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The purpose of this article is to establish the value of looking at global governance from the point of view of those who are governed, thereby making them more visible in a field in which they have often had too little profile. This is a necessary addition to an evolving global governance scholarship that seeks to highlight greater sensitivity to issues of complexity, time, space, continuity, and change. We explore recent advances in the literature emphasizing that, although much has been done to enhance global governance as an analytical endeavor, far more intensive efforts are required to reflect the everyday experiences of the globally governed. Three examples of everyday global governance are provided to illustrate how more meaningful research could be accomplished and the potential payoffs that could result. KEYWORDS: global governance, the everyday, international organization, international law, world order., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE EVOKES IMAGES OF WELL-PAID AND WELL-FED INTERNAtional bureaucrats in New York and Geneva, world conferences in glamorous cities on issues of planetary significance, and geopolitical wrangles about appointees [...]

In this article we explore what a programme of 'reglobalization' could look like for the governance of global trade. Our focus is on the centrepiece of the current commercial order, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our aim is to illustrate the potential value of a reformulated WTO not just for commercial relations globally but also for other areas of social concern. We seek to be both practical and challenging. We seek to be practical by establishing what a programme of WTO reform might look like in the near-to-medium term, including changes to the negotiating process and opening up the WTO to non-state actors. We seek to be challenging by setting the transformation of global trade governance within the context of a thorough process of reglobalization wherein the primary public mechanisms of global governance are reoriented towards the delivery of progressive social and environmental outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conclusion of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Buenos Aires ministerial conference (10–13 December 2017) was immediately celebrated and derided in equal measure. For its supporters, Buenos Aires opened the way toward negotiations in e‐commerce, investment facilitation for development, and measures designed to help micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs). For its detractors, the meeting underscored the gridlock that continues to blight the WTO's negotiating function and underlined the organisation's declining credibility as a mechanism for governing global trade. In this paper we provide one of the first full length critical evaluations of the Buenos Aires conference and its outcome. In so doing, we offer answers to three questions. What accounts for such dramatically different assessments of the meeting's outcome? How should the outcome be interpreted? What is its significance for the future of the WTO and the multilateral trading system? We argue that the meeting's outcome was indeed significant. It has consolidated the process of reconfiguring the WTO's negotiating function; and it enables members to tackle more effectively a range of pressing economic and social issues as well as to navigate blockers and blockages in the negotiations. However, it also poses challenges for the WTO's poorest constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper peers backwards into the history of the multilateral trading system and its development over the past half century as a means of considering what may lie beyond the horizon for the future of global trade governance. Its purpose is to underscore the necessity and urgency for root-and-branch reform of the multilateral trading system. It achieves this by comparing and contrasting the global trading system of 50 years ago with its modern-day equivalent and its likely future counterpart half-a-century hence. In so doing, the paper throws into sharp relief not only the inadequacies of global trade governance today but also the damaging consequences of not fundamentally reforming the system in the near future, with a particular emphasis on the past, present and future development of the world’s poorest and most marginalised countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the role crises play in enabling existing systems of global economic governance to evolve and endure while also preserving underlying power dynamics. The article uses global trade governance as its case-study. Its aim is to explore the impact of the negotiating crises that beset the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha round of trade negotiations. The article traces how, over the course of the Doha round, periodic crises resulting from divergent pressures for opposing outcomes combined to preclude one set of institutional developments from resulting (those on which the Doha round had been launched and the basis upon which developing countries negotiated) while enabling others (those advanced by the leading industrial states). The result has been to usher in changes that have returned global trade governance to a form of system management more familiar to observers of the multilateral trading system of the 1970s.This 'retro' form of trade governance signals a departure from the more inclusive system that had emerged from the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and evolved during the WTO's early years, replacing it with a lither system of mini-lateralism more fit for industrial country purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This concluding article argues that while the actions of emerging powers have left an indelible mark on the way multilateral trade is governed, they have not been able to disrupt to any significant degree the deeper structures of power that underpin the World Trade Organization (WTO). While emerging powers have proven to be important players in the Doha negotiations, particularly in the closing stages, they have ultimately come up against a glass ceiling that prevents their further rise. This ceiling is the product of a series of institutional factors that combine to facilitate alterations in the general arrangement of members one-to-another but which prevent deeper configurations of power from being disturbed. The result is that while we may have witnessed some changes in the multilateral trading system, these have been more akin to a rearrangement of the multilateral furniture than to a fundamental transformation of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a full-length evaluation of the World Trade Organization's ( WTO) decisive December 2015 Nairobi ministerial conference. It examines the dynamics of the meeting, the emergence of a new negotiating mode, and the contestations between key developing and developed members; it explores the substance of the deal negotiated; and it reflects on the future capacity of the WTO to serve as a means of securing trade gains for developing and least developed countries. Three arguments are advanced. First, the use of a new mode of negotiating brought participation and consensus into the core of the Nairobi talks, but it also resulted in an agreement that moves away from the pursuit of universal agreements to one wherein more narrowly focused piecemeal deals can be brokered. Second, the package of trade measures agreed continues an established pattern of asymmetrical trade deals that favour developed members over their developing and least developed counterparts. Third, Nairobi alters fundamentally the likely shape of future WTO deals with significant consequences for developing country trade gains. The likely result is that while Nairobi will energise the multilateral system it will do so in a way that is of questionable value to developing and least developed countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations teeters on the edge of an abyss of irrelevance. As an academic pursuit, it has become disparate and fragmented. Those of us in the discipline have ceased to pursue greater clarity in the way that we understand the world around us. Moreover, we have failed as agents of change; that is, as purveyors of opinion and proposals about a better and fairer world order. As such, we no longer serve our students and those practitioners who seek our advice, or, for those of us who take on policy jobs, to push out the envelope of what is considered acceptable. Global governance offers one potentially compelling way of "saving international relations" though it is not without its problems. This article outlines how and why. The argument unfolds in three parts. The first outlines why and how IR teeters on the edge of an abyss. The second offers a proposal for moving beyond the fragmentation and atomization that afflicts international relations. We suggest that one way of encouraging reengagement is to return to debating grand questions that used to be the sustenance of IR. The third part argues that global governance--appropriately and specifically framed to make it fit for purpose--offers an opportunity to return to these questions and, in so doing, reinvigorate our fragmented and atomized field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has elicited a voluminous response from scholars, business groups, journalists and beyond. Within this literature, a 'China Threat Theory' has emerged which portrays China as a destabilizing force within global politics and economics. Though originating in Realist accounts, this China Threat Theory has spread across to other approaches, and it increasingly forms the backdrop against which scholarly work positions itself. Our article contributes to this debate by examining China's role within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It assesses the extent to which China has been the disruptive power that it is often claimed to be. In particular, the article examines the change identified in Chinese diplomacy around 2008, and argues that this is attributable to the process of learning and socialization that China had to undergo as a new member, coupled with its elevation to a position of decision-making power. Contrary to the China Threat Theory, we find little to suggest that China has adopted an aggressive system challenging mode of behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two distinct literatures have emerged on the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and its likely benefits for developing countries. One is built on the use of computable general and partial equilibrium simulations, while another explores the political economy of the negotiation process to explore the opportunities a concluded round will bring for developing countries. Both literatures generate important insights into the DDA, and both highlight that the deal on offer to developing countries is very weak. However, there has been little engagement between these two bodies of thought. This paper seeks to begin to redress this, fusing a review of the simulations of likely DDA gains with an examination of the passage of the Doha negotiations. It argues that through this process we can arrive at a fuller understanding of how limited, and problematic, the results of the DDA are likely to be for the less developed countries. If the DDA is to deliver on its mandate, a qualitative shift in the negotiations is required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the World Trade Organization's ministerial conference in Hong Kong in mid December 2005. The aim of the meeting was to inject energy into an increasingly delayed and periodically fractious round of trade negotiations, the so-called Doha Development Agenda. The Hong Kong meeting was the first time trade ministers had gathered for a full conference since the collapse of the meeting in Cancun, Mexico.

Evaluates the World Trade Organization's (WTO) accomplishments after its emergence from the Uruguay Round in 1986-1994. Contributions to the growth in world trade; Coherence brought by the WTO in global economic policy making; Progress in the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements; Public image of the WTO; Obstacles facing the WTO.

Analyzes the failure of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization within the context of the evolution of post-war international trade regulation. Background on historical institutionalism; Components of the post-war system of economic management; Evolution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

As well as consolidating and enhancing the process of trade liberalisation, the completion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) formalised the expansion of multilateral trade regulation into areas of commercial activity previously deemed to be trade-related. This expansion, however, has been highly uneven, privileging the needs of capital, and to a much lesser degree land, over labour. Attempts to secure a degree of regulatory protection for labour in the legal framework of the WTO-by requiring that the Organisation's members adhere to a set of core labour standards when engaged in trade-producing activities-have so far failed. Both the Singapore (1996) and Geneva (1998) Ministerial Meetings of the WTO witnessed discussion of this issue, yet neither resulted in a comprehensive and satisfactory outcome for labour. That said, significant opportunity exists for the reconstruction of the trade-labour standards debate within the WTO. This article, seeks to demonstrate how this might be the case. In doing so, it first reviews the process of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO involvement in the regulation of trade-related areas. Second, it explores the current deadlock that characterises the issue of trade and labour standards within the WTO's legal framework as well as the more significant positions that have emerged among the Organisation's membership by focusing on British, US and EU involvement in this issue. Third, it identifies the reactions of certain key member states to the protests of civil society at the 1998 Geneva Ministerial Meeting of the WTO as the means by which the issue of trade and labour standards may once again be raised. And finally, it considers how the effective regulation of labour standards might be made within the confines of the WTO's legal framework by examining a range of options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]