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To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.007 Byline: Christopher M. Snyder (a), Nicholas S. Vonortas (b) Keywords: Research joint ventures; Multiproject contact; Multimarket contact; Bargaining Abstract: In the first part of this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of all research joint ventures registered under the National Cooperative Research Act. We document the pervasiveness of multiproject contact, defined as groups of firms engaging in several research joint ventures together. In the second part of the paper, we develop a theoretical model providing a new rationale for multiproject contact. In the model, each project involves decisions that are the subject of negotiations among participants. The inefficiency associated with bargaining under asymmetric information can be mitigated if negotiations over several projects are combined. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA (b) Center for International Science and Technology Policy, Department of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA Article History: Received 26 April 2001; Accepted 22 March 2004

Abstract. Inter-firm collaboration is not new. What is new is that such collaboration has exploded during the past couple of decades, in parallel to the intensification of international competition. Moreover, the nature of collaboration has changed, shifting from peripheral interests to the very core functions of the corporation, and from equity to non-equity forms of collaboration. Importantly, cooperation focusing on the generation, exchange, and/or adaptation of new technologies has risen at very fast rates. Research joint ventures, the focus of this paper, belong in the latter category. The proliferation of RJVs has created extensive interest among economists, business analysts, and policy decision-makers and led to the profusion of literature on the topic. This paper critically reviews the literature in industrial economics and strategic management that deals with RJV partner motives and RJV outcomes. The paper categorizes the different streams of this literature and indicates the state-of-the-art, synthesizes important understandings, and suggests key nodes of a future research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. Research joint ventures (RJVs) have been widely acclaimed for their alleged ability to restore private incentives to undertake R&D. Economists have, however, also sounded the alarm concerning the opportunities RJVs may create for collusion between partners. The danger of anti-competitive behavior increases significantly when repeated R&D collaboration occurs between firms that also "meet" in many product markets. This phenomenon is shown to be present in a large set of U.S.-based RJVs. The question is about the incentive trade-off: Are the alleged advantages of RJVs in terms of enhancing incentives for R&D sufficient to overcome the potential disadvantages in terms of decreasing incentives for R&D due to simultaneous multiproject and multimarket contact? Significant foreign participation, high technological and market uncertainties, and the set up of "porous" RJVs may operate as a check to anti-competitive behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opinion. Comments on the effect of intellectual property rights on the rate of formation, organization, nature of research and economic impacts of research joint ventures. Proliferation of interim cooperation in research and development; Relationship between IP rights and national innovation systems; Possibilities for increased patent harmonization.