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Attitudes toward outgroups are an important determinant of peaceful coexistence in diverse societies, but it is difficult to improve them. The current research studies the impact of messages with negations on outgroup attitudes, more specifically on outgroup trust. All studies were preregistered. Using different target groups, Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for the prediction that communicating negations (e.g., "they are not deceptive") enhances outgroup trust (more so than affirmations, such as "they are reliable," and no messages) among people who are initially low in outgroup trust. Three additional studies (Studies 3a, 3b, and 4), using both a causal chain approach and (moderated) mediation analysis, demonstrate that negations promote cognitive flexibility which in turn enhances outgroup trust among those initially low in outgroup trust. One final study suggests that these findings generalize to outgroup attitude change per se by showing that communicating negations also results in more moderate attitudes when the dominant initial attitude is positive (Study 5: high warmth) rather than negative (Studies 1-4: low trustworthiness). As such, communication that negates people's initial outgroup attitudes could be an effective (previously discounted) intervention to reduce prejudice in intergroup settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Past research on counterfactual mindsets (CFMs) has mainly focused on how those influence dealing with own information, without addressing the potential impact of CFMs on responses to others' information. Thus, this study examined how CFMs combined with an interpersonal focus influence responses to others' statements in a decision making context. Results reveal that a CFM combined with an interpersonal focus leads to more biased communication in response to others' information, thereby reinforcing own preferences. No such effect was observed in an intrapersonal focus or a control condition. A congruency between induction and application context thus seems to make the application of CFMs more likely. We discuss our findings in relation to previous work on counterfactual thinking and the mindset literature in general., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Social power implies responsibility. Yet, power-holders often follow only their own interests and overlook this responsibility. The present research illuminates how a previously adopted cognitive focus guides perceived responsibility when a person receives high (vs. low) power. In three experiments, adopting a cognitive focus on another person (vs. on the self or taking over another person's perspective) promoted perceived responsibility among individuals receiving high (but not low) power in a subsequent context. This effect was specific for perceived responsibility - a cognitive focus on another person did not change the perceived opportunity to pursue goals or the perceived relationship to an interaction partner (e.g., interpersonal closeness). While prior research examined how social values (i.e., chronically caring about others) guide responsibility among those holding power, the current findings highlight that mere cognitive processes (i.e., situationally focusing attention on others) alter perceived responsibility among those just about to receive power., (© 2016 The British Psychological Society.)

Numerous studies comparing the effects of competition and cooperation demonstrated that competition is detrimental on the social level. However, instead of purely competing, many social contexts require competing while cooperating with the same social target. The current work examined the consequences of such "co-opetition" situations between individuals. Because having to compete and to cooperate with the same social target constitutes conflicting demands, co-opetition should lead to more flexibility, such as (a) less rigid transfer effects of competitive behavior and (b) less rigidity/more flexibility in general. Supporting these predictions, Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that co-opetition did not elicit competitive behavior in a subsequent task (here: enhanced deceiving of uninvolved others). Study 2 showed that adding conflicting demands (independent of social interdependence) to competition likewise elicits less competitive transfer than competition without such conflicting demands. Beyond that, co-opetition reduced rigid response tendencies during a classification task in Studies 3a and 3b and enhanced flexibility during brainstorming in Study 4, compared with other forms of interdependence. Together, these results suggest that co-opetition leads to more flexible behavior when individuals have to reconcile conflicting demands. Implications for research on social priming, interdependence and competition in everyday life are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

Being aware of someone else's existing knowledge is a prerequisite to effectively adapting an explanation to that person's learning needs. However, such knowledge awareness introduces the potential for motivated self-evaluation based on relative knowledge, that is, for social comparison. Because favorable social comparisons are actively defended, we propose that knowledge awareness might undermine information sharing in explanation when social comparison motives are active. We tested this hypothesis in a series of experiments in which participants provided explanations to an ostensible learning partner with or without knowledge awareness. Both dispositionally and situationally motivated social comparison interacted with knowledge awareness to reduce information sharing in explanation. Intriguingly, knowledge awareness uniformly facilitated adaptation of the information that was shared to address partner knowledge deficit. These results illustrate a tension in the components of effective explanation. At the same time that knowledge awareness effectively coordinates explanation content, it can lead to knowledge hoarding by knowledgeable explainers who are motivated to rely on knowledge differences between the self and the explanation recipient for self-evaluation., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)