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Iran's possible development of nuclear weapons has now come front and center in U.S. foreign policy, as well as in consideration overall of preventing the spread of weapons of mass [...]

Focuses on foreign relations of the U.S. with the Soviet Union during the 1970's. Role of the Soviet Union in the conflict between Vietnam and the U.S.; Issues focused on in the foreign policy of the U.S. President; Political advantage of the Soviet Union in obtaining strategic nuclear parity over the U.S.

May 1971 could go down in the history of diplomacy as one of those critical months when a series of events sets in train developments that are to affect nations for years to come. A "breakthrough" at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), a political agreement on Britain's admission to the European community; a Soviet offer to talk about troop reductions in Europe, and a U.S. Senate vote on the withdrawal of half the U.S. troops in Europe. It is tempting to dwell on U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's announcement about developments at the SALT talks in Vienna, but the changes now possible in Europe are equally important. Under way is a major redefinition of Atlantic politics, and the relating of these politics to East-West understanding. None of this should be surprising; the trend of events had been clear for some time, if only a number of dilemmas could be resolved.

'Addressing the demand side of proliferation is not a trivial or secondary approach. Indeed, it should be at the heart of nonproliferation analysis and strategy.' --Robert E. Hunter, December [...]

"Addressing the demand side of proliferation is not a trivial or secondary approach. Indeed, it should be at the heart of nonproliferation analysis and strategy. Unfortunately, it is often downplayed, [...]

The article discusses the involvement of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other international alliances as of September 2004. Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a slow but steady review of its international alliances. In the wake of the bitter dispute over the war in Iraq, it is unclear whether the transatlantic partners are ready and willing to overcome their differences and reaffirm their basic common interests in security and other relations: the essence of the NATO alliance. Because of domestic attitudes and foreign benefits, it is not correct to say that acting in an alliance limits U.S. options. The question remains whether the United States is better off--in the Middle East and perhaps in other parts of the world where members of the NATO alliance could reasonably be expected to have an interest--working through NATO or through "coalitions of the willing." If the United States looked more to the preferences of the alliance as a whole, rather than simply its own wishes, in dealing with the Middle East, it would incur fewer casualties, spend less money, and gain more domestic political support. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of what NATO has done to promote security in Europe has once again been diplomatic as much as military, with initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace. In terms of dealing with the underlying problems of the Middle East, beginning with reconstruction in Iraq but extending far beyond, nonmilitary approaches and nonmilitary relationships are likely to be as crucial in the long run as military security is in the short run. Supplementing the transformation and modernization of NATO with a new U.S.-European Union strategic partnership could help transform not only key areas of the world in deep difficulty, but also transatlantic relations.

The article focuses on the reemergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War. The alliance has progressed from an outdated one to a set of new missions demanding an alliance to fulfill them. The organization has redesigned its system making it more sustainable. Furthermore, new developed countries were added to NATO including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, politicians demand that NATO should focus on strengthening its strategic partnership with Russia. Crucial factors must also be considered to help central European states and Russia succeed.

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "Three Reasons Not to Bomb Iran--Yet," by Edward N. Luttwak in the May 2006 issue.