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The article examines the effect(s) of the intent of the U.S. Congress for enacting a law in the interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court of said law. Also cited are the comments by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia on congressional intent, the cases Zuni Public Schools v. Department of Education and Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services to illustrate the issue, and the systematic influence of congressional intent.

The article presents a study which examined the influence of presidential rhetoric on the political environment in which American federal judges operate. A dataset of all presidential references to judges from 1789 through 1993 is utilized to ascertain judicial behavior. The study provides a frequency count of the number of statements about judges and a model on the influence of presidential rhetoric over the collective ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the contingent attitudinal model, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database, we analyze the votes of individual judges in 1995 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. Our results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. These results suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors, the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the contingent attitudinal model and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study which examined the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches from a different perspective by focusing specifically on attempts by U.S. Congress to constrain the behavior of federal judges. Overview of previous research on legislative-judicial interactions; Analysis of principal agent relationships in political science; Research design and methodology used; Impact of statutory constraint and individual ideology on appointment of judges.

The article focuses on the international norms that affect human rights decisions in criminal and civil cases. It states that increased rights protection is determined through structure of the court and agenda of the justices. It furthers states that international norms can modify state behavior through special mechanisms of socialization processes which may bring changes in the decisions of the court in criminal and civil cases.

To what extent are lower court judges anticipating how their decisions might be reviewed on appeal? Unfortunately, few empirical analyses concentrate on answering these important questions. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on the anticipation of Supreme Court responses by judges on the Courts of Appeals. Do judges on the Courts of Appeals guess the preferences of Supreme Court justices when rendering decisions? Additionally, does this anticipatory behavior significantly impact or constrain the ability of these judges to maximize their personal policy preferences? To address these questions, I examine decisions rendered by the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1953 to 1988, and their subsequent treatment by the U.S. Supreme Court, under a strategic choice statistical framework. Initially, the empirical results indicate that Appeals Court judges do anticipate responses from the Supreme Court, and adjust their behavior according to this perceived constraint. However, this constraint is not experienced by all appellate judges. During the Warren Court era it is apparent that the constraint is experienced by all appellate panels, regardless of ideology; yet, the likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari is substantially higher for conservative decisions than for liberal ones. During the Burger Court era it is apparent that more liberal appellate panels experience this constraint to a higher degree that conservative appellate panels (and the likelihood of Supreme Court review increases substantially for liberal decisions). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically tests a formal model of strategic interaction between judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the model of contingent discretion, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions purely in accordance with their sincere ideological preferences, or do legal factors - specifically the language of relevant state statutes - constrain their ability to vote according to their preferences? Numerous existing studies of judicial behavior focus on this tension between the attitudinal and legal models to determine the extent to which judges make decisions according to their individual ideological preferences or are constrained by legal factors.This paper contributes to the literature on judicial politics by incorporating a continuous empirical measure of legal constraint on judicial behavior. We posit that legal influences and ideological influences work in tandem among state supreme court judges. These judges are influenced by the model of contingent discretion and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. Using data from the Brace and Hall State Court Database, we examine whether institutional differences across state high courts interact with potential statutory constraints (from both the state and federal level) to affect judicial behavior. By examining state court behavior we can draw inferences about the influence of statutory language on the judiciary across several institutional structures and legal environments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]