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The article discusses the defence research and combat development in the early Cold War army of Canada. The author talks about the credibility of Canada as a nation that could successfully engage in combat development. He also tackles the move of the Canadian government to implement a defence policy designed to protect Canada's sovereignty and national interests amid the military aggression of Soviet and communist in Europe.

The article focuses on the defence policy of Canada at the start of the 21st century. It mentions that the defence policy of Canada was evaluated by considering three primary goals of its Armed Forces. These inlclude protection of Canada, participation in the defence of North America in conjunction with the United States, and promoting international security. Many observers conclude that in reviewing this policy, the Canadian Armed forces must have an increased military budget.

The article focuses on the strategic debate in Canada in early 1960s. It states that the debate has particularly been the case in the contest of Ottawa's relations with Washington, specifically on broad military strategic issues. It mentions that the debate arises after more than a decade of Cold War and amid the attempts by John G. Diefenbaker government to change the approach of the previous Liberal governments, a debate issued over the nature of the country's foreign and defence policy. Moreover , as the country's political leaders enjoyed appearing on global stage, it was realized, specially in the prime minister's office and the cabinet, that foreign and defence policies could interfere with the domestic agenda or threaten to sabotage electoral support.

The article discusses stability operations and the renewal of international security policy of Canada. The Canadian commitment to Afghanistan has singularly concentrated the attention of policymakers in Ottawa. The role of Canada in Afghanistan started as a means to assuage American concerns over its security in the post-9/II period--a "forward defence" policy to complement domestic homeland security measures. Canada's Operation Apollo would initially compose of the rapid deployment of a naval task group into the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. It also tackles doctrine and policy issues relating to Canada's intervention in Afghanistan.

This paper examines Canada's much-heralded--but now considerably delayed--recommitment to UN peace support operations. It explores both the changing environment of contemporary peacekeeping as well as the evolving nature of the Canadian debate around the place of peacekeeping within Canadian foreign policy. The paper's central argument is that Canada's deferred - and increasingly lukewarm--re-engagement with peacekeeping is indicative of a broader and deepening crisis of confidence, within Western states in particular, in the liberal interventionist paradigm that has governed international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states since the end of the cold war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada is now at a crossroads unlike any other period in its history and needs to carefully consider which path to take. With the new Trudeau government comfortably ensconced since the defeat of the Harper government in the fall of 2015, a variety of competing interests have emerged in an attempt to turn Canadian policy back to a more nostalgic period of the 1970s that some see as preferable to the institutional lash-up that existed since the rolling out of the Canada First policy in the 2000s. That nostalgic period is, however, misunderstood both willfully for political purposes but also through a lack of historical context. Firmly rooting future actions in a blunt analysis of national interests is preferable to the alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explain the evolution of Canada's relationship with NATO during the tenure of the Conservative governments of Stephen Harper (2006–14). A long-standing pillar of the country's international policy, engagement with NATO has been noticeably weakened as Canada withdrew from joint Alliance programmes, ended participation in its operations, and paid less attention to relationships with NATO partners. Based on analysis of primary sources and interviews conducted among Canadian and NATO policy-makers, we argue that the loosening attachment to NATO has two sources, both underpinned by a particular interpretation of morality shaping the Conservative approach to foreign policy. One source is Canadian foreign policy becoming ‘unfixed' from what was broadly termed its ‘middle power' identity; the second, the experience of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (2006–11), which made NATO as an institution seem incompatible with the Conservatives' approach to foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Brazil can only be classified as a middle power by engaging in what Sartori criticized as the process of conceptual stretching. Moreover, it is argued that Brazil neither sees itself as a middle power, nor conducts itself as one despite superficial appearances. After the context is set with a survey of thinking on middle power theory, attention is turned to explaining how Brazil might be mistaken for a middle power before explaining in more detail why the country is not one. Evidence is drawn from Brazil's multilateral engagement in institutions such as the WTO, the inter-American system, the NPT, and the wider context of global development. Ultimately the paper advises policy-makers and academics against using the concept of middle power as a conceptual guide or shortcut to understanding Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the militarization in the Arctic region that leads to the conflict among the Arctic nations. It states that Canada has announce the expansion of its marine water military base at Baffin Island as this is the effort of Canada to protect its Arctic sovereignty. It mentions that this slow militarization of different Arctic nations leads to conflict in the nations as there are pending claims and disputes in the area.

In its first 2 decades the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), Canada's premier foreign policy think tank, never functioned merely as a neutral and apolitical research organization. Under the leadership of Edgar Tarr, president of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, and in its capacity as the Canadian Council of the transnational Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), in the 1930s and 1940s the CIIA became an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought to expand Canada's international role, while challenging British imperialism, racism, and Anglo–Saxon dominance. Prominent Canadian diplomats and other officials were complicit in this enterprise, which reached its apogee at the IPR conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942. The CIIA's activities during this period revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms. Throughout World War II, DEA and other Canadian government representatives attended CIIA and IPR conferences as “official non-officials,” effectively cooperating with private individuals in a network of purportedly non-governmental organizations that enabled Canada to exert leverage on the British government, reject British leadership, align itself with the United States, and secure a greater world role. CIIA leaders and Canadian officials also consciously encouraged nationalist forces in India, China, and Southeast Asia that sought to reject colonial rule and Western dominance. CIIA activities thus became part of a web of diplomatic interactions across a transnational network of think tanks within and outside the British Empire that had their own impact upon international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the grand strategy theory of Carl von Clausewitz applied to the culture and strategic choice of Canada in military strategy during the Cold War. It examines the explanations of the region's war strategy related to the theory of foreign policy and international relations. An overview of the conceptual and methodological challenges to Canada's military strategy is provided. It also explores the strategy applied in North Atlantic Triangle in Ottawa, Ontario wherein the strategy requires industrial, human, and military resources.

The article focuses on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada. It explores how and why is that NATO has managed to retain considerable significance to the Canadian security and defense policy a ten years after the September 11, 2011 terrorists attacks. It highlights the pessimism about NATO's future prospects expressed by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. It notes that Canada was more engaged with NATO than it had been since the start of the early 1950s, an engagement that correspond closely with liberal foreign policy doctrine.

This article attempts to counter the conventional wisdom surrounding Quebec's “undue” influence on Canada's international security policy. Focusing on the war in Afghanistan, it argues that this influence is substantially exaggerated and that if Quebec's distinct attitudes have had an influence on Canada's Afghan policy, they have actually contributed to strengthening rather than hampering its legitimacy. The article is divided into three parts. The first examines the long-standing debate surrounding Quebec's alleged “undue” influence on Canadian foreign and defense policy. It highlights that scapegoating Quebecers for making Canada's security policies less forceful tends to ignore the lack of public support elsewhere in Canada and thus marginalizes the policy responsiveness issue in Canadian foreign policy. The second part of the article maps and discusses Canadians' support and opposition toward their country's participation in the war in Afghanistan. It calls into question the existence of “two solitudes” as well as nuancing the common views pertaining to attitudes in Quebec. The third assesses the federal government's policy responsiveness toward Quebec's elite and popular opinion. It focuses on Harper's two principal decisions - the extension of the mission to February 2009 and later to December 2011 - while it considers Quebec's opinion in terms of public opinion polls, editorials in La Presse and Le Devoir, and political representation through the Bloc Quebecois in the House of Commons. It shows that if Quebecers influence Canada's Afghan policy, they do so only because of ill-informed decision-makers convinced of the existence of a fictional distinct and pacifist Quebec. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the overwhelming literature on the life of Lester Bowles Pearson, Canada’s only recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, little attention has been paid to the complexities and paradoxes that made up his approach to peace at the practical level—both how he expressed it, and how others interpreted and responded to his views. Pearson’s understanding of peace was grounded in a combination of Methodism, personal experience, and Canadian nationalism. It was both bold and intrinsically appealing: a unique mixture of faith, a belief in justice, and an unflinching acceptance of the realities of the contemporary global environment. It was not cynical, but nor was it profoundly idealistic. Those whose only association with Lester Pearson is United Nations peacekeeping might well be shocked by the military undertones of his conception of collective security and by the unapologetic elitism that contributed to his recipe for peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The government of Fidel Castro has over this long period maintained correct if not always warm relations with a country which could have been considered one of the least likely to have been in such a position. In 1959 Canada was in a political situation of seemingly exceptional dominance by the United States of its foreign policy and economy. That dependence, in the view of many, has grown even firmer over the last half-century. Yet the relationship between Cuba and Canada, far from flagging, has prospered even though not without headaches as well as ups and downs. This connection is rightly considered extraordinary, but the basic elements of it have remained constant over the years and explain why it has at times flourished and rarely been put in question. The key factor here is that the maintenance of the relationship has always been at least to some degree of mutual advantage for both the states and, in the case of Canada, for the governing party of the time. Other elements come to light as one makes an overview of the fifty years of the relationship but the bedrock of mutual advantage remains present throughout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay on international relations between Canada and U.S. It offers a history on the foreign policy of both countries and examine how self-help associated with the country's security practices. It illustrates the importance of defense policy in strengthening the so called U.S.-Canada "security bargain," and discusses the influential effect of defense against self-help strategy in enhancing the country's access to the U.S. market.

The article looks at Canadian governmental perceptions of the European through an analysis of parliamentary debates, reports of House of Commons and senate committees, official papers released by the ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the election platforms of five federal political parties. The article also gives a historical review of the evolution of the relationship between Canada and the European Union.

Strategic culture remains a highly contested but potentially vital concept in the analysis of security policy. This paper contributes to the strategic culture debate by using the cases of Australia and Canada to assess the utility of strategic culture as an explanatory tool. Much of the debate over strategic culture hinges on the proper relationship between the ideational and material variables in analyzing a country's security policy, and the attendant difficulties of distinguishing between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. We argue that if strategic culture is defined in an inclusive way to include ideational factors, material factors, and strategic behaviour, one will develop a richer understanding of a country's strategic situation. Using this approach, this paper undertakes a long-range historical survey of strategic culture in these two countries. We show that in both countries, strategic culture remains relatively stable for extended periods of time, usually changing only when patterns of global power shift, and provides a better explanation for contemporary security policy in both countries than perspectives that focus on purely material or ideational factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the public debate over Canada's participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program in North America in 2005. Key issues discussed include background information on Canada's relations with the U.S., the Canadian government's defense policies pertaining to the BMD and the possibility of Canada alienating the U.S. if it refuses to participate in the BMD program.

Canadian foreign policy has often been described in terms of 'middle power' status. But this description has always been problematic, and changes in the international climate now make a new paradigm necessary. The author discusses other foreign policy vocations, including the 'soft power' approach, and a purely regional destiny. She concludes by emphasizing the strength of internationalism in Canada, and of factors compelling the country to stake out a distinctive role in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the strategic assessment of the military power in Canada. Reference to the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1818 between Canada and the U.S.; Percentage of the Gross National Product allocated for the defense sector in Canada; Dependence of Canada's political, economic, and military power on the U.S.

Enthusiasts of human security argue that what is needed in the post-Cold-War period is a foreign policy agenda that is more 'people-centred' than the state-centred focus of security policy during the Cold War period. Among the most enthusiastic proponents of the human security paradigm in the 1990s was the Canadian government, which, in partnership with a number of other like-minded governments, sought to press the human security agenda, taking a number of human security initiatives. However, since the late 1990s, we have seen a paradox: the concept has attracted increased attention from scholars while its salience among policy-makers appears to be declining. Using the case of the Canadian government's policy towards the crisis in Timor in September 1999, we explore the difficulty that policy-makers have had in moving human security from the rhetorical realm to the level of concrete policy that makes a difference to the safety of people whose security is threatened. We conclude that there was a significant gap between Canada's human security rhetoric and Ottawa's actual policy in Timor. While the Canadian government did eventually contribute troops to the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), we show that Canada's response was slow, cautious, and minimalist. There was neither the willingness nor the capacity to be at the forefront of the efforts to send a robust force to East Timor. This case demonstrates some important limits of the human security agenda, and why this agenda remained so firmly in the realm of the rhetorical in the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The future of the U.S.-Canadian defense relationship will largely be determined by Canadian decisions. The strength of the U.S. Canadian defense relationship is based on history, shared values, and shared experience. These factors have produced mutual confidence. The starting phase of defense relationship was the period 1938-1940. The second major institutional expansion of the U.S.-Canada defense relationship was the establishment of the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. The most significant institutional expansion of U.S.-Canadian military cooperation was the establishment of the North American Air Defense command in 1958. While the U.S. never feared that Canada would not cooperate in countering terrorism in North America, the border control case is interesting for what it might tell the U.S. about how to work with Canada to improve defense cooperation and especially how to secure increased Canadian government support for the Canadian Forces to that end.

Canada's engagement in the Korean War was initially presented as an exercise in collective security under the United Nations Charter. However, after China's involvement, an impassioned policy review within the Department of External Affairs demonstrated deep divisions within the department. Those who were determined to sustain Canada's conversion from the mistaken isolationism of the inter-war period to the ideal of collective security were in dispute with senior members of the department who now favoured the realism of security through the newly-formed North Atlantic Alliance. It was Lester B. Pearson, as Secretary of State, who brought unity to Canadian policy in conditions which dramatically illustrated the dilemmas of collective security and severely tested Canadian-American co-operation. Pearson showed discernment in promoting a Canadian policy which gave strategic priority to collective defence through NATO, while refusing to abandon the collective security ideals of the UN Charter. If the Korean War was a lesson in realism, for Pearson it equally confirmed the necessity of renewed multilateral approaches to peace maintenance through the United Nations - a path which would soon lead to the pioneer peacekeeping experiments of 1956. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes and analyzes the little-known, but extensive, defense cooperative relationship that exists among the armed forces of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. While perhaps arguably a relatively esoteric subject prior to 1989, given the recent changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union, U.S. alliance strategy is now on the threshold of a new era--an era in which the Soviet threat is seen by many allies as diminishing. As U.S. officials ponder the implications of a decreased Soviet threat on its many alliances, of which almost all have been threat-based, it will be important to recall the one series of collective security arrangements with allies that has been founded on similarities, vice solely threats. This intimate Anglo-Saxon connection appears to have the needed bases for enduring well into the post-cold-war era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The major findings of an analysis of the foreign policy opinions of the leaders and general public of Canada are briefly summarized. Correlates and causes of attitudes about coexistence, the United Nations, foreign aid and the arms race are indicated. The results are presented so as to show similarities and differences among the groups in the study; some attention is given to the practical implications of the findings. Finally, a plea is made for comparative studies of attitudes about issues related to peace and war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]