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This article introduces a Special Issue dedicated to applying international relations theories to Turkish foreign policy. More specifically, it contrasts structural or neo-realist approaches with ideational or constructivist ones, suggests general strengths and shortcomings in each, and briefly suggests how both might apply to TFP. It also introduces the eight substantive articles in the Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Strategic Review / Przeglad Strategiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study focuses on Turkey as a rising drone power in the international arena in recent years. In this context, the article will scrutinize the case of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which broke out on September 27, 2020. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one of the frozen problems in the Caucasus region, was ended in favor of Azerbaijan less than two months later. Turkey took on a game-changing role in the region by supplying its ally Azerbaijan with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for use in the conflict, and significantly contributed to Azerbaijan's victory. Turkey's political, diplomatic, and military contributions to Azerbaijan will likely be discussed on the global agenda for years to come; this study will contribute to the literature on the role and impact of Turkey's military support, especially its drones, on Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh victory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 44-day Karabakh War seriously affected the international balances in the Caucasus in terms of security, politics, and economic dimensions. The attitude of international actors during the war was important to define the fate and consequences of the war. Among these international actors, Russia's attitude was of special importance. The policy followed by Russia during and after the 44-day Karabakh War had four main and parallel pillars: The first pillar of Russia's policy was maintaining the status of its traditional ally Armenia. The second pillar was maintaining its mediator role for the resolution of the conflict. The third pillar of the policy pursued by the Kremlin was not harming the strategic partnership relationship with Azerbaijan, which had been specially developed during Vladimir Putin's tenure. The fourth pillar of the policies pursued by Russia was not disrupting the multidimensional profound relationships with Turkey, which had advanced in recent years. The first two dimensions of this policy followed by the Putin Administration during the 2nd Karabakh War represent Russia's conventional Caucasus policy and the last two dimensions embody a policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article scrutinizes relations between economic diplomacy and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by focusing on the Turkey-UK free trade agreements which came into force in 2021. Accordingly, the article first introduces the concept of economic diplomacy, an important issue as it has been shown that bilateral trade agreements, nowadays preferred by many countries, can be used as a tool of economic diplomacy. The article then discusses the history and development of free trade agreements signed by Turkey, including its long-running experience of economic integration with the European Union. Although Turkey began establishing free trade agreements in the 1990s, it has been concentrating on and accelerating its use since 2000. Based on economic and political reasons underlying the free economic agreements, the reasons why Turkey and the UK have reached such an agreement are summarized. Economic relations between the two countries are then analyzed and the details of the agreement are investigated in the context of the changes that it provides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluating Turkey-Russia relations is a dilemma, as the two countries fluctuate between perceptions of mutual historical hostility and strategic partnership. An alternative perspective is needed to get beyond the impasse of this dilemma. The main purpose of this study is to explain the common aspects of the grand strategies of Turkey and Russia within the framework of the pattern and to evaluate the policies of both countries in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus where the interests of both intersect and occasional conflict. We propose that Turkey-Russia relations can best be defined around the concepts of 'smart alignment' and 'flexible competition.' Their bilateral relations cannot be considered black or white in the abstract, but rather take place in the 'gray zone.' Alternative scenarios for the future of bilateral relations are presented in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how Turkey should adjust its grand strategy under the changing international order. It claims that the international order has undergone a significant transformation that is pushing Turkey to relocate its international position. First, the article examines the characteristic features of the changing dynamics of the international system; it then sheds light on the new aspects of Turkey's changing strategic landscape. By taking into consideration the transformation in Turkish foreign and security policy since the Arab Uprising, the article argues that Turkey needs a basis for determining what is important and what is not, what the primary threats to the nation's interests are, and how best to serve those interests in a way that is attentive to the costs and risks it is willing to bear. Our aim in this article is to describe how Turkey can deal with the new reality of the international system and pursue and protect its important interests by developing a comprehensive grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How compatible is Turkey's grand strategy with the grand strategies of global great powers? This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While there are some observable conflicts between Turkey and the French, Russian, and American proxies in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, there are no outstanding militarized conflicts between Turkey and the British proxies. China is also positioned against Turkey in several international conflicts including Syria, and the intense persecution of Turkic Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang adds another dimension of latent Chinese-Turkish conflicts. The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international system is experiencing profound changes and has taken on an uncertain character as a result. The concept of strategy and its study has closely followed this trend, and new concepts have emerged both to adapt to and theoretically describe the practical changes and challenges it has engendered. This article explores the ill-suited features of mainstream debates and theorizing from a Turkish perspective and suggests that a critical realist analysis of agential strategizing is most useful to addressing the emerging context. It argues that Turkey has a long pursued grand strategy, but new concepts --resilience, protean power, and connectography-- can enhance Turkey's ability to strategize and can enrich the lately emerged vibrant debates exploring Turkey's grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Macron did decide to withdraw French troops from the Sahel last summer, leaving only special forces based in north Mali, he stated that Operation Barkhane will end early in 2022. Nonetheless, Algiers' decision to not allow French military planes to use Algeria's airspace will create a direct impact on the military mission and France's entire 'war on terror in the Sahel. In Algeria, however, bold decisions toward a strategic rapprochement with Turkey were in the making. Even though the new authorities in Algiers were hesitant for such a foreign policy shift, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the internal political struggle, constitutional and institutional amendments in the aftermath of the peaceful Algerian 2019 Hirak needed to be put in place. However, the tenacious resistance of the Francophile and Arabophone-nationalists anti-Ottoman legacy, the well-off social class, and elite pro-France lobbies in Algiers and Paris held back President Abdelmadjid Tebboune's Administration from improving the relations between Algiers and Ankara. Meanwhile, the ambassadors from both countries have been pushing tirelessly for the success of the strategic rapprochement between these two states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish-African relations have consistently exhibited strong growth since Ankara declared 2005 as 'the year of Africa.' Turkey's growing economic, political, and security involvement in Africa re- flects Ankara's need to establish new markets for its manufactured goods and its defense and armaments industry and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor different from traditional western players on the continent. African countries have been astute in their engagement with Ankara in terms of exercising leverage in the evolving Turkish-African partnership. They seek to attract Turkish foreign direct investment, diversify economic and political partners to reduce dependency and fuel their state-building projects. Ankara's domestic economic woes notwithstanding, Turkey's growing footprint in Africa will likely continue to produce positive results for both sides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, soft power plays an important role in advancing states' foreign policy goals. As one of the world's emerging economic powers, Turkey pays special attention to the development and maintenance of its soft power. This commentary uses a descriptive-analysis approach to address the components of Turkey's soft power in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region in the years 2011- 2020, the second decade of AK Party governance. Turkey's soft power during this time period has mainly targeted and become influential in the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and Asia. Although certain events, such as the 2016 failed coup, the Gezi Park protests, the Syrian crisis, fluctuations in the value of the Turkish lira, etc., have somewhat tarnished the country's image, various indicators of Turkey's soft power demonstrate that it has remained strong in the MENA region during the time span of the present research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 outbreak has had a huge impact on the global economy and politics. Closures and lockdowns stopped international trade resulting in an economic slowdown. It has changed the daily lives of people and the way business takes place. Politics has also been affected by the pandemic. Discussions about the changing world order have gained a new dimension and momentum. In this article, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in international relations is analyzed. Has COVID-19 triggered a change in the world order? If it has, what are the nature, scope, and content of this change? As a rising regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean region, how has Turkey been affected by this, and how did it respond to the changing situation? Signs of deteriorating world order, declining U.S. leadership, escalating geopolitical competition amongst global powers were in the air before the pandemic. Turkey's adaptation to this new world order pre-dates the pandemic, when it changed its political system, and invested in its security and cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the rigid boundaries in relations between China and Turkey by applying social identity theory to international relations. It evaluates different networks of political alliance and external cultural-ethnic ties as rigid boundaries between the two countries. Turkey-China relations have been shaped by both inter-systemic and inter-state dynamics. Therefore, to show how social context and the permeability of social structure have affected the nature of bilateral relations, this article divides relations into two historical contexts of Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It concludes that it will be hard to go beyond rigid boundaries as long as each side has its own solutions to problems between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, Turkish policymakers have perceived the possible emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region or an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq as an existential threat to Turkey. However, from 2008 onwards, under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkish foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was gradually desecuritized. In light of Turkey's experience, this paper explores the role of context in desecuritizing foreign policy issues in general and Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG in particular. It argues that the changing civil–military relations in Turkey as well as the country's broader political and economic conjuncture allowed for the desecuritization of Turkey-KRG relations from 2008 onwards. The context also determined what kind of a desecuritization Turkey experienced towards the KRG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main argument of this paper is that Turkey had close relations with Middle Eastern states during the Atatürk period, which is contrary to the literature that claims the opposite because of Turkey's Western-oriented ideology. The article asks why Turkey as a Western-oriented state sought to have close relations with Middle Eastern states. To answer this question, the article uses discourse analysis focusing on Middle Eastern leaders' visits as represented in Turkish public discourse. Accordingly, it proposes two main answers. Firstly, the paper argues that the new state's relations with Middle Eastern countries played an important role in legitimation of its Westernization projects in the eyes of its citizens. Secondly, the Turkish state marginalized rival political discourses, mainly Islamism, by proving that even Muslim majority countries wanted to imitate modern Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes an empirical approach to Turkey's perceptions of China's proposal to build a Community of a Shared Future for Mankind and begin the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by examining data from Turkey's mainstream media, think-tanks, academic and business fields, and social media sources. The findings demonstrate that, despite Turkey's geological position, the degree of concern for a Community of a Shared Future and the BRI is not high enough. There are positive and negative evaluations. The positive evaluation is mainly related to the importance of BRI with regard to Turkey's economy, business, infrastructure construction and the national rejuvenation, while the negative side is about China's aim, cultural security and the disputes between the two countries. To deal with such cognitive differences, China needs to boost the publicity of the initiative and form a better understanding about Turkish domestic needs. China and Turkey should also seek to strengthen people-to-people ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the coup attempt of 2016, bilateral ties between Ankara and Tehran have witnessed a significant boost. Using and refining Steven David's framework of omni-balancing, which argues that the conduct of foreign policy in Third World settings also takes stock of domestic threats to the regime, this paper explains this emerging rapprochement. The article argues that after 2016, the AKP's foreign policy became increasingly predicated on regime survival, which was also reflected in Ankara-Tehran ties. This rapprochement was strengthened by both countries' intersecting positions on the following issues (1) A mutual pro-Qatar stance in the recent Saudi Arabia-Qatar spat, (2) Mutual opposition to a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and (3) Increasingly troubled relations with the US. Through a careful analysis of Turkish and Persian sources along with official discourses, this paper will expand on these key aspects of these significantly improved bilateral relations between both countries and will conclude with discussion of its durability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With high interdependence, politicization, and unlikely enlargement, alternative options for EU–Turkey relations beg for consideration. This article argues that, first of all, conceptualization of a new model of EU–Turkey relations must thoroughly account for the evolution of the European project away from uniformity and towards more differentiation as a result of both integration and disintegration pressures. Secondly, an extended model of external differentiated integration has a potential to foster new, more dynamic EU–Turkey relations. However, its practical implementation is constrained by a number of challenges and scope conditions related to preferences and interests of key actors, namely EU institutions, member states and Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the evolving relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey following the 2015 refugee crisis. It argues that post-crisis relations have become predominantly functional, measured by strategic EU-Turkey partnership based on interdependence as well as the EU's relative retreat from political membership conditionality. This is particularly demonstrated by the March 2016 EU-Turkey 'refugee deal' whereby functional cooperation deepened amidst material and normative concessions that the EU granted Ankara. The article concludes that although functionalism is set to guide the relations beyond the question of Turkey's EU accession, a future EU-Turkey external differentiated integration arrangement remains uncertain due to pending challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been made of the once brotherly relationship between Syrian President Bashar al Assad and the Turkish President Recep Teyep Erdogan. Indeed, this relationship formed the bedrock of Turkey's much-vaunted move towards the Arab world and its re-engagement with regions on which Ataturk and his successive Kemalist Generals had shut a door. Yet, more than fifteen years after the historic first visits by the Turkish and Syrian leaders to each other's capitals, the Syria-Turkey relationship lies in ruins. Whilst much of the focus of the war in Syria has been on the exaggerated sectarian divide in the Middle East and the great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, a key aspect overlooked is the fundamental relationship between Turkey and Syria. The last two decades of this relationship have been defined by Assad and Erdogan. As Turkey slowly begins to re-engage with Syria one can trace the tumultuous relationship between the two neighbours in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists have been at daggers drawn over the make up of the border. Syria has never forgotten the land-grab of the Turks in the aftermath of the French exit of the Levant. Furthermore, the diverse set of communities – the Greeks, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Syriacs – that make up the inhabitants of the region still suffer from the effects of the mismanagement of the French exit and what is seen by many of these communities as an illegal annexation by Turks and Arabs. However, under the Syrian Arab Republic the Christians of all denominations including the Armenians and Greeks flourished whilst Turkey forced only one identity upon its once diverse people. This article will argue that the relationship between Syria and Turkey has ebbed and flowed – and this dynamic is rooted in history where successive Turkic dynasties have favoured Syria as their pivot to control the region. Similarly, when Syria became less important, the very foundation of the Turkic and later Turkish influence became weak in the region. The close relationship between Erdogan and Assad overturned more than six decades of animosity, but once Erdogan turned his back to Assad and supported the overthrow of the Syrian government the relationship fell apart. As the end of the war nears, a defining factor to end this war will be how Turkey and Syria reconcile or interact. The Syrian Kurds now seem to be back in Assad's corner as they prefer to be under Damascus' sovereignty then under attack from Ankara across the border. The Kurdish question is of significant value to both Syria and Turkey; it has been a major reason for both countries to be at peace and war. A closer look at the history of these two countries' relationship proves that the Assad-Erdogan relationship has mirrored the history of the two states since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Their future in more than one way is now inter-twined on how they interact with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes regional events in the twenty-first century and identifies Turkey's relations with Arab countries, pointing out the serious deterioration that has occurred in those relations with its bordering Arab neighbors as well as Egypt and Lebanon. The article argues that Turkey's "imperatives of state," as in the case of any other state actor, determine the foreign policy trajectory and consequently its regional and international relations. Turkey has chosen to ally itself with pro-Western regional states, namely Israel and Qatar, but not others, such as Egypt. Creating rivalry and animosity with bordering states is neither conducive to Turkey's long-term relations with those states nor to its ultimate political stability. Its NATO membership exacerbates animosity that would ultimately work against Turkey's regional influence. Consequently, Turkey's imperatives of state ironically stand in the way of achieving its regional ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has undergone a structural change since 2002. This shift in Turkey's identity is primarily linked to the ascendancy of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) and its proactive foreign policy towards Turkey's eastern neighbourhood. The change in Turkey's identity and foreign policy is mostly intertwined with the Islamist identity embraced by the AKP, which can be traced back to the National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi). This article aims to analyse what are said to be 'newly' established preferences in AKP identity and its reflections in Turkey's foreign policy, particularly since 2009/2010. The main argument is that the emergence of this new ideological discourse has had immediate reflections on Turkey's relationship with North Cyprus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey's intervention carries adequate impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of trustworthiness that questions the 'ability' and 'integrity' of counterpart organisations to explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, his condolence message to Armenian communities and positions taken by the legislatures of countries, the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. Topics include that the message acknowledged the deaths of the Ottoman Armenians who were killed alongside people of all religions and ethnicities in the events of 1915; and the deteriorating relations between Israel and Turkey.

In recent years, one of the most popular concepts in Turkish foreign policy has been public diplomacy, which refers to government activities to increase the country's image among foreign societies. While the concept is important, the problem is that a similar emphasis and attention is not given to personal diplomacy, another state practice of modern diplomacy. This article illustrates that personal diplomacy is most effective in crisis periods, when there is dominant leadership, and when the political leader is confident about his/her ability to shape policies. As all these factors exist in Turkish foreign policy today, it is not surprising to see that Ankara increasingly relies on personal diplomacy in its relations with foreign countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on the contents of the Turkish Cypriot Museum of Barbarism and a Greek Cypriot elementary level schoolbook to show how the image of the home, both personal and collective, can be used as an evocative framework for commemorating the conflict on Cyprus. The inherent familiarity of this image, its deep connection to our identities and its ability to evoke feelings of nostalgia and grief, hope and pain, make it a powerful trope around which memories of the many lives lost in the conflict can be constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been significant changes in Turkish foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in particular since the 2016 military coup attempt. The changes have resulted in a strong focus on national security, an assertive style in policy implementation, a preference for transaction-based relations, and a quest for more strategic autonomy. Two main arguments are made: First, these features of policy represent both change and continuity when compared with earlier periods in Turkish foreign policy. The novelty under Erdogan is primarily in how the features are combined. Second, the changes do not represent a shift in Turkey's overall international orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on understanding and explaining the changes in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the last decade. Many observers have expressed suspicions that Turkey is abandoning its old Western-centric alignment and gradually shifting its axis. The thesis argues that rather than a shift, Turkey is taking an independent position. It maintains that the 1990 end of the Cold War and changes in the international structure from Bipolarity to U.S.-based Unipolarity have provided incentives for countries with some degree of material capabilities to pursue more independent policies from U.S. policy-preferences. This study analyses structural effects on the behavior of Turkey, followed by observed changes in Turkey's foreign policy as the outcome of taking more independent positions to maximize its objectives. Empirical research prove this analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Heydar Aliyev, the father of the incumbent president Ilham Aliyev, became the country's president in 1993, Azerbaijan has been known for its staunch pursuit of a so-called "balanced" policy in its relations with the outside world, particularly Russia and the West. Whereas in the past this policy tended to be "balanced" more in favor of the West as far as Azerbaijan's strategic interests were concerned, Baku's political disposition has shifted decidedly towards Russia in recent years. Over the past decade, several developments on the national, regional, and global levels have worked to gradually alter the long-established regional dynamic and alignment patterns, bringing Azerbaijan back into the Russian fold. This article's objective is to critically examine those developments to shed more light on the nature of Azerbaijani-Russian relations today and their prospects for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region after the Russian annexation of Crimea. It focuses on two main issues: Turkey's policies within NATO and its balancing actions vis-a-vis Russia. The paper concludes that in spite of the sporadic Western criticism Ankara is still committed to NATO. Nonetheless, Turkey has taken only limited balancing actions to counter the Russian threat. Ankara evaluates and prioritizes threats often very differently from its Western partners, and considers certain balancing steps ineffective or too costly at a specific moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last decades, in parallel to its economic growth and foreign policy activism, Turkey has become an important regional actor in the Balkans. Turkey's activism has led to different reactions both from inside and outside the region. Skeptical views regarding Turkey's intentions are occasionally expressed in the international media. The skeptics' mostly voiced claim is that Turkey is undermining the Balkans' stability and Euro-Atlantic integration. Yet Turkey's approach to the region does not provide a justifiable basis for these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the divisive commemoration of the battle of Erenköy, which has gained significance since the early 2000s in a resignifying of Turkish Cypriot history. Over time, the commemoration has shifted from a triumphalism symbolized in monuments to an act of mourning at the graves of the fallen. We show through this commemoration how actors have repurposed official narratives, deterritorializing them from the terrain of nationalist ideology and its countermemory and reterritorializing them in ways that look similar but are affectively quite different. We argue that this repurposing of the ritual produces an affect of agency among participants that is open-ended and future oriented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have become very active in Northeast Africa. In addition to developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, they regard the area as the gateway to connections with the rest of the continent, although they are guided by different motivations. Turkey's expansion of its interests in Africa is both a reaction to the European Union's rejection of its membership and an opportunity to expand its trade, which has been hindered by instability in the Middle East in recent years. Like Saudi Arabia, it views Northeast Africa as a place to extend its cultural influence with that region's indigenous Sunni population. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth to curtail Iran's attempts to expand its influence in the region, while Turkey has provided on-the-ground technical assistance to enhance its political and economic connections in the region. In recent years the two countries have been drawn together by Iran's involvement in Yemen, although Turkey has sought to avoid becoming involved in local political disputes. Rather, it has served in multinational peacekeeping efforts and actions to prevent piracy in the sea lanes off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. However, since the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the latter country's relations [End Page 1] with Iran that began in June 2017, some tension has arisen between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While Iran also wants those sea lanes to be freely open to traffic—as they were during the time of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi—it also wants to counteract Israeli involvement in Northeast Africa. Turkey has made great inroads politically and economically in Northeast Africa in recent years, while Saudi Arabia has gained the upper hand in its rivalry with Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's eight years between 2008 and 2016 has been dominated by Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision of foreign policy, which was derived from his multi‐edition book Strategic Depth (2000). In order to be able to present itself in its larger periphery as a pro‐active, trustworthy actor, Davutoğlu argued, Turkey needed to change the foreign‐policy paradigms with which it was stranded. As the Strategic Depth vision unfolded, it drew explicit parallels between modern Turkey and the Ottoman neighborhood policy. Turkey‐Syria relations since 2008 had been providing the seekers of neo‐Ottomanist tendencies in the contemporary Turkish foreign policy with abundant examples, because Syria, once an Ottoman territory and always a challenge to modern Turkey, came to be the first poster country in the shift towards Turkey's imperial awakening. In the post‐Davutoğlu era, however, the rhetoric and practices of the past eight years seemed suddenly to disappear from the use of the Turkish agents of foreign policy; the new code of terms and actions to replace the Strategic Depth version is yet to be decided. This study seeks to pin down the neo‐imperialist character of Turkey's foreign‐policy discourse of the aforementioned eight years and contribute to discussions of the Turkish aspiration of neo‐Ottomanism with focus on the Syrian crisis through the Justice and Development Party's re‐invented peace discourse. In doing so, it aims to find out and elaborate on the current tendencies of Turkish foreign policy, which are no longer as explicit and articulated as they were during Davutoğlu's ministry and prime ministry. As Turkey's cross‐border operation to Syria — the Euphrates Shield — ends and another one in Idlib begins, a discursive analysis stretching from Davutoglu's diplomatic "zero problems" with Damascus to the military use of ground troops and air force is timely. Such an endeavor would be essential in understanding the spectacular swing from one edge to the other in Turkey's inclination over a phantasmagorical empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications of relations between Syria and Turkey and the former's conflict for latter's border security. In addition to defending the its border, Turkey organized several border-securing operations in order to prevent spillover from the Syrian conflict. The article further states that both the countries were involved into a water-sharing dispute over cross-border river flows and a territorial dispute over Hatay.

International relations (IR) scholarship rests on a conception of ‘the international’ based on the experiences of core actors. A burgeoning literature has asked what IR would look like if non-core actors’ conceptions of ‘the international’ were also considered. This article analyzes conceptions of ‘the international’ in Turkey as an example of a non-core context. In doing this, the article develops and offers a new analytical framework which breaks down the components of conceptions of ‘the international’ into three questions: ‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘where’ of world politics - namely, the main dynamics of world politics, the main actors of world politics, and the location where world politics takes place. I utilize this framework to empirically analyze the election manifestos and party programs of the political parties in Turkey, and tease out their conceptions of ‘the international.’ The article concludes by considering the implications of these findings for IR scholarship in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the drastic changes in the Eastern Bloc after 1989, global and regional actors including Turkey have become interested in former Soviet countries. Turkey has shown particular interest in the Turkish Republics since they gained their independence. This paper assesses Turkey's foreign policies towards the Turkish Republics over the last 25 years in two periods: 1991-2002 and post-2002. The main finding is that Turkey's foreign policy toward Turkish Republics was initiated with great enthusiasm but continued with a more logical and reasonable approach after having understood the realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkey has taken another direction in the international scene, based primarily on the ideas of Ahmet Davutoglu, architect of Turkish foreign policy. Different from Turkey's conduct during the Cold War, Davutoglu developed a new foreign policy with specific principles, with their implementation still open to debates. After Davutoglu's exit, it should be noted that Turkey found itself in another political context, and began recalibrating its foreign policy, as president Erdogan has undertaken a more active role under the essentials of a de facto presidential foreign policy. It is worth mentioning some shifts from Davutoglu's framework, such as: from soft power to hard power, from multilateralism to strategic security alliances, from zero problems with neighbours to a policy of regaining friends, from strategy of active globalisation through multilateralism to strategic security alliances, and from civilisationalist realism of Strategic Depth to proactive moral realism. The article aims to shed light on how effective the principles of Turkish foreign policy devised by Davutoglu were, whether Turkey continues implementing his policies or has abandoned them and what the dynamics of the new Turkish Foreign Policy are (after Davutoglu's exit). This article argues that there has been a reorientation of the foreign policy of Turkey as a result of structural and contextual changes in the regional and international political landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maintains that the treatment of the Ottoman/Turk in the English School of International Relations, as in broader Western scholarship, is Eurocentric and highlights less frequently utilized concepts to restructure our thinking on the Ottomans. In Eurocentric historical narratives, the Ottomans are represented as an abnormal entity or as the very opposite of Europeanness. This peculiar representation anachronistically impacts upon European Union–Turkey relations today as the Europeans conflate the dissolved Ottoman Empire with contemporary Turkey. In an attempt to move forward, I turn to Martin Wight's concepts to recast the Ottomans as a potential European superpower rather than as an abnormality in European life and then to Herbert Butterfield's "academic history" as one way of dissociating the Ottoman past and the Turkish present. Both moves can help reimagine the Ottoman/Turk on more positive and balanced terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)