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For five decades, Professor Colin Grays scholarly writings contributed tremendously to our understanding of strategy, and his wise counsel benefited U.S. security policies enormously. His intellectual depth, rigor, curiosity, and [...]

The need for an effective deterrence strategy in view of the new terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction and missile technology is stressed. Deterrence now is primarily one of intelligence and newer methods of deterrence need to be adopted while the earlier ones based on nuclear forces and a mutual balance of terror must be reconsidered.

A new world order seemed to have come up with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the international coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicates that nuclear weapons are essential to deter aggressions willing to take extraordinary risks and include great costs but they are not suited to many of the contingencies for which one has to be prepared in the 21st century.

This article examines the methodology needed to assess U.S. arms control positions and nuclear force requirements, focusing on official policy, public proposals for nuclear disarmament, and analysis that should precede these recommendations. The panel of experts discuss changes in the post-Cold War era that have effect startegic planning, potential threats and requirements of deterrence, and the need to maintain offensive and defensive forces; the authors suggest that arms control should focus on consultation, coordination and transparency, rather than the traditional bipolar startegy of treaties of Mutual Assured Destruction perpetuated during the Cold War.

The future of the nation's nuclear deterrence policy in the post-Cold War period raises significant issues such as who and what the US would deter, the part nuclear weapons would play in deterrence and how weapons of mass destruction particularly chemical and biological weapons would be deterred. An analysis is made of the foundations of the nation's nuclear deterrence policy, its existing approach to deterrence and the new context for deterrence policy formulation.

The difficulties of implementing nuclear abolition to effect nuclear deterrence, along with its counterproductive and potentially dangerous implications are discussed. Other nations such as Japan and Israel, which depend on the US for security, may start developing their own nuclear arsenals with the implementation of US nuclear abolition. In addition, the lack of assurance of international cooperation and effective disarmament policies and procedures undermines the effective and realistic implementation of nuclear abolition.

The US has three strategy options based on noninterventionism, unipolarity and multilateralism in the period after the cold war. The end of cold war has made the US policy of containment irrelevant in the international arena. The three strategies are aimed at maintaining the status quo and international stability. The debate assumes significance due to the nature of the outside threat and the internal weakness of the US. The details of the policy can be formulated by the experts after deciding on a particular option.

The US deterrence policy regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be flexible to ensure its compatibility with contextual working of deterrences. Avoiding the use of WMD requires specific threats to opponents. The opposing nation should be made to realize that losses will outweigh the gains in case of war. The success of this strategy depends on the existence of a strong arsenal. The US's deterrence capability will be reduced with the wholesale destruction of strategic capabilities.

Several prominent features of the post-cold war international system are emerging to cast a pall over the optimistic pronouncements of the early 1990s about a manageable New World Order. Two [...]

The post-Cold War era signals a new period of US-Soviet relations, based not on mutual nuclear vulnerability but on increased international cooperation. However, stability in the two countries still depends on the use of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to protect urban areas from missile attacks. The US does not favor deterrence, which discourages the use of BMD as the future national security policy.

In January 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin completely rewrote the terms of debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by proposing a 'Global Protection System' to defend against limited missile [...]

The rise of hostile rogue states supporting terrorism and armed with weapons of mass destruction ended most of the hopeful 1990's talk of a new world order, which necessitates the need for the capability to deter attacks. The Bush AdministrationEs 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) integrates a much broader range of deterrent threat options than we inherited from the Cold War.

The limitations of the United States deterrence policy for the post-Cold War era are discussed. A methodology for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts is developed to 'get inside' the decision-making process of the challenger and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint.

After spending more than $70 billion over three decades on more or less urgent research and development, the United States appears finally to be moving toward the deployment of a [...]

Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance are elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda. In this text, we call out and examine the apparent grand strategy underlying Russian policies, programs and behavior. This examination demonstrates that Russian grand strategy now includes a deeply-troubling mix of ingredients, including increasing hostility toward the West, expanding conventional and nuclear weapons programs, a military doctrine that place much greater emphasis on nuclear weapons and military campaigns against neighboring states. These developments have created the potential for escalating political military crises in Europe and may be more dangerous than were Soviet Cold War policies and behavior. In particular, contemporary Russian nuclear strategy is intended to coerce the West and enforce Moscow's expansionist moves with nuclear first-use threats and planning that go well beyond Soviet Cold War behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the impacts of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Topics discussed include the nuclear-weapons modernization in the U.S., the social aspects of nuclear weapons, and the international relations management. Also mentioned are the nuclear deterrence policy by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the nuclear force reductions policy, and the nuclear weapons policy.