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This study examines those factors that influence the issuance of reasoned opinions within the European Union’s ‘Early Warning System’. It is posited that greater aggregate public Euroskepticism results in the issuance of more reasoned opinions. This expectation is tested using data derived from the European Parliament, the Commission’s platform for European Union Interparliamentary Exchange, and longitudinal data from the Eurobarometer survey series. It is found that greater aggregate public Euroskepticism is associated with the issuance of more reasoned opinions. This study has important implications for our understandings of policy processes, political responsiveness, and democratic governance in the European Union and its member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the British court case Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd., which dealt with doctrine of forum non conveniens. Topics include the discretionary staying of proceedings, judicial pronouncements of jurisdiction, and how the doctrine became part of the comity of nations.

The history of comitology-the system of implementation committees that control the Commission in the execution of delegated powers-has been characterised by institutional tensions. The crux of these tensions has often been the role of the European Parliament and its quest to be granted powers equal to those of the Council. This process came to a head with the 2006 Comitology reform and the introduction of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny ( RPS). After just over three years of experience with the RPS procedure, the Treaty of Lisbon has made it redundant through the creation of Delegated Acts ( Article 290 TFEU). This article aims to evaluate the practical implications that Delegated Acts will entail for the Parliament, principally by using the experience with the RPS to better understand the challenges ahead. This analysis will be of interest to those following the study of comitology, formal and informal inter-institutional relations and also to practitioners who will have to work with Delegated Acts in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reform of comitology and the introduction of the new instrument of delegated acts in the Lisbon Treaty were followed by protracted negotiations on the implementation of both articles. This article examines the resultant system that has emerged for both types of non-legislative instruments. In the area of implementing acts, a new regulation sets out important changes: a reduction in the number of procedures, the extension of the scope to trade defence measures and the replacement of a referral to the Council with a new appeal committee. With respect to delegated acts, the search for an overarching framework resulted in a Common Understanding. Our analysis not only demonstrates the need to go beyond the treaty provisions in understanding the nature of non-legislative rule making in the EU, but also emphasises the importance of informal procedures and non-binding agreements in fully assessing the nature of non-legislative rule making in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Impact assessment ( IA) has gone from an innocuous technical tool typically used in the pre-legislative phase to an instrument at the heart of the European institutional machinery. However-in deviation from its roots as a tool governing delegated rulemaking in the US-most experience with IA in the EU has been gathered in a legislative context. Against the background of the recent evolution of the EU's old 'comitology' system into a two-track system of delegated acts and implementing measures, this contribution discusses in three parts the 'whys,' 'whats' and 'hows' of extending IA to 'non-legislative rulemaking.' It explores various aspects of the rulemaking process that IA-if properly applied-could strengthen: consultation, control and quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how changes of powers in the inter-institutional balance have affected the willingness of the Commission and the Council to delegate legislative power to comitology committees. Starting from the assumption that actors seek to maximize their institutional power in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes, we argue that changes of institutional rules affect their willingness to adopt legislation through comitology procedures. We examine the effects of the introduction of the 1999 comitology decision, which increased the competences of the Commission in the comitology procedure by abolishing the ‘double safety net’. We show that the Commission has proposed delegation to management and regulatory committees more extensively since the adoption of this decision. Surprisingly, the Council – which saw its own competences reduced by the decision – did not put up significant resistance to the more frequent use of delegation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The comitology regime, the committee-based system developed as a mechanism for controlling the Commission's exercise of its powers to implement EU measures, has been subject to severe criticism on grounds of lack of accountability and transparency. The system has recently been fundamentally reformed by means of the new Implementing Acts Regulation, which came into force on 1 March 2011. This paper investigates whether the new rules are sufficient to remedy accountability deficits as regards implementing acts and concludes that as far as accountability to the Member States is concerned, their control powers have remained static. In addition, the new-delegated acts procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon grants the European Parliament (EP) more control powers, although the EP's gains are more modest than they might appear. This change has come at the cost of reduced control powers for Member States as well as lowered standards of transparency for the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lisbon Treaty introduces a distinction between legislative, delegated and implementation acts and thus represents a new approach to delegated decision-making in the EU. This will lead to a reform of the comitology system. Against this background this contribution takes stock. What do we know about the comitology system? Can the existing literature help us understand the post-Lisbon changes? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although rejecting it in principle, the European Parliament has implicitly accepted the comitology system. In 2001, it agreed with the other institutions that financial services legislation adopted under co-decision could be limited to basic principles, with the adoption of detailed rules being delegated to the Commission, the so-called 'Lamfalussy arrangements'. In return, the Commission proposed a reform of the comitology system, though Parliament had to resort to different tactics to overcome the Council's reluctance to take a decision. Notwithstanding significant legal and political constraints, in July 2006 the institutions agreed on a new scrutiny procedure which gives both Parliament and the Council the possibility to block the adoption of draft implementing measures of general scope which amend basic legislation. The new procedure improves the democratic control over an important category of secondary legislation, though it leaves this question open as regards the other procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of the comitology developed by the European Union. Brief overview of the history of the creation of the term in 1962 in the context of agricultural market organization to simplify the adoption of implementing legislation until it became complicated and almost an occult science for insiders is provided. However, the complexities of the directive has prompted committees to invent new name to distinguish the different variations of calculating prices.