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Neoklasik realizm, ortaya ciktigi 1990'lardan gunumuze gerek realist uluslararasi iliskiler gelenegi icerisinde gerekse uluslararasi iliskiler disiplini capinda pek cok hararetli ve bereketli tartismaya kaynaklik etti. Baslarda, yalnizca yapisal realist (ya [...]

Why do some near crises tip over into full-blown crisis and others do not? This paper considers existing scholarship and identifies four key barriers to using quantitative analysis for tipping-point analyses: strategic indeterminacy; the incentives for conflict parties to avoid inefficiencies; the paucity of cases; and the availability of quality data. Due to these challenges, many do not perform well as immediate causes for crisis escalation. We also argue and demonstrate through two quantitative models of crisis escalation that some variables, particularly related to domestic politics, can do well in explaining why some disputes tip into crisis and others do not. As we illustrate with reference to the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, qualitative approaches that analyze the processes by which leaders and foreign policy institutions make decisions add needed explanatory power to purely quantitative models of the potential for near crises to tip into crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can Canada and the United States, as well as the international institutions to which they belong, promote peacemaking between rivals in troubled regions? This task is an important one [...]

An assumption runs through this symposium that peaceful change is desirable and ought to be encouraged. We do not believe it is that simple. The term "peaceful change" itself is not well defined. The article, therefore, narrowly defines peaceful change as a process whereby a hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more regions. Drawing on neoclassical realism, we hypothesize that a declining hegemon will only accept peaceful change if: (1) it has high confidence change is inevitable because it lacks the military, economic, or political means to resist it; or (2) when domestic political or economic costs of resistance of prohibitively high; or (3) when the leadership of the hegemonic state faces domestic constraints in its ability to enact policies to resist the challenger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school's main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalizations school's claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the “symptoms” they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this article, we investigate the impact of globalization on four core areas in which globalization scholars contend that the national security function of states has been affected: 1) the frequency of interstate wars; 2) the level of global military spending and the size of armed forces worldwide; 3) the participation of multilateral security providing institutions and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in international security activities; and, 4) the challenge of global terrorism. Our analysis reveals that most of the globalization theorists' expectations about the worldwide pursuit of national security remain unfulfilled. There is no major evidence of a decline in global military spending, a reduction in armed forces worldwide or an increasing reliance on international institutions or INGOs to foster security in the contemporary era. Moreover, those changes that are evident -- such as an apparent reduction in interstate warfare cannot be attributed with confidence to the phenomenon of globalization, rather than to other geopolitical factors, such as the end of the Cold War and the entrenchment of American hegemony. Thus, while globalization may transform the pursuit of security in the future, there is no evidence that it has done so profoundly to-date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholars do not adequately conceptualize or measure economic inter-dependence, a crucial variable in studies of trade and conflict, economic sanctions, and globalization. Most studies conflate vulnerability with sensitivity and confuse interconnectedness with genuine interdependence by relying on inadequate indices of interdependence such as unadjusted trade as a percentage of GDP. Such measures fail to capture the true cost to states of a termination of normal trading relations and ignore completely interstate financial and monetary ties. In this article, we offer a new method, the Contextual Sensitivity Estimator (CSE), for gauging sensitivity interdependence. The CSE addresses existing shortcomings in several noteworthy ways. First, it takes into account the strategic and domestic economic context of external economic linkages. Second, it assesses the composition of trade and the uses of trade proceeds. Third, it provides a detailed conceptualization of critical channels of sensitivity like foreign investment and exchange rate ties. Using Arab—Canadian economic relations in 1979, after a threatened boycott of Canada, as a case study, we show that our CSE yields a more accurate assessment of sensitivity interdependence than traditional measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on foreign security policies in democratic countries and German rearmament after World War II. It discusses the studies on democratic countries which primarily examine their commonalities instead of differences, resulting in the notion that they cannot autonomously conduct foreign security policies. The article explores the determinants of structural autonomy in foreign security policies and provides a model which illustrates the effects of the determinants on policy independence of a country. The model is applied to U.S. policies towards German rearmament after World War II.