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In a prior article in this journal, John Nyman argues that the effect on health care use and spending found in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment is an artifact of greater voluntary attrition in the cost-sharing plans relative to the free care plan. Specifically, he speculates that those in the cost-sharing plans, when faced with a hospitalization, withdrew. His argument is implausible because (1) families facing a hospitalization would be worse off financially by withdrawing; (2) a large number of observational studies find a similar effect of cost sharing on use; (3) those who left did not differ in their utilization prior to leaving; (4) if there had been no attrition and cost sharing did not reduce hospitalization rates, each adult in each family that withdrew would have had to have been hospitalized once each year for the duration of time they would otherwise have been in the experiment, an implausibly high rate; (5) there are benign explanations for the higher attrition in the cost-sharing plans. Finally, we obtained follow-up health-status data on the great majority of those who left prematurely. We found the health-status findings were insensitive to the inclusion of the attrition cases.

This paper examines the role of price in health insurance coverage decisions within the family to guide policy in promoting whole family coverage. We analyze the factors that affect individual health insurance coverage among families, and explore family decisions about whom to cover and whom to leave uninsured. The analysis uses household data from California combined with abstracted individual health plan benefit and premium data. We find that premium subsidies for individual insurance would increase family coverage; however, their effect likely would be small relative to their implementation cost.

The individual insurance market is perceived by many to provide primarily transition coverage, but there is limited research about how long people stay in this market and what affects their disenrollment decisions. We examine these issues using administrative records and survey data for those enrolled in the individual market in California. We conclude that there is less turnover in this market than is commonly believed. We find that economic factors and coverage characteristics are important in the decision to disenroll, but that perceptions about insurance and the health care system also affect this decision.

We use data from 1993 and 1997 employer surveys to assess whether the three largest statewide small-group health insurance purchasing alliances--in California, Connecticut, and Florida--increased coverage in small business. They did not. Specifically, they did not reduce small-group market health insurance premiums, and they did not raise small-business health insurance offer rates. We explore and discuss some reasons why. Alliances do permit employers to offer much greater choice in the number and types of plans; employees are found to take advantage of this wider choice.

Data from the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey provide new information comparing public- and private-sector employee health benefits. The federal government is ahead of other employers in adopting managed competition principles using financial incentives and consumer information to promote choosing efficient plans. Federal employees experience a $200 annual compensation gap relative to those in the private sector, but it is partly explained by advantage in purchasing power. In contrast, state and local governments make higher payments toward health insurance than private-sector employers do. Their premiums are equivalent, but they pay a greater share of the total cost.

This paper provides a test of the hypothesis that people shift their consumption of health services to time periods when they have more generous insurance coverage, in order to take advantage of third-party payment. We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to compare utilization rates for people in transition between being insured and being uninsured to those of people who are continuously insured and continuously uninsured. We find little support for the hypothesis that people anticipate changes in their insurance status and arrange their health care consumption accordingly.