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In the twenty-first century, cyberspace and the 'real world' have become inseparable. The stability and security of cyberspace therefore affect, in increasingly profound ways, the economies, international reputations, national security, military capabilities and global influence of states. In their short history, operations in cyberspace have already been used extensively by states and their non-state supporters for many purposes. They are an inevitable aspect of contemporary international affairs while carrying significant risk. In this Adelphi book, Marcus Willett, a former deputy head of GCHQ, argues that there is no coherent or widely shared understanding of what cyber operations really are, how they are used and what they can do; or of their implications for strategic affairs and international law; or what their 'responsible' use really entails. The myths and misunderstandings that abound tend to dull the conceptual clarity needed by strategic policymakers and overseers, and they complicate the essential task in a liberal democracy of maintaining public consent for, and legitimisation of, the development and use of such capabilities. The book sheds light on these issues, exposing myths and clarifying misunderstandings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-ROK boundary disputes in the Yellow Sea and the associated fishing conflict are often neglected in the rich body of literature on China's maritime disputes. This article examines the question of why and how China has persistently pursued a de-escalatory posture in the Yellow Sea in the past decade despite having considerably hardened its posture in the East and South China Seas. I argue that the high stakes China has in its bilateral ties with South Korea create strong incentives for Beijing to deescalate maritime controversies whereas the absence of broad-based hawkish pressure at home creates a permissive domestic political climate for Beijing to pursue de-escalation. This paper also evaluates conditions that may facilitate a hardening Chinese position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-U.S. inadvertent escalation has been a focus of recent international relations literature. The current debate, however, has not paid sufficient attention to two important factors: the survivability of China's nuclear forces under unintentional conventional attacks; and China's nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) system. Based on detailed analysis of these two variables, three potential mechanisms of China-U.S. inadvertent escalation are examined: use-it-or-lose-it, unauthorized/accidental, and damage-limitation. Although the possibility of a major China-U.S. conventional war inadvertently escalating to a nuclear level cannot be excluded, the risk is extremely low. China's nuclear forces would survive U.S. inadvertent conventional attacks and, thus, are unlikely to be significantly undermined. Even though China's NC3 system might be degraded during a conventional war with the United States, Chinese leadership would likely maintain minimum emergency communications with its nuclear forces. Moreover, China's NC3 system is highly centralized, and it prioritizes "negative control," which can help to prevent escalation. China's nuclear retaliatory capability, although limited, could impede U.S. damage-limitation strikes to some extent. To keep the risk of inadvertent escalation low, both sides must take appropriate precautions and exercise self-restraint in their planning and operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technologies for creating and distributing knowledge have impacted international politics and conflict for centuries, and today the infrastructure for communicating knowledge has expanded. These technologies, along with attempts to exploit their vulnerabilities, will shape twenty-first-century great power competition between the US and China. Likewise, great power competition will shape the way China develops and uses these technologies across the whole spectrum of competition to make decisions, disrupt the operational environment, and destroy adversary capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceptualizes the emerging detente within inter-Korean relations as evidence of tangible transformations within North Korea's domestic and foreign policy, establishing how this phenomenon represents a unique and conclusive opportunity for peace and engagement. It contextualizes the inter-Korean and Singapore summits as foundations for the detente, before expanding upon the nature of the detente through the contrasting objectives of North and South Korea, and the transitional nature of domestic affairs in North Korea. The article establishes the bona fide nature of North Korea's detente, as revealed by a direct connection between North Korea's international diplomatic gestures vis-av-vis transitional domestic circumstances; involving incremental economic modernization and political liberalization under a shift in focus within Kim Jong-un's Byungjin Line policy. This analysis departs from and orthodox Western interpretation of inter-Korean relations, providing a holistic analysis of inter-Korean affairs and North Korean domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst fears over artificial intelligence 'arms races', much of the international debate on governing military uses of AI is still focused on preventing the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Yet 'killer robots' hardly exhaust the potentially problematic capabilities that innovation in military AI (MAI) is set to unlock. Governance initiatives narrowly focused on preserving 'meaningful human control' over LAWS therefore risk being bypassed by the technological state-of-the-art. This paper departs from the question: how can we formulate 'innovation-proof governance' approaches that are resilient or adaptive to future developments in military AI? I develop a typology for the ways in which MAI innovation can disrupt existing international legal frameworks. This includes 'direct' disruption – as new types of MAI capabilities elude categorization under existing regimes – as well as 'indirect' disruption, where new capabilities shift the risk landscape of military AI, or change the incentives or values of the states developing them. After discussing two potential objections to 'innovation-proof governance', I explore the advantages and shortcomings of three possible approaches to innovation-proof governance for military AI. While no definitive blueprint is offered, I suggest key considerations for governance strategies that seek to ensure that military AI remains lawful, ethical, stabilizing, and safe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the "advantage of backwardness." That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is China likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program? Securing and destroying Pyongyang's nuclear weapons would be the United States' top priority in a Korean contingency, but scholars and policymakers have not adequately accounted for the Chinese military's role in this mission. China's concerns about nuclear security and refugee flows, its expanding military capabilities to intervene, and its geopolitical competition with the United States all suggest that China is likely to intervene militarily and extensively on the Korean Peninsula if conflict erupted. In this scenario, Chinese forces would seek to gain control of North Korea's nuclear facilities and matériel. For the most part, China has the capabilities to secure, identify, and characterize North Korean nuclear facilities, though it exhibits weaknesses in weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation practices. On aggregate, however, Chinese troops on the peninsula would be beneficial for U.S. interests and regional security. Nevertheless, to mitigate the risks, the United States should work with China to coordinate their movements in potential areas of operation, share intelligence, and conduct combined nuclear security training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the status of the strategic relationship between India and the United States. It emphasizes the need for India to collaborate closely with the United States and its allies in order to cope with issues resulting from China's rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's debate over what 'energy security' is and how it can be achieved has evolved considerably over the past decade. Traditionally, Chinese officials and analysts have been most worried about China's mounting oil imports, and they have expressed considerable wariness of international energy markets and institutions. This narrow and relatively nationalistic view of China's energy-security challenge has been challenged on several different fronts, however, particularly in the past five years. Prominent analysts now call for a more positive approach to international markets and institutions, and some argue that external dependence is a less important energy security challenge than the shortcomings of China's own energy system. China's broadening debate over energy security represents an opportunity for the outside world as it engages China on energy and climate change in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contextualises current debates over human rights and transnational corporations. More specifically, we begin by first providing the background to John Ruggie’s appointment as ‘Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’. Second, we provide a brief discussion of the rise of transnational corporations, and of their growing importance in terms of global governance. Third, we introduce the notion of human rights, and note some difficulties associated therewith. Fourth, we refer to Ruggie’s scholarly work on ‘embedded liberalism’, the ‘global public domain’ and ‘social constructivism’. Following this, we refer to the other five papers contained in this Journal of Business Ethics special issue, ‘Spheres of Influence/Spheres of Responsibility: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights’, and consider some of the potential obstacles to Ruggie’s recent suggestion that a ‘new consensus’ has formed, or is forming, around his ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. We conclude by raising questions regarding the processes of consensus-building around, and the operationalisation of, Ruggie’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nongovernment organizations (NGOs) are an example of an institution that plays an increasingly important role for business, organizations and society, and needs to be considered in international business research. This article provides a conceptual integration and synthesis of the interrelationship of the roles of nongovernment organizations and the multinational corporations. A conceptual framework is developed that shows the potential role of NGOs in the transfer of institutional knowledge practices among countries or national business systems. A description is given on the factors behind the increasing trend for partnerships between NGOs and multinational corporations and the value that they can bring to both parties.

The United States is confronting a power transition that challenges the foundation of American security in post-World War II East Asia. The relative change in U.S. and Chinese capabilities has [...]

U.S. national-security leaders must assess the speed and sustainability of the national effort by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to deploy a global navy. In June 2018,1 stood on [...]