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China has initiated a series of "economic sanctions" against South Korea, affecting Korean pop stars visiting China and Korean investments in China. Sanctions were imposed on South Korea in response to the decision of South Korea to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016. Furthermore, the Global Daily assembled local population to boycott Korean products and investments in China. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has never positively confirmed these activities as economic sanctions to South Korea related to the THAAD installation. In other words, the Chinese government singled a relatively weak message via these sanctions to South Korea. As a result, the THADD implementation continued in South Korea. In the paper, I interpret China's rationale to impost puzzling economic sanctions, which have a weak resolution, to South Korea and Taiwan. As signaling theory argues, economic sanctions with insufficient resolution, which are more likely to fail, is a more provocative foreign policy. By reviewing China's sanctions usage to South Korea and Taiwan, I propose arguments of bureaucratic competition to answer why China launched such sanctions to other countries: those are caused by domestic institutions who are seeking reward from the Communist Party of China. By comparing shifts of leadership between domestic agencies, the paper provides evidence to support the proposed argument. I also include two alternative explanations to strengthen the proposed argument, albeit connecting the paper with other two larger streams of research, which address analyses of China's aggressive foreign policies as well as the domestic politics of economic sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of "friendly and cooperative relations' in 1992, relations between South Korea and China have been continuously elevated almost every 5 years. The two countries have achieved great advancements in expanding civil exchanges, bringing economic relations closer, finding common ground in foreign policy and security and elevation of political relations. Despite the honeymoon period that the two countries experienced after they established diplomatic relations, however, conflict is now arising due to differences in opinion and interests in various fields such politics, economy, society, culture, diplomacy, and security. This paper will examine Sino-South Korean relations using the four factor model, which is based on four approaches, starting with economic relations, followed by perception and emotions, diplomacy and security and lastly, these factors" influence on domestic politics. Following this analysis, this paper will argue that despite their continuous but rocky developments, Sino-South Korean relations will sustainably maintain their development. Considering the synergy effect of bilateral relations, two countries are standing on the opportunity to build a New Type of Sino-South Korean relations which would allow for resolution of conflicts and misunderstandings through dialogue and communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the diverse ways Chinese policymakers view the foreign policy process in China. Two approaches characterize conventional accounts of the foreign policy decision-making process. One of these, based on Graham Allison's rational, organizational, and bureaucratic politics models, focuses on intragovernmental aspects of foreign policy decision-making processes, while the other highlights extra-governmental domestic and foreign factors. However, these approaches have neglected the question of who leads foreign policy and how state, society, and grassroots interact through coalition. We interviewed Chinese scholars and foreign policy experts using Q statements to explore China's foreign policy response to South Korea's deployment of THAAD. Our findings offer new theoretical insights into China's foreign policy process by identifying state-driven, grassroots-based, and state-society coalition models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Air pollutants allegedly originating from China have become a thorny issue in South Korea. Despite a neutral view of the topic on the part of the South Korean government, recent public polls show a high correlation between the air pollution issue and negative sentiment toward China. How has the media reported on China regarding air pollutants in South Korea? What is the effect of media reports on air pollution on anti-Chinese sentiment and foreign policy attitudes? By examining news headlines and Twitter data in 2015 and 2018, this work finds that media reports blaming China for air pollution doubled during the 2015–2018 period. Discourse surrounding air pollution also shifted: negative sentiment directed at both the Chinese government and the Chinese people increased in 2018 compared to 2015. In addition, an original online survey experiment shows that China-blaming articles have a causal effect on increasing related resentment, particularly toward Chinese people, and that this effect is moderated by age group. Such articles have also had negative effects on foreign policy attitudes via increased anti-Chinese sentiment; greater hostility toward the Chinese people is found to have a causal effect on reduced support for strengthening relations with their country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does economic interdependence generate and foster positive attitudes among people? Few studies in the existing literature deal directly with this question. To fill this gap, this paper examines the economic relationships among China, Japan and South Koreaandthe resulting public opinions. We find that economic interdependence in Northeast Asiahas negatively influenced public opinion and hence increased tension and conflict among these states. Then, we draw some important political and theoretical implications from our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Beijing Olympics have been watched closely by the South Korean media. In this paper its response to anticipated Chinese dominance of the Games, not least on the part of women, will be monitored, collated and analysed. Of particular interest is the South Korean media's extrapolation of expected Chinese dominance to future geo-political circumstances in the Western Pacific Rim and the possible consequences for South Korea. Are the Beijing Olympics a harbinger of the changing nature of political relationships in the region? Is this a concern of the South Korean media? If so, what is the nature of this concern and how are future relations with the Asian nascent superpower viewed? And far from least, if Chinese women come out on top in the Games what will be the political consequences for gender outcomes for South Korea? Is this of interest to the South Korean media? If not then why not? Finally, with the balance of power slowly and steadily shifting in the Pacific Rim region what does the media consider that the anticipated dominance of China at the Games imply for the relationship between South Korea and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is aimed at deriving possible scenarios for China's future relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and their implications for South Korea's policy stance. The paper offers seven scenarios that will help provide an understanding of what directions China might take in regard to North Korea, making a connection to the North Korea nuclear problem. The seven scenarios cover both optimistic and pessimistic possibilities, five of which are related to the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. These five scenarios are "Confusion and Chaos," "Agreement for Protection and Dependence," "Strategic Cooperation and Betrayal," "Hierarchical Subordination," and "China's Securing of Control over North Korea." The remaining two scenarios involve sudden contingencies: "Military Clash with Neighboring Countries" and "North Korea's Internal Contingency." The paper argues that the most plausible scenario is that of "Agreement for Protection and Dependence." However, when considering the U.S. factor, realistically, the fourth scenario of "Hierarchical Subordination" is more likely to come about. Given these projections, South Korea's policy toward China must be distinguished by a peacetime- and contingency-based policy. A peacetime policy toward China would serve to promote Chinese influence over the DPRK and thereby achieve a reliable level of predictability in North Korean behavior. Meanwhile, a contingency-based policy should be tailored to the contingency at hand on a case-by-case basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2004, a Chinese claim that the ancient Kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC-AD 668) was China's vassal state ignited a firestorm of protest in South Korea. The decade-long South Korean love affair with China appears to have ended, as increasing numbers of South Koreans have begun to view their colossal neighbor with new suspicion. What were the causes and consequences of this controversy? Rather than forwarding the usual political, economic, and security explanations, this paper interrogates the deeper identity politics at stake, arguing that the Koguryo controversy implicates the very meaning of being Korean or Chinese in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how Washington views the burgeoning across-the-board ties between Seoul and Beijing in the midst of the strained alliance relationship with the former. On the basis of poll and interview data, the paper demonstrates (1) average Americans' perceptual bias in favor of Europe and general lack of interest in Asian affairs at large, (2) Americans' (both public and elite) strong antipathy toward China and indifference to Korea, and (3) the potentially adverse impact of such perceptions on the future U.S.-Korea relations within the context of rapidly expanding Sino-Korean bilateralism. In the short run South Korea's strategic choice will be invariably to stick with the U.S.-centered alliance structure and, at the same time, to expand the burgeoning ties with China. South Korea's policy will increasingly resemble hedging. This approach will require much prudence. In the mid-term--by 2030--China's shadow over South Korea will perhaps have eclipsed that of the United States in Asia and, given that China may become a de factor "hegemonic" player in its traditional sphere of influence, the time will come when South Korea has to decide whether or not to jump on the Chinese bandwagon. Much of this, however, will certainly by largely predetermined in the next decade during which the future pattern of U.S.-China relations and the "revisionist" disposition of China will become increasingly manifest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Japanese and South Korean governments' reshoring and diversification policies of supply chains especially away from China since the early 2010s, with particular attention to the measures taken under the 2020–21 pandemic. The article also explores how much Japanese and South Korean reshoring from China, a subset of foreign economic policy, counts as economic statecraft as a deliberate government attempt to achieve geopolitical objectives using 'economic' means. One would expect these governments, which innovated proactive industrial policies and guided the private sector to catch up with developed economies in the 20th century, to have an easy time encouraging businesses to re-shore. While these two governments have employed various policy instruments to shift their economic dependence away from China, there is only limited success in motivating businesses to return to their homeland. This leads to an intriguing departure in our understanding of the capacity of those two Asian nations, which used to be considered prototypical 'developmental states' where governments have significant influence over business behaviour. This research brings more nuance and complexity to prevailing state-as-unitary-actor assumption of the economic statecraft literature and advocates closer attention to domestic sources of foreign economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 generated significant anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Domestic elite-level narratives regarding China at the pandemic's onset were highly polarized: conservative parties advocated border shutdowns, emphasizing China as originating the virus, while progressive parties warned that this would incite xenophobia. Did these narratives shape anti-Chinese sentiment, and what are their foreign policy effects? Using social media data, I show that despite the polarized narratives at the elite level, attitudes of both conservative and progressive voters became unfavorable toward China following COVID-19's onset. Furthermore, statistical analyses of survey data show that this blame is strongly associated with negative perceptions of China. Although substantively not directly linked to foreign policy, blame of China is strongly associated with rejection of foreign policy alignment with China and a shift toward supporting alignment with the US. These results have implications for understanding public support of South Korea's foreign policy amid US--China bifurcation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Panax ginseng, as a kind of rare and valuable Chinese materia medica with the largest global trade volume, has been widely applied in many fields, such as medicine, food, health care, and production of daily chemical products. It is widely used in Asia, Europe, and America. However, its global trade and standardization present different features and an uneven development in different countries or regions. As the main country for its production and consumption, Panax ginseng in China is characterized by its large cultivation area and high total yield and is mainly sold as a raw material or primary processed product. By contrast, Panax ginseng produced in South Korea is mainly sold in manufactured products. Besides, European countries, as another consumption market of Panax ginseng, pay more attention to the research and development of its products. Although Panax ginseng has been widely recorded in various national pharmacopoeias and regional standards, the current standards of Panax ginseng differ in quantity, composition, and distribution, and the existing standards cannot be enough to meet the demands of its global trade. Based on the above issues, we systemically summarized and analyzed the status and features of Panax ginseng standardization and put forward suggestions on the development needs of international standardization of Panax ginseng to guarantee its quality and safety, regulate the order of its global trade, and resolve trade disputes, thereby promoting the high-quality development of the Panax ginseng industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Korean peninsula has never managed to safely avoid the repercussions of hegemonic struggles or power transitions between great regional powers. Yoon's foreign and security policies are heavily dependent on the ROK-US alliance. The most serious foreign and security challenges facing the Yoon government will likely come from South Korea-China relations. Examining various scenarios in the era of the US-China strategic competition, it is imperative for the Yoon government to pursue a strategy of 'pro-U.S. and harmonious relations with China (親美和中).' South Korea must actively pursue a policy of regional security cooperation, multilateralism, and coalition among middle powers in order to alleviate the risks of abandonment and entrapment vis-à-vis the U.S. on the one hand and to defend against and prevent interference and retribution by China on the other. As the Yoon administration has stressed, transforming the U.S.-South Korea alliance into a comprehensive global alliance and cooperating closely with the U.S. on security as well as key strategic industries is unavoidable. But the strategic cooperative partnership with China also needs to be respected. At a minimum, a situation in which the South Korea-China relationship devolves into a hostile one needs to be avoided. There is a need to strengthen communication and cooperation with China in non-strategic areas and non-traditional security. At the same time, military and security preparedness needs to be enhanced in preparation for drastic changes to the regional security environment in Northeast Asia. New security issues such as health, cyber, the environment, and climate change are areas in which cooperation with both the U.S. and China can be pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and China in 1992, there has been an active interaction between the two countries which goes beyond differences in political, economic, social, and cultural systems. The astonishing growth in South Korea-China relations, however, has also increased areas in which conflict and clash may occur. In particular, the socio-cultural interaction between the two countries has created new identities, images, ideas and discourses, subsequently increasing the areas of conflict and clash. Based on Appadurai's discussion of the transnational interaction in the globalization process, the present paper analyzes the sociocultural relationship between South Korea and China, focusing on ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes, which are especially important in looking at socio-cultural dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the theory of sub-national governments' foreign affairs, this paper analyzes the role played by China's local governments at the time when China's central government was formulating polices to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. China's local governments, with Shandong Province in particular, made strong attempts to lobby the central government on the economic need for enlarging bilateral trade and drawing investment from South Korea. These efforts played an active role on Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization and further advanced the realization of diplomatic contacts already underway. Shandong Province's case shows that sub-national governments have been playing ever more important roles in China's overall diplomacy since the Reform and Opening Up for the economy, which began in 1978. In the multi-fold policy-making process by the central and local governments, it appears that the central government needs to respond to the reasonable interest case for engagement made by sub-national governments. How to accommodate the policy interests of the central and sub-national government entities is an important problem facing China's future diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asserts that with the advent of the post-Kim Jong-il era, China will advance from its previous role of mere balancer and seek to become a more active manager in pursuit of its own national interests. China hopes for a softer, more stable North Korean regime, so that a mutually beneficial partnership can develop between the two states. China believes that it must adjust and take on a new role in the process of North Korea's "normalization." China also expects that by adopting this new role, it can restructure North Korea into a strategic buffer zone in the long term. This Chinese perspective can be seen as not merely an attempt to manage the situation, but rather a visionary approach toward the North Korean issue. This is expected to spark considerable controversy within South Korea concerning its Chinese policy. From a progressive viewpoint, the new Chinese approach concerning the stabilization of the North Korean region, the softening of the North Korean regime, and the development of mutually beneficial relations, resembles the Sunshine Policy of South Korea in certain aspects. But from a conservative perspective, while there has been a noticeable shift in China's attitude toward North Korea, there is no detectable change in its actual North Korea policy. For the conservatives, China's approach to North Korea is likely to be seen as an attempt to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula for self-gain. These changes will be intertwined with the political schedule of South Korea and may incite social controversy over what kind of strategic position South Korea should occupy between the U.S. and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview and analysis of the foreign policy stance taken by China since the mid-1990s. Various outside perceptions of China's power and influence are reviewed. The nation's deliberate adherence to a "middle power" strategy of fostering a global image of caution and pragmatism in security issues is introduced and explained. Further analysis is offered relating this doctrine to those of Australia and South Korea, showing where their respective approaches to the region's geopolitics are in agreement and in conflict.

For the past 12 years, China and South Korea have significantly improved their bilateral ties--to such an extent that China is now South Korea's largest trading partner. Furthermore, China's role is essential to any progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks over the North Korean nuclear issue. On the other hand, there also exists a growing yet little-discussed list of potential problems and issues underlying their otherwise prosperous relationship. Prime examples include the North Korean "refugees" in China, the history of Goguryeo, and the longer-term "China's rise." In short, the current state of Sino-South Korean relationship can be likened to standing right in the eye of the typhoon without knowing where the shelter is. This paper attempts to shed some light on these little-discussed yet highly consequential aspects of the Sino-South Korean relationship, not only by addressing their 12-year ties but also by gauzing their future ties in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Overall, it poses a critical question: How would the China factor play out in South Korea's future security environment and in the evolving U.S.-South Korean relationship? Its conclusions can be summed up as follows: The seeming "convergence" of interests between Beijing and Seoul in many aspects of their bilateral ties does not necessarily mean that the former is supportive of South Korea's major policy goals--especially when they come to concrete issues or longer-term questions on the Korean peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the effects of the outbound foreign direct investment (FDI)) from Korean. Economic growth in Korea; Factors which contributed to the compressed economic development process; Characteristics of Korean outbound FDI; Motives for Korean manufacturing firms to invest abroad; Information on the foreign investments by Korean firms; Trade relationship between Korea and socialist countries; Trade between China and South Korea.

This article examines South Korea's response to BRI, focusing on former President Park Geun-hye's "Eurasia Initiative" as well as current President Moon Jae-In's "New Southern Policy." Given Beijing's preoccupation with political and social stability both domestically as well as in neighboring countries, it argues that there is little doubt that for Beijing economic goals are subordinate components of broader national goals, which in turn formulate the basis for geopolitical calculations. BRI represents an attempt by Beijing's leadership to shape the rules and norms governing the surrounding regions to better reflect their own preferences. Following Xi Jinping's launch of BRI, Seoul announced the Eurasia Initiative (EAI) as its own vision for an East-West connection. In calling for a revival of the ancient Silk Road, President Park's main goal was to foster a flow of economic, political, and social interaction from Europe though the Korean Peninsula. Her policy was driven primarily by political and security motives concerning the division of the Peninsula. Park's successor, President Moon announced his own foreign policy initiative, the New Southern Policy (NSP), which seeks to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia while continuing to manage relations with Northeast Asia. While NSP at first sight might suggest a new policy direction, the article argues that both EAI and NSP ultimately have sought to change dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and work toward peace with the North. Both policies reflect the Korean fear of vulnerability to great power competition, seeking to foster relations with smaller powers so as to increase Seoul's foreign policy leverage as a middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on national and local news stories, newly declassified documents, u.s. prisoner of war (POW) memoirs, and popular films, this article argues that the legacy of the Korean War in the United States from 1953 to 1962 dramatically shaped how Americans imagined the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It specifically examines how media portrayals of North Korean atrocities, the alleged misconduct of u.s. captives, and the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the DPRK affected public perceptions of "North Korea" as a subjective construct. The painful legacy of the Korean War, particularly the experience of u.s. POWS , encouraged Americans to think of North Korea as an inherently violent foe and as part of a broader "Oriental Communist" enemy in the Cold War. When the experiences of u.s. soldiers contradicted these narratives, media sources often made distinctions between 'Worth Koreans," a repugnant racial and ideological "other," and "north Koreans," potential u.s. friends and allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many scholars and pundits have explored bilateral relations between South Korea and the People's Republic of China during the past few decades, they have paid relatively little attention to the Cold War period. Specifically, there is a lack of studies about why the government of Seoul employed a conciliatory policy toward Beijing from the beginning of the 1970s, despite China's strong ties with North Korea that posed grave threats to Seoul. Although the power-based argument purports that the U.S.-Sino rapprochement exerted a considerable influence on South Korea's strategic calculation, it underestimates the fact that the South felt increased insecurity after the international détente. This article attempts to offer theoretical explanations for why South Korea initiated a flexible approach toward China in the 1970s and the early 1980s. First, by narrowing the scope of the alliance security dilemma to small powers, it sheds light on significant elements that have an influence on abandonment fears by small powers. Second, this article demonstrates how the theory explains the case of South Korea, relying on declassified documents and recent works. Finally, it discusses the relevance of theoretical elements to the present time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the sources and consequences of East Asia's participation in global governance. Despite the rhetoric of global contribution, the article argues that global governance issues are reframed in East Asia to better suit domestic and regional priorities. Specifically, two underlying mechanisms are at work to complicate, and often render ineffective, East Asia's foray into global governance: (1) the conflicting identities of the three countries at the regional and global levels; and (2) the localization of global governance issues. By examining the global role of China, Japan, and South Korea in climate change, peacekeeping, nuclear nonproliferation, the article shows how the shared desire of enhancing global status in East Asia is tempered by the politics of dual identity and issue localization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese popular nationalism has been spotlighted as a source of the 'China Threat' in interpreting the country's foreign policies by China scholars, especially, so-called constructivist pessimists. However, the applicability of this interpretation is quite limited when Sino-South Korea relations are examined. Though it is true that the anti-Korean sentiment of the Chinese has seriously grown in recent years, it has not affected the government's foreign policies to Korea. On the contrary, it has been played down or counter-balanced by the government, its media, and academics of China, as the period around the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when negative feelings surged, clearly illustrates. Chinese nationalism is not a threat to South Korea and cannot be generalized as a variable explaining Chinese foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the relation between China and Taiwan, as well as South and North Korea. It examines the success of China and Taiwan in functionalist cooperation and exchange despite its failure to shift economic cooperation into political cooperation through a neo-functionalist political package deal. It also explores aspects that influence the regression of the economic cooperation and human exchanges between North and South Korea. It notes the move of China and Taiwan in utilizing functionalism to augment economic cooperation without touching the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, it cites integration patterns of divided countries basing on inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations, and discusses their implications on regional integration theories.

Moscow wants a seat at the table when the future of the Korean peninsula is on the agenda, but Russia's political and economic weakness undercuts its political and economic ambitions in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor "bandwagoned" but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with China's rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates China's goals as not directly threatening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how South Korea relates to China's national security objectives in East Asia. Specifically, it argues that for China, the strategic value of South Korea lies in coping with the strong position of the US in East Asia. Moreover, South Korea's stance on the North Korean nuclear issue is closer to China's, compared with that of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]