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Despite the growing demand for long‐term care (LTC), the uptake of private LTC insurance (LTCI) is low and even declining in the United States. One reason is the complexity of LTCI decisions. Researchers have therefore suggested to support decision‐making abilities. This paper shows, however, that such support would not unambiguously enhance functioning of the LTCI market. We analyze whether selection arises from two correlated but different decision‐making abilities at old age, education and numeracy, and interactions thereof with private information. Using historical data from the Health and Retirement Survey we find that education generates adverse selection, which is only partially offset by advantageous selection due to numeracy. In addition, individuals with greater decision‐making abilities make better LTCI choices, amplifying selection by education and numeracy. This points at a trade‐off between decision simplicity and selection in insurance markets and suggests other steps are needed to enhance the performance of private LTCI markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of price, service quality and information search on people's propensity to switch health insurers in the competitive Dutch health insurance market. Using panel data from annual household surveys and data on health insurers' premiums and quality ratings over the period 2006-2012, we estimate a random effects logit model of people's switching decisions. We find that switching propensities depend on health plan price and quality, and on people's age, health, education and having supplementary or group insurance. Young people (18-35 years) are more sensitive to price, whereas older people are more sensitive to quality. Searching for health plan information has a much stronger impact on peoples' sensitivity to price than to service quality. In addition, searching for health plan information has a stronger impact on the switching propensity of higher than lower educated people, suggesting that higher educated people make better use of available health plan information. Finally, having supplementary insurance significantly reduces older people's switching propensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper we examine the pricing behaviour of nonprofit health insurers in the Dutch social health insurance market. Since for-profit insurers were not allowed in this market, potential spillover effects from the presence of for-profit insurers on the behaviour of nonprofit insurers were absent. Using a panel data set for all health insurers operating in the Dutch social health insurance market over the period 1996–2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour of nonprofit health insurers. We find that financial stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing behaviour. In the presence of weak price competition, health insurers did not set premiums to maximize profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that regulations on financial reserves are needed to restrict premiums. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Health care reforms in several European countries provide health insurers with incentives and tools to become prudent purchasers of health care. The potential success of this strategy crucially depends on insurers’ bargaining leverage vis-à-vis health care providers. An important determinant of insurers’ bargaining power is the willingness of consumers to consider alternative providers. In this paper we examine to what extent consumers are willing to switch hospitals when they are fully covered for hospital services, which is typical for many European countries. Since prices do not matter to these patients, we estimate time-elasticities to assess hospital substitutability. Using data from a large Dutch health insurer on non-emergency neurosurgical outpatient hospital visits in 2003, we estimate a conditional logit model of patient hospital choice taking both patient heterogeneity and hospital characteristics into account. We use the parameter estimates to simulate the demand effect of an artificial increase in travel time by 10% for every patient, holding all other hospital attributes constant. Overall, the resulting point estimates of hospitals’ time-elasticities are fairly high, although variation is substantial (−2.6 to −1.4). Sensitivity tests reveal that these estimates are very robust and differ significantly across individual hospitals. This implies that all hospitals in our study sample have at least one close substitute which is an important precondition for effective hospital competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy analysts consider the Netherlands health system a possible model for the United States. Since 2006 all Dutch citizens have to buy standardized individual health insurance coverage from a private insurer. Consumers have an annual choice among insurers, and insurers can selectively contract or integrate with health care providers. Subsidies make health insurance affordable for everyone. A Risk Equalization Fund compensates insurers for enrollees with predictably high medical expenses. The reform is a work in progress. So far the emphasis has been on the health insurance market. The challenge is now to successfully reform the market for the provision of health care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulators may be hesitant to permit price competition in healthcare markets because of its potential to damage quality. We assess whether this fear is well founded by examining a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers to freely negotiate prices with hospitals. Unlike previous research on hospital competition that has relied on quality indicators for urgent treatments, we take advantage of a plausible absence of selection bias to identify the effect on the quality of elective procedures that should be more price responsive. Using data on all admissions for hip replacements to Dutch hospitals and a difference-in-differences comparison between more and less concentrated markets, we find no evidence that price deregulation in a competitive environment reduces quality measured by hip replacement readmission rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]