Search

As the governments of the United States, Russia, and China signal a renewed emphasis on great power competition, tensions among three leading military and nuclear powers are rising. Mounting tensions portend an increase in proxy conflicts, raising concerns about support for possible atrocity crimes of proxies. As states formulate their approaches to great power proxy conflict, they would do well to consider the possibility of their officials facing liability for aiding and abetting atrocity crimes. This paper focuses on aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law through the lens of great power proxy conflict. It argues that proxy conflict among great powers is likely, that it will probably contribute to atrocity crimes, and that states have not taken sufficient measures to ensure they do not contribute to the commission of atrocities. While this paper deals with the United States, Russia, and China, it especially focuses on recommendations and implications for the U.S. government. Section I discusses the rise of great power competition as the driving force in international politics, argues that great power competition will likely manifest as proxy conflict between great powers, and discusses the relationship between proxy conflict and liability for atrocity crimes. Section H analyzes the elements of aiding and abetting liability through the lens of three debates among legal scholars and judges that bear particular relevance for individual liability in the context of proxy conflict among great powers. Section III examines the relationships between the governments of the United States, Russia, and China and the International Criminal Court. The Section then outlines the ongoing legal debate regarding whether the ICC can properly assert jurisdiction over the nationals of those and other non-party states as a matter of customary international law. Section IV reflects on the practical implications of the paper's findings and recommends policies that the United States should adopt in light of those findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does power shape foreign policy attitudes? Drawing on advances in psychological research on power, I argue that the sense of relative state power explains foreign policy hawkishness. The intuitive sense that "our state" is stronger than "your state" activates militant internationalism, an orientation centered on the efficacy of force and deterrence to achieve state aims. Beyond general orientation towards the world, this sense of power explains discrete attitudes towards pressing security issues, from threat perception in the South China Sea to nuclear weapons use against Iran. Five original surveys across the US, China, and Russia, as well as an experiment fielded on the US public, lend support to these claims. The psychological effects of state power overshadow dispositional traits common in behavioral IR, like individuals' personalities and moral proclivities. More surprisingly, power changes individuals, making hawks of even the most dovish. Taken together, the paper presents a "first image reversed" challenge to standard bottom-up accounts of foreign policy opinion and offers unique explanatory leverage in a potential era of US decline, China's rise, and Russian belligerence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is one of the founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and, next to China, one of its leaders. While being an active and engaging member of the organization, Russia's strategy towards SCO remains puzzling. Initially, it sought a pragmatic cooperation with China on solving numerous security issues that plagued post-Soviet Central Asia. However, Russia gradually developed alternative regional bodies (viz. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)) where it is a supreme leader, and which became its preferred tools for interacting with other states in the post-Soviet space. This impacted the place and role of the SCO in Russia's regional and global strategies. Moreover, Russia's growing power asymmetry vis-à-vis China added an additional dimension to its consideration of SCO. Hence, Moscow promoted several policies, especially the enlargement, which seemed to undercut SCO's development. This paper relies on a theoretical framework of the so-called theory of cooperative hegemony, especially the application of one of its main analytical variables – the commitment capacity – to examine Russia's policy towards SCO. Apart from considerable secondary sources, the article draws upon six semi-structured expert interviews, and a number of primary documents including but not limited to foreign policy concepts, declarations, and charters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies focusing on China and Russia, whose relationship is of key importance to the configuration of the international system, have been evolving dynamically in various disciplines. We analyze the evolution of this research by focusing on the fields of International Relations and Area Studies. This novel bibliometric study employs Biblioshiny, AntConc, and VOSviewer to analyze 947 publications collected from the Web of Science Core Collection, focusing specifically on 266 publications in International Relations and Area Studies. While mapping research on China and Russia over the last three decades (1990–2019), we identify the main trends regarding the annual distribution of papers, document types, dominant journals, collaboration networks between countries, and the most productive authors. We also establish prevailing research themes resulting from keyword analysis and their respective growth over time, as well as the density of the most frequently used terms and methods employed in the selected research fields. Finally, we identify fruitful avenues for further research, while also demonstrating how the bibliometric approach can inform and direct developments on China and Russia studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Carta Internacional is the property of Associacao Brasileira de Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The transition away from post-Cold War unipolarity has repercussions for regional orders that have been shaped and sustained by US preponderance. Small states like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), traditionally reliant upon extra-regional powers to balance against more powerful neighbours, are adopting an increasingly muscular foreign policy to hedge against a possible reduced US regional role. Consequently, there is an opening for non-traditional powers to adopt larger roles. Primarily using an outside-in approach, this paper explores the nature of China and Russia's more active bilateral engagement with the UAE. It finds that in an environment where political instability within the larger Middle East combines with uncertainty about US intentions, regional leaders and leaders of extra-regional powers with interests in the Persian Gulf have to adjust accordingly, either to protect those interests or to take advantage of the opportunity to expand their presence in a strategically and economically important theatre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central Asia, the hub of natural resources, has been the battleground of international power politics among the big powers since long. In order to have influence in the region, the Russian and the British Empires indulge in the "Great Game". However, it ended with the collapse of the Russian empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an unexpected power vacuum in Central Asia followed by a fierce competition between the big three, Russia, China and US. This competition is commonly known as "The New Great Game" in the present day international politics. The rich energy resources are usually considered the main reason of the renewed interests in the region and provide principal motivation for Russia, China and US. However, the role of energy resources is usually overstated. This paper will identify which other factors along with energy resources should be considered in order to have a broader and comprehensive understanding of the present Geo-political scenario in the Central Asia. Using the Neo-Realist approach, this paper will first analyze the significance of the Central Asian states, how they provoke strategic competition between great powers and how pipeline politics translate it. Finally, the paper will analyses the competing interests of Russia, China and US and the strategies adopted by each for the achievements of its objectives. It will be concluded by stating that how Russia, China and US struggle to attain, keep and enhance power and that energy resources are just a mean to this supreme objective. It will also conclude by asserting that although the great powers behave aggressively and self-interestedly they may find a minimum degree of cooperation to tackle common concerns such as a growing radical Islamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we attempt to analyze the China-Russia cooperation within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For this end, the prospects for and challenges toward the alignment of the two countries' Eurasia strategies and the impact of such cooperation on the economics, politics, and security of the region and beyond are examined. Exploring the two nations' actual and potential points of convergence and divergence, we maintain that China-Russia strategic partnership stands at the center of the BRI's expansion in Eurasia. Economically, the cooperation aims to boost development in the region by spurring infrastructure, connectivity, and innovation. Politically, it seeks to create a more institutionalized and harmonious regional existence via an economy-driven approach to security to address such threats as extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Therefore, in the long run, we argue that the China-Russia cooperation on the BRI is poised to remake the Eurasian geoeconomic and geopolitical landscape with major implications for regional and global politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ostensibly, Joe Biden's victory over Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential elections should have placed United States international policy back on a familiar path. However, despite the prevalence of a highly traditional vision of US foreign policy, the Biden administration has maintained significant continuities with the previous administration, as reflected in the policy towards China and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. In part, this is due to the constraints produced by the deep divisions that exist at domestic level. This paper aims to unravel the fundamental elements of Biden's foreign policy, focusing on possible ideological and doctrinal elements, strategic priorities, and any continuities and changes relative to his predecessor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research of Eurasian regionalism mostly focuses on the Eurasian core, for example, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, which have been pursuing a more exclusive and closer form of integration – Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union. Other countries of the post-Soviet space are often described as post-Soviet ‘escapists’ or ‘isolationists’ and mostly discounted in the analyses of the Eurasian regionalism. The paper looks at six post-Soviet states, who opted out from the Eurasian Economic Union, and analyse their interaction with the EEU. The paper argues that despite tensions in relations with Russia, most of these countries are reluctant to entirely disrupt their economic relations with the post-Soviet Eurasia. The paper argues that six countries of the post-Soviet Eurasian periphery effectively pursue policies of a looser form association with the Eurasian core. This finding allows to argue that Eurasian regionalism, similarly to its European model, consists of the core and outer circle. The outer circle is featured by overlapping regional arrangements and growing presence of external powers and growing number of transit and trade flows linking this Eurasian periphery with the West and Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Purpose |!|#8211; The purpose of this paper is to understand the changes in Swedish and Finnish companies|!|#39; traffic flows and evaluate the future prospects. Design/methodology/approach |!|#8211; Research was implemented through web-based questionnaire. Furthermore, numerous second-hand sources were used to gain knowledge. Research was conducted in three parts: first research was executed in 2006, second in 2009 and the third was realized in 2010. Findings |!|#8211; The main findings support previous studies arguing that the traffic between Europe and China will continue to grow in the future. However, contrary to earlier studies, the balance will change from eastbound to westbound traffic. The future prospects to Russian traffic are stated as a slight increase in demand: however, the balance is shifting from eastbound to westbound transport, and it is noted that the transport flows from Russia to Europe might increase in the near future. Research limitations/implications |!|#8211; Empirical data were gathered from two North European countries, Sweden and Finland. To follow the development in the market, and in order to make more general conclusions, research should be extended to include other countries. Furthermore, economic downturn|!|#39;s influences on traffic flows and its development could be analyzed in a year|!|#39;s time. Practical implications |!|#8211; The research aggregates data from three surveys and evaluates the companies|!|#39; standpoints. The study results could be used to evaluate the companies|!|#39; development trends in Finland and Sweden. In addition, the research provides valuable data for the business world, as well as for academia, by adducing the market actors|!|#39; outlook. Originality/value |!|#8211; The paper contributes actor-level data to the subject, which previously has been scrutinized mainly via second-hand data and literature analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being neighbors, China and Central Asian states face common problems, which require collective response and leadership. In this article, we explore to what extent China's increased engagement in the region since the dissolution of the USSR has included attempts to lead cooperation to address some of these common problems. We answer our research question by exploring observable leadership efforts, such as institutional development, financial support, moral or belief supply, and unilateral exemplary activities. The analysis shows that in three selected issue areas, namely counter-terrorism, infrastructure development, and water management China has made certain efforts to lead, but the scope and character of its efforts have varied significantly between different issue areas and over time. This variation can be explained in the light of China's evolving foreign policy interests, the specificities of the Central Asian states, and the role of Russia as the other prominent external actor. While earlier China's initiatives focused on Central Asia and Russia, the more recent ones either include Central Asian states among other members or focus only on some of them. Joining China's projects helps Central Asian states to improve their international standing and diversify their foreign relations, but also affects regional geopolitical structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 15 years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has preserved its non-Western (and sometimes anti-Western) identity and its policy toward the West has been based on a "soft-balancing" strategy. This paper aims to examine the SCO's identity positioning and understand the implications of its strategy and policy toward the West in terms of three recent global events relating to the SCO. India's membership effect will be able to soften the SCO's image of the club of authoritarian states or an anti-Western group as well as to make less-assertive its non-Western identity. China's economic power projection aiming at the "peaceful rise" is inclined to make the SCO's identity less anti-Western. Russia's policy of expanding partners and widening cooperation in greater Eurasia is also likely to weaken not only the rhetoric, but also the substance of the anti-Western narrative. The SCO's shift of identity positioning, in general, from the non-Western to a less assertive non-Western is likely to soften the SCO's soft balancing against the West, and the anticipated range and effect of the softer balancing could be greater due to the widened platform and the improved image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses China and Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Organisation (SCO), a Eurasian regional organisation established in 2001 and consisting of China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. I argue that while the two largest members of the SCO are essential to the organisation, they at the same time prevent the SCO from becoming a more comprehensive regional organisation. Moreover, the actions and presence of China and Russia in Central Asia, together with inherently inauspicious characteristics of the region when compared to the post-Cold War new regionalist thinking, hinder the overall regionalisation in the area. However, regionalisation, hopefully in time leading to greater regional cooperation in Central Asia, is very much in the interests of Europe and the European Union (EU) as a potential peaceful way forward in the development of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forms the core of China's foreign policy and future foreign cooperation, and energy cooperation is an important component of the BRI. Energy security is closely related to the interdependent relations between countries. The present paper investigates energy interdependent relations between China and the countries along the Belt and Road using data collected in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy , between 2000 and 2015. The main results are as follows: (1) Abundant proven reserves of energy resources exist in these countries, which were equivalent to 758.73 billion tons of standard coal in 2015, accounting for 52.27% of the world. The distribution of these resources presents a pattern with two centers—one in Russia, and one in West Asia and the Middle East. (2) Established interdependence relations exist between China and the countries along the Belt and Road in terms of energy cooperation. China has imported 437.21 million tons of standard coal from these countries and their guarantee degree to China's energy security is 58.42%, of which 13.56% refers to coal, 73.37% to oil, and 13.06% to gas. Meanwhile, their dependence degree in energy exports to China was 13.56%, or 11.15% for coal, 14.92% for oil, and 10.55% for gas. An interdependence relation thus exists between China and these countries, and the degree of mutual dependence between them was 0.23 (0.22 for coal, 0.13 for oil, and 0.38 for gas), locating China in a relatively passive position with respect to the countries along the Belt and Road as a whole, but a relatively active position in relation to individual countries (with the exception of Russia). Our findings are useful to the tasks of identifying the spatial distribution pattern of energy in countries along the Belt and Road, assisting in the promotion of energy cooperation between China and these countries, and the future construction of the BRI. Highlights • Energy cooperation relationships between China and the countries along the Belt and Road are examined. • The indicators of guarantee degree, dependence degree, and mutual dependence degree are selected for this study. • Energy resources present a pattern with two centers; one in Russia and one in West Asia and the Middle East. • Countries along the Belt and Road maintained an energy GD of 58.42% for China; their DD on China was 13.56%. • The MDD between China and the countries of the Belt and Road was 0.23, and China's position in the relation was passive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is now a major power in the international system. One axiom of the realist theory on international politics is that states will acquire power to ensure their own position and security within the system. One effective way Major or Great Powers have done this is through alliance building. Historically, China has not had much success in cultivating long-standing alliances; however, cooperation between it and its neighbor Russia have deepened. This paper, using structural and defensive realism as theoretical framework on how and why states form alliances, explores the potential China-Russia military alliance. This paper looks at both balancing power and balancing threat as justifications for Great Powers to form alliances. As both a powerful state and a potential threat, the United States serves as the prime impetus for both Russia and China to align with each other. Whether the US is an actual threat to both Russia and China is immaterial, rather it is the perception by both China and Russia that the US's military strength and stated policy of promoting democratic norms and values represent a threat to the established leadership in both countries. China is in a unique position as a near peer competitor to the US; however, with few natural allies Russia is still powerful but in a relative state of decline. Both countries benefit from an alliance to counteract American influence within their zones of influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria remained the powder keg of East Asia. In the war’s aftermath, three empires, the Qing, the Russian and the Japanese, stationed their troops in Manchuria, in a struggle for military supremacy there. There has already been a considerable amount of research on these military activities. However, previous works have not discussed them from a triangular relationship. This paper contends that the history of modern East Asia cannot be understood until one examines the shift in the military balance in Manchuria from a triangular comparative point of view. The results of such examination show that, in Manchuria, each empire was unable to establish military domination alone, and therefore needed an alliance partner. During the Xinhai Revolution, the Russia-Japan ‘alliance’ wielded overwhelming military power against China. However, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, Japan renounced cooperation with a weakened Russia and built a new partnership with China to advance the Siberian intervention. The military triangle of Russia, China and Japan was unable to create a comprehensive regional security system in Manchuria because what was established was based on mutual distrust and fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides requisite information on the thorny civil war and destructive situation in the Republic of Sudan, which has led to the indictment of the sitting Sudanese Head of State in 2009. This paper will provide an in depth discussion regarding increased weapons transfers and its adverse impact on the conflict in Sudan. Additionally, theoretical frameworks regarding the foreign policies of nation-states, power, and resource conflict will be utilized to analyze the Sudanese government's relationships with China, Russia and Iran as well as its relationship with the marginalized communities of the Sudan such as Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. Information has been provided to underscore the major players in the conflict, whereby Russia, Iran and China are considered culprits in the arms race in the area. Russia, China and Iran have continued to supply arms to Sudan despite the institution of a UN arms embargo in 2004. Although the weapons procurement chain in Sudan demands a comprehensive analysis of both state and non-state actors a close examination of its relationship with various nation-states such as China, Iran and Russia will provide a greater understanding of the economic and political environment that has contributed to the increase of weapons transfers which has adversely impacted internal and regional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deepening rapprochement between China and Russia, those two formidable continental powers, constitutes one of the most noteworthy phenomena in post-Cold War world affairs. Through detailed investigation of this vital bilateral relationship over a variety of issue areas, we characterize the current Sino-Russian relations as a limited defensive strategic partnership, with strategicness constituting the core of the Sino-Russian relationship. More than that, we further argue that the Sino-Russian rapprochement is externally-driven rather than internally-driven. More specifically, realism's balance of power theory, or its variety balance of threat theory, provides a relatively convincing explanation regarding the increasingly strengthened Sino-Russian strategic partnership. In a roughly chronological way, this paper will demonstrate how America's increasing unilateralism in its foreign policy approaches was correlated with, and thus contributed to, the deepening rapprochement between China and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper casts light on the myth, current in China before the Opium War, that the Europeans could not survive without rhubarb. The myth has its roots in differences between pharmaceutical theories and material culture in the Chinese and Western traditions. In China, rhubarb was considered a drastic purgative, indicated only in case of grave illness. In the West, in consequence of a specific method of processing, it was regarded as a mild and gentle drug, albeit wonderfully effective in ridding the body of superfluous humoral substances. Thus the same herb acquired completely different images in China and in the West. An important factor that fostered the myth was the Russian government's termination of the rhubarb monopoly in the prelude to the Sino-Russian border conflict in the late eighteenth century. This gave rise to increased smuggling, which was misinterpreted in China as evidence that Russia stood in desperate need of rhubarb. When the border conflict came to an end in 1792, Russia's unusually submissive attitude tended to confirm this misapprehension. This article not only explains why the Qing government adopted an embargo on rhubarb; it also shows how differing pharmaceutical views influenced international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the resilience of distinctive local consumption cultures, this paper challenges some of the more sweeping claims that have been advanced in the name of ‘globalization’. Thinking about a ‘globalizing’ rather than a fully ‘globalized’ world encourages us to examine the deeply contested nature of the concept and to explore the geographically uneven nature of recent economic, political and cultural transformations. This paper approaches globalization as a site of struggle rather than as an established fact, emphasizing the need for empirically grounded studies of the impact of ‘globalization’ on consumer cultures in different geographical contexts. The paper examines the way that producers have ‘customized’ their products for different markets (drawing on evidence from China and South Africa). It then reviews case study evidence from three contrasting consumption cultures: consumption and ‘public culture’ in India, ‘consumer nationalism’ in China, and ‘artful consumption’ in Russia. The paper concludes by identifying some current debates and outlining some directions for future research, including a re-emphasis on consumption and material culture; an exploration of consumption as social practice; the delineation of commodity-specific consumption cultures; and some reflections on the political, ethical and methodological issues that are being raised in contemporary consumption research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the "strategic triangle" has been conventionally applied to the relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In actuality, there has also existed a mini-triangle among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. The first part of this paper explores the various positions in a strategic triangle, ranks these roles in terms of desirability, differentiates between endogenous and exogenous factors, and identifies three sets of derivative relations based on exogenous factors. The paper then reviews the historical patterns of interactions within the great strategic triangle and the mini-triangle, as well as explores the impact of the former on the latter. The third part concentrates on the post-Tiananmen permutations of the dual triangles, evaluates the PRC's position after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and explains U.S. behavior during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait mini-crisis in view of the structure of the mini-triangle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conflict between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic Community has taken the form of a systemic crisis, in which we face the risk of running from incident to incident. It is argued that the European post-Cold War order has undergone a norm-transforming, rather than norm-governed change. The normative framework and shared purpose on which it rests and which are essential to stabilise and perpetuate an international order have been eroded. The crisis is assessed on the basis of both the acts of violation and retreat by key ordering agents and their intersubjective assessment of the order. It is argued that normative pillars have gradually dissolved in four key areas: the principles of the Paris Charter on the indivisibility of security, the arms control regime, collective security and the European border regime. Tackling these issues is particularly complicated, because some, such as arms control, require today a global approach, involving China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and how does state interaction in cyber-space result in norm development? In this article, we contend that governments take on roles vis-á-vis both domestic and foreign audiences, often resulting in conflicts between crosscutting internal and external role expectations. To alleviate these role conflicts, governments use various secret instruments of statecraft that, in turn, shape international norm development. We theorize the nexus between domestic and foreign role play and secrecy, thereby extending the understanding of role taking in international relations to the cyber-space. We argue that whereas the role conceptions of autocratic powers China and Russia have been geared toward cyber-sovereignty of the regime vis-à-vis internal and external others, the United States, as a democratic power, has sought cyber-security for both state and non-state actors in the international realm. Trying to hide some of their cyber-operations, the interaction between China, Russia and the US has resulted in a distinct pattern of cyber-proxy use and state-based surveillance interaction that has facilitated the stabilization of illiberal cyber-espionage norms and the spread of diverging notions of information sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022 posed challenges for the People's Republic of China and its priorities. This article assesses the Chinese party-state's response across four dimensions: informational, diplomatic, economic, and military-strategic. Beijing has been most supportive of Moscow in the informational and diplomatic arenas; its economic posture has been mostly self-interested, and military support for Russia has remained more or less constant. China's stance on the conflict in Ukraine appears to be shaped by several factors: a perceived need to counter the United States; the desire to support Russia while minimizing the costs of doing so to Chinese interests; China's desire for internal political stability and particular features of its domestic political system that affect foreign policy decision-making; and Beijing's evolving assessments of what the Ukraine conflict might foretell for Taiwan. The article summarizes China's interests at the time the conflict began, outlines the party-state's response, and assesses potential explanations for that response, with specific attention to implications for Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The RSC framework is used to examine the present case of Russia-China-Mongolia with particular references on areas of wide-ranging teamwork and also leading to the historical backgrounds of the Sino-Soviet Union relations, Mongolia--Soviet Union relations and Sino-Mongolian relations. Aiming at the couple Russia-China with or without Mongolia, the paper is based on regional levels of analysis and variables, as developed by Buzan and Waever in Regions and Powers. Taking into consideration the international situation among these states, there is no doubt that the pattern of amity as well as both functional and operational relations will embrace the regional triangle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]