texture rotation. This would be consistent with an intrusion of task-irrelevant local upon task-relevant global information. However, illusory expansion did not cause a relative TTC underestimation but rather also a tendency towards overestimation. In Experiment 2, a vertical cylinder moved on the frontoparallel plane. Observers judged its TTC with a finish line. The cylinder was textured with stripes oriented in parallel to its longitudinal axis. It was either not rotating, rotating such that the stripes moved towards the finish line (i.e., in the same direction as the contour), or rotating such that the stripes moved away from the finish line. Both types of texture motion caused TTC overestimation compared to the static condition. Experiment 3 showed that the different effects of task-relevant and task-irrelevant texture motion are not a mere procedural effect of the prediction-motion task. In conclusion, task-irrelevant local motion and global motion are neither averaged in a simple manner nor are they processed independently.

On Earth, gravity accelerates freely moving objects downward, whereas upward-moving objects are being decelerated. Do humans take internalised knowledge of gravity into account when estimating time-to-contact (TTC, the time remaining before the moving object reaches the observer)? To answer this question, we created a motion-prediction task in which participants saw the initial part of an object's trajectory moving on a collision course prior to an occlusion. Observers had to judge when the object would make contact with them. The visual scene was presented with a head-mounted display. Participants lay either supine (looking up) or prone (looking down), suggestive of the ball either rising up or falling down toward them. Results showed that body posture had a significant effect on time-to-contact estimation, but only when occlusion times were long (2.5 s). The effect was also rather small. This lack of immediacy in the posture effect suggests that TTC estimation is initially robust toward the effect of gravity, which comes to bear only as more time is allowed for post-processing of the visual information.

The accuracy of time-to-contact (TTC) judgments for single approaching objects is well researched, however, close to nothing is known about our ability to make simultaneous TTC judgments for two or more objects. Such complex judgments are required in many everyday situations, for instance when crossing a multi-lane street or when engaged in multi-player ball games. We used a prediction-motion paradigm in which participants simultaneously estimated the absolute TTC of two objects, and compared the performance to a standard single-object condition. Results showed that the order of arrival of the two objects determined the accuracy of the TTC estimates: Estimation of the first-arriving object was unaffected by the added complexity compared to the one-object condition, whereas the TTC of the second-arriving object was systematically overestimated. This result has broad implications for complex everyday situations. We suggest that it is akin to effects observed in experiments on the psychological refractory period (PRP) and that the proactive interference of the first-arriving object indicates a bottleneck or capacity sharing at the central stage., (2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Although distance estimation has been extensively studied in the laboratory, our ability to judge large distances in the field is not well researched. We challenge the notion that large distances are uniformly underestimated. We presented different targets to observers at distances ranging from 25 to 500 m to obtain egocentric distance judgments in natural environments. Three experiments showed that observers tend to underestimate distances below 75 m in a large open field, whereas they overestimate farther distances. Both the eye height of the observer and the size of the target also influenced distance estimation. We conclude that the notion of a uniform vista space has to be reconceived.

The effects of moving task-irrelevant objects on time-to-contact (TTC) judgments were examined in 5 experiments. Observers viewed a directly approaching target in the presence of a distractor object moving in parallel with the target. In Experiments 1 to 4, observers decided whether the target would have collided with them earlier or later than a standard (absolute identification task). A contrast effect was observed: If the distractor arrived later than the target, it caused a bias toward early responses, relative to the condition without a distractor. The early-arriving distractor had no significant effect. The pattern of results was unaltered when potentially confounding information from individual visual cues was removed. The availability of stereoscopic information reduced the effect. The contrast effect was also observed if target and distractor were abstract geometric objects rather than simulations of real-world vehicles, rendering less likely a simple safety strategy activated by a potentially threatening distractor. Experiment 5 showed that the effect of the late-arriving distractor generalized to a prediction-motion task. The results indicate that task-irrelevant information in the background has to be considered in revision of time-to-contact theory.

Current theories of arrival time have difficulty explaining performance in the common but neglected case of nonlinear approach. Global tau, a variable supposed to guide time-to-passage (TTP) judgments of objects approaching on linear trajectories, does not apply to circular movement. However, TTP judgments are surprisingly accurate in such cases. We simulated movement through a three-dimensional cloud of point-lights on various circular trajectories. Arrival-time judgments were found to be above chance when observers had to determine which of two expansionless targets would pass them first. Similar to the inside bias observed in heading studies on circular trajectories, observers showed a strong bias to select the target on the inside of their own curved motion path as passing by first. Analysis of the projected target motion revealed that targets on the inside had lower optical velocities and relatively high optical acceleration rates. Empirical TTP judgments agreed best with a strategy based on relative optical velocity changes.

Transfer from perception to action is well documented, for instance in the form of observational learning. Transfer from action to perception, on the other hand, has not been researched. Such action-perception transfer (APT) is compatible with several learning theories and has been predicted within the framework of common coding of perceptual and motor events (Prinz, 1992, 1997). Our first experiment aimed at an empirical evaluation of APT and involved motor practice of timed two-cycle arm movements on verbal command without visual feedback. In a transfer test, visual judgments of similar patterns had to be made. In addition, transfer from the visual to the motor task was studied. In Experiment 2 we separated kinesthetic aspects of motor practice from preparatory and efferent contributions to APT. The experiments provide evidence that transfer between perception and action is bi-directional. Transfer from perception to action and, more importantly, from action to perception was found. Furthermore, APT was equally pronounced for participants who had actively practiced movements during training and for passive participants who had received merely kinesthetic feedback about the movement. This kinesthetic-visual transfer is likely to be achieved via visuomotor-kinesthetic matching or via timekeeping mechanisms that are involved in both motor and visual performance.