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IMF surveillance is typically thought to have effect because it provides useful information to member countries, because it engages countries in cooperative behaviour or because it piggy-backs the bargaining power the IMF enjoys in some countries. This article explores IMF surveillance by bringing to bear theoretical explanations as to why and how these effects might work. The simplest explanation is a rationalist-realist one that the IMF has impact in countries over whom it has bargaining power: this is borne out by the evidence regarding IMF surveillance in aid-dependent countries. However, this is not the only condition under which surveillance might work. Rationalist-institutionalists point to the role information plays in shaping competition and cooperation among states, and this effect is borne out to a limited degree by the impact of IMF-supported international standards and surveillance activities on the other economies. Finally, constructivists would describe the possible impact of surveillance in terms of learning or socialization, focusing on the social organization and impact of the IMF's activities. The evidence, however, suggests that neither bilateral nor multilateral surveillance is structured or organized in a way that promotes learning or socialization. The implications are that for IMF surveillance to be more effective across all its members would require restructuring the way the organization engages with its members, as well as a greater delegation of authority by countries to the organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Monetary Fund is often perceived as imposing harsh policies on countries facing financial crisis. A comparison of six countries affected by the pressures of the 1990s suggests more subtle effects. In Malaysia, India, and South Africa, policymakers kept the IMF at arms length to permit a more gradual and heterodox adjustment, including capital controls in India and Malaysia. By contrast, Argentina, Turkey, and Indonesia were bound tightly into the embrace of the IMF. However, this did not push policymakers to take tough decisions. Rather, IMF loans to Argentina and Turkey permitted policymakers to postpone difficult choices as both they and the IMF sought to protect previous policies and loans. In Indonesia, by contrast, borrowing from the IMF opened up a conduit for larger political pressures that brought down the Suharto regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The IMF is governed by a 24-member Executive Board which represents 184 countries. Although often prized as a small and efficient decision-making body, the Board represents some countries more effectively than others. This is due to the institutional structure and incentives within which the Board operates. Prime among them is a system of constituencies which have formed and evolved as countries have sought to improve their position in the organization. These groups vary in size, shared interests, and distribution of power. Their effectiveness is not only affected by these attributes. It is also determined by decision-making rules across the institution, by the lack of formal accountability of Board members, and by the strength of other coalitions of countries acting informally within the institution. The analysis implies that representation on the IMF Board could be improved without altering the size of the Board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an interview with Ngaire Woods, who has a book out entitled "The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers." Woods says the future of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is in jeopardy as more developing countries chose not to take loans from the organizations. Both organizations have come under a lot of criticism for forcing industrialization, exacerbating poverty and destroying the environment. Woods discusses the problems with the IMF's "conditionality" policy, particularly in regards to Mexico. She supports maintaining the organizations and provides a list of reforms.

Discusses concerns about the accountability of international organizations. Challenges facing multilateral economic organizations; Financial and constitutional accountability of international organizations; Limitations to accountability.

Over the past two decades the functions of international economic institutions have greatly expanded to include programmes and policies which affect a wider range of people, groups, and organisations than before. Where previously people could hold their national governments to account for such policies, they must now look to international institutions where the decisions are being made. But to whom are these institutions accountable and are they accountable to those whom they directly affect? This paper sets out to answer that question in respect of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. After analysing the new intrusiveness of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, we explore how the concept of accountability might best be applied to international economic institutions. The paper then outlines the specific ways in which the IMF, World Bank, and WTO have recently bolstered their accountability through enhanced transparency and monitoring. In conclusion, however, the paper argues that in spite of improvements in accountability, the international economic institutions have not gone far enough in reforming their governance structures. There is a remaining imbalance between what they do, and their legitimacy as perceived by those they affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]