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Covid-19 has exposed and deepened global inequalities: rich countries spent aggressively to sustain their economies and secured early vaccine access while most of the developing world continues to endure a growing disease burden. It also underlined the extent of inter-dependence and weaknesses in some of our international institutions and rules, many of which were established in the now discredited era of neo-liberalism. There is a rich, complex, and difficult agenda going forward for international cooperation. This includes aiding developing countries in restructuring their debt obligations, and guaranteeing that multi-national corporations pay their fair share with a robust international tax regime, better trade and intellectual property regimes, and better global regulatory frameworks for competition and social media. The failures of the past rules have led to political opposition to globalization. The only sustainable and inclusive path out of this pandemic is through cooperation and a re-imagining of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose – This paper aims to provide a theoretical approach of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in order to assess whether CSR will develop as a concept pushing efficiently for more de facto social responsibility or will become a pure marketing artefact. The trade-off between the development of CSR behaviour and lobbying over regulations is a key element that will influence the evolution of CSR. The result is that if the world consolidates or if it tends towards multilateralism to a large extent, then CSR is less likely to have an efficient impact.Design/methodology/approach – Theoretical approach based on three fields: credence goods, greenwashing and political economy.Findings – The coordination is harder for lobbies in the more multilateral scenario. The more politically powerful group would lose its influence on the decision body in the multipolar scenario. If lobbies keep influencing their state governments, the efficiency would also be reduced in the regionalization or multipolar scenarios. The easiness of the greenwashing strategy is also crucial in order to determine the possible evolution of the CSR as a real commitment that benefits environment and society.Research limitations/implications – Countries may take advantage of CSR by offering an advantage to firms willing to develop CSR thanks to public regulations if greenwashing is easy and if the evolution of the world that prevails is similar to the tripolar or regionalization scenarios. This may also occur under the multipolar scenario but it would necessitate an effective international coordination.Originality/value – This is the first work that brings together the strategic behaviour of firms with respect to Corporate Social Responsibility and political economy determinants. The predicted evolutions of these two features according to the degree of multilateralism as well as how they are intertwined are also novelties of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia y Politica: Ideas, Procesos y Movimientos Sociales is the property of Departamento De Historia del Pensamiento y de los Moviemientos Sociales y Politicos (Madrid) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores why international economic cooperation is both potentially beneficial and difficult to attain in practice. Taking nation states as unitary actors the paper uses game theory to explore the difficulties states face to sustain cooperation over time. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the incentives for following non-cooperative behavior, as well as on problems of time inconsistency. The paper also discusses how the existence of economic hegemonies can facilitate cooperation, as well as how the existence of international regimes and institutions fosters cooperation by modifying the incentives different states face. Thus, cooperation can be facilitated but never ensured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]