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This article examines various rebellions against the nationalist government in Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence (TWI) (1919–1922), which began as an insurrection against the Ottoman government and the occupation forces of the Entente. As the nationalists began to extend their authority, they met with resistance from different groups in different parts of the country. While some groups sought independent ethno-states, some consisted of war-weary Turks who simply refused to share the burden of a new conflict; others were supported by the Ottoman government in Istanbul and sought to restore the authority of the Sultan and weaken the nationalists. Most rebellions, especially those supported by the Ottoman government, involved former or current soldiers and government officials. Both sides fought in the name of what they considered to be legitimate governments and had access to heavy weapons. The rebellions often met with violent repression and the use of irregular forces, resulting in significant loss of life and damage to property and leaving a lasting impact on the collective memory of Turkish society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Africa Spectrum is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For two days in August 1831, an enslaved preacher named Nathaniel Turner and a core group of followers rampaged across rural Southampton County, Virginia, killing some 55 white people. One month later, 46 free Black residents of Alexandria, Virginia, published a petition in the local newspaper, asserting their loyalty to the town. What compelled these 46 men to do this? I explore the connections among the petitioners as well as 238 other free Blacks in Alexandria in 1831, focusing on the concepts of social dissonance and stability. I propose that free Black Alexandrians mitigated the discord in their lives by forming neighborhoods, buying property, putting down roots, and establishing a favorable reputation within the white community. I conduct a documentary archaeology of primary sources to investigate the ways that free Blacks tempered the daily onslaught of racist disruption in their lives, particularly for the period ca. 1829–1833. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on two online surveys concerning reactions to the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Study 1 occurred between January 8 and 11, 2021; Study 2 took place between July 8 and 15, 2021. In both studies, both Trump and Biden voters reported negative attitudes toward the rioters, but those attitudes became significantly more positive from Study 1 to Study 2 in both groups. As expected, in both studies, Trump/Pence voters had less confidence in, and satisfaction with, the election results, which correlated with more positive attitudes toward the rioters and the president. Biden/Harris voters held more positive beliefs about the election, which correlated with more negative attitudes toward the rioters and the president. In both studies, Biden voters were more likely to report feeling fear, disgust, anger, and sadness than Trump voters, who were more likely to report feeling joy and surprise. Unexpectedly, across all voters and within voting groups, more people in Study 2 reported feeling each emotion, compared with Study 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to protest and freedom of expression are core principles of democracy; however, on January 6th, 2021, the right to protest spiraled into a full-fledged assault on American ideals. While the smoke was still smoldering, millions were left dumbfounded—the actions were way beyond a traditional protest, instead, the attack on January 6th was classified as an insurrection. Months prior, during the Summer of 2020, then President Trump threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act of 1807 to curb the mostly peaceful Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. Thus, a clear paradox emerges. On one hand, an unjustified insurrection was met with minimal force, but on the other hand, peaceful protests against state-sanctioned murder were quelled almost immediately. To hypothesize about the insurrection of January 6th without examining the racism and racial privilege embedded in the actions would be immoral; this is especially true considering the historical importance of slave insurrections in advancing Black liberation. Thus, we argue that advancing the narrative of the January 6th insurrection as justified is a disservice to the legacy of protests, rebellions, and insurrections. Utilizing Critical Race Theory (CRT) as a framework, the article analyzes and compares the BLM protests against the insurrection of January 6th and draws attention to ways in which race served as a tool of oppression. The insurrection of January 6th, along with the rhetorical construction and justification of the events that unfolded that day, is steeped in privilege and white supremacy—luxuries that were not afforded to racial justice protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origin of the criminalization of African Americans is often considered to be the period after the Civil War with the passage of a series of repressive laws called the Black Codes. However, I argue that the progenitor of this criminalization originated over 80 years earlier during the Founding Era, particularly following the British royal governor of Virginia's proclamation in 1775 that promised to free all enslaved people who fought on the side of the British. The Founders feared any actions from the Black population to obtain their freedom and equal rights. Therefore, the Founders criminalized all aspects of their lives which was discussed at federal and state constitutional conventions, codified in the United States Constitution and confirmed at the First Congress of the United States. This was the catalyst for the laws and policies that negatively influence the present-day criminal justice system that disproportionately impacts African Americans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the violent January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, federal authorities have sought to hold participants and organizers accountable for their assault on American democracy. Troublingly, however, a substantial fraction of the public opposes the prosecution of participants in the assault on the Capitol and rejects charging former president Trump with crimes relating to the planning and execution of the attack. Why does a substantial fraction of the American public oppose accountability for perpetrators of the January 6 attack? In this article, we argue that racial attitudes play a central role in determining individuals' attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack. Elaborating on the theory of "racial spillover," we argue that former president Trump's frequent use of racial rhetoric—which established a racialized identity and cemented a close relationship between negative racial attitudes and support for his presidency among members of the mass public—created conditions in which these attitudes were likely to "spill over" into the ostensibly non-racialized domain of attitudes toward holding perpetrators, planners, and inciters accountable for the attack. Because attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack are inextricable from Trump's racialized persona, we hypothesize that negative racial attitudes should be associated with increased opposition to accountability for those responsible for the attack. Using data from four original, nationally representative surveys fielded between 2021 and 2023, we find strong evidence for our racial spillover hypothesis and show that individuals with more negative racial attitudes are more opposed to accountability for those responsible for the Capitol attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our analysis of data from a nationally representative survey of adults shows that beliefs in whether the January 6th insurrection was justifiable and whether it required investigation through the creation of the U.S. House Select Committee are inexorably steeped in affective partisanship and racial resentment. It is easy to attribute the insurrection to partisan machinations, but evidence shows that racial resentment is the dominant explanation: this includes the fact that allegations of election fraud were centered on districts with large African American and Latino populations; that many of the insurrectionists were white nationalists, racists, and members of radical right-wing groups; and that a large proportion of the electorate had voted to retain a president who fueled whites’ sense of victimization by African Americans and other minorities. We argue that reactions to the legitimacy of the January 6th insurrection have become an example of how racial resentment fuels affective partisanship.

The Vendée War (1793-1795) was an essential part of the French Revolution (1789-1799). A region of western France, south of Nantes, the Vendée, refused to continue obeying the new authorities of the Republic (1792), against a backdrop of forced military mobilization and anti-Catholic religious persecution. This peasant insurrection, led by nobles like Charette, suffered terrible repression, beyond military counter-insurgency. The Convention, the assembly governing the Republic, was very frightened in 1793, in a context of difficult foreign war and multiple domestic disputes. It took revenge by organizing a populicide in the Vendée. Carrier's infamous massacres in Nantes, carried out to order, were the norm, not a pathological exception. The infernal columns of the Republican army carried out the Vendée genocide. We propose to rediscover these historical facts, sometimes still hidden.

How do citizens respond to extreme violations of democratic institutions, such as the January 6th, 2021 insurrection at the US Capitol? Using an online survey of 900 employed respondents conducted January 5–9, 2021, I find that those interviewed just hours after the insurrection were about 10% points less likely to identify as Republicans, reported greater dislike for Donald Trump, and expressed less attachment to conservatism even controlling for prior levels of party identification. Self-reported Trump voters interviewed after the insurrection were also less likely to identify as Republican and expressed a less favorable view of Donald Trump. The findings only reflect the short-term reactions of employed respondents but are robust to alternative specifications and the very narrow temporal window of the analyses helps to isolate the impact of the insurrection. These results offer evidence in the on-going debate over how to interpret the events of January 6th, 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following roundtable is a recorded and edited discussion between four fan studies researchers that took place in March 2022. Having all worked with QAnon and the insurrection in the context of fan studies, our discussion took its departure from the US insurrection on January 6, 2021, as QAnon fans, Trump fans, and other right-wing groups stormed the US Capitol building while live-streaming their endeavor to social media. The discussion draws out some main perspectives that may guide our future thinking in the context of fandom, complicity, and politics and points toward new cultural and social territories for research into fandom and fan practices. Centrally, as fandom enters into the domain of politics and conspiracy theories, it seems increasingly unfruitful to distinguish between fan practices and participatory culture. Instead, participatory culture's primary mode seems to be deeply driven by fan practices, that is, textual poaching and enunciative and textual productivity (Jenkins, 2013; Fiske, 1992). Instead, understanding this amalgamation of fan practices into other social domains can help us make sense of current phenomena in the seeming growth of conspiracy theory communities and right-wing movements alike. Participatory culture is a source of great creativity, playfulness, and mobilization of social and political movements, but, as Jenkins pointed out as early as 2006 "has benefited third parties, revolutionaries, reactionaries, and racists alike" (Jenkins, 2006, p. 221). In some instances, it seems that these online communities are driven by fan practices, in other instances fan communities are weaponized in order to serve a political agenda. While research into fandom and politics (see Hinck, 2019; Jenkins et al., 2020, Sandvoss, 2012, etc.) and toxic cultures (Proctor et. al., 2018) is certainly not new, it seems that the current transmedial landscapes drive participation and complicity in very specific ways that fan studies would do well to focus on in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After general Miguel Primo de Rivera's coup d'état in Spain in 1923, Francesc Macià went into French exile. The leader of the Catalan separatist movement and his political-military organization, Estat Català, organized an army. Macià's aim was to penetrate with several columns of men into Catalonia to proclaim the Catalan Republic in Barcelona. This article exposes Macià's difficulties in obtaining weapons and ammunition, describes the armament obtained and uses the conflicts which took place in Ireland between 1916 and 1923 as a frame to analyse the scope and prospects of the Catalan separatist insurrection in 1926. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Toni Morrison suggests that storytelling is a highly effective way of structuring knowledge, and that the harnessing of a clever allegory, the search for well-patterned language is a constant, provocative engagement with the contemporary world. This article considers the ways poetry, imagination, and well-patterned language are utilized in the philosophies of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Rorty, and Leonard Harris. The author notes that there are apparent similarities between Rorty and Harris, but one should also notice that there are significant differences in these two philosophical positions. The author ultimately argues that Harris's move toward poetry and well-patterned language is extremely powerful and needed if people wish to move beyond a well-established set of values and norms. Harris prods us to tell thought-provoking, engaging stories—to intricately tuck knowledge into allegory and well-patterned language—but do it without being an apologist for the prevailing bourgeois liberal democratic tradition. In this manner, the harnessing of metaphor and clever allegory, the creative engagement with poetry and well-patterned language (in philosophy) is a provocative means of engaging the oppression, dispossession, and immiseration of the contemporary world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study unpacks the 2022 Brazilian Presidential campaign marked by multiple claims of electoral fraud and calls for a coup d'état by supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro. We identify the narrative frames underpinning this insurrectionist playbook by analyzing Bolsonaro's statements during the presidential campaign. We subsequently test the penetration of this playbook on members of the Brazilian National Congress during the campaign trail and the transition of power to the opposition candidate, when pro-Bolsonaro protesters attempted to overthrow the Federal Government. Our analyses lend support to the thesis that the coup d'état was not successful due to the dwindling support beyond the hard-core Bolsonaro base. Our results also describe an insurrectionist playbook largely centered on the blueprint of false claims of electoral fraud, a playbook that can be monitored through the public statements of elected officials. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and recommendations for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aftershocks of the riot at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, continue to ripple through the American public square. The United States Department of Justice brought over 750 criminal charges against the assailants. The United States House of Representatives appointed a Select Committee to investigate the riot. And the public continues to discuss the meaning of January 6 as these criminal prosecutions continue and the House's investigation concludes. Although this is the first time in American history that a mob actually breached the Capitol, riots and insurrections attempting to overawe parliamentary bodies on their own grounds are well precedented in the Anglo-American legal tradition. The purpose of this article is to provide historical context for affrays like the Trump Riot of January 6 and provide a framework for how legislatures should respond. Parliamentary precedents on both sides of the Atlantic prove that anyone who riots at the legislature is in contempt of parliamentary privilege. The legislature can refer such contempt to the executive for criminal prosecution. In egregious cases, however, the legislature should not hesitate to vindicate itself by using its own contempt power. The legislature should appoint a joint select committee or independent commission to investigate and hold those politically responsible to account. There may be cases when an officer or an agent of the executive provokes or incites a riot at the Capitol. The legislature must prevail in its efforts to bring them in for a hearing and compel them to produce discovery. Of the three coordinate branches of the federal government the legislature is first among equals. Parliamentary privilege must therefore trump executive privilege during an investigation of an assault on the national assembly. Any member of the executive who contemptuously incites a mob at the seat of government is liable for discipline under the inherent power of Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of a violent attack, questions of definition arise. News framing research has shown that the words chosen to define a given event can affect attitudes and decision-making, even when only a single word is varied. This study analyzes public discourse in the aftermath of the January 6 U.S. Capitol attacks to better understand which labels predominated and how different labels were explained/justified. We pair computer-assisted content analysis with qualitative textual analysis to identify patterns in public commentary during the week following the attacks. Results indicate that initial news coverage favored "protest(s)" as a descriptor, but "riot," "attack(s)," and "insurrection" gained traction as the week unfolded. Many labels were also definitively applied and deployed to contextualize the attacks, providing a degree of contrast to framing norms. The results are considered in relation to ongoing debates over definitions of domestic terrorism and related crises, as well as normative considerations central to the maintenance of U.S. democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On January 6, 2021, the United States experienced an insurrection at the United States Capitol that was framed in varying and complex ways by traditional U.S. allies, competing nations, and adversaries. This manuscript examines the statements of foreign leaders, international media reports, and social media posts through a media framing analysis. Thousands of pages of press reports from countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Israel, Russia, and China, formed different views of the insurrection. There were concerns about U.S. democracy, questions about U.S. leadership, and expressions of each nation's self-interest in the transactional nature of their own economical, ideological or political interests. Operationalizing a media frame analysis, this essay examines the January 6th events to suggest that global reactions to democracy are bolstered, ridiculed, and, frequently, contested internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents evidence of a conspiracy theory discourse on the anonymous messaging board 4chan, specifically /pol as in politically incorrect. Previous research shows 4chan lacks a coherent political discourse. Recent research suggests that the site is at least a reliable source of white supremacism within a larger framework of conspiratorial thinking. Grounded theory guides a systematic analysis of posts from 4chan's /pol board during the dates third to ninth January 2021, before and after the attempted insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. Following Trump's call to supporters to Stop the Steal (referring to unsubstantiated claims of a fraudulent 2020 election), the search terms steal and Trump collected all posts in threads with matching posts. A critical discourse analysis investigates the presence and articulation of conspiracism in selected posts. Findings reveal confirmation with previous research about the apparent lack of ideological coherence on/pol yet also affirms the discourse of white supremacism. Additionally, a diversity of conspiracism functions as a primary form of communication on 4chan regardless of one's loyalty to a particular political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theoretical insights of Mikhail Bakhtin offer the rhetorical critic of demonstrations and the social movements they are often a part of a useful analytical tool. Bakhtin's focus on polyphony, particularly the type he termed "passive varidirectional" in his study of Dostoevsky, dovetails with his exploration of the "carnivalesque" as a popular culture and literary mode to offer a subversive rhetoric intended to undermine hegemony. Extant studies of Bakhtin by rhetoricians have bogged down in trying to make sense of his "messy" canon and, perhaps as a result, inadequately understood this subversive rhetoric. After offering an overall reading of Bakhtin and a sense of how the concept of "carnivalesque" has been used by critics, this essay will enrich that concept by applying it to the events of 2020 and 2021 and arguing that, to grasp the critical tool Bakhtin has offered critics, one must recognize (1) its political neutrality, (2) the possible varieties of " carnivalesque," (3) the place of violence in the "carnivalesque," and (4) the new and subtle ways the body plays a rhetorical role in it. The events of 2020–2021 enable the critic to acquire a more nuanced understanding of Bakhtin's rhetorical insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the debates of the Hôtel Lambert, the constitutional monarchist wing of the Great Polish Emigration, led by Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, about the Austrian rule in Galicia, with a specific focus on the question of the position of Austrian bureaucracy in plans for the future Polish uprising. From the Hôtel Lambert's point of view, Galicia was an integral part of a restored independent Polish state. Discussions about its strategic position and the role of its inhabitants were a critical part of plans for the future uprising. The local Austrian bureaucracy was also among those groups who were, therefore, debated. The article concludes that although Czartoryski shared the generally accepted negative image of the bureaucracy in his pre-emigration writings, once in Paris all plans for the uprising emphasized the importance of maintaining the functioning administration. Consequently, according to the Hôtel Lambert's plans, bureaucrats in Galicia (and in the Prussian and Russian partitions as well) would play one of the crucial roles during the Polish insurrection. Either voluntarily, receiving benefits like promotion, or by force, under the direct supervision of insurgents. In that case, they would be later released from the service and expelled from the country.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En droit interne congolais, spécialement droit pénal militaire le traitement des personnes étrangères à l’armée interpelle et inquiète. L’interpellation se rapporte particulièrement à la situation des civils condamnés par les juridictions militaires dans le procès Kamuina Nsapu devant le tribunal militaire de Garnison de Kinshasa Gombe, accusés de mouvement insurrectionnel à Kinshasa et dans le Grand Kasaï. Et l’inquiétude est suscitée notamment par rapport au choix opéré sur la juridiction compétente militaire à la place des juridictions ordinaires conformément aux prévisions légales. L’étude a d’abord utilisé la méthode exégétique, en recherchant le vrai sens à donner aux dispositions normatives en rapport avec la question sous examen. L’objet majeur est celui de rendre justice, afin que le coupable subisse la sanction prévue par le texte pour son agissement, que les victimes soient rétablies, tant soi peu, dans leur droit, et que l’ordre public troublé par le comportement décrié soit rétabli au sein de la société toute entière. Or, le militaire vis-à-vis de la nation n’est pas soumis aux mêmes obligations que le commun des citoyens. Les dures exigences de son métier imposent qu’il soit régi par des règles particulières. Le fondement du droit pénal militaire et de la justice militaire réside dans la nécessité du maintien d’une façon permanente et sans relâche d’une discipline particulière aux Forces Armées et de la mise en œuvre des moyens propres à assurer la sécurité de l’Etat et de l’unité de la nation. Et donc confondre le militaire soumis à la discipline et le civil non soumis à une quelconque discipline à un même régime répressif serait alors une injustice institutionnelle.

This research explores the theoretical underpinnings of the expressed hero narrative utilized by groups and individuals to justify their opposition and use of violence against their own government and citizens. By using narrative analysis, this research deconstructs the language used by the groups and individuals involved in the 6 January 2021, attack on the United States Capitol. What emerges is a theory of self‐radicalization and rationalization where one believes their actions are justified because they perceive themselves to be the hero. Their belief and ideology are built on a foundation of cognitive dissonance, in which they construct a paradoxical hero identity, all while engaged in destructive political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The second impeachment trial of Donald J. Trump provides a useful test case for exploring law's tacit dimension – a domain in which thinking in pictures and sounds remains largely hidden (or disguised) and thus protected from the deliberative work of critical reason. The impeachment team's failure to refer to the January 6 rally video suggests an insufficient understanding of how, and with what predictable impact, Trump's video helped to incite his supporters to violent insurrection at the nation's capital. Lawyers, judges, and lay jurors alike can ill-afford to ignore the implications of such a massive blind spot when it comes to the strategic composition and critical assessment of such a pervasive form of communication in contemporary society. If trial lawyers cannot identify how jurors are being tacitly persuaded on the screen, they will be unable to properly test the sounds and images their opponents rely on in court. This is how the adversarial quest for truth and justice breaks down. As spectacle and critical reason contend for dominance in late modern culture an insistent question echoes: will the craft of reason overcome the wild impulses of spectacle in our time? The fate of liberal democracy hinges on our response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the demonstrations taking place on December 13 each year in Burkina Faso to commemorate the 1998 assassination of Journalist Norbert Zongo and three of his companions. At the time, the mobilization following the assassination transformed into a movement entitled "truth and justice" which played a major role for the Burkinabe leftist movement, despite attempts to cover up the affair by the regime of President Blaise Compaoré. Over the years, 13 December has become an alternative holiday to the national independence day of 11 December. After the 2014 insurrection that ended the reign of Compaoré, the fight against impunity developed a new dynamic by merging with movements fighting for broader socio-political changes. The author conducted participant observation of commemorations and manifestations that offers an analysis that aims to understand the reconfiguration of the Burkinabe leftist movements in Ouagadougou since 2014. The commemoration of Norbert Zongo reveals significant divisions within the left, between the old revolutionaries ("the reds") and the young people from civil society ("the insurgents"), even if, in recent years, a convergence has formed against imperialism in general, and more particularly against French politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the appearance of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Medellin during the decade of the sixties of the 20th century. In the study, the city is observed in the framework of its irregular demographic growth, a result of the arrival of people coming from the countryside due to its industrialization and the armed conflict that had existed since 1948. It also takes into account the context of the Cold War, in which the theory of modernization was developed, which contained social development and security measures with which it was sought to contain socialism. Documents were revised that gave an account of the Colombian context and the defense policies, the security measures implemented by local security forces and the appearance in the press of deeds related to the insurgency. It is concluded that although there was panic that was exacerbated by the governments due to the supposed presence of powerful insurgent groups, which «obliged them» to unleash harsh security measures, the operative power of these, analyzed in the light of the actions manifested in the period studied, was weak. This is why more than being a real threat to the establishment, it was a strategy to maintain social order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociología Histórica is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The presented sketch, referring mainly to conservative thought, tries to present the moral dilemmas of Polish romantics (A. Mickiewicz, J. Słowacki, Z. Krasiński, C. Norwid) on the road to independence. Taking into account the concept of Wallenrodism, the state of conspiracy, open insurrectionary struggle, and methods of revolutionary terror, these methods of active resistance were confronted with Christian ethics, co-creating the essence of Latin civilization. The sometimes immoral ways of fighting suggested by the historical situation conflicted with the Decalogue and tested the conscience of their perpetrators, Polish patriots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An assessment of the work of the January 6th committee investigating the assault on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. The commentary addresses the committee's work as an exercise in institutionalist anti-populism that seeks to disrupt the populist, Trumpist narrative by insisting on the rule of law, the power of expertise, and the value of norms in maintaining a liberal, democratic order. It offers an analysis of how the committee's work might contribute to the demise of the Trumpist social movement, adding possible lines of analysis to the populist phenomenon going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 2016 election of President Donald Trump, conspiracy theories have become more salient among Americans. Using the deep state conspiracy theory QAnon as a case study, we argue three types of conspiracy theory adherents exist due to cognitive dissonance experienced in the face of key theory milestone failures: Hardliners, who do not face cognitive dissonance in response to failed conspiracy theory predictions; Moderates, committed members who experience cognitive dissonance and must adapt in order to maintain belief in the conspiracy theory, and Bandwagoners, casual members with shallow beliefs who experience cognitive dissonance and abandon the conspiracy theory. From these types, we put forth the bandwagoner acceleration hypothesis: by emphasizing the disconnect between complex deep state conspiracy theory beliefs and reality that demonstrates the falsehoods perpetrated by the movement, relevant stakeholders exogenous to the conspiracy theory can activate Bandwagoners to stimulate conspiratorial belief abandonment. This is important as Bandwagoners represent the peril of latent power which can be coopted and used to threaten democratic legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The actions of Balkan insurgents during Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 were closely followed by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his supporters as well as by the Italian politicians and writers that were a part Mazzini’s school of thought. Garibaldi actively sustained the insurgents and his red shirts went to fight in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first year of the Crisis. When the uprising evolved into a war of Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottomans the involvement of red shirts as well as the one of volunteers in general was considerable reduced, with the exception of the Russian contingent under the commandment of the Russian general Mikhail Chernyaev. However, the interest for the ongoing developments in the Bosnia and Herzegovina only changed the form, since Italian politicians and journalists made several projects trying to mobilize Italian general public to support South Slav cause. The Venetian writer Marco Antonio Canini even imagined a confederal solution for the nations in the Danube basin thus trying to overcome the conflicts between the nascent nationalisms that could dispute among them the territorial heritage of the Austria-Hungary after its projected demise. None of the projects were put in practice, but they remain as testimony of Italian interest and involvement into the Great Eastern Crisis and its consequences.

In this paper, we explore the socio-material infrastructures that maintained and repressed the 2018 Nicaraguan protests, as they made and unmade the insurrectional city. We consider the insurrectional city to be an urban place that is socio-materially reconfigured by the act of revolt and ensuing conflict. In Nicaragua, the insurrectional city (re)emerged as an entangled moral material battleground where past and present practices and notions of insurrection, as well as diverging imaginations for the future collided. With the 2018 protests, new material and human flows settled onto the streets, disrupting extant ways of being in and moving through the city. These were directly deemed illicit by government authorities, who projected the protesters as vandals, thugs, and later even terrorists. A competing ethics of care emerged then, as protesters and (para-)state actors understood the protection and defense of their lives and respective political projects differently. Autoconvocados (self-convened protesters) organized socio-material networks to distribute vital goods for protesters occupying public space, at the same time that the government mobilized its hybrid repressive apparatus to quash and criminalize both the protesters and the care networks supporting their activities. To understand the city-making practices that the protests engendered – both during the months-long insurrection and in its aftermath – examining the interplay between care, repression and legitimacy is crucial.

In this paper, we explore the socio-material infrastructures that maintained and repressed the 2018 Nicaraguan protests, as they made and unmade the insurrectional city. We consider the insurrectional city to be an urban place that is socio-materially reconfigured by the act of revolt and ensuing conflict. In Nicaragua, the insurrectional city (re)emerged as an entangled moral material battleground where past and present practices and notions of insurrection, as well as diverging imaginations for the future collided. With the 2018 protests, new material and human flows settled onto the streets, disrupting extant ways of being in and moving through the city. These were directly deemed illicit by government authorities, who projected the protesters as vandals, thugs, and later even terrorists. A competing ethics of care emerged then, as protesters and (para-)state actors understood the protection and defense of their lives and respective political projects differently. Autoconvocados (self-convened protesters) organized socio-material networks to distribute vital goods for protesters occupying public space, at the same time that the government mobilized its hybrid repressive apparatus to quash and criminalize both the protesters and the care networks supporting their activities. To understand the city-making practices that the protests engendered -- both during the months-long insurrection and in its aftermath -- examining the interplay between care, repression and legitimacy is crucial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public historians have struggled to take a hard line against neo-Confederate groups in theory as well as practice. This article proposes a methodological shift that can clarify the work and obligations of the public historian following the insurrection on January 6, 2021. The frame of action research positions historians as public-facing actors and advocates. The frame of restorative justice clarifies the stakes of, and stakeholders within, historical harm. We apply these frameworks to two contested sites for public history in Florence, Alabama, that revolve around the Confederacy. Finally, we use our experiences from the field to distinguish communities from counter-communities and provide strategies for making cultural institutions inhospitable to cultural insurrectionists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political process that led to the Gloriosa Revolution of September 1868 in Spain has been sufficiently studied. We also know well the ideological foundations, the connection with the economic situation, and the social composition of the groups behind the revolution. What is less known are some of the mobilization dynamics used by the Progressive Party and the groups to its left to carry out the insurrection. In the years prior to the revolution, the insurgents organized patriotic banquets, civic parades, and similar events in city squares, pleasure gardens, and monuments, all charged with revolutionary symbolism. Many of the spaces used to spread insurrectional culture were recently created in the process of the expansion of the Spanish cities. This article studies the use made by Progressives and their allies of captivating forms of mobilization in these new public spaces and places of memory to attract the popular groups to the revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'war on terror' produced discourses, which elevated terrorism as a primary threat to international peace and security and justified the overthrow of regimes that were suspected of supporting terrorism. After two decades, the United States (US) seeks to wind down the war, including through negotiations with groups that it once regarded as terrorist or complicit in terrorism. This article takes a critical approach to examine these shifts in US policy in relation to the Taliban in Afghanistan. It conceives the Taliban as a networked movement that consisted of local roots, transnational jihadist ties and connections to Pakistan's proxy war in Afghanistan. The article then identifies and problematises key assumptions of American discourses by assessing them against local patterns of terrorism and (in)security and the Taliban's violent tactics. Drawing on US sources, it finds that the US discourses shifted over time between various aspects of the Taliban movement as signifiers of its identity to justify shifting Washington's priorities in Afghanistan. These discursive shifts, which reflected US policy priorities, introduced uncertainties and contradictions that contributed to the failure of the war efforts in Afghanistan. Analyse critique des changements survenus dans la politique américaine à l'égard des talibans [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I reconstruct Étienne Balibar's work against the background of the debate on modern universal citizenship. I argue that universal citizenship is neither fundamentally emancipatory nor fundamentally oppressive but is rather both. In order to defend this position, I build on Balibar's concept of the "citizen subject." First, I parse this concept, showing how it allows us to think about the contradictions of modern universal citizenship. In the second section, I elucidate its temporal logic and show how it undermines the telos of modern universal citizenship. In sections three to five, I show how citizenship's universalism clarifies both its oppressive and its emancipatory thrust. The dialectic of universal citizenship, I argue, unfolds as a conflict between and within political universals. In the conclusion, I will tie up these different strands and end with some reflections on the conditions of possibility of this dialectic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]