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Mind-set refers to people's beliefs about whether attributes are malleable ( growth mind-set ) or unchangeable (  fixed mind-set ). Proponents of mind-set theory have made bold claims about mind-set's importance. For example, one's mind-set is described as having profound effects on one's motivation and achievements, creating different psychological worlds for people, and forming the core of people's meaning systems. We examined the evidentiary strength of six key premises of mind-set theory in 438 participants; we reasoned that strongly worded claims should be supported by equally strong evidence. However, no support was found for most premises. All associations ( r s) were significantly weaker than .20. Other achievement-motivation constructs, such as self-efficacy and need for achievement, have been found to correlate much more strongly with presumed associates of mind-set. The strongest association with mind-set ( r = -.12) was opposite from the predicted direction. The results suggest that the foundations of mind-set theory are not firm and that bold claims about mind-set appear to be overstated.

It is well established that measures of reasoning ability and of working memory capacity (WMC) correlate positively. However, the question of what explains this relationship remains open. The purpose of this study was to investigate the capacity hypothesis, which ascribes causality to WMC. This hypothesis holds that people high in WMC are more successful in capacity-demanding cognitive tasks than people lower in WMC because they can temporarily maintain more information in the form of sub-goals, hypotheses, and partial solutions. Accordingly, this hypothesis predicts that the correlation between WMC and reasoning performance should increase as the capacity demands of the reasoning items increase. We tested this prediction using items from Raven's Progressive Matrices and two measures of WMC, complex span and the k estimate from the Visual Arrays task. Neither WMC measure showed the effect predicted by the capacity hypothesis. Furthermore, the results cannot be attributed to restriction of range in performance on the individual reasoning items. This finding adds to existing evidence calling into question the capacity hypothesis, and, more generally, the view that WMC has a causal influence on fluid intelligence.

This study explored developmental and individual differences in intellectual humility (IH) among 127 children ages 6-8. IH was operationalized as children's assessment of their knowledge and willingness to delegate scientific questions to experts. Children completed measures of IH, theory of mind, motivational framework, and intelligence, and neurophysiological measures indexing early (error-related negativity [ERN]) and later (error positivity [Pe]) error-monitoring processes related to cognitive control. Children's knowledge self-assessment correlated with question delegation, and older children showed greater IH than younger children. Greater IH was associated with higher intelligence but not with social cognition or motivational framework. ERN related to self-assessment, whereas Pe related to question delegation. Thus, children show separable epistemic and social components of IH that may differentially contribute to metacognition and learning., (© 2017 The Authors. Child Development © 2017 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

The question of what underlies individual differences in general intelligence has never been satisfactorily answered. The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of an executive function that we term placekeeping ability-the ability to perform the steps of a complex task in a prescribed order without skipping or repeating steps. Participants completed a newly developed test of placekeeping ability, called the UNRAVEL task. The measure of placekeeping ability from this task (error rate) predicted a measure of fluid intelligence (Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices score), above and beyond measures of working memory capacity, task switching, and multitasking. An existing model of Raven's performance suggests that placekeeping ability supports the systematic exploration of hypotheses under problem-solving conditions.

Psychometric intelligence (g) is often conceptualized as the capability for online information processing but it is also possible that intelligence may be related to offline processing of information. Here, we investigated the relationship between psychometric g and sleep-dependent memory consolidation. Participants studied paired-associates and were tested after a 12-hour retention interval that consisted entirely of wake or included a regular sleep phase. We calculated the number of word-pairs that were gained and lost across the retention interval. In a separate session, participants completed a battery of cognitive ability tests to assess g. In the wake group, g was not correlated with either memory gain or memory loss. In the sleep group, we found that g correlated positively with memory gain and negatively with memory loss. Participants with a higher level of general intelligence showed more memory gain and less memory loss across sleep. Importantly, the correlation between g and memory loss was significantly stronger in the sleep condition than in the wake condition, suggesting that the relationship between g and memory loss across time is specific to time intervals that include sleep. The present research suggests that g not only reflects the capability for online cognitive processing, but also reflects capability for offline processes that operate during sleep.

The relations between video-game experience and cognitive abilities were examined in the current study. In two experiments, subjects performed a number of working memory, fluid intelligence, and attention-control measures and filled out a questionnaire about their video-game experience. In Experiment 1, an extreme-groups analysis indicated that experienced video-game players outperformed nonplayers on several cognitive-ability measures. However, in Experiments 1 and 2, when analyses examined the full range of subjects at both the task level and the latent-construct level, nearly all of the relations between video-game experience and cognitive abilities were near zero. These results cast doubt on recent claims that playing video games leads to enhanced cognitive abilities. Statistical and methodological issues with prior studies of video-game experience are discussed along with recommendations for future studies., (© The Author(s) 2015.)

Working memory is a critical element of complex cognition, particularly under conditions of distraction and interference. Measures of working memory capacity correlate positively with many measures of real-world cognition, including fluid intelligence. There have been numerous attempts to use training procedures to increase working memory capacity and thereby performance on the real-world tasks that rely on working memory capacity. In the study reported here, we demonstrated that training on complex working memory span tasks leads to improvement on similar tasks with different materials but that such training does not generalize to measures of fluid intelligence.

Numerous recent studies seem to provide evidence for the general intellectual benefits of working memory training. In reviews of the training literature, Shipstead, Redick, and Engle (2010, 2012) argued that the field should treat recent results with a critical eye. Many published working memory training studies suffer from design limitations (no-contact control groups, single measures of cognitive constructs), mixed results (transfer of training gains to some tasks but not others, inconsistent transfer to the same tasks across studies), and lack of theoretical grounding (identifying the mechanisms responsible for observed transfer). The current study compared young adults who received 20 sessions of practice on an adaptive dual n-back program (working memory training group) or an adaptive visual search program (active placebo-control group) with a no-contact control group that received no practice. In addition, all subjects completed pretest, midtest, and posttest sessions comprising multiple measures of fluid intelligence, multitasking, working memory capacity, crystallized intelligence, and perceptual speed. Despite improvements on both the dual n-back and visual search tasks with practice, and despite a high level of statistical power, there was no positive transfer to any of the cognitive ability tests. We discuss these results in the context of previous working memory training research and address issues for future working memory training studies., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

The authors agree with P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) that working memory capacity (WMC) is not isomorphic with general fluid intelligence (Gf) or reasoning ability. However, the WMC and Gf/reasoning constructs are more strongly associated than Ackerman et al. (2005) indicate, particularly when considering the outcomes of latent-variable studies. The authors' reanalysis of 14 such data sets from 10 published studies, representing more than 3,100 young-adult subjects, suggests a strong correlation between WMC and Gf/reasoning factors (median r=.72), indicating that the WMC and Gf constructs share approximately 50% of their variance. This comment also clarifies the authors' "executive attention" view of WMC, it demonstrates that WMC has greater discriminant validity than Ackerman et al. (2005) implied, and it suggests some future directions and challenges for the scientific study of the convergence of WMC, attention control, and intelligence., (Copyright (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved.)

Two studies were conducted to investigate whether a meaningful task-switching construct could be identified and, if so, to determine how it was related to measures of higher order cognition and to adult age. Both studies revealed that measures of task switching were moderately correlated across different combinations of tasks and that a switching construct could be distinguished from a construct reflecting processing speed. The results of the 2nd study revealed that although the task-switching construct was related to age and to measures of episodic memory, inductive reasoning, and spatial visualization, most of the relations between the switching construct and both age and other measures of cognition were shared with other variables.

This study explored developmental and individual differences in intellectual humility (IH) among 127 children ages 6-8. IH was operationalized as children's assessment of their knowledge and willingness to delegate scientific questions to experts. Children completed measures of IH, theory of mind, motivational framework, and intelligence, and neurophysiological measures indexing early (error-related negativity [ERN]) and later (error positivity [Pe]) error-monitoring processes related to cognitive control. Children's knowledge self-assessment correlated with question delegation, and older children showed greater IH than younger children. Greater IH was associated with higher intelligence but not with social cognition or motivational framework. ERN related to self-assessment, whereas Pe related to question delegation. Thus, children show separable epistemic and social components of IH that may differentially contribute to metacognition and learning.

Numerous recent studies seem to provide evidence for the general intellectual benefits of working memory training. In reviews of the training literature, Shipstead, Redick, and Engle (2010, 2012) argued that the field should treat recent results with a critical eye. Many published working memory training studies suffer from design limitations (no-contact control groups, single measures of cognitive constructs), mixed results (transfer of training gains to some tasks but not others, inconsistent transfer to the same tasks across studies), and lack of theoretical grounding (identifying the mechanisms responsible for observed transfer). The current study compared young adults who received 20 sessions of practice on an adaptive dual "n"-back program (working memory training group) or an adaptive visual search program (active placebo-control group) with a no-contact control group that received no practice. In addition, all subjects completed pretest, midtest, and posttest sessions comprising multiple measures of fluid intelligence, multitasking, working memory capacity, crystallized intelligence, and perceptual speed. Despite improvements on both the dual n-back and visual search tasks with practice, and despite a high level of statistical power, there was no positive transfer to any of the cognitive ability tests. We discuss these results in the context of previous working memory training research and address issues for future working memory training studies. (Contains 7 tables, 6 figures and 7 footnotes.)

The purpose of this study was to identify sources of individual differences in knowledge acquired under natural conditions. Through its direct influence on background knowledge, crystallized intelligence (Gc) had a major impact on political knowledge, acquired over a period of more than 2 months, but there were independent influences of personality and interest factors, via exposure to political information through activities like reading the newspaper. We also found sex differences in political knowledge, favoring males, and these differences could not be explained in terms of any of the predictor variables we modeled. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the results. (Contains 1 figure and 3 tables.)

The purpose of this study was to investigate sources of inter-individual differences in current events knowledge. The study occurred in two sessions. In the initial session, 579 participants completed tests to ability, personality, and interest factors, as well as prior knowledge of current events. Approximately 10 weeks later, participants completed tests to assess new knowledge of current events, acquired since the initial session. Structural equation modeling revealed positive effects of both ability and non-ability factors on prior knowledge, and in turn, a large positive effect of prior knowledge on new knowledge. Results are interpreted in the context of theories of human intelligence that integrate ability and non-ability traits.

A hallmark of intelligent behavior is rationality – the disposition and ability to think analytically to make decisions that maximize expected utility or follow the laws of probability. However, the question remains as to whether rationality and intelligence are empirically distinct, as does the question of what cognitive mechanisms underlie individual differences in rationality. In a sample of 331 participants, we assessed the relationship between rationality and intelligence. There was a common ability underpinning performance on some, but not all, rationality tests. Latent factors representing rationality and general intelligence were strongly correlated (r =.54), but their correlation fell well short of unity. Rationality correlated significantly with fluid intelligence (r =.56), working memory capacity (r =.44), and attention control (r =.49). Attention control fully accounted for the relationship between working memory capacity and rationality, and partially accounted for the relationship between fluid intelligence and rationality. We conclude by speculating about factors rationality tests may tap that other cognitive ability tests miss, and outline directions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The circumvention-of-limits hypothesis holds that the more skilled and knowledgeable the task performer, the less it matters for task performance whether that person has limited general cognitive ability. We tested this hypothesis using a knowledge activation approach to manipulate knowledge experimentally. The criterion task, which we designed to capture a fundamental requirement of a broad class of real-world tasks, was a placekeeping task in which participants had to perform a sequence of operations in a specified order, applying 7 different 2-alternative decision rules to a series of randomly generated stimuli. The measures of interest in this task were response time and accuracy, as well as frequency of use of a help function to recall the correct sequence of steps. In the knowledge-activated condition, we gave participants a mnemonic in which the first letters of the decision rules spelled the English word unravel. In the knowledge-not-activated condition, no mnemonic was given, and the use and discovery of mnemonics was frustrated by reversal of the terms of some decision rules so that their first letters spelled the difficult to pronounce nonword unrbcel. The predictor tasks, which we used to predict performance in the placekeeping task, were standard tests of cognitive ability, which have been shown to predict performance differences in a wide range of complex tasks. Inconsistent with the circumvention-of-limits hypothesis, the positive effect of cognitive ability on placekeeping performance did not differ across conditions. This finding adds to previous evidence that it may not always be possible to overcome limitations on cognitive ability through extensive training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to identify sources of individual differences in knowledge acquired under natural conditions. Through its direct influence on background knowledge, crystallized intelligence (Gc) had a major impact on political knowledge, acquired over a period of more than 2months, but there were independent influences of personality and interest factors, via exposure to political information through activities like reading the newspaper. We also found sex differences in political knowledge, favoring males, and these differences could not be explained in terms of any of the predictor variables we modeled. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the results. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The deliberate practice view has generated a great deal of scientific and popular interest in expert performance. At the same time, empirical evidence now indicates that deliberate practice, while certainly important, is not as important as Ericsson and colleagues have argued it is. In particular, we (Hambrick, Oswald, Altmann, Meinz, Gobet, & Campitelli, 2014-this issue) found that individual differences in accumulated amount of deliberate practice accounted for about one-third of the reliable variance in performance in chess and music, leaving the majority of the reliable variance unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors. Ericsson's (2014-this issue) defense of the deliberate practice view, though vigorous, is undercut by contradictions, oversights, and errors in his arguments and criticisms, several of which we describe here. We reiterate that the task now is to develop and rigorously test falsifiable theories of expert performance that take into account as many potentially relevant constructs as possible. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study was designed to investigate sources of individual differences in musical skill acquisition. We had 171 undergraduates with little or no piano-playing experience attempt to learn a piece of piano music with the aid of a video-guide, and then, following practice with the guide, attempt to perform the piece from memory. A panel of musicians evaluated the performances based on their melodic and rhythmic accuracy. Participants also completed tests of working memory capacity, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, processing speed, and two tests of music aptitude (the Swedish Music Discrimination Test and the Advanced Measures of Music Audiation). Measures of general intelligence and music aptitude correlated significantly with skill acquisition, but mindset did not. Structural equation modeling revealed that general intelligence, music aptitude, and mindset together accounted for 22.4% of the variance in skill acquisition. However, only general intelligence contributed significantly to the model (β = 0.44, p <.001). The contributions of music aptitude (β = 0.08, p =.39) and mindset (β = −0.06, p =.50) were non-significant after accounting for general intelligence. We also found that openness to experience did not significantly predict skill acquisition or music aptitude. Overall, the results suggest that after accounting for individual differences in general intelligence, music aptitude and mindset do not predict piano skill acquisition in beginners. • We investigated sources of individual differences in piano skill acquisition. • Participants completed 8 tests of cognitive ability and 2 tests of music aptitude. • General intelligence and music aptitude correlated with skill acquisition. • SEM revealed that only general intelligence predicted skill acquisition. • In the SEM, contributions of music aptitude and mindset were non-significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Substantial research in the psychology of expertise has shown that experts in several fields (e.g., science, mathematics) perform better than non-experts on standardized tests of intelligence. This evidence suggests that intelligence plays an important role in the acquisition of expertise. However, a counter argument is that the difference between experts and non-experts is not due to individuals' traits but to academic selection processes. For instance, in science, high scores on standardized tests (e.g., SAT and then GRE) are needed to be admitted to a university program for training. Thus, the “academic selection process” hypothesis is that expert vs. non-expert differences in cognitive ability reflect ability-related differences in access to training opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we focused on a domain in which there are no selection processes based on test scores: chess. This meta-analysis revealed that chess players outperformed non-chess players in intelligence-related skills ( d − = 0.49). Therefore, this outcome does not corroborate the academic selection process argument, and consequently, supports the idea that access to training alone cannot explain expert performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some people more skilled in complex domains than other people? Here, we conducted a meta-analysis to evaluate the relationship between cognitive ability and skill in chess. Chess skill correlated positively and significantly with fluid reasoning (Gf) ( r − = 0.24), comprehension-knowledge (Gc) ( r − = 0.22), short-term memory (Gsm) ( r − = 0.25), and processing speed (Gs) ( r − = 0.24); the meta-analytic average of the correlations was ( r − = 0.24). Moreover, the correlation between Gf and chess skill was moderated by age ( r − = 0.32 for youth samples vs. r − = 0.11 for adult samples), and skill level ( r − = 0.32 for unranked samples vs. r − = 0.14 for ranked samples). Interestingly, chess skill correlated more strongly with numerical ability ( r − = 0.35) than with verbal ability ( r − = 0.19) or visuospatial ability ( r − = 0.13). The results suggest that cognitive ability contributes meaningfully to individual differences in chess skill, particularly in young chess players and/or at lower levels of skill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]