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In Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] AC 1173, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that contract interpretation involves 'striking a balance between the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions'. This paper investigates the nature of the balancing act at the heart of construction. It argues that the balancing exercise is easier to comprehend if construction is understood in a particular way, namely, as a technique employed to infer objective intention from the choice of words in a contract. The admissible factors—ie, the potential meanings for the words, the background, the purpose of the contract and the consequences of the potential interpretations—serve as indicators of intention. The composition and relative strength of the competing considerations ultimately determines the resolution of the dispute. Often, the objective intention of the parties is found in the complexities and implications of the contract text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to separate out and justify two means of proving manslaughter by an unlawful (and dangerous) act. One is manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm. The other is manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. Some historical authority for these two kinds of unlawful act manslaughter is established, but the line of argument centres on the separate justifications for each kind. The justification for manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm centres on the relationship between intention and luck. The justification for manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act concentrates on the distinction between negligence and heedlessness. This article concludes that manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm may be justifiable, but that this may be possible where death is caused through any advertent crime. This is with a view to potential development or reform through the courts or Law Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses general and specific intent in U.S. law. It says that judges and scholars alike long have criticized the terminology of general and specific intent as perplexing and perhaps incoherent. It adds that the Model Penal Code's drafters, for example, described these terms as an abiding source of confusion and ambiguity in the penal law.

Nine years after its adoption, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive continues to give rise to controversy as concerns its scope of application and the national laws that are covered by its provisions. The recent Anzeige ruling suggests that the existence of a specific competitive intent is required in order to bring a commercial representation within the personal scope of the Directive. However, this essentially allows the national legislature to impose more restrictive requirements on advertising in the written media than those allowed by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive's provisions. The ruling also seems to provide some interesting clarification on the relationship between the Directive and EU legislation on audiovisual media services, authorising in principle the imposition of more restrictive advertising obligations on national broadcasters based on the minimum harmonisation clause of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the British court case Marley v. Rawlings, which dealt with the issue of intention in wills and the rectification of clerical errors in wills. Topics include the enforcement of mirror wills, the British Wills Act of 1837, the construction of wills, and the failure to satisfy a testator's instructions.

This article tackles the difficult question of what the consequences of failing to comply with the formalities required for the celebration of marriage will be in different circumstances. Whether the marriage will be valid, void or simply non-existent depends both on the degree of compliance with the law and whether any non-compliance was deliberate. While the concept of non-marriage is not to be found within legislation, the Marriage Act 1949 does provide the framework for determining what the minimum degree of compliance to create a valid or void marriage must be and, by inference, when it is necessary to categorise a ceremony as resulting in a non-marriage. Given the need for certainty in this area, it is suggested that the intentions of the parties -whether the positive intention to be married despite having failed to comply with any of the requisite formalities or the negative intention not to be married despite having gone through a formal ceremony of marriage - should not be relevant to the determination of this point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the intention principle of family mediation from doctrine and in legal regulation. Intention principle of several participants of the process is reviewed. The article tackles the relationship between mediator's intention and other mediation principles. Eventual exceptions and limitations to the principle are analyzed, such as mediation with domestic violence the well-known "preventive or mandatory mediation." Finally, the article describes the force of the intention principle after the agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I reply to the very thoughtful comments on my book by Antony Duff, Doug Husak, Al Mele and Alec Walen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In chapter 6 of Attempts, Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is 'possible to attempt crimes of negligence' (, p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that 'attempt crimes of negligence' is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for 'attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.' But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring it about that one commits a crime of negligence, but the attempt can be successful as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interest for such a study resides from the correct decoding of certain practical situations, not infrequently confusing, on the differentiation of the offence of murder from other types of offences which have resulted in the death of the victim. On the other hand, it is important to mention the fact that the offence of murder is committed only with INTENTION, in both its versions, unlike those offences which have resulted in the death of the victim and which can be committed only with PRAETERINTENTION or have unintended consequences. In this paper we have used a very rich jurisprudence, precisely to observe the specific differences between the two types of offences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the British court case Jones v. Kernott, which dealt with the property ownership rights of unmarried couples. Topics include express and implied intention, beneficial interest, and co-ownership of real property. Information is provided on inference and imputation, and how they impact the court's decision in property cases.

Right intention is one of the staple criteria of traditional just war theory. In classical terms, right intention is met when a belligerent aims to achieve a just and peaceful order. I will address the problem of determining when a belligerent has satisfied the criterion of right intention. I will argue that right intention is determined by observing a belligerent's acts during and after a conflict. Intention is not merely a private mental act known ultimately only by the people who express the intentions of their governments. Rather, right intention is a communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined. I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this way of determining intention by concentrating on the stated intentions of the Allies before World War II and of the U.S. before the First and Second Gulf Wars. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that the international community can check a belligerent's stated intentions both while the war is in progress and after the war has ended. I will argue that how well a belligerent conforms to the jus in bello and, when appropriate, to the jus post bellum, provide the international community with much of the information it needs to determine whether or not right intention has been met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]