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This paper, part of a broader research project, is concerned with the question of how military intervention as part of the 'war on terror' was justified in the three core members of the 'Coalition of the Willing': the US, UK and Australia. In particular, we focus on the ways in which interventions in Iraq were justified to domestic audiences across these states. Building on critical constructivist understandings of security, we suggest the importance of conceiving of security discourse and policy as an intersubjective realm. Within this realm, the ability to legitimise or enable particular foreign and security practices is related to the extent to which these practices are located within dominant narratives of history, culture and identity within the political communities concerned. While political leaders in these three states therefore defined the need for intervention in broadly similar terms, subtle differences in emphasis and argumentation are potentially important not only in communicating how the military interventions themselves are made possible in different contexts, but also in illuminating the possibilities and constraints for discourses and practices of security in global politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine aimed at avoiding the political manipulation of the American military power. In that, it reflected the traditional professional ethics of the military, as formulated by Samuel P. Huntington. The Powell Doctrine, however, has been eroded throughout the 1980s and especially in the post-Cold War decade with the emergence of the United States to hegemonic position in the world. The "War on Terrorism" and the Bush Doctrine marked its end: with preemption prevailing and nation building returning on the US foreign and security agenda, the "strategic exit" in any military engagement is ruled out. In this paper, I argue that the end of the Powell Doctrine marks the debut of the global security era in which the borders of domestic and international security are blurred. As politics, security in the global era is to be understood as an "intermestic" issue. Lenin's old dictum about the mistake of separating domestic and foreign policy has become true for security issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Professionalizing, Fragmenting and Perpetuating the Military-Tribal-Commercial ComplexA marginal actor in international politics and a state still in its formative stage, Yemen has turned into a frontline in the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT). GWoT is premised on the assumption that states deemed weak, thus viewed as a ‘breeding ground’ for terrorist organizations, are tantamount to a direct threat to international security. This equation has been articulated specifically through the notion of ‘state failure’ which, for the West, necessitates bundling state building, development and reform together with security in a single, all-encompassing strategy. Accordingly, Yemen receives substantial Western military and intelligence assistance intended to reinforce state powers and predicated on a strategy of developing local counter-terrorism capabilities. This consists essentially of rebuilding and upgrading Yemeni military and security organisations with the aim of attaining a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and effective control over national territory. As such, security sector reform is one, albeit crucial, facet of Western-led efforts, and of indirect US intervention in particular, to build and reshape the state in Yemen. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the changes wrought by GWoT in the Yemeni state, focusing on its military-security structure and the distinct institutional, socio-economic and territorial ordering that underpins it. This involves breaking away from the dominant ‘state failure’ narrative through which experiences, modes of governance and economies of state political systems that operate in ways only superficially akin to those associated with the European sovereign state model, are expressed in terms of deviation from such model and conceptualised as dysfunctional. Central to this narrative are assumptions of externally-driven modes of socio-political order, domestic ‘endemic’ weakness and, by extension, lack of proper historicity and political agency. In contradistinction to this approach, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the state, through a mixture of appropriation, resistance and accommodation, has proven able to alter the nature and direction of GWoT in Yemen as a means of actively refashioning its authority and role. Rather than being solely imposed from the outside, US counter-terrorist discourse and policies are reformulated and reworked from within by the Yemeni regime according to its own strategic priorities and to its need for enhanced domestic legitimacy. This has led to quite different trajectories and outcomes than anticipated. In the course of its engagement with US-led counter-terrorist policies, the Yemeni military has been reconstituted and strengthened in ways that invest it with novel functions and opportunities, and intersect with multifaceted trajectories of state-society relations. First, the military in Yemen consists in multiple, sprawling and fragmented apparatuses rather than in a singular, cohesive institution. In the absence of a comprehensive and unified strategy, external assistance fuels a tendency to segmentation, duplication and competition among security apparatuses and their missions. Second, the Yemeni military does not yield the kind of military cast-like insulation and autonomy from civil society and politics conventionally associated with it in the West. It is characterized by a systematic straddling of public and private, civil and military, licit and illicit logics. The Yemeni military's hybrid nature epitomises the regime's subtle balancing act between overlapping and intersecting social, economic and political networks... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarianism became the normative foundation for legitimizing military intervention in the 1990’s. These norms were developed and applied in an international security environment in which there was little concern that a humanitarian justification for military force could provide a cover for non-humanitarian purposes. This international security environment has profoundly changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq have been framed within a humanitarian discourse. An interpretation of legitimacy that results in the violation of international humanitarian law and legal norms constraining the use of force necessitates an examination of the gap between legitimacy and legality. Recent practice and discourse in military intervention indicate a weakening of the restraints on the use of force embedded within international legal norms. This paper is concerned with the legitimization of warfare witnessed within the current security paradigm of the “War on Terror” that is being justified via humanitarian concerns. The preventive war strategy is paramount in this discussion as it reflects a direct challenge to international peace and security. To be emphasized is the challenge to the cosmopolitan agenda which supports intervention solely for the genuine protection of humanity and is embedded within the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In essence, this paper will illustrate that the framework for the use of force deriving from the “War on Terror” is parasitic on the conceptual tools of humanitarian intervention. This strategy undermines the normative order of international society reinforcing the perception that “right” depends on tactics of legitimization regardless of the illegality of actions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic theorists depict the process of appraising the national interest, developing a supporting foreign policy, and crafting strategy that applies resources to policy ends as one of the most important and most vexing challenges of statecraft. This challenge is particularly difficult for contemporary Japan, where the habit of strategic thought has fallen into disuse -- and disrepute --owing in large part to decades of constitutional pacifism. With regard to sea power, the legacies of militarism and wartime defeat discredited strategic theory. Japanese leaders evidently recoil from Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea-power theories as they consider how to uphold Japan's interests at sea. Nor has Mahan been replaced in the Japanese lexicon by a less bellicose strategist such as Julian Corbett or C. E. Callwell. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces' (JMSDF) postwar dependency on the U.S. armed forces has only compounded the difficulties Tokyo faces as it rethinks its maritime policy and strategy in a more and more complex security environment.In recent years Japan has moved gradually to resume its place as a "normal" country, including in maritime affairs. Tokyo dispatched JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the first Gulf War, for example, and after September 11 it deployed escorts and logistics ships to support the coalition flotilla watching for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan. At the same time, Japanese leaders have evinced increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian operations. JMSDF units joined the massive multinational relief operation following the 2004 tsunami that struck South and Southeast Asia. Tokyo has portrayed the tsunami relief effort as a model for future maritime operations, not only out of genuine concern for disaster relief but as a way to amass "soft power" and to confer legitimacy on a more activist military strategy in the eyes of the Japanese populace. It is evident that Tokyo is increasingly couching "hard" maritime power in humanitarian terms.The dual nature of Japan's emerging maritime strategy, which seeks to cope with both conventional threats and new humanitarian responsibilities, raises several important theoretical and policy-relevant questions that we intend to address. Tokyo has declared that it will expand its new array of missions while continuing to discharge traditional missions such as defense of the sea lines of communication and the home islands, all at current funding levels and with the same force structure that now comprises the JMSDF. Accordingly, we will ask: Are these ambitious objectives feasible? Has Japan created a mismatch between policy and strategy? If so, how can it realign its maritime strategy with policy? Should (or can) it scale back humanitarian operations and other nontraditional initiatives? Should it rethink how it approaches traditional maritime security missions such as sea-lane defense? Should (or can) it increase naval spending and acquire new platforms? What kind of assets would the JMSDF need to execute a more ambitious slate of missions? Which strategic theorist supplies the best guidance in these matters?We will conclude that unless Japan conducts a thoroughgoing reassessment of its maritime posture, it will confront severe strategic dilemmas arising from a mismatch in policy and strategy. To help Japanese and U.S. decision-makers fend off such an outcome, the paper will generate a series of policy-relevant recommendations for Japan and its seafaring partner, the United States. We thus expect the paper to have immediate policy relevance for strategists and alliance managers, both in Tokyo and Washington. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of international relations is comprised of complex, interactive, interdependent, and interconnected systems. Building on this premise, this paper utilizes Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s notion of General Systems Theory (GST) to shed light on the postu ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

9/11 and the war on terror seemed to expose the limits of a truly common foreign and security policy, as the big three EU member states ? Germany, Britain and France ? scrambled for national influence in the war in Afghanistan at the expense of EU unity. Each claimed to speak for Europe, given that the EU CFSP lacked the capabilities of going beyond declarations of solidarity with the US, but did so against the objection (and over the heads) of smaller member states as well as the Belgian Presidency and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. Given the continuous efforts since the creation of CFSP in 1993 to construct a common foreign policy, the question that arises from these events is whether the events of 9/11 and the US-led war on terror have exposed the limits of Europeanization understood as a convergence of views towards a common foreign policy, or whether the changed geo-strategic landscape and US military dominance have not fundamentally changed national commitments to CFSP. This paper will analyse the policies of Britain, France and Germany towards CFSP using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. It will explore the attitudes of the three member states towards CFSP to determine whether the British, French and German foreign policies were a sign for the permanent re-assertion of informal directorates in CFSP or a national struggle for assertion in a changed geo-strategic landscape at the expense of CFSP, and what consequences this is likely to have on the institution itself. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]