Search

The return of authoritarian great powers, the slowing of the democratic wave, and outright reversion to authoritarian rule pose important questions for international theory. What are the implications of an international system populated with more autocracies? This question was posed by a diverse array of social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy analysts in response to the autocratic wave in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. We show that a series of conversations emanating from quite diverse intellectual priors – from Christian realists to international lawyers and disaffected Marxists – converged on the risks these autocratic regimes posed to democratic regimes and the international order they sought to forge. These risks included unconstrained rulers, an inability to sustain international commitments and political processes that undermined rational deliberation at home and spread disinformation abroad. The reading of this work suggests an under-appreciated strand of liberal international relations theory, and these debates have direct implications for liberal arguments about the democratic peace. Rather than theorizing why democracies avoid war, they underscore the importance of understanding why authoritarian and democratic countries are particularly prone to conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the effects of globalization on social policy and welfare, and the parallel literature on the effects of democracy, operate in mutual isolation to a surprising degree. This article extends the debate on the welfare state in the developing world by examining the social policy reactions of democratic and authoritarian governments to globalization. Using unbalanced panel data on 57 developing nations, and considering social security and health and education spending, the authors examine whether democratic and authoritarian regimes exhibit similar or different social spending priorities in the context of increasing economic openness. The results show that social spending in 'hard' authoritarian regimes is more sensitive to the pressures of globalization than in democratic or intermediate regimes. Keywords: democracy; social spending in developing countries; globalization; redistribution; social welfare

New scholarship on economic development in Korea has focused on the beneficial effects of Japanese colonialism and on certain continuities between Korea's growth strategy before and after World War II. We challenge this new revisionism. The growth record under the Japanese occupation was more modest than is often thought, there are greater discontinuities than continuities between the colonial and postwar eras, and political independence was an important factor in subsequent growth. We trace the turning point in Korea's long-term growth to political, policy and institutional changes that occurred following the military's seizure of power in 1961. Key words - development, colonialism, growth, politics, Korea, Asia

A central hope of engagement with North Korea is that increased cross‐border exchange will encourage the strengthening of institutions and, eventually, a moderation of the country's foreign policy. An unprecedented survey of Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea reveals that trade is largely dominated by state entities on the North Korean side, although we cannot rule out de facto privatization of exchange. Little trust is evident beyond the relationships among Chinese and North Korean state‐owned enterprises. Formal networks and dispute settlement mechanisms are weak and do not appear to have consequences for relational contracting. Rather, firms rely on personal ties for identifying counterparties and resolving disputes. The results cast doubt that integration between China and North Korea, at least as it is currently proceeding, will foster reform and opening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides the three main points which emerge from the analysis of the efficacy of economic inducements and sanctions in North Korea. These include the country's domestic politics, the lack of efforts of the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush, and the country's response to pressure and sanctions. The article notes how the political economy and the external relations of North Korea are remarkably insensitive to either sanctions or inducements.

This article discusses North Korea's willingness to engage in diplomatic relations with members of the United Nations Security Council. The author notes that after North Korea's second nuclear test in 2009 and the tightening of United Nations sanctions, North Korea increased its relations with partners who are not interested in the sanctions. It has also drawn back from economic reform. This article notes that concerns over the government's weakening control over the economy have caused it to turn to a stricter control policy. The article also notes that a shift in trade patterns has made it difficult for an effective sanctions strategy.

The year 2007 witnessed a gradual rapprochement between North Korea and the world, reflecting changes both in the country's external environment and domestic political economy. Key markers were the resumption of the Six- Party Talks and the second North-South summit. Whether these developments will endure depends largely on North Korean intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent writing on the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrializing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-has been dominated by an institutionalist perspective that focuses on the "strength" of the state vis-à-vis societal actors. A study of Korea's stabilization efforts in the 1980s underlines the importance of organizational factors in explaining policy outcomes, but also suggests important limits on institutionalist arguments. These include the absence of unique institutional solutions for political problems and the indeterminacy of institutional configuration with respect to the economic efficiency of policy. A focus on characteristics of the state alone can overlook the organizational resources of societal actors and the interest of politicians in building bases of support even in "strong" states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies. Different social configurations, state structures, and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export-oriented East Asian NICs—Korea and Taiwan—and the more "inward-looking" countries of Latin America, particularly Mexico and Brazil. These different strategic choices, in turn, account for variations in the patterns of external "dependency" that characterize countries in the two regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purely economic analyses of the East Asian newly industrializing countries have overlooked the politics of their growth. Why were these countries able to pursue strategies that combined rapid growth with a relatively equitable distribution of income? The reason lies partly in external conditions, including expanding world trade, and, in the case of Taiwan and Korea, pressure from the United States for policy reform. Domestic social and political conditions were also auspicious, however. Export-led growth was facilitated by weak labor movements and the absence of leftist or populist parties. A relatively brief period of import-substitution policies prevented the development of strong protectionist business interests. Equity was advanced by land reforms in Korea and Taiwan and by the absence of a rural sector in Hong Kong and Singapore. No explanation is complete, however, without reference to the strength of the East Asian states, including their insulation from interest-group pressures and their cohesive, meritocratic bureaucracies. These political institutions facilitated coherent, decisive, yet flexible policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]