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Positive associations between human intelligence and brain size have been suspected for more than 150 years. Nowadays, modern non-invasive measures of in vivo brain volume (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) make it possible to reliably assess associations with IQ. By means of a systematic review of published studies and unpublished results obtained by personal communications with researchers, we identified 88 studies examining effect sizes of 148 healthy and clinical mixed-sex samples (>8000 individuals). Our results showed significant positive associations of brain volume and IQ (r=.24, R(2)=.06) that generalize over age (children vs. adults), IQ domain (full-scale, performance, and verbal IQ), and sex. Application of a number of methods for detection of publication bias indicates that strong and positive correlation coefficients have been reported frequently in the literature whilst small and non-significant associations appear to have been often omitted from reports. We show that the strength of the positive association of brain volume and IQ has been overestimated in the literature, but remains robust even when accounting for different types of dissemination bias, although reported effects have been declining over time. While it is tempting to interpret this association in the context of human cognitive evolution and species differences in brain size and cognitive ability, we show that it is not warranted to interpret brain size as an isomorphic proxy of human intelligence differences., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

To further knowledge concerning the nature and nurture of intelligence, we scrutinized how heritability coefficients vary across specific cognitive abilities both theoretically and empirically. Data from 23 twin studies (combined N = 7,852) showed that (a) in adult samples, culture-loaded subtests tend to demonstrate greater heritability coefficients than do culture-reduced subtests; and (b) in samples of both adults and children, a subtest's proportion of variance shared with general intelligence is a function of its cultural load. These findings require an explanation because they do not follow from mainstream theories of intelligence. The findings are consistent with our hypothesis that heritability coefficients differ across cognitive abilities as a result of differences in the contribution of genotype-environment covariance. The counterintuitive finding that the most heritable abilities are the most culture-dependent abilities sheds a new light on the long-standing nature-nurture debate of intelligence.

It is important to understand potential sources of group differences in the heritability of intelligence test scores. On the basis of a basic item response model we argue that heritabilities which are based on dichotomous item scores normally do not generalize from one sample to the next. If groups differ in mean ability, the functioning of items at different ability levels may result in group differences in the heritability of items, even when these items function equivalently across groups and the heritability of the underlying ability is equal across groups. We illustrate this graphically, by computer simulation, and by focusing on several problems associated with a recent study by Rushton et al. who argued that the heritability estimates of items of Raven's Progressive Matrices test in North-American twin samples generalized to other population groups, and hence that the population group differences on this test of general mental ability (or intelligence) had a substantial genetic component. Our results show that item heritabilities are strongly dependent on the group on which the heritabilities were based. Rushton et al.'s results were artefactual and do not speak to the nature of population group differences in intelligence test performance.

Scores on cognitive tasks used in intelligence tests correlate positively with each other, that is, they display a positive manifold of correlations. The positive manifold is often explained by positing a dominant latent variable, the g factor, associated with a single quantitative cognitive or biological process or capacity. In this article, a new explanation of the positive manifold based on a dynamical model is proposed, in which reciprocal causation or mutualism plays a central role. It is shown that the positive manifold emerges purely by positive beneficial interactions between cognitive processes during development. A single underlying g factor plays no role in the model. The model offers explanations of important findings in intelligence research, such as the hierarchical factor structure of intelligence, the low predictability of intelligence from early childhood performance, the integration/differentiation effect, the increase in heritability of g, and the Jensen effect, and is consistent with current explanations of the Flynn effect., (Copyright 2006 APA.)