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Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Mawlid, a sacred holiday commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, holds immense power in Morocco as a communal prayer event that animates citizens, transcending its religious significance to become a potent sociopolitical tool. This article delves into the multifaceted nature of Mawlid, examining its dynamic role as both a collective expression of faith and a means of governmental control. Through the example of the Qadiri Boutchichiyya Sufi order’s annual Mawlid programming, it explores how the Moroccan government has skillfully harnessed Mawlid’s enlivening energy to further its political agendas, utilizing it as a vector to transmit the kingdom’s particular brand of Islam. However, while the government may seek to manipulate Mawlid for political gains, Moroccans are not mere pawns in this dynamic. On the contrary, the Mawlid’s animating quality extends well beyond the public sphere and resonates deeply within the private lives of individuals. By delving into this intricate web of interactions, we can better grasp the vibrant and multivalent nature of religious expression in Morocco and its implications for the broader dynamics of faith-based governance in the country today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Islamic Republic of Iran, femininity encounters a distinct conflict with the prevailing political system discourse. The rise of political Islam after the Islamic revolution has resulted in extensive limitations on women’s rights and the institutionalized suppression of their freedoms. In light of the constraints imposed by the I.R, social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have become vital spaces for accessing valuable information pertaining to competing political discourses, specifically those concerning women-related issues. This study examines the frequency and nature of women-related indicators generated by the opposition movement on Twitter from early 2020 to early 2022. The findings indicate that, relative to other groups, subversive oppositions place a stronger emphasis on women’s demands. Drawing inspiration from feminist discourse and advocating for the elimination of political Islam, subversives argue that women’s demands cannot be met without overthrowing the Islamic Republic. They focus on topics such as women’s rights violations and the individual’s right to choose whether or not to wear the hijab, thereby posing significant challenges to the I.R. These challenges were further intensified by the death of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, who died while in the custody of morality police, leading to widespread public demonstrations in the summer and fall of 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research focuses on new courses of action taken by Muslims in their fight against Islamophobia in global cities like London, Paris, and Madrid. Employing Putnam's Social Capital Theory, this article demonstrates that the most effective actions against Islamophobia are those carried out by organizations deploying both bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital reinforces primary solidarity, which allows Muslim movements to survive in hostile contexts, while bridging social capital generates links outside the group and adds diversity to the movement. Using qualitative methods such as specific observations, biographical interviews and focus groups, this comparative research identifies a typology of anti-Islamophobia actions in each city. In addition, it shows the ideological and generational tensions that can arise from the myriad ways Muslim leaders incorporate religion into their activism, and the types of alliances they build inside and outside the primary group. This research also shows how both youth and women's groups are trying to break away from these ideological confrontations by proposing new spaces of mobilization where it might be possible to turn a particular interest (the fight against Islamophobia) into a general one (the fight against extremist ideas and the defense of individual and collective rights). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces Islamic apocalyptic jurisprudence (theories of final law that will govern humanity in the End Times) to academic study. Section 1 considers why the topic has remained unexamined and suggests a basic taxonomy. Section 2 exposes the apocalyptic jurisprudence of two case studies, representing the "reversionist" and "progressivist" poles of Sunni discourses: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), and Dāwūd and his "Awaited Mahdī" movement in Egypt. Section 3 considers two further case studies, representing the "revanchist" and "idealist" orientations in Shi'i discourses: the Islamic Republic of Iran, and al-Ṣadr, a theorist of the Iraqi Ṣadrist movement. Throughout, the following aspects of the final legal system are considered: sources of law; conflicts between Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and international laws; the jurist's role; changes to classical Islamic legal theory, including qiyas and ijtihad; the legitimacy of legal schools; and new positive laws, policies, and rules of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article charts changes in the views towards popular culture of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement that operated in the late twentieth century, the Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'), a movement that altered Turkey's history and brought up its current Islamist leader – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Through a unique and intensive analysis of Millî Görüş texts and documents, the article follows significant changes in Millî Görüş discourse regarding three forms of popular culture – cinema, television, and spectator sports – from the 1970s – when these forms of popular culture were warned against – to the 1990s – when the movement recommended engaging with such culture. This article argues that these changes reflect a greater change in the movement's views on how Muslims should live their lives. Lastly, the paper suggests these changes may have occurred due to three main reasons: (1) deciding strategically to not resist the growing availability and appeal of popular culture; (2) the movement's wish to win the Turkish elections, which required them to appeal also to less pious Turks, and (3) the gradual appearance of alternative, 'Islamic' popular culture in Turkey – one which the Millî Görüş felt comfortable to promote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A biographical study through the lens of Mills' sociological imagination and Erikson's identity crisis provides a unique understanding of Dr Fauzi AR, a dedicated Islamist. Fauzi grew up in a devout Muslim family in Kauman, Yogyakarta, the heartland of the modernist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah. He was educated in Muhammadiyah schools and eventually became a qualified medical doctor. He was politically active in the Islamic United Development Party and joined Laskar Jihad, a Salafi-Wahabi paramilitary group, during the inter-religious conflict in Maluku in 2000. This article argues that the political turbulence during the democratic transition in 1998--1999 led Fauzi to have an identity crisis, which spurred his desire to participate in jihad (holy war). Afterwards, Fauzi became a reformed "maverick post-jihadist," in that he was unpredictable yet competent. He was unorthodox in his methods, remaining active in mainstream political Islam through the United Development Party while also engaging in physical jihad, which is contradictory because participation in partisan politics is forbidden by the Salafi doctrine. He also remained a heavy smoker although smoking is forbidden by Salafi religious decree. He further defied Salafism by supporting his wife in an unsuccessful bid for a seat in the national parliament as a member of the secular-nationalist party Gerindra in the 2009 election. This case study of Fauzi AR reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of political Islam and Islamic movements in the post-Soeharto era, including those who resorted to extremism and violence to achieve greater Islamisation of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime came to power in Sudan in1989, the international community was alarmed. Among other things, the treatment of Sudan's minorities was a chief concern. For instance, in his ten-hour visit to Sudan in 1993, Pope John Paul II warned against imposing Islamic law on the country's large Christian population. The concerns about the NIF regime's treatment of minorities were due to its ideological background, since particular interpretations of Islamic law discriminate against minorities. The paper examines the regime's policies toward the largest ethnic minorities in Sudan. It illustrates that the regime's treatment of minorities lacked coherence toward both Christian and Muslim ethnic groups. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the regime's minority policies were the result of shifts in alliances that followed internal divisions within the regime. As the Islamist leadership fractured, the ruling faction sought to coopt new allies, including ethnic groups, to strengthen its position in the face of relentless opposition from ousted Islamists. The paper draws on material collected through fieldwork as well as secondary sources to make its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic backsliding in many world regions has prompted scholars to study how democracies can resist and push back against autocratization, and many accounts suggest that a unified, pluralist opposition is key to mobilize voters against democratic backsliding. However, pluralist ideology is not necessarily associated with higher awareness of and opposition to backsliding, as evaluations of democratic erosions are highly contingent on political context. We illustrate this point with the case of Indonesia, a country where a pluralist government coalition has deepened democratic erosion by harshly repressing an anti-pluralist Islamist opposition. Using data from a national survey, we document that Islamist Indonesians are systematically more likely than pluralist individuals to believe that democracy has worsened: Resistance to democratic erosion is thus concentrated in the most ideologically illiberal citizens. Rethinking the pluralist/anti-pluralist dichotomy has implications for how we conceptualize democratic backsliding and assess democratic resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces a special issue of the journal Contemporary Islam that explores the topics of Islam, critique, and the canon. The authors discuss the importance of understanding how concepts related to power, authority, critique, and resistance have been understood by classical Muslim scholars. They argue against de-historicizing and decontextualizing Islamic ideas and emphasize the need for nuanced understandings of Islamic practices and movements. The collection of articles in this issue aims to complicate assumptions about the Islamic canon and engage with diverse perspectives and critiques within Islam and Islamic thought. [Extracted from the article]

The secularizing reforms of the republican elites in modern Turkey encountered Islamic resistance orchestrated by Naqshbandīs, who were declared enemies of the regime, repressed, and banned. The literature on how Turkish Islamists and the Naqshbandiyya have responded to republicans predominantly deals with either how they withdrew into a sort of diaspora or how they submitted and/or adapted to the republican regime. The consensus has been that Naqshbandīs played a role in inhibiting the infiltration of radical Islamic ideologies in modern Turkey. However, there is a lacuna in the literature on the Naqshbandī diaspora outside Turkey and its cooperation with transnational Islamic movements in building networks of resistance to secularism. Addressing this gap, this paper argues that some Naqshbandīs evaded republican surveillance and bans by creating an Egypt-based diasporic community, developing an Islamic cadre intended to eventually re-Islamize the Turkish state, its politics and society. Based on the memoirs and biographies of the prominent figures of the diaspora in Cairo, the study uncovers the connection between the Naqshbandiyya and other Islamic transnational movements, principally the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, at the ideological and institutional levels from the 1920s to the 1980s, to show how this cadre emerged and subsequently shaped the character of Islamism in modern Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the idea of political Islam as a discursive tradition within the context of Iranian Kurdistan. It challenges the prevailing essentialist and universalist approaches commonly used in the analysis of political Islam, advocating for a more adaptable and comprehensive interpretation. By conceptualizing political Islam as a discursive tradition, this study sheds light on the complex interconnections, configurations, and historical contingencies influencing Islamist discourses and movements. The paper argues that political Islam should be examined in relation to other phenomena and discourses, acknowledging its dynamic nature within specific temporal and spatial contexts. Focusing on an influential yet underexplored Islamist discursive tradition in Iranian Kurdistan during the 1970s and 1980s, the research acknowledges the hybrid nature of Islamist discourses, drawing from diverse traditions to fulfill particular objectives. In particular, it explores the perspectives of Ahmad Moftizadeh, a Sunni Kurdish Islamist and the founder of the Maktab Quran (MQ). This study investigates Moftizadeh's views on the Islamic government, positioning it within the framework of discursive tradition. It analyzes his core categories and inquiries within Islamist thought, notably emphasizing Moftizadeh's alignment of the Islamic government with the Islamic tradition of the Shura, highlighting its central role in the Islamist discursive tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the ideas of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement which operated in the late twentieth century, Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'). The research focuses on the evolution of their view on Muslim migration to 'the West' (focusing on Germany as a case study). The article demonstrates a substantive change in the movement's discourse on the subject. During the early 1970s, prominent Turkish Islamist politicians and intellectuals warned Turks against migrating to Germany. They warned of migrating to a morally corrupt country, filled with 'Western' values which are alien to Islam, a country in which Turks will neither make a good living, nor manage to hold on to an Islamic lifestyle. Two decades later, during the 1990s, Turkish migration to Germany was presented by the Millî Görüş as a model of Islamic life, Germany was portrayed as an example of a country which allows Muslims religious freedoms they can only dream of in Turkey, and migrants were shown as exemplary Muslims. This article suggests a few causes for the Millî Görüş movement's discursive change on Turkish migration to Germany, from initially seeing it as a liability, but – eventually – as an asset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out to address the root of religious-based intolerance cases in Indonesia arising out of particular groups of Muslims in Indonesia. It seeks to identify which group triggers those cases and offers a possible response for Indonesian Christians faced with this confronting reality. The case is made for a non-violent response that opens up the possibility of reconciliation with those whose political stance is opposed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Annals of Criminology is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Arts Magazine is the property of Thamar University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This briefing evaluates the role of international intervention in prolonging the Libyan conflict, from financial, logistical, and military support. The briefing concludes that foreign interference interest was not necessarily the direct reason for protracting the Libyan conflict but played an essential role in strengthening the presence of the parties in the field. The regional countries showed different interests related to the Libyan conflict, including the interests of Egypt and the UAE, which harmonized with the eastern side led by Haftar's forces ideologically in their hostility to political Islam. Conversely, the interests of Qatar and Turkey with the western side and political Islam contributed to supporting this party. Accordingly, the international intervention did not take a unified position, whether supporting conflict or peace. This led to the dispersion of international support between the conflicting parties, creating an imbalance of power to settle the conflict militarily. Moreover, some foreign parties tried to spoil the peace by biasing mediations such as the Skhirat Agreement and broadcasting their goals through internal spoilers, such as Haftar when he started the Tripoli war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017 marked a significant shift in the dynamics of Islamist movements within Indonesia's political landscape. Although officially banned, the HTI continued to operate in the shadows, employing various camouflage methods. This article analyzes how political dynamics led HTI to its outlawed status and how it adapted in pursuit of its goals amidst the challenges faced. By adopting a political opportunity structure and Islamist ideology as the theoretical framework with the case study as the method, this study scrutinizes HTI's postdisbandment endeavors at the national level and delves deeper into cases in West Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java. The primary findings of this study reveal that the disbandment of HTI reflected the peak of incongruence between the antisystem ideology they embraced and Indonesia's political structure. HTI's ideological drive to exploit electoral events in 2016-2017 eventually put them at a threshold that the ruling authority perceives as a severe threat. HTI struggled to maintain its movement, mixing overt and covert operations, and facing significant pressures and constraints. Its strength is rooted in an Islamist ideology that integrates political and religious beliefs, supported by a disciplined structure. This resilience, seen as adaptive resistance, leverages tactical ingenuity and militancy in response to external pressures and the socio-cultural context in which they operate. Nevertheless, the disbandment has rendered it nearly impossible for HTI to reestablish its expansion in Indonesia's political arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article undertakes an examination of the contentious issue surrounding the translation of "fundamentalism" to "Usulia," with a specific focus on the divergent perceptions of this concept among both Muslims and non-Muslims. Through historical exploration and conceptual analysis, the study aims to illuminate the various perspectives regarding the usage of "Fundamentalism/Usulia" within an Islamic context. Drawing from an analysis of pertinent literature and scholarly discourse, it becomes apparent that despite attempts to incorporate fundamentalist ideologies into the “Usulia” framework, most Islamists vehemently reject this translation, perceiving it as perpetuating a negative Western stereotype. The article delves into the theological, social, and political factors that underpin these differing stances, along with their implications for Islamic movements. By providing insights into this ongoing debate, the research contributes to a deeper comprehension of the internal diversity within Islamic thought and the intricate relationship between fundamentalism as a Western concept and “Usulia” in contemporary Islamic discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, interest in and conversion to Islam among non-Muslims in the West has been on the rise. There is a view in the scholarly literature that Western converts to Islam are overrepresented in regard to politicized interpretations of the religion, commonly referred to as political Islam or Islamism, and even militancy or jihadism. This article presents the findings of a national survey of Muslim Australians. It focuses on views amongst Australian converts to Islam concerning political Islam, including views and understandings of such concepts as the caliphate, shariah, and jihad, and the relationship between Islam and politics, democracy, and conflict. The findings suggest that in the Australian context, converts to Islam are not more likely, and in some cases less likely, than the broader born-Muslim population, to understand and interpret Islam in accordance with political Islamist ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of the renowned Indo-Pakistani thinker and activist Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) on the political thought of two contemporary Arab Islamist thinkers: Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). In his extensive discourse on politics, Mawdudi resurrected and popularized two intersecting notions: the Islamic state and God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah, or hakimiyya). Borrowing these two pivotal Islamist notions from Mawdudi, Qaradawi and Qutb utilized them to construct contending perspectives on politics and society in majority-Muslim states. The article argues that the divergent views of Qaradawi and Qutb can be attributed, at least in part, to the fluidity of Mawdudi's notions of the Islamic state and hakimiyya, and their pliability to different interpretations. This fluidity helps explain the different stances of Qaradawi and Qutb on whether, or not, hakimiyya is compatible with popular sovereignty and democracy. Furthermore, the article underscores the cross-fertilization of ideas between the Arab and non-Arab (in this case South Asian) parts of the Islamic World. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the idea of ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam (mastership of the world), in the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam was formulated by the movements' founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, as the ultimate goal of the MB, the last of a gradual seven-stage plan to Islamize the individual, the family, society, the government, and the state, and restore the caliphate. In an attempt to unpack this abstract concept, this article offers a contextualized reading of its use in the foundational tracts of the MB general guides, and in pertinent commentaries on some of these tracts. We point to an inherent ambiguity in the concept, which intertwines ideational and active elements of domination, ranging between the homiletical task of propagating Islam to the world and striving to rule the world. Within the MB, ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam is found to serve alternately as a privileged status of the Islamic nation, a duty, a mechanism of power legitimation, and as a source of motivation in times of despair, while utilized in anti-MB campaigns to discredit the MB and curb its internationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of lnternational Journal of Geography & Geography Education is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses the emergence of a discourse on 'political Islam' in the policy circles of European elites. It interprets this discourse on one hand as a manifestation of the further criminalization of Muslimness emanating from programs of countering 'extremism' and deradicalizing Muslim youth in the wake of the global war on terror. More specifically, the discourse on 'political Islam' is seen as an extension of countering violent extremism projects to counter an alleged non-violent 'extremism.' The article discusses three cases: Austria, Germany, and France to analyze what the fight against 'political Islam' (in Austria), 'legalistic Islamism' (in Germany), and 'Islamist separatism' (in France) respectively mean. These terminologies are analyzed as 'empty signifiers' and (Foucauldian) dispositifs that are used deliberately to legitimize state interventions to shape their respective societies. It is argued that the main shared idea is not that Muslims break the law or commit violence. Rather, the argument is that Muslims use the law to subvert their European nation-states. This aims at excluding Muslims from political life and not allowing them to shape the future of these countries. A simultaneous effort is the nurturing of an unpolitical, submissive Muslim that does not question hegemonial power structures, a project which is pursued by creating a domesticated or 'national Islam.' The article discusses these three terminologies' similarities and differences in the respective countries. In sum, the apparatus of 'political Islam' is interpreted as a means to 1) push back or exclude Muslims from the public sphere; 2) crackdown on organized Muslims; and 3) silence critical voices to these policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exploration of the quiddity of political Islam and the diverse range of categories and terms associated with it has emerged as a prominent research agenda within the social and political sciences. The application of these terms to a wide array of heterogeneous phenomena and currents among Muslim populations worldwide, coupled with the utilization of multiple theoretical approaches to define and formulate them within the realm of social studies, has posed significant challenges to their usage. The inherent ambiguity and lack of determinacy surrounding the dominant categories and definitions prevalent in the study of political Islam have led to a decline in their explanatory capacity, giving rise to a host of theoretical, methodological, normative, and political dilemmas and predicaments. This problematic state, compounded by the extensive body of research in the field of political Islam, necessitates an epistemological interrogation into the prevailing categories and definitions within this scholarly domain. Through a critical examination of prevailing definitions within the field, particularly in relation to the idea of foundation, the present article draws on the post-foundationalist approach to propose a distinctive conceptual apparatus for understanding and interpreting the phenomena categorized under political Islam. By juxtaposing the notions of discursive tradition and social configuration, the article endeavors to construct a nuanced understanding of political Islam that not only incorporates and comprehends the singular characteristics of the objects of inquiry but also encompasses varying levels of universality in elucidating the social phenomena observed among Muslims and in the Islamic world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While research on geographies of creativity have proliferated in the last few years, there has been scant attention to religious cultural and artistic practices, particularly in the context of the Middle East. This research seeks to address such gap with a focus on the Islamic and traditional visual arts scene which has flourished in Istanbul in the past decade and a half along with the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Rendered obsolete through the Western-oriented and secular cultural politics since the early republican era, art forms such as Arabic calligraphy (hat), miniature (minyatür), and illumination (tezhip) have now found currency as 'authentically Turkish and Islamic' in an art scene that emerged alongside Islamist politics. This paper examines the trajectory of Islamic and traditional visual arts through the lens of cultural and creative industries starting from the cultural politics of Islamic urban governance through the 1990s and 2000s, and to the emergence of an Islamist-nationalist authoritarianism in the past decade. In doing so, it aims to situate Islamic and traditional visual arts on the map in studies on geographies of creativity, particularly in the Middle Eastern and Islamic context, where limited attention has been paid to cultural and artistic practices. With ethnographic reflections from the field, it highlights the internal dynamics of an art scene and the potential it bears in unsettling the core concepts of Turkish Islamic nationalism from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Western democracies, decentralization is typically associated with pluralism and demands for minority rights. In other contexts, however, decentralized governance may be instrumental to conservative and exclusionary ideologies. We illustrate this point with an analysis of Indonesia, a diverse and decentralized country. By leveraging an original survey, we find that Islamist individuals are significantly more likely to support decentralization than pluralists. This can be attributed to this country's legacy of political development. As pluralist elites have long dominated national politics, political Islam has sought to empower regional governments, where Islamist agendas can more easily be implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 15th Malaysian General Elections (GE15), the first since the Covid pandemic lockdown, were supposed to bring back political stability, after three different prime ministers since 2018. The results were inconclusive with no single coalition winning the bare minimum to form a government. The King then asked Anwar Ibrahim to form a new government. The biggest surprise was the rise of Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), which became the single largest party in Parliament. Another surprise was UMNO supporting Anwar to be prime minister. The role played by the King and the Malay rulers raised questions about the state of constitutional monarchy in Malaysia. PAS's victory will have a profound impact on Malaysia's reputation as a moderate Islamic country and will accelerate the trend towards Islamic identity politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tracing back political Islam to the French Campaign that invaded Egypt in 1798, the article argues that political Islam emerged and developed from within the folds of the modern nation state in Egypt. The article conceptualizes three historical phases: from 1805 to 1849, 1849 to 1879, and 1879 to the mid-1920s. Each of these phases is centered around a common theme that characterized the discourses, knowledge, and structures of politics, the economy and "Islam", as they encountered the West, which are, in order, technology, civilization, and ideology. The works of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār will be explored as an example of the first phase, and the works of Rifāʿah al-Ṭahṭāwī will be the example of the second phase, where Islam, as it encounters politics, becomes the foundation of state nationalism. The third phase will start with a transitional period of undifferentiated discourses, but will quickly, after the British occupation in 1882, differentiate into three political Islams: liberal, represented by Muḥammad ʿAbduh and al-Ummah Party; official, represented by ʿAlī Yūsuf and the Reform on the Constitutional Principles Party; and extra-state, radical Islamism, represented by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Jāwiš, and the Nationalist Party. The article will explain the national and international political and economic contexts that surrounded and participated in the formations of political Islam in all its varieties. Against the popular academic conviction of rooting Ḥasan al-Bannā's thought in Muḥammad ʿAbduh's work, and rooting ʿAbduh in Jamāl al-Afghānī's movement, this article will explain the rupture and contradictions between Afghānī and ʿAbduh, on the one hand, and the rooting of al-Bannā's ideology in ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Jāwīš's thought, on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article examines Islamic thought and changes in state structure in Indonesia since the reform era from 1998 to the present. The fundamental change of state order in Indonesia is marked by the amendment of the 1945 Constitution and the wide space open for the people to participate in the life of the country. In this situation, progressive Islam, mainstream Islam, and political Islamist thought emerged. The main problem in this article is how Islamic thought is transformed by three variants of Indonesian Muslims in changing state order in the reformation era of Indonesia. The basic theoretical framework that is used to explain Islamic thought and changes of state order above, in addition to using the people's approach as full citizens before the state, also uses a socio-historical approach, political economy. Then the analysis used in this article is political philosophy. The main sources used are the official publications and decisions of each figure and organization related to changes in state order during the reformation era in Indonesia from 1998 to the present. The results of the study can be concluded that three variants of Islamic thought in Indonesia that are very prominent in responding to and directing the changes in state order in Indonesia become a just and welfare state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Surra Man Raa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Traditionally, Sufis, jurists, philosophers, and theologians, are known as different schools of Islamic thought, each of which has its own approach to Islamic education. However, from the 19th century onwards, another powerful approach emerged: political Islam, which also had a different conception of Islamic education. The present study tries to explain how the political conception of Islamic education was formulated in this approach. To achieve this goal, al-Afghani's ideas have been examined. Al-Afghani was one of the first Islamic theologians who formulated modern political Islam and called for accepting modern values because of their consonance with Islamic values. This article, interprets Al-Afghānī's political theology as an emancipatory proclamation that aimed at the liberation of Muslims. His emancipatory attitude concentrated on the cultural reform; and the education of the nation was the core of this cultural reform. He believed that a general education system must be established that all people enjoy from childhood; and the core of the curriculum of this education should be based on political education with the theme of the greatness of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on empirical research, this article analyzes "the specialization" of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development and the internal tensions between its political and religious vocations. The latter is one of the Islamist parties with the longest political experience in the Maghreb area which started its "professionalization" in politics at an early stage, at least since 1997–1998. However, little is known in the literature if this pragmatic decision led to the reformation of the movement's classical ideology. In fact, the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis" showed that the institutionalization of the Islamists parties does not necessarily entail their ideological moderation. By analyzing the contradictions of the structural reform between the party and the Movement for Unity and Reform this article argues that some practices could question the "specialization" thesis. It highlights that despite the "specialization," the PJD did not reform its core beliefs which are preserved for both religious and political reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article deals with the attitude of the Islamic movements towards the political system of the Modern State and analyzes the relationship between the two sides. It also sheds light on the development of the political discourse of these movements in the modern era. Islamic movements called for revival of the Caliphate System in the twentieth century, and gradually their political discourse developed into acceptance of the idea of the establishment of a modern Islamic State through the system of a Modern State. This development characterized the discourse of the majority of the Islamic movements, mainly the movement of the Islamic Brothers, who started to believe in the possibility of the application of the Islamic Law in the Modern State. Adoption of the system of the Modern State by the Islamic movements caused an intense debate between the supporters and opponents of this system and their disagreements centered on the difference between the values and principles on which each system is established: the Islamic System and the Modern System. This difference made the supporters of the Modern State work on bringing together the principles of modernity and the Islamic principles and thoughts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2020, the government of Bangladesh announced plans to erect a 25-foot-tall sculpture of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the national memorial located in the country's capital, Dhaka. This announcement caused a massive uproar among the religious ulema and quickly turned into a quasi-mass scale movement, sparking a torrent of political and religious rhetoric from both sides. This article argues that behind the religious rhetoric, the true cause underlying this fracas was purely political in nature, and tied to the clash of two contrasting nationalist dogmas. The country's Islamic political parties and the Qawmi madrasas leaders face a clear and perceived threat from the nationalist narratives expounded by the ruling political party, the Bangladesh Awami League, and this movement was a retaliatory attempt and will not be the last. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on Islam and human rights is roughly 50 years old. During this time a vast literature has been produced analyzing the relationship between the religion of Islam, Muslims societies and international human rights norms. What have we learned during this time that can further an understanding of this topic among students, scholars and members of the general public? What analytical framework is optimal? Is the crisis of human rights in Muslims societies a function of internal conditions, external factors or are they to be located within the framework of Islamic doctrine, traditions, the shariah in particular? This article grapples with these questions by looking back over the past five decades. The objective of this essay is to advance an objective framework of analysis for understanding the debate on Islam and human rights. A historical and comparative approach is adopted. Key moments that have shaped the debate on Islam and human rights are recalled. Significant political developments that have shaped the contours of the debate are examined such as the legacy of colonialism, the rise of political Islam, the role of Western policy and the failure of the post-colonial state in the Arab-Islamic world. The contributions of influential scholars and activists who have advanced the struggle for human rights in Muslims societies are also recognized in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work examines some recent developments and transformations in the Islamist discourse in Morocco. The emphasis is laid on how sharīʿa, or Islamic law, is redefined within an objective-based outlook to fit with what this article argues to be a symptom of post-Islamism. Central to these developments is the abandonment of establishing a khilāfah, "caliphate" or an Islamic state, as the main purpose for which Islamism has toiled to achieve since its inception. The article argues that the metamorphoses of Islamism in Morocco are not necessitated by some ephemeral political exigencies exclusively, but rather they reflect a paradigm shift in the ideology underpinning the Islamist discourse. To explore the aspects and implications of this shift, the article focuses on some recent works of two Islamic leaders: Ahmad al-Raysuni and his reformulation of Islamic law based on an emasculated utilitarianism and Saadeddine Othmani in his attempt to lay down theoretical and legal foundations for a silent religious secularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politics in Malaysia revolves around the tensions between the three major ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese and Indians. After the 1969 ethnic riots, the country adopted an affirmative action programme widely regarded as racist towards the non-Malays. The rise of political Islam in recent times has added a religious layer to institutional racism. This article looks at contemporary racism towards the Malaysian Chinese community and argues that things will get worse in the future owing to the omnipresence of the Malay Islamic supremacy ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia has a long history of racism towards its Chinese population dating back to colonial times. Its population has suffered through discriminatory policies and a series of racist riots, some sponsored by the state. This article examines the transformation of racism towards the Indonesian Chinese by summarising the past, before investigating recent developments. While the Chinese have enjoyed unprecedented political freedom since the fall of the racist New Order regime, they have been witnessing worrying developments, including: continuing racist attitudes of some officials and political elites; a proliferation of Shariah-inspired bylaws in the regions; and lastly, unresolved grassroots racism. Grassroots racism has become more difficult to tackle as it has intertwined with religious issues, making being anti-Chinese justifiable. This article suggests that a counter-narrative from Islamic moderate civil organisations would be needed to redress the religious sentiment in native Chinese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Late Ottoman intellectual Mehmed Akif (1873–1936) was for decades depicted in Turkish public discourse in generic terms as an Islamist radical opposed to the secular nation state. Through Akif's poetry, articles, translations, correspondence from his exile in Egypt, and biographical detail revealed in the scattered memoirs of students and colleagues, this article offers a reappraisal of his thought as a leading Muslim modernist who adapted the thinking of Egyptian religious scholar Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) to an Ottoman and then Turkish audience in the formulation of an early, prescient compromise between religion and nationalism. The article also notes remarkable similarities between Akif and Indian thinker Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877–1938), whom Akif was instrumental in introducing to Arab audiences, and suggests that, once political Islam had later gained currency across all fields of public life, Akif became an alternative to nationalist icon Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) as an intellectual symbol of the republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from literate merchants, government officials, and professionals who lacked political representation. We test these claims with a unique tranche of microlevel data drawn from a Muslim Brotherhood petition campaign in interwar Egypt. Matching the occupations of over 2,500 Brotherhood supporters to contemporaneous census data, we show that Egyptians employed in commerce, public administration, and the professions were more likely to sign the movement's petitions. The movement's supporters were also overwhelmingly literate. Contrary to expectations, the early Brotherhood also attracted support from Egyptians employed in agriculture, albeit less than we would expect given the prevalence of agrarian workers in the population. A case study tracing Muslim Brotherhood branch formation and petition activism in a Nile Delta village illustrates how literate, socially mobile agrarian families were key to the propagation of the movement in rural areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Journal of Al-Frahids Arts is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent scholarship on state–civil society dynamics in neoauthoritarian contexts demonstrates that the space for civil society is rapidly shrinking worldwide. Faced with legal, administrative, and extralegal measures that restrict operations and resources, civil society actors are forced to choose between marginalization or co-optation. This article examines the ruling party–Islamic civil society symbiosis in Turkey and identifies mutual constitution as an alternative model of the state–civil society relationship in hybrid regimes. Defined as utilitarian reciprocity between the ruling authority and civil society actors where both parties expand and consolidate their respective domains, the mutually constitutive relationship between the AKP government and Islamic civil society actors has facilitated the consolidation of neoauthoritarianism. Drawing attention to the recent rise of conservative civil society actors worldwide, the article urges the civil society and neoauthoritarianism research program to shift its focus to non-state actors that endorse non-democratic socio-political agendas and function as co-constitutors of illiberal regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erdogan's 'moderate' political Islamist administration was initially introduced in Turkey as the bourgeois state that would facilitate the implementation of neo-liberal economic order and a new cycle of accumulation of capital. However, Erdogan's breed of Islamism has proven itself incapable of constituting the bourgeois 'strong state'. The inability of political Islam to constitute the 'strong state' is rooted in its tendency toward violating the separation of the state (political sphere) from the bourgeois (civil) society—the 'perfect state'. Political Islam, by definition, is contradictory and consequently is necessarily a source of crisis; its failure in constituting the strong state is inevitable because it necessarily violates the principles of the 'perfect state'—the precondition of the emergence of the 'strong state'— 'which relegates religion to a place among the other elements of civil society'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the demise of Suharto's New Order in 1998, many observers have noted the growing influence of political Islam in Indonesia, despite its peripheral presence in national politics. A notable development was an unprecedented surge in the influence of Islamists during the 2019 presidential election campaign, many of whom were known for their intolerance of religious minorities. What ideological appeal drove Islamists into unprecedented collective action for the first time since 1998? This paper sheds light on the historical trajectory of the Masyumi and an organization called Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). More specifically, via an analysis of their discursive efforts, it shows that rather than sectarian exclusivism which has long characterized political Islam in Indonesia, historically embedded anti-authoritarian efforts developed by their predecessors during the Sukarno and Suharto regime have enabled Islamists to engage in collective actions and attract the support of many ordinary Muslims. However, such collective action will not last because they have lost the shared aspirations of their predecessors for an alternative political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outburst of The Iranian Revolution in 1978 generated fear and hope at the same time for several political forces across the West and the East. The emergence of Islam as a political force came as a surprise across all political spectrums in Europe, even though religion was already at the time becoming a determining variable in the field of international relations. The echoes of The Iranian Revolution precipitated even further the making of several organizations of political Islam in the Middle East, forging transnational identities. Through primary and secondary sources drawn from mainly British leftist organizations, this study aims at examining the responses of the British Left towards Islamic revivalism. Thus, this article gives an historical outline of the intellectual production and the strategies of interpretation adopted by the British Left during the period of 1978–2001, by exploring the main historical events that involved (political) Islam, such as The Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese civil war, the Palestinian Intifada and The Algerian Civil War. The main argument postulated is that interpretation trajectories by the British Left were highly dependent on ideological and geostrategic lineages and respective synchronic political alliances, resulting in putting the centre of gravity sometimes on Islamic activism's regressive nature and sometimes on its anti-imperialist perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When under pressure do mainstream Islamist movements moderate more, or do they moderate less? Focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, I argue that religious framing and references are reaffirmed in the discourse and programmes of the movement (and its party) despite pressure, ensuing splits and internal disputes. Through field interviews, media and content analysis, I find that the movement reacted to pressure by adopting a conciliatory stand and appeasing rhetoric towards the Jordanian authorities. However, the movement also stresses its religious themes and references as a source for mobilization and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolutionary 1960s are often seen as the heyday of socialist theories and leftist movements. In the Middle East the period until the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 is regularly perceived as the pinnacle of secular, socialist Arab nationalism in the region, whereas the rise of various forms of political Islam is often presented as a phenomenon pertaining to a different era beginning in 1979. This article proposes a perspective which situates important Islamic thinkers in the intellectual environment of the revolutionary 1960s. Starting with the Algerian war in 1954 and lasting until the Iranian revolution of 1979, I argue that the 'long' 1960s were dominated not only by Marxist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. Muslim revolutionary intellectuals, such as Malek Bennabi, Amar Ouzegane, or ʿAli Shariʿati, also took part during the Algerian war in the shaping of a new discourse in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]