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In June of 2010, a Canadian couple, Donald Heathfield and Tracey Lee Ann Foley, was arrested in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as the KGB "sleeper agents." These KGB agents (Andrei Bezrukov and Elena Vavilova) lived in Canada since 1992, and in the United States since 1999, working for the Russian intelligence as "a sleeper cell" of the Russian spies. This story became an inspiration for the American TV show The Americans (2013–2018). Using the reviews of this TV show from the United States and Russia, the interviews with the real participants of the events of 2010 and with the retired KGB officers, the KGB documents from the SBU Archive in Kyiv, Ukraine, this article is an attempt to study how the special KGB/FSB operations in the USA, portrayed in one American TV series became an object of fascination and "fictionalization" on the both—American and Russian—sides of the geo-political conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although gay espionage is a well-established Cold War trope, this article analyzes new evidence that intelligence agencies in divided Berlin actively sought to recruit gay men. They did so because they believed that gay men's contacts in the opaque and class-crossing queer subculture made them ideally suited for the purposes of intelligence work. Using files from the archives of the East German secret police, this article sheds light on these practices through the experiences of a gay agent recruited in 1960. It analyzes his experiences in order to question the relationship between sexuality and the modern security state. In so doing, the article highlights a gap in the Foucauldian model of surveillance, revealing not only how surveillance could play a permissive, rather than a disciplinary, role in queer lives, but also how the paranoias of the security state could reinforce themselves through the surveillance of subcultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authoritarian impulse has characterized human governance through most of recorded history, and popular resistance to the same has waxed and waned with the intellectual currents and conditions of the day. There is little in the open literature, however, that considers the common counterintelligence vulnerabilities of contemporary authoritarian states. Growing out of the traditional authoritarianisms, our century is seeing the emergence of a modern authoritarianism characterized by technology-infused surveillance states whose new vulnerabilities are now emerging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the interest in the motivation behind intelligence work is great, hardly any empirical investigations have been published. This may be due to the subject itself being difficult to research. Intelligence services, secret police and the police hardly report openly on such matters, especially considering their reluctance to expose their conspiratorial personnel in academic investigations. Included in the findings published by "experts" are mostly testimonials and evaluations from criminal proceedings involving informers, which, under empirical aspects, hardly lead to valid results. The group of defendants poses only an exposed minority, presumably aware of its advantage in criminal law, and consequently unlikely to venture more "primitive" motives. The greater number of testimonials, mostly communist and post-communist memoirs, is similarly unhelpful since the former agents, messengers or spies emphasise their ideals as motivation. In contrast, the confidants tending towards materialism report less openly about the structure of their motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Public Administration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Public Administration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis is the property of Amsterdam University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of National Security Review / Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle is the property of National University of Public Service and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An interview with David Omand, visiting Professor in the War Studies Department at King's College London, England, is presented. Topics discussed include existence of the British secret agencies with work on signals intelligence was David Kahn's "The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing," effectiveness of British intelligence and security machinery and budget constraints focused on the Warsaw Pact armed forces, and on the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

This article will offer an assessment on the effectiveness of clandestine operations conducted by the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr, against the British colony of Gibraltar during the Second World War. This assessment is based on declassified British archival records, and this paper will argue that while the Abwehr had complex networks which attempted operations against the British at Gibraltar the Germans actually achieved little meaningful success. This article will reason that the inability to achieve any significant results was due to ineffective leadership and direction from Abwehr officers who also oversaw inadequate agent recruitment and training which impaired Abwehr clandestine operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1932 to 1945, Imperial Japan secretly developed the largest state biological warfare (BW) programme of its time, which was unique in its use of biological weapons in warfare and in its inhumane experiments on captive Chinese civilians. After Japan's surrender, US military intelligence teams searched for any evidence of BW activities, whilst sharing all it could find with its close partner, the UK. Despite the UK offering little intelligence material in return, it secured detailed US intelligence reports on Japanese BW war crimes, and colluded with the United States to keep these Japanese war crimes a secret. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers observation on the prevalence of the information-centric intelligence model. Topics discussed include information on Mark M. Lowenthal's book "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy," description of the analysis-centric model, and efforts of intelligence organizations to make sure their analysts avoid the pitfalls of cognitive biases and fears of politicization.

The article examines efforts to achieve a balance, or tradeoff, between democratic civilian control and the effectiveness of intelligence agencies since Francisco Franco's dictatorship ended in 1975 and Spain's transition to democracy began. Topics discussed include ethical aspect of Madrid's post-Franco Intelligence Community (IC) as a profession, legacy of illiberal intelligence agencies, and roles, missions and legal basis of Spain's IC.

The article reports on the relationship between the intelligence services and the parliaments. Intelligence services has been the top secret policy tools of governments with its system being outside the law of legislation and of public accountability. They are also not mandated by the constitution and its annual budgets are automatically and easily approved. Moreover, failure has been defined as the inability of the intelligence services to obtain and use intelligence in a successful pursuit of a rational objective.

The article reports on the alleged espionage at Fort Monmouth. The Army Signal Corps Center has been the target of accusations regarding espionage wherein several employees were suspended from work for security reasons. Several facts that were available to public show that no one has been accused of espionage, charges received by others include "guilt by association" accusations, several civilians have been deprived of access to important documents and others. Sample charges, notice of suspension, open hearings and others were also discussed.

Abstract: This paper presents a historical analysis of the genesis, context, and function of “Operative Psychology,” a little‐known branch of applied psychology developed by employees of the Ministry of State Security in the German Democratic Republic. For 25 years, theories and practices of Operative Psychology were taught to elite agents at the Juridical Academy in Potsdam, introducing them to various “silent” psychological techniques of persuasion, interrogation, and repression. After highlighting the economic and political context that increased the need for “silent” techniques of observation and repression, an overview of the topics that were taught and researched at the chair for Operative Psychology is given. Examples of how these techniques were put into practice are provided and the consequences for the victims of Operative Psychology are discussed. Furthermore, commonalities and differences between Operative Psychology and the use of psychological torture by the CIA during the “war on terror” are discussed and questions regarding the relation between methodological and moral strategies of justification are addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the transformation of Chile's intelligence community following the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet and the transition of Chile into a democracy focusing on the democratic reform of intelligence. Topics include human rights violations under Pinochet's regime, establishment of the Department of National Intelligence (DINA) in Chile, and strengthening of democratic civil-military relations.

The article focuses on Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin of having been a chekist, a member of the USSR's secret police and intelligence service. It states that Putin is, for a Russian, comparatively short and skinny and this means that, back in the day he frequently had to contend with opponents considerably taller and heavier than he was and this can only have meant that he had to be faster, more determined and more ruthless than they were.

The article examines German Gestapo secret police intelligence efforts in East Asia from 1939 through 1945. Topics discussed include failure of the Gestapo to monitor and control the affairs of German nationals residing in East Asia, assignment of a police liaison officer by the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) as the Gestapo agent in Japan and China, and the history of Gestapo intelligence efforts in East Asia starting with the Anti-Comintern Pact.

This article offers a first academic evaluation of the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, two British undercover police units working for the Metropolitan Police Service at different times between 1968 and 2011. It provides a historical overview of their infiltration of political groups involved in protest for the purpose of gathering criminal and political intelligence aimed at preventing violence, public disorder, and subversion. It discusses the controversies surrounding these units, and the related institutional responses, and offers an attempt at understanding their operations within the remit of intelligence-led policing and against a political culture that prioritizes action over inaction in reducing risks and threats to the State and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oversight of intelligence and security agencies has become of significant interest in recent years. In the UK the principal mechanism for providing parliamentary oversight of the agencies is the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). However, until 2013 the ISC was a constitutional anomaly: as a statutory committee appointed by the Prime Minister it was a committee of parliamentarians, but not a committee of Parliament. In recent years a number of parliamentary select committees have undertaken inquiries involving scrutiny of the work of the intelligence agencies and the government's use of intelligence. Some select committees have also argued that Parliament should play a greater role in the scrutiny of intelligence. In 2011 the ISC proposed that it should become a committee of Parliament, an idea taken up in the Justice and Security green paper and which became reality in 2013. This article examines the role of select committees in scrutinising intelligence issues and the potential impact of the change in status of the ISC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the role of intelligence analysts for policymakers. Among the topics discussed include the need for policymakers to collaborate with Intelligence Community (IC), the responsibilities of analysts in providing comprehensive solutions for the operations of policymakers, and the impact of intelligence analysts for political systems in the U.S.

The article focuses on the capabilities and limitations of intelligence and national security communities in the U.S., with emphasis on the sources of information available about the search for Osama Bin Laden. It is mentioned that official, publicly available investigation or analysis of the intelligence effort were absent in the finding and killing of Osama bin Laden that shows that the intelligence effort was successful. It is stated that significant implications for a wide range of political and foreign policy objectives is provided by the new American approach toward intelligence.

The article presents the main causes which determined General Ion Mihai Pacepa, assistant director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, to desert in the U.S.A., in July 1978, as they result from unclassified documents from the archives of this service (The "Securitate"). Pacepa owned important state functions and very important secrets, so that his desertion had serious consequences for Romania, not only for the political system of that time. The researches certify that Pacepa worked both for the Soviet secret services and for the C.I.A. The author excludes the idea that Pacepa deserted because he was loathing the communist system or Nicolae Ceauşescu. General Pacepa served the communist regime with loyalty, fact proved by the high ranks and the important state functions he got during the 27 years while he worked in the Romanian espionage. The article shows that Pacepa was suspected for treason and for corruption; he got into a critical situation, and decided to leave Romania and surrendered in Washington. In the same time, general Pacepa's desertion served Russian interests to defame Nicolae Ceauşescu, and to carry out the "Dniestr" plan of replacing him with a pro-Russian communist leader. The author relates to some of the thesis about the subject which he doesn't agree with, the way they are presented, in some of the papers that he indicated as bibliography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dawning of the information age, coupled with a greater understanding of the value of intellectual property, has increased the quantity of proprietary information businesses choose to keep as trade secrets. An often-underappreciated cost of trade secrets is the effect they have on the employment relationship - they frequently result in employers and employees involving themselves in convoluted legal and contractual relationships beyond their own expectations or comprehension. Further complicating the matter is the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), which increases the stakes of employer-employee conflict by criminalizing the misappropriation of trade secrets. This note provides a primer to help both employers and employees deal with the specific issues trade secrets frequently create in the employment relationship, first by outlining the current status of trade secrecy law, then by examining how the EEA is changing the trade secrecy landscape, and finally by providing a practical summary of best practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although mentioned since the early years of Alexandru Ioan Cuza's reign, the Internal Affairs Bureau's intelligence service has almost remained obscure to the Romanian historians. The few facts known about this issue occur around the year 1862, when Cuza, while visiting Bucharest's police prefecture, recomended to the prefect to take all the necessary steps to guarantee the efficiency of the „renseignemente chancellary“. Afterwards, with the lack of certain documents, historians and specialists had tried to reimagine the starts of these intelligence structures by using the hypothesis that the Internal Affairs Bureau (assigned with the defense and maintainment of public order) undertook intelligence activity through specialized personal and utilised secret funds for ghatering intelligence and remunerating its own agents. Following this lead, with the help of valuable documents from the Romanian's National Archives, the goal of this paper is to shed light upon this historical issue and to prove the fact the Internal Affairs Bureau's intelligence service was brought into existence since 1860 under the name of The Secret Service, that was provided since the start with a national coverage. From this point of view, The Internal Affairs Bureau's Intelligence Service can be considered to be the modern Romanian's first intelligence service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On April, 1943, after the reorganization of the Soviet Intelligence and Security Services was created the SMERSH Counter Information and repression organs in the Soviet Army, Soviet Military Maritime Fleet and the organs of the Internal Affairs. At the end of March 1944, the soviet troops reoccupied Northern Bukovina and till August 23, 1944, as a result of capitulation of Romania, the rest of Bessarabian territory was reconquered. At the same time with the Soviet Army operative units the security structures came back to Bessarabia. The firstly arrived structure was SMERSH organs of the military units and the SMERSH Counter Information Office of the Moldavian SSR NKVD which was represented by the SMERSH offices of the NKVD departments from Bălţi, Bender (Tighina), Cahul, Chişinău, Soroca, Orhei districts and the Tiraspol city department. The basic mission of the SMERSH Counter Information Office of the Moldavian SSR NKVD was to eliminate the hostile elements from the Internal Affairs Organs. The mission was difficult because the majority of the staff was recruited from that territory which was under "ocuppation". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The parliamentary oversight of the secret services, due to their specific nature, is based on legal rules determining what and how to oversee and/or on a consensus among the relevant political forces, establishing the scope and methods of the oversight. Which one of these two dimensions prevails depends on the political system, historical tradition and current circumstances of a given state. This article deals with the situation in five countries: France, Germany, United Kingdom, Romania and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beginning of civil secret service formation is considered to be in 1989. The transformation began after the elections in June, 1989 and an attempt to adjust security apparatus to the standards of a democratic country was made. At that time the idea of civil supervision over the first secret service institution (Office for State Protection) appeared. This regulation was formalized by an act issued on 6 April, 1990 concerning Office for State Protection. Under the Law of 6 April 1990 on the Office for State Protection Security Service of the Ministry of Interior (polish acronym SB) was abolished and the State Security Office was established (polish acronym UOP). The new intelligence service was supposed to have a structure which would allow it to function properly within the democratic state. Also tasks and powers of the UOP had to be modified. Finally, the activity of a new intelligence service was subject to oversight and control by state institutions entrusted with proper powers. The first step of such profound changes was supposed to be the enactment of new laws. In this article, organizational structures, functions and powers of the SB and the UOP were compared. This makes it possible to point out the differences in the status of a new intelligence service. Legislative changes made in 1989-1990 had two priorities. First, they were supposed to give a legal basis for the organizational and functional separation of the Police of the UOP. Secondly, the various provisions of the Act were supposed to be formal and legal guarantee against the politicization of this service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the intelligence communities of the United States and the United Kingdom have faced a rapidly changing security environment. In that time, a number of high-profile failures have exposed weaknesses within these communities and how they perform their tasks. This article analyses these failures, identifying the key problems, and examines the various reforms designed to overcome the identified weaknesses. These reforms are discussed in three categories: structural change, budget increases, and increased oversight procedures. The article concludes with an assessment of whether said reforms have produced intelligence communities ready for the new security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]