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Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of four democracies, the US, India, Japan, and Australia, was first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his 'confluence of two seas' speech that subsequently embarked on the path to the foundation of the group. Quad perceives China's economic growth, which enables her to transform the world order as a threat and aims at containing the growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean by the Quad members were one such exercise. This paper, aims to analyze the formation of Quad and will contemplate whether the group is causing confrontation or stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. The paper will also assess that the Quad is designed to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-pacific and Indo-pacific regions. Containing China is likely to create a confrontation in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the report of a task force established by Australia India Institute (AII) director Amitabh Mattoo concerning security in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). It mentions that the Task Force was comprised of both Indian and Australian international relations scholars. The three sections of the report deals with the changing security dynamics in the region, the multidimensional security concept, and the roles of Australia and India in Indo-Pacific security. Moreover, the research and policy recommendations of the report include the development of cooperative mechanism, cooperation of Australia and India in maritime security issues, and collective action.

With fast-growing economies, defence capabilities and international interests, China and India are becoming increasingly active as contributors of public goods in international security, such as anti-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, capacity-building, stabilisation and peacekeeping. This article examines the drivers and characteristics of China's and India's growing roles in contributing to security public goods. It also considers the extent to which modernisation of these rising Asian powers' conventional military capabilities is suited for these roles; the conditions under which China and India might expand such activities; and some of the possible consequences of enhanced Chinese and Indian roles in protecting the commons using military means. Those effects include potential impacts on the management of transnational security problems, the extension of Chinese or Indian geopolitical influence, the worsening of Sino-Indian strategic competition, and the ways other powers might respond, particularly in situations where China or India act unilaterally. Policy implications for existing public goods providers, such as Australia, are briefly considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]