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China's material interests are in a stable global order, given the immense benefits that Beijing has enjoyed under extant conditions. Although some accounts seek to portray China as a revisionist power, this is not consistent with the interests of China's growing economy or its transnational elites. Rather, Beijing requires that the status quo remains, at least when it comes to the basic economic underpinnings of the global system. Given some of the contradictions within the Chinese economy, a calm global order whereby China seeks to resolve its problems is critical for Beijing. Thus China can be expected to continue to support and contribute to the global capitalist system, rather than seek to change it in any meaningful fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Chinese arms sales to Africa have increased in recent years. In a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes, and where arms sales are a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence, this is inherently problematic. The sale of weaponry to a regime in Khartoum caught up in an alleged “genocide” in Darfur, the awkward appearance in 2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with weapons bound for Mugabe's Zimbabwe off the coast of eastern Africa, and the recent exposure in 2011 that Chinese arms companies offered to sell around $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi's regime are emblematic of an issue in Africa's political violence that needs analysis. This article seeks to discuss the rationale behind China's arms sales to Africa and the effect that they have had on political violence in recipient countries. It also provides an analysis of the supply-and-demand circumstances of Chinese arms transfers to Africa, Beijing's attempts to control such transfers, and evidence that Chinese policies on proliferation are (slowly) evolving. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite endeavoring to construct an image as a contributor to a "harmonious world," China faces criticism for bringing neocolonialism back to Africa. This case study of Uganda offers a quantitative and qualitative basis for examining how young Ugandans understand and interpret "China" and "the Chinese." It also suggests how these perceptions could be applied to Sino-African relations in general and the Beijing-Kampala relationship in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has, in the past decade or so, emerged as an important contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, with Chinese peacekeepers serving in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sudan. Indeed, China currently sends more peacekeeping troops abroad than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is a major development in Sino-African relations. China's stance on peace operations is closely tied to its attitude on state sovereignty and this limits the type of interventions that Beijing is prepared to sanction vis-a-vis its role in peacekeeping missions. Yet it appears that Chinese policy in this regard is evolving. This study discusses why and how China's role in peacekeeping in Africa has played out and the likely directions this is to take in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In seeking to cultivate external relations with African countries, China has long stressed its commonly shared roots with African nations as a developing country rather than a Western state, and as such the symbolic attraction of China clearly reverberates with many African elites who seem to look on China as a positive development model. However, it should be noted that this has not been embraced solely by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes but in fact China's approach to non-interference has struck a chord even with those democratically elected leaders in Africa. While such practices clearly benefit African elites, it is remains doubtful that they do so for ordinary Africans, although sustained analysis suggests that the potential exists, albeit hampered by the modalities of governance on the continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government and its companies have dramatically increased their presence in Africa in the last decade. There has been much media interest and commentary on the impacts of this engagement on governance in Africa, as it is often seen to be strengthening authoritarian states, such Sudan and Zimbabwe.1 However, Chinese actors are also engaging with more democratic states and spaces, such as Zambia. This article seeks to explore the impacts of increased Chinese engagement with Africa on governance through a comparative case study of two contrasting cases: Sudan and Zambia, using the concept of flexigemony. Contrary to popular perception, behaviour by Chinese actors has sometimes been a moderating force in Sudan, while provoking violence in Zambia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched in 2001 as the pre-eminent vehicle to promote Africa's recovery. Initially it was enthusiastically promoted by a select number of countries in Africa, as well as by key members within the G-8. The European Union was active in its support, particularly vis-a-vis governance issues, stating that the EU 'finds that Africa's development efforts are best served by a greatly sharpened focus on NEPAD as the basis for partnership between Africa and the international community'. However, there have been significant problems facing NEPAD. These revolve around the actual extant political economy and dominant political cultures across Africa, which the technocratic neoliberal agenda of 'good governance' cannot deal with. Furthermore, the rise of Chinese engagement with Africa adds a major difficulty to Brussels' claim to be a key engine in supporting NEPAD's goals regarding governance and development. Indeed, the emergence of Chinese actors in Africa threatens to make much of the EU's policies on governance largely irrelevant, although it is acknowledged that, in the long term, Beijing's policy interests are not served by chaotically ruled states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular perceptions of China and its global role are often shaped by two words: 'made in'. Yet this vision of China that focuses primarily on Beijing as a coming economic superpower is relatively new, and it is not that long ago that two other words tended to dominate debates on and discourses of China: 'human rights'. To be sure, real interest in human rights in China was never the only issue in other states' relations with China, nor consistently pursued throughout the years (Nathan, 1994). Nor did human rights totally subsequently disappear from the political agenda. Nevertheless, the rhetorical importance of human rights - perhaps best epitomised by the narrow defeat of resolutions condemning Chinese policy in 1995 at the Human Rights Council in Geneva — stands in stark contrast to the relative silence thereafter as the bottom line of most states' relations with Beijing took on ever greater economic dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nigeria has become one of China's most important trading partners. China is investing heavily in Nigeria in both commercial and political terms. This article analyses the relationship between China and Nigeria and suggests ways it might develop in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For all the rhetoric surrounding globalisation, its meaning remains both vague and elusive and symbolises a host of different things to different people. In the main, however, most studies are marked by a restricted theoretical and empirical base, which precludes such studies from being truly global. They are generally predicated on selected examples from the core, with an occasional nod in the direction of experiences outside the familiar. While there are sporadic references to Asia and Latin America (invariably in the context of collapsing currencies and capital flight) there is almost no mention at all of Africa, South Asia, the Pacific region or Central Asia. That this neglect impoverishes the discipline of International Political Economy (ipe) is self-evident. It is argued that an ipe that is comparative by nature and takes into account the multi-variegated nature by which globalisation affects the global political economy, in particular recognising that the developing world has been, to a large extent, left out of the debate, is required if we are to make ipe truly global in scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the position of Africa in the world politics. Colonialism, neocolonialism, debt, structural adjustment programs and now "globalization" are all said to provide explanations for the continent's plight, while its leaders have been tacitly exonerated from almost all blame. Volatile commodity prices complicate economic policymaking and planning, and an unequal trading relationship helps to maintain Africa's marginalization, particularly with regard to subsidies and tariff and non-tariff barriers in the developed world.

Through a series of meetings and consultations over the past four years--known as the Kimberley Process--representatives from government, civil society and the diamond industry have devised a regulatory framework that aims to end the trade in conflict diamonds. This article assesses the accomplishments and challenges associated with the regulatory framework ranging from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) on the production and export of diamonds to the 'chain of warranties' upheld by diamond wholesalers and retailers. By tracing the evolution of conflict diamonds as a pressing human security concern in international politics, we demonstrate that the ongoing Kimberley Process represents an intriguing development in global governance and multi-track diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The launch in July 2001 of the New Africa Initiative was a culmination of events over the last two years involving the emergence of a group of African leaders who have increasingly played a prominent role in negotiations between Africa and the developed world. This 'New Africa', initially comprising Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa but now more diffuse, has been welcomed at a great number of elite gathering points by the North. This article investigates what is 'new', if anything, about the positions being advanced by this group. The article contends that a hearing is being granted to the New Africa representatives precisely because the message communicated fits the neo liberal discourse. While appreciating elements of New Africa's agenda, it is feared that there is no obvious strategy to be found in the New Africa Initiative inequalities of the global political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-à-vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how far the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has sabotaged the attempts of South African President Thabo Mbeki to engineer an African Renaissance. It does so in three stages. The first section discusses how South Africa's African policy has been influenced by Mbeki's vision of a renaissance and exactly what this has entailed. The second section then provides an analysis of the conflict in the DRC and suggests that the primary factor driving the violence is a form of klep-tocratic political economy, what we call vagabondage politique. The third discusses South Africa's unsuccessful attempts to broker a peace agreement. The article concludes that, ironically, the very neo-liberal principles that lie at the heart of Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance have contributed to the erosion of the neo-patrimonial state in Africa and actually encouraged the growth of what William Reno described as 'warlord capitalism'. Thus, instead of understanding the war in the DRC as the antithesis of an African Renaissance, it may well represent a prophetic glimpse of what the dark side of neo-liberalism has in store for areas of the globe that remain peripheral to the affairs of the great powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cairns Group is a coalition of medium-sized agricultural exporting countries who have grouped together to pursue common agricultural trade objectives in world trade negotiations. Membership currently comprises 15 member states of whom six also belong to the Commonwealth. However, a number of these Commonwealth countries have taken a leading role in the Group's activities and have led the Group into becoming a successful example of a bridge-building coalition between developed and developing nations. This in part mirrors the Commonwealth's own experiences. This article examines the origin and role of the Cairns Group in international politics. It is written with particular reference to South Africa's own activities within the body--a Commonwealth nation that has rapidly risen to prominence within the Cairns Group and in international trade talks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The horrors of Bosnia and Rwanda notwithstanding, South Africa suggests that people of difference can live together in harmony. Yet for all the celebratory rhetoric regarding the South African transition, a note of caution must be sounded, South Africa's future is far from settled and remains, a full six years on, an open-ended process. The country's peoples are only just now exploring a series of associations in which publics, programmes, procedures and politics will come to play their respective parts. So, the "miracle", as many observers readily describe the "new" South Africa, seems reflective of a liberation from the country's unhappy past, rather than a confident belief in a secure future for the "Rainbow Nation." Much of this optimistic fervour over South Africa's future is derivative of the continuities that have survived the end of legalised apartheid. All manner of everyday experiences in South Africa are said to be in a process of "change" or are said to be "new." This is not to belittle what has genuinely changed, but a responsible, reflexive position demands a more critical perspective. Seen in this light, positioning the South African transition within the ongoing discourse of globalisation, is a vital prerequisite for any coherent analysis of South Africa's change and the country's prospects for peace.

Following Robert Cox, the essential function of multilateralism is seen as the institutionalisation and promotion of an ongoing hegemonic project. Yet, taken alone this understanding is unsatisfactory in explaining wholly the behaviour of international organisations and in particular the Commonwealth’s relationship with South Africa. By making use of Frederick Gareau’s notion of de-legitimisation as well as legitimisation, a fuller understanding of multilateralism and the Commonwealth as a particular organisation is crafted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Intrusion of the Sino-Soviet in the liberation struggle during the mid-1960s; Refusal of the Soviet Union to provide assistance to the Pan-Africanist Congress; Involvement of Beijing in the diplomatic struggle against Pretoria.

Examines multilateral diplomacy in South Africa's foreign policy. Availability of instructive studies on individual aspects of the country's multilateralism; Absence of a clear and systematic treatment of multilateralism in the legislative and executive branches of government; Evaluation of reasons and conceptual underpinnings.

Former South African president Nelson Mandela was consistently used as a tool of the Pretoria government's foreign relations. Despite Mandela's moral stature there are limits to the portrayal of South Africa as something special, rather than just another country. There have been failures as well as successes and a pursuit of issues that secure international respectability rather than embody the ethos of the Rainbow Nation. The authors contrast how water or housing policies in South Africa are discussed in the context of their effect on the poor while foreign policy is divorced from such popular considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC's) and Africa in the 1990s. In-depth look at trade between China and Africa during the 1980s; Details on China's aid to Africa during the 1980s; Examination of China's economic dealings with Africa.

The diplomatic struggle between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been a consistent feature of the African landscape since the continent first embarked on the evolution to independence. For Taipei, Africa offers an area of operations for its attempts to break out of the diplomatic isolation forced upon it by Beijing. On its part, the PRC is determined not to allow Taipei international breathing space, for in its view such a raised profile would undermine its own legitimacy as the ruler of the Chinese people, and raise doubts regarding its unofficial claim to be the "leader" of the Third World. Furthermore, African nations have provided a large support constituency for China in its clashes with the West over human rights and democratization. Beijing can ill-afford to dispense with such support at international forums. vet Taipei has refused to submit to Chinese pressure and continues to have a presence in Africa. With this in mind, the diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC on the African continent is likely to continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beijing's involvement in Angola in the mid-1970s as a testing ground for the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) position toward the superpowers was a disaster for its foreign policy in southern Africa. As it ended up on the vide of the United States and regional pariah South Africa. Chinese policy was commonly perceived as lacking an awareness of African intricacies and of being opportunistic. As a result, Beijing was excluded from Angola by a government bitter at the PRC's support for the rivals in its civil war. Only after skillful diplomacy and a change in attitude by Angola toward its ties with Moscow, combined with China's pragmatic foreign policy, was Beijing able to establish linkages with Luanda. Since then, Sino-Angolan relations have become comparatively strong and are likely to develop further as China views Angola as a potentially wealthy and strategic nation slowly emerging from a paralyzing civil war [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of International Relations in South Africa is largely underdeveloped at a theoretical level and a large proportion of analysts within the academy remain wedded to neo-realism. This article advances a movement beyond the theoretical predicament that the academy has reached by critically examining the work of those whose approach has been dominant. It explores the ramifications that neo-realism and its associated objectivist epistemology has regarding ongoing power relations and alternative discourses. An argument for a more reflectivist theoretical position is suggested as a way forward for South African International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]