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In some societies, entrepreneurs coming from outside of a community (i.e., outside entrepreneurs) are more active than entrepreneurs from within the community (i.e., inside entrepreneurs). Institutions and relationships that entrepreneurs entertain may hamper insiders from starting or succeeding. Institutional economics and anthropology suggest that, rather than outside entrepreneurs having more resources, the case may be that inside entrepreneurs could be hampered by existing institutions that blind and social relations that bind. Outsiders, however, may be less inclined to generate societal value in a community.

Unrealized potential of entrepreneurial activities in developing countries has often been attributed to missing formal market-based institutions. In new institutional economics, the concept of ‘voids’ is suggested to describe the absence of market-based institutions. In reality, however, ‘institutional fabrics’ are always and necessarily complex and rich in institutions. No societal sphere is institutionally void. In this article, we contribute to existing literature on entrepreneurship and institutional economics by presenting a framework for studying the richness and complexities of institutional fabrics, as well as ways in which entrepreneurs respond to institutions. Distinguishing four types of institutions relevant for entrepreneurs, we analyze case study data from Ethiopia, and discuss how ‘tensions’ between potentially incompatible institutions result in behavioral frictions. Some entrepreneurs play the complex institutional environment and benefit from the tensions in it, whereas others may drown into the institutional ‘swamp’ they face. Policy makers should acknowledge that institutions not only result from formal policy making and that in many cases a diverse set of institutions is needed to facilitate market exchange and solve constraining tensions. The diversity that results from initiatives of institutional entrepreneurs may create a more effective institutional environment for development.

Economists tend to see the market as a default option for social order and a role for government only when markets fail. Developing a convincing analysis of the role of government in economic processes, however, needs to start by considering government failure in its own terms. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, law and economics and the philosophy of law, emphasizing the necessity of rules for the economy, this paper develops the concept of government failure. The paper identifies and develops four different types of government failure. Government can set rules for economic processes and actors that are (1) too specific, (2) too broad, (3) that are arbitrary, or (4) that conflict with other rules it has set out to address other, related issues (possibly primarily noneconomic). Government failure is illustrated in the context of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law as it relates to Anti-Trust law.

New Institutional Economics (NIE) claims that Silent Trade exists. Indeed, it would constitute the first step 'as trade moves beyond the border of the village' (North). In this brief article we show both that Silent Trade - trade between parties who have only the most minimal of a shared frame of reference, without direct contact - has not existed and that NIE cannot account for the representational re-description and change in governance structure that it would entail. At least on the issue of language and learning, NIE is categorically different from Original Institutional Economics (OIE).

Original institutional economics (OIE) and new institutional economics (NIE) have differing positions on a number of issues. There is an ongoing discussion about the question of whether these categorically different positions (Hodgson 1988) are part of the same continuum (Rutherford 1994, 1995) or may even be reconciled (Groenewegen et al. 1995; Schmid 2004). These discussions tend to focus on methodological points of contention, and often draw heavily on the history of economic thought. I take a slightly different approach by analysing the phenomenon of ‘silent trade’ (ST).

Pop music is an important symbolic good, the advent of which in the 1950s and 1960s is not well understood. In this article I argue that this is due to the fact that its consumption is not usually analyzed. I therefore analyze survey and group interviews material to argue that pop music was not just an instrument in conflict between generations, but that it increasingly came to be associated with socio-cultural meanings such as success, independence and sexuality. In understanding the life world of consumers of pop music, I find that it is essential to know whom it represents but also what it represents.

Only in recent times is attention from economists moving to the topic of consumption, even as Adam Smith claimed in his Wealth of Nations that consumption is the sole end of production. One reason for this increased attention may be that consumption patterns become increasingly fickle. Further, and in contrast to the intuition of economists, considerations about price, given people's budget constraints, seem to play a minor role for consumers in making decisions about what to buy. This seems especially true for what might be called "symbolic goods", goods that people define themselves in terms of, goods the consumption and use of which helps constitute people's identity, goods that communicate the kinds of commitments people have. Archaeologists and anthropologists claim that the use of symbols for purposes of communication with others indicates that complex use of language and (more) sophisticated thinking emerged in man, but they bicker about the exact timing for this emergence. What is important in terms of this special issue on the consumption of symbolic goods is that insights from outside of economic theory proper become increasingly relevant to properly understand such behavior. Social and Institutional economics, for which the Review of Social Economy is among the most influential outlets, is in a position to shed light on what it is that makes people consume. Ideas and concepts that are central in such analyses are the identity of individuals, and commitment to that identity. The active involvement of people in the things they consume is most evident when they consume what might be called "symbolic goods". Symbolic goods may be defined as goods that people buy to signal their identity with. Obvious examples are clothes, cars and music, but food often is a symbolic good as well. A bone of contention in the analysis of consumption that a focus on identity and commitment uncovers is if and how the social environment influences people in their consumption behavior. Contributors to this issue take different positions on this, as will be apparent when one studies the subsequent articles. What are the elements in the social environment that affect people's consumption behavior, and how should one understand the interaction between the individual and the environment? Some contributions in this special issue approach this matter in a more fundamental, almost philosophical way than others who focus more on empirical phenomena seemingly do. …

This volume investigates the relationship between globalization, inequality and social capital, and reveals that although strongly related, these ideas are also highly contested. The authors elucidate the interactions between these concepts, looking in detail at the conflicts and competitiveness which can arise at both the national and organizational level.

This volume investigates the relationship between globalization, inequality and social capital, and reveals that although strongly related, these ideas are also highly contested. The authors elucidate the interactions between these concepts, looking in detail at the conflicts and competitiveness which can arise at both the national and organizational level.

Feminist economics draws increasing attention from professional mainstream economists. In this paper, we discuss methodological issues, some theoretical developments – notably on the household – and issues of economic policy. We point to parallels between feminist economics and institutional economics, and argue that these relations might be strengthened to the benefit of both.