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This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the 'core' countries' interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the endogenous strategic considerations in simultaneously creating, enlarging, and deepening an international union of countries. What explains for example the heightened legislative activity within the EU in the periods leading up to ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and strategic delegation on the equilibrium outcome of policy centralization within a two-country union. It also introduces a dynamic approach in explaining partial unification and depth of integration. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]