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This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes three core arguments. First, the single most serious threat to the national security of the world is nuclear terrorism: the devastation of one of the world's great cities by a terrorist nuclear bomb. Second, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is today precariously poised at a tipping point that could, if it is allowed to further erode, result in a cascade of proliferation. Third, the ultimate catastrophe of nuclear terrorism is preventable. There exists a feasible, affordable agenda of actions that the nations of the world could take to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist's Hiroshima to nearly zero. But current trendlines are going in the opposite direction indeed, heading toward predictable catastrophe. Preventing nuclear terrorism will thus require a significant departure from current behavior. An urgent test in the agenda to preventing nuclear terrorism is the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The best hope for success is for China to take the lead in a new phase of active diplomacy that aims to effect a freeze of nuclear activity on the Korean peninsula and then design a mini-step-by-mini-step process in which the other five members of the Six-Party Talks provide benefits to North Korea in return for the freeze and ultimate dismantling of its nuclear weapons infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on national and local news stories, newly declassified documents, u.s. prisoner of war (POW) memoirs, and popular films, this article argues that the legacy of the Korean War in the United States from 1953 to 1962 dramatically shaped how Americans imagined the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It specifically examines how media portrayals of North Korean atrocities, the alleged misconduct of u.s. captives, and the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the DPRK affected public perceptions of "North Korea" as a subjective construct. The painful legacy of the Korean War, particularly the experience of u.s. POWS , encouraged Americans to think of North Korea as an inherently violent foe and as part of a broader "Oriental Communist" enemy in the Cold War. When the experiences of u.s. soldiers contradicted these narratives, media sources often made distinctions between 'Worth Koreans," a repugnant racial and ideological "other," and "north Koreans," potential u.s. friends and allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China reacted very differently to the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis: engaging in passive and ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy in the first and choosing more proactive and ‘stage-managing’ diplomacy in the second. This article has sought to explain this striking contrast in China's foreign behavior. Though most studies tend to rely on Chinese strategic and security interests in explaining China's proactive diplomacy as demonstrated in the six-party talks, those strategic and security interests do not explain directly the contrasting foreign behavior of China. China faced basically equal strategic and security concerns and equally dangerous potential military conflict between the US and North Korea through the first and the second nuclear crises. This article, then, argues that ‘same interests, but different behaviors’ should be explained not by China's external interest calculus but by internal changes within China itself. By the turn of the new millennium, China had undergone an evolutionary change of state identity from a cautious accommodator to an active constructor, or from a state of ‘taoguang yanghui’ to a state of ‘fuzeren daguo’. The contrasting foreign behaviors in the first and second nuclear crises are profoundly reflective of this identity shift of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study sets out to analyze strategic relations of two major donors – the United States and China – in delivering food aid to North Korea in the 1990s. By reviewing the historical evolution of US–China strategic relations in line with food aid and adopting a game model to verify historical findings, it addresses two significant observations. First, the North Korean food aid dynamics were constructed and crystallized by donors' strategic interactions, rather than humanitarian intention to save the famine-stricken North Korea. Both donors first took into account strategic interests in aid dynamics, and then utilized food aid as a strategic instrument for their own purposes. Second, any multilateral cooperation for delivering food aid to North Korea dooms to failure, despite the potential of aid coordination among donor states. Donors' competition for the primacy in the region of Northeast Asia hampered policy coordination for institutionalizing aid networks. It is concluded that the two donors were bound to strategize food aid as a logical outgrowth of their own interests in the wake of North Korea's humanitarian disasters. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although superficially China and the United States initially appeared to have common interests in the management of the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, the crucible of North Korean provocations revealed that Chinese and US preferences were more different than alike. Instead of laying the groundwork for an effective Northeast Asian multilateral security organization, as many hoped, the North Korean crisis has increased suspicions between Washington and Beijing. The crisis foreshadows additional difficulties in the tense transition from regional unipolarity to bipolarity, as China demands increased influence and privileges within its near-abroad while the United States continues to affirm the legitimacy of its post-war role as the enforcer of global norms – some of which China does not support. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A review of four periods and a comparison of three regional institutions provide evidence for how serious China has become about multilateralism with its neighbors in Asia. Approval for multilateralism does not mean that China is ready to endorse strong regional organizations that bind their members, especially when it has reservations both about institutions that could undermine its narrow notion of sovereignty and norms that could support US or even Japanese efforts to impose long-feared universal values. If China calculates that limited multilateralism now provides a variety of benefits, to date its support reflects specific circumstances, not general trust in this format. Focusing on the Six-Party Talks as the presumed foundation for regionalism in Northeast Asia offers a concentrated view of strategic thinking toward the area most vital to China's security. In the standoff between North Korea and the United States we are able to assess the degree to which China accepts working with four or five states and the prospects for its active support, if circumstances permit, for the establishment of a peace and security mechanism through the fifth working group that originated in the Joint Agreement of February 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moscow wants a seat at the table when the future of the Korean peninsula is on the agenda, but Russia's political and economic weakness undercuts its political and economic ambitions in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between North Korea and the rest of the world, focusing on the country's dictator, Kim Jong-il, and the problems posed by his regime's nuclear weapons program. The policies of the United States and China regarding North Korea are analyzed. It is noted that neither the Americans nor the Chinese seem to have much power to affect North Korean nuclear policy. Efforts at diplomacy have proved ineffectual, and any coercive solution would be prohibitively expensive, either in terms of money or human lives.

The article discusses the relationship between North Korea and the rest of the world, focusing on the problems posed by the isolated and impoverished dictatorship's nuclear weapons program, and the dearth of reasonable diplomatic or even military options for resolving the ongoing crisis. The policies of China and the United States regarding North Korea are analyzed. It is noted that neither the Chinese nor the Americans seem to have much power to affect North Korean nuclear policy. Efforts at diplomacy have repeatedly and consistently failed, and any coercive solution would be prohibitively expensive, either in terms of money or human lives.

While the progress to date on denuclearizing North Korea is encouraging, proclaiming the end of nuclear threats in Northeast Asia is premature. First, North Korea has lately been having second thoughts with regard to full disclosure of its nuclear holdings. Second, and more seriously, the deterioration of Russo-American relations over nuclear issues is not confined to a strictly European agenda. Issues arising out of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy that seem to expand the parameters for first-strike use by America, the future of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and missile defenses in Asia in the context of revivified U.S. alliances in Asia have all appeared on the agenda and could lead to negative consequences for Asian security. Two potential consequences in particular could emerge. One could be a nuclear arms race between Moscow and Washington, while another could see further movement toward the consolidation of a genuine Sino-Russian bloc in opposition to what Moscow and Beijing both see as a consolidation of such a bloc around missile defenses and the strengthening of the U.S. alliance system in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1993 North Korea's response to US ‘hegemony’ has been a seemingly paradoxical attempt to bandwagon with the United States by means of military coercion. However, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea has failed to normalize its relations with the United States. In the years ahead, it can either pursue more proactively the strategy of bandwagoning with the United States, shift its strategic focus to China, or embark upon a policy of equidistance between the United States and Japan on the one hand and China on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2003 and 2004, after having successfully hosted two six-party talks and a round of working-group level meetings on the North Korean nuclear crisis, China pushed to institutionalize the talks. Such an initiative coming from China was a shock to the world, since it has long maintained a passive, negative and defensive posture against multilateral cooperative security arrangements. This article declares that China's idea to utilize the six-party talks as a steppingstone toward a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is premature. It argues that the first priority is to address the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea--what was, then, believed to be the solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis. This article dissects the failure and identifies one critical factor for the viability of any future peaceful resolution--the economic sanctions that the US has placed against North Korea for the past half-century. The authors argues that if the issue of sanctions is not addressed, the current six-party talks will not be successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most discussions of East Asian security focus on three issues: the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea; the region's US-based security architecture; and coping with China's rising power in the region. A fourth issue, often overlooked, skirts the other three categories but has implications for each: the new China--South Korea détente. The dramatic transformation of this relationship in the 1990s is the most successful case of 'engaging China' in East Asia. This case sheds light on the likely effectiveness of American and South Korean efforts to engage North Korea. As the Agreed Framework threatens to unravel and another potential crisis looms over the Peninsula, the China-South Korea axis constitutes -- on balance -- a stabilising factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]