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The aim of this paper is to analyze the most important aspects of the ideological relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the face of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Policy Brief is divided into four parts: Reactions of the Workers' Party of Korea to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party CPC; Mention of Korea during the 20th CPC Congress; The role of CPC in People's Republic of China according to WKP and the Significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th Congress of the CPC. The methodology included media and literature review, which were collected through Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun and documents of the 20th Congress of the CPC. This study makes evident the importance of ideological relations between China and North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Article Type: Viewpoint paper Purpose--This is an article which intends to clarify and profoundly specify China's North Korean foreign policy. Design, Methodology, Approach--This is a viewpoint paper which seeks to enhance the understanding of, and remedy any misunderstanding of China's key interest, as well as its intentions. Findings--First, regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the subsequent sanctions against the North, China wants to be seen as a legitimate, norm-based, great power. Second is the PRC-DPRK bilateral economic cooperation, which is a practicality driven diplomacy. Strategic efforts for balancing between justification and practicality represent its diplomatic concerns because Beijing's efforts to strike a strategic balance have resulted in lowering its "bottom-line thinking.". Practical Implications--As competition between the U.S. and China intensifies, China will pursue a more tactical two-sided strategy between implementing sanctions against the North, while at the same time cooperating economically with North Korea. China has to realize that its policy towards the North will result in a continued lowering of its political and strategic room to maneuver. Originality, Value--While much of the literature on PRC-DPRK regards China's diplomacy through the "buffer zone" explanation, this study sheds light on two other motives that clarify China's actions. China's North Korea policy is strategically focused on the above two areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing North Korea is essential for examining international relations in East Asia as a whole, but North Korea's tight control over information makes this difficult. Another factor complicating analysis of North Korea is its "special relationship" with China. The aim of this paper is to examine four factors contributing to the "special relationship" between China and North Korea, how that relationship came about, and how it functions within the context of international politics today. This paper is a structural analysis of China–North Korea relations that describes four factors behind their "special relationship." It continues by analyzing China–North Korea relations under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. The "special relationship" between China and North Korea is based on four factors. What is distinctive about these factors is that they can bring the two sides together but also push them apart. In terms of national security issues, the force bringing them together has ultimately prevailed. Socialist ideology issues have surfaced much less frequently now and have lost their capacity to both bring the two together and push them apart. In the area of traditional ties, the two leaders are attempting to use their personal relationship to have closer relations, but this is not having much lasting effect. Where economic relations are concerned, Beijing and Pyongyang have become even more dependent on each other and this is a strong force pushing them closer together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since establishing diplomatic relations in October 1949, North Korea and China have forged a complex alliance characterized by both firm solidarity and mutual distrust. This paper analyzes the ups and downs of their alliance relationship by examining the "Northeast Rear Doctrine" (NRD) suggested by Mao Zedong in the early 1960s, which proposed that North Korea could utilize China's Northeast region as its rear base in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Mao's proposal represents the apex of the Sino-North Korean alliance, implying China's temporary concession of its sovereignty over the northeastern territory to North Korea. However, when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, the NRD policy was virtually abolished, thereby significantly affecting Sino-North Korean relations. First, it exacerbated security threats to North Korea's regime as Northeast China, which once served as Pyongyang's rear base, was transformed into Seoul's outpost for infiltration into North Korea. Second, it deepened North Korea's distrust of China and served as a catalyst for transforming Sino-North Korean relations into normal state-to-state dynamics, rather than the traditional party-to-party relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes the political directions Pyongyang has displayed in its nuclear diplomacy for the past ten years in a time sequential manner. The particular focus has been on Pyongyang's insistence on maintaining various options to choose from and its political ability to materialize them. The study has looked into North Korea's major policy transitions and the changes in position prominently demonstrated in its diplomacy with the U.S., China, and South Korea. During the period studied, Pyongyang has shown flexible attitudes, which include: 1) its radical transition from aggressive nuclear and missile capacity building to returning to the negotiation table; 2) its transition of the main issue from demanding corresponding security measures to demanding sanctions relief; 3) its transition of the up-front goal from showing off its retaliation deterrence capacity to strike the U.S. mainland to completion of nuclear war-fighting capabilities in the regional arena; and 4) its transition from hedging against China, focusing on its possible negotiation with the U.S.; to hedging against the U.S.; focusing on its possible closer ties with China. Such flexibility has been quite successful as a way to realize the strategic objectives that North Korea wanted to achieve in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the emotions-policy nexus within the EU's foreign policy, specifically focusing on the EU's human rights sanctions against China and North Korea. By embedding the discussion within an extended framework of analysis that underscores the emotional dimensions of the EU's foreign policy, the article scrutinizes how policy decisions, unfolding through a series of actions, reactions and third-party responses, shape, and are shaped by, emotional chains via its enabling and constraining mechanisms. While the case study of China illustrates the two mechanisms via exploring the EU-China investment negotiations, human rights sanctions as well as China's retaliatory measures and the EU's response, the case of North Korea, using the same sanctions, shows a divergent policy response and absence of emotions albeit within a similar rhetoric. The conclusion ponders over the efficacy of sanctions policies, suggesting that the integration of emotional awareness into policy-making can foster a more holistic approach in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the international audience is interested in finding cases of denuclearization in the past to draw out lessons that can be applied to North Korea. In order to find the optimal reference point, it is crucial to carefully examine the background of North Korea's decision to begin denuclearization talks. Thus, this paper will begin by discussing the overall context of the talks and highlight core issues that may occur during the process of denuclearization. Next, it will examine which case is most relevant to the negotiations with North Korea, and will analyze key implications of Iran's nuclear deal, which is the most recent and similar to the case of North Korea. And by focusing on the core issues identified, it will suggest policy considerations for preparing strategies to continue negotiations with North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea's behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China's indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing's ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea's behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China's indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China's emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-DPRK relationship had often been described, at least until the end of the Cold War, as one of 'lips and teeth' or 'blood-cemented' brothers. However, remarkable changes in the previously strong Sino-DPRK relations have been observed in recent years. Most importantly, the DPRK has ignored the People's Republic of China's repeated warnings to withhold nuclear tests, instead conducting them five times in a row since 2006. In response to those tests, China has vehemently criticized the DPRK. In addition, it voted for UN Security Council resolutions that imposed strict sanctions on Pyongyang. China even imposed its own sanctions against the DPRK. The strained relationship between China and North Korea is demonstrated by the fact that China's new president, Xi Jinping, has met South Korea's President Park Geun-hye eight times since he came to office in 2013, whereas he has never had a summit meeting with North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un, who succeeded his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. What has driven this dramatic change in the relationships of these two military allies? This paper argues that while multiple factors have pushed formerly strong Sino-DPRK relations into a new direction, the three most important factors are mistrust between two allies (historical), diverging interests (strategic), and growing Sino-ROK ties (economic and political). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the aftermath of Kim Jong-Il's death in December 2011, China clearly wanted a more cooperative new North Korean regime which would help stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Kim Jong-Il regime had been a political liability and economic burden to China, as it defied the international community by perpetrating numerous provocations and crises. In order to avert a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing had to bail out the Kim Jong-Il regime by defusing the crises created by North Korea's saber-rattling behavior and brinkmanship. Clearly, China did not want to repeat or endure a similar relationship with the new North Korean regime under Kim Jong-Un. This article seeks to examine China's policy toward the Kim Jong-Un regime from December 2011 to the present. In spite of initial optimism, Beijing has been disappointed by the Kim Jong-Un regime's defiant actions, such as the two ballistic missile tests in 2012 and the third nuclear test in February 2013. These developments inevitably raise serious doubts about China's ability to rein in the belligerent Kim Jong-Un regime. It is a major contention of this paper that it will be difficult for China to "tame" the Kim regime unless China is willing to reset its diplomatic priorities from seeking to prevent the collapse of Kim's regime to halting North Korea's provocations that may ignite a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The surest way to achieve this change will be through the effective utilization of economic sanctions to enhance the efficacy of the diplomatic measures on which it has relied too long and too single-mindedly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the international community is facing a nuclear stalemate with Iran and North Korea, China is increasingly emerging as a Great Wall in blocking the path towards sanctions and peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis and denuclearizaton of the Korean Peninsula. While much recent literature has been written on the deleterious effects of a regional nuclear arms race should Iran become a nuclear power, there has been relatively little effort to explore why China persistently defends Iran by blocking or watering down UNSC sanctions and on the strategic partnership between Iran and North Korea in missile and nuclear collaboration. This paper explores the triangular strategic alliance between China, Iran, and North Korea and the attendant negative spillover that poses a threat to East Asia and Middle East regional stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan and North Korea have no formal diplomatic relations and their informal interactions are negligible. Nevertheless, Taiwan's security has always unavoidably intertwined with what happens on the Korean peninsula. Thanks to North Korea which initiated the Korean War in the 1950s, Taiwan was able to avoid being conquered by China. This sort of North Korea-Taiwan linkage has become more related but not necessarily positive to Taiwan as it was, given the growing China's influence in the Korean affairs since the collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequently rising China and China's successful diplomatic maneuvers. This paper intends to explore Taiwan's perspective on North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The paper first elucidates two competing security perspectives of the Pan-Green coalition and the Pan-Blue group in Taiwan and how North Korean nuclear issue fits in their respective strategic perspectives, then discusses the implications for Taiwan. The biggest worry for Taiwan is that China might take advantage of the North Korean nuclear crisis to reach some kind of secret deal with the US and sacrifice Taiwan. This is not necessarily a paranoia. This perspective is based upon China's grand strategic design immediately after the 1996 missile testing incident against Taiwan. The stratagem is a mixture of traditional Communist united front and the western liberal approach focusing on multilateralism, preventive diplomacy and soft power. Under China's new security concept, Beijing actively pursues Sino-US condominium in an attempt to upgrade China's international status, to weaken US-Japan alliance, to prevent Taiwan independence, and eventually to emerge as the leader of Asia economic bloc vis-à-vis NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and EU (European Union). Taiwan is China's primary enemy, while the US is the secondary enemy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea looms large as a challenge for the United States and China. US-China cooperation in working to deal with the challenge of North Korea is often held up as an example of constructive engagement between Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, North Korea has the potential to generate discord or even conflict between the United States and China. This paper considers several possible scenarios for North Korea and evaluates the implications of each for the US-China relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is aimed at deriving possible scenarios for China's future relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and their implications for South Korea's policy stance. The paper offers seven scenarios that will help provide an understanding of what directions China might take in regard to North Korea, making a connection to the North Korea nuclear problem. The seven scenarios cover both optimistic and pessimistic possibilities, five of which are related to the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue. These five scenarios are "Confusion and Chaos," "Agreement for Protection and Dependence," "Strategic Cooperation and Betrayal," "Hierarchical Subordination," and "China's Securing of Control over North Korea." The remaining two scenarios involve sudden contingencies: "Military Clash with Neighboring Countries" and "North Korea's Internal Contingency." The paper argues that the most plausible scenario is that of "Agreement for Protection and Dependence." However, when considering the U.S. factor, realistically, the fourth scenario of "Hierarchical Subordination" is more likely to come about. Given these projections, South Korea's policy toward China must be distinguished by a peacetime- and contingency-based policy. A peacetime policy toward China would serve to promote Chinese influence over the DPRK and thereby achieve a reliable level of predictability in North Korean behavior. Meanwhile, a contingency-based policy should be tailored to the contingency at hand on a case-by-case basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common view is that China is North Korea's ally. The two countries share a similar political system and considerable strategic interest in regional international relations. Indeed, this is true to a large extent. This paper, however, analyses the problems in the bilateral relations that are gradually eroding the strategic ties the two countries formed 50 years ago. Its central argument is that, in reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations the two countries share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has defied the international community on its nuclear program despite diplomatic and economic pressure. Why has the country been willing and able to defy and resist the international community? What should we do about it? Many stress China's ties with North Korea and believe that the question of whether China is willing to use its leverage on North Korea is the key to the solution to the Korean nuclear issue. This paper draws from international relations theories and the history of China–North Korea relations to analyze North Korean foreign policy strategy. Two arguments are made, namely: first, that North Korea does not view its relationship with China as highly as many would think; and, second, that China's role in North Korea's strategic planning is not significant enough to change its behavior. Therefore, it is argued, asking China to use its leverage on North Korea would not solve the Korean nuclear crisis. On the contrary, the more China puts pressure on North Korea, the more likely the latter would resist. A possible way ahead in dealing with the Korean nuclear issue is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asserts that with the advent of the post-Kim Jong-il era, China will advance from its previous role of mere balancer and seek to become a more active manager in pursuit of its own national interests. China hopes for a softer, more stable North Korean regime, so that a mutually beneficial partnership can develop between the two states. China believes that it must adjust and take on a new role in the process of North Korea's "normalization." China also expects that by adopting this new role, it can restructure North Korea into a strategic buffer zone in the long term. This Chinese perspective can be seen as not merely an attempt to manage the situation, but rather a visionary approach toward the North Korean issue. This is expected to spark considerable controversy within South Korea concerning its Chinese policy. From a progressive viewpoint, the new Chinese approach concerning the stabilization of the North Korean region, the softening of the North Korean regime, and the development of mutually beneficial relations, resembles the Sunshine Policy of South Korea in certain aspects. But from a conservative perspective, while there has been a noticeable shift in China's attitude toward North Korea, there is no detectable change in its actual North Korea policy. For the conservatives, China's approach to North Korea is likely to be seen as an attempt to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula for self-gain. These changes will be intertwined with the political schedule of South Korea and may incite social controversy over what kind of strategic position South Korea should occupy between the U.S. and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes three core arguments. First, the single most serious threat to the national security of the world is nuclear terrorism: the devastation of one of the world's great cities by a terrorist nuclear bomb. Second, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is today precariously poised at a tipping point that could, if it is allowed to further erode, result in a cascade of proliferation. Third, the ultimate catastrophe of nuclear terrorism is preventable. There exists a feasible, affordable agenda of actions that the nations of the world could take to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist's Hiroshima to nearly zero. But current trendlines are going in the opposite direction indeed, heading toward predictable catastrophe. Preventing nuclear terrorism will thus require a significant departure from current behavior. An urgent test in the agenda to preventing nuclear terrorism is the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The best hope for success is for China to take the lead in a new phase of active diplomacy that aims to effect a freeze of nuclear activity on the Korean peninsula and then design a mini-step-by-mini-step process in which the other five members of the Six-Party Talks provide benefits to North Korea in return for the freeze and ultimate dismantling of its nuclear weapons infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whenever the existence of North Korea is threatened, China always has in the past come to its aid by opposing both economic sanctions and military pressure against Pyongyang, and most likely will continue to do so in future. At the same time, China prefers to orchestrate stability on the Korean Peninsula by restraining military adventurism by Pyongyang that might lead to the collapse of the regime. For China, the survival of North Korea is key to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, China has continually expanded its economic relationship with North Korea, as well as hosting the series of six-party talks. However, some questions still remain: How much influence does China really have over North Korea, and what kind of leverage does China have? This paper will argue that China's influence over North Korea is greater than that of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. China's influence extends from the economic, political/diplomatic, through to the military fields. However, due to the complex security and political environment in Northeast Asia, it is uncertain whether China will actually exercise its influence over North Korea. Rather, China's influence over North Korea is limited at best, because if China were to use all the instruments it has at its disposal to bring pressure to bear on North Korea, it would endanger its larger strategic objectives for the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 12 years, China and South Korea have significantly improved their bilateral ties--to such an extent that China is now South Korea's largest trading partner. Furthermore, China's role is essential to any progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks over the North Korean nuclear issue. On the other hand, there also exists a growing yet little-discussed list of potential problems and issues underlying their otherwise prosperous relationship. Prime examples include the North Korean "refugees" in China, the history of Goguryeo, and the longer-term "China's rise." In short, the current state of Sino-South Korean relationship can be likened to standing right in the eye of the typhoon without knowing where the shelter is. This paper attempts to shed some light on these little-discussed yet highly consequential aspects of the Sino-South Korean relationship, not only by addressing their 12-year ties but also by gauzing their future ties in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Overall, it poses a critical question: How would the China factor play out in South Korea's future security environment and in the evolving U.S.-South Korean relationship? Its conclusions can be summed up as follows: The seeming "convergence" of interests between Beijing and Seoul in many aspects of their bilateral ties does not necessarily mean that the former is supportive of South Korea's major policy goals--especially when they come to concrete issues or longer-term questions on the Korean peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the most complicated issues in contemporary Chinese foreign policy is that of the Korean Peninsula and North Korea in particular. Critics have long complained, often internally, that China dare not use, and did not know how to use, the leverage it possessed. Why was this the case given that the relationship with North Korea is an asymmetric one with China the much more powerful side? Has China managed this asymmetry better more recently, and why? This article tries to address these questions. The relationship changed significantly in recent years when the Xi Jinping leadership decided to take unprecedented measures. Those actions have been consequential. China has emerged from being embarrassed by North Korea's nuclear and missile development to re-establishing itself as central to Korean and Northeast Asian security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has driven China's policy toward United Nations (UN) sanctions on North Korea? While insisting on a peaceful settlement of North Korean nuclear issues via diplomatic dialogues, China has gradually loosened its protective stance regarding UN sanctions on North Korea. This article examines the factors that have pushed China to take a tougher position toward North Korea: North Korea's increasingly aggressive nuclear policy, the influence of the United States on Chinese foreign policy, and the changing perception of North Korea in China. Through close examination of China's domestic discussions on North Korea, this article concludes that, besides the external factors, a growing negative perception of North Korea has played an increasingly important role in changing China's official stance. The findings suggest that closer attention should be paid to the changes in the domestic political environment of China to understand its current and future approach toward North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has started choking off the flow of financial resources entering North Korea by blocking North Korea's export of natural resources and other industrial products since early 2017. What has pushed Beijing to enforce sanctions strictly, in contrast with its loose administration of sanctions in the past? By employing principal-agent theory, this article shows that Beijing's conformity to sanctions depends on China's own need and the degree of pressure from Washington for sanctions enforcement. Until the end of the Obama administration, China did not act meaningfully for sanctions enforcement, as the pressure from Washington was weak and North Korea's nuclear capabilities remained limited. Now, international contexts have dramatically changed. Beijing feels a need to discipline Pyongyang with sanctions as Pyongyang has become a de facto nuclear weapon state. The new Trump administration in Washington has also pushed Beijing to do more to rein in Pyongyang's weapon programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the unique survey data involving 138 Chinese firms, this study examines the determinants of the performance of the Chinese firms doing businesses with North Korea. The business ties between the Chinese firms and their North Korean counterparts affiliated with the army are positively correlated with the former’s performance. This finding suggests that North Korea’s “Military First” policy acts as a guiding principle of the resource allocation in the country’s export sector. We also found that South Korean sanctions against North Korea were ineffective in banning North Korean goods from gaining access to the South Korean market possibly because of the circumvention of Chinese firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is widely regarded as having failed to enforce them. Indeed, China's deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. This article argues that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. This article sheds light on how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in considerable flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]