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From 2020 up to summer 2023, there was a substantial change in the situation concerning the high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus in Europe. This change concerned mainly virus circulation within wildlife, both in wild birds and wild mammals. It involved the seasonality of HPAI detections, the species affected, excess mortality events, and the apparent increased level of contamination in wild birds. The knock-on effect concerned new impacts and challenges for the poultry sector, which is affected by repeated annual waves of HPAI arriving with wild migratory birds and by risks due to viral circulation within resident wild birds across the year. Indeed, exceeding expectations, new poultry sectors and production areas have been affected during the recent HPAI seasons in France. The HPAI virus strains involved also generate considerable concern about human health because of enhanced risks of species barrier crossing. In this article, we present these changes in detail, along with the required adjustment of prevention, control, and surveillance strategies, focusing specifically on the situation in France.

We detected highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in a domestic cat that lived near a duck farm infected by a closely related virus in France during December 2022. Enhanced surveillance of symptomatic domestic carnivores in contact with infected birds is recommended to prevent further spread to mammals and humans.

In France during winter 2016-2017, 487 outbreaks of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 subtype high pathogenicity (HP) avian influenza A virus (AIV) infections were detected in poultry and captive birds. During this epizootic, HPAIV A/decoy duck/France/161105a/2016 (H5N8) was isolated and characterized in an experimental infection transmission model in conventional mule ducks. To investigate options to possibly protect such ducks against this HPAIV, three vaccines were evaluated in controlled conditions. The first experimental vaccine was derived from the hemagglutinin gene of another clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N8) HPAIV. It was injected at three weeks of age, either alone (Vac1) or after a primer injection at day-old (Vac1 + boost). The second vaccine (Vac2) was a commercial bivalent adjuvanted vaccine containing an expressed hemagglutinin modified from a clade 2.3.2 A(H5N1) HPAIV. Vac2 was administered as a single injection at two weeks of age. The third experimental vaccine (Vac3) also incorporated a homologous 2.3.4.4b H5 HA gene and was administered as a single injection at three weeks of age. Ducks were challenged with HPAIV A/decoy duck/France/161105a/2016 (H5N8) at six weeks of age. Post-challenge virus excretion was monitored in vaccinated and control birds every 2-3 days for two weeks using real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction and serological analyses (haemagglutination inhibition test against H5N8, H5 ELISA and AIV ELISA) were performed. Vac1 abolished oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding to almost undetectable levels, whereas Vac3 abolished cloacal shedding only (while partially reducing respiratory shedding) and Vac2 only partly reduced the respiratory and intestinal excretion of the challenge virus. These results provided relevant insights in the immunogenicity of recombinant H5 vaccines in mule ducks, a rarely investigated hybrid between Pekin and Muscovy duck species that has played a critical role in the recent H5 HPAI epizootics in France., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

During winter 2020-2021, France and other European countries were severely affected by highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses of the Gs/GD/96 lineage, clade 2.3.4.4b. In total, 519 cases occurred, mainly in domestic waterfowl farms in Southwestern France. Analysis of viral genomic sequences indicated that 3 subtypes of HPAI H5 viruses were detected (H5N1, H5N3, H5N8), but most French viruses belonged to the H5N8 subtype genotype A, as Europe. Phylogenetic analyses of HPAI H5N8 viruses revealed that the French sequences were distributed in 9 genogroups, suggesting 9 independent introductions of H5N8 from wild birds, in addition to the 2 introductions of H5N1 and H5N3., (© 2022 The Authors. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases published by Wiley-VCH GmbH.)

An H3N1 avian influenza virus was detected in a laying hens farm in May 2019 which had experienced 25% mortality in Northern France. The complete sequencing of this virus showed that all segment sequences belonged to the Eurasian lineage and were phylogenetically very close to many of the Belgian H3N1 viruses detected in 2019. The French virus presented two genetic particularities with NA and NS deletions that could be related to virus adaptation from wild to domestic birds and could increase virulence, respectively. Molecular data of H3N1 viruses suggest that these two deletions occurred at two different times., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In 2016-2017, France experienced a devastating epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8, with more than 400 outbreaks reported in poultry farms. We analyzed the spatiotemporal dynamics of the epidemic using a structured-coalescent-based phylodynamic approach that combined viral genomic data (n = 196; one viral genome per farm) and epidemiological data. In the process, we estimated viral migration rates between départements (French administrative regions) and the temporal dynamics of the effective viral population size (Ne) in each département. Viral migration rates quantify viral spread between départements and Ne is a population genetic measure of the epidemic size and, in turn, is indicative of the within-département transmission intensity. We extended the phylodynamic analysis with a generalized linear model to assess the impact of multiple factors-including large-scale preventive culling and live-duck movement bans-on viral migration rates and Ne. We showed that the large-scale culling of ducks that was initiated on 4 January 2017 significantly reduced the viral spread between départements. No relationship was found between the viral spread and duck movements between départements. The within-département transmission intensity was found to be weakly associated with the intensity of duck movements within départements. Together, these results indicated that the virus spread in short distances, either between adjacent départements or within départements. Results also suggested that the restrictions on duck transport within départements might not have stopped the viral spread completely. Overall, we demonstrated the usefulness of phylodynamics in characterizing the dynamics of a HPAI epidemic and assessing control measures. This method can be adapted to investigate other epidemics of fast-evolving livestock pathogens., (© 2022 The Authors. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases published by Wiley-VCH GmbH.)

In 2021, France faced large avian influenza outbreaks, like in 2016 and 2017. Controlling these outbreaks required the preventive depopulation of a large number of duck farms. A previous study in 2017 showed that the quality of decontamination of trucks and transport crates used for depopulation was often insufficient. A new study was then set up to evaluate cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of trucks and crates used for duck depopulation and whether practices had changed since 2017. Three methods were used to assess decontamination: 1) detection of avian influenza virus (AIV) genome, 2) visual inspection of cleanliness, and 3) microbial counts, considering that 2 and 3 are commonly used in abattoirs. Another objective of the study was to evaluate the correlation between results obtained with the 3 methods. In 5 abattoirs, 8 trucks and their crates were sampled by swabbing to detect AIV genome by rRT-PCR before and after decontamination. Visual cleanliness scores and coliform counts were also determined on crates after C&D. Trucks and crates were decontaminated according to the abattoirs' protocols. Before C&D, 3 quarters of crates (59/79) and 7 of 8 trucks were positive for AIV genome. C&D procedures were reinforced in 2021 compared to 2017; use of detergent solution and warm water were more common. Nevertheless, 28% of the crates were positive for AIV genome after C&D, despite the fact that cleaning scores and microbiological counts were satisfactory for 84% and 91% of the crates, respectively. No correlation was observed between results for AIV genome detection and results from visual control or from coliform counts. Abattoirs are encouraged to use environmental sampling coupled with AIV genome detection to monitor the quality of cleaning and disinfection of trucks and crates during AI outbreaks. Reinforcement of biosecurity measures at abattoirs is still needed to avoid residual contamination of the equipment and cross-contamination during the decontamination process., (Copyright © 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

We detected 3 genotypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) virus in France during winter 2016-17. Genotype A viruses caused dramatic economic losses in the domestic duck farm industry in southwestern France. Our phylogenetic analysis suggests that genotype A viruses formed 5 distinct geographic clusters in southwestern France. In some clusters, local secondary transmission might have been started by a single introduction. The intensity of the viral spread seems to correspond to the density of duck holdings in each production area. To avoid the introduction of disease into an unaffected area, it is crucial that authorities limit the movements of potentially infected birds.

Infections by A/H5 and A/H7 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) can cause acute disease and are therefore notifiable in poultry and wild birds. During winter 2015-2016, several cases of infection caused by highly pathogenic (HP) AIVs belonging to the A/H5N1, A/H5N2, and A/H5N9 subtypes were detected in southwestern France. Throughout winter 2016-2017, several cases of infections caused mainly by A/H5N8 HP AIV (A/goose/GD/1/1996, clade 2.3.4.4) were detected across Europe. On both occasions, the viruses were widely detected on palmiped farms in France. This study was designed to evaluate the persistence of A/H5 HP AIV in slurry from various duck productions. This was achieved (i) in the laboratory setting by artificially spiking four AIV-free slurry samples with known amounts of A/H5N9 HP AIV and monitoring virus infectivity, with or without lime treatment to achieve pH 10 or pH 12, and (ii) by sampling slurry tanks on five naturally A/H5N8 HP-contaminated farms. Experimental results in artificially spiked slurry suggested virus survival for 4 weeks in slurry from Muscovy or Pekin duck breeders and for 2 weeks in slurry from ducks for foie gras production during the assisted-feeding period, without lime treatment. Persistence of infectious A/H5N9 HP AIV in all slurry samples after lime treatment at pH 10 or pH 12 was less than 1 week. The A/H5N8 HP AIV persisted in naturally contaminated untreated slurry for 7 weeks. The results obtained provide experimental support for the 60-day storage period without treatment or the 7-day interval after lime treatment defined in French regulations for slurry sanitization. IMPORTANCE From November 2015 to July 2017, two successive episodes of H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HP AIVs) infections occurred on poultry farms in France, mostly in domestic ducks raised for foie gras production in southwestern France. During the two epizootics, epidemiological investigations were carried out on infected farms and control and biosafety measures were implemented in association with surveillance in order to stop the spread of the viruses. Effluents are known to be an important factor in environmental dissemination of viruses, and suitable effluent management is needed to help prevent the spread of epizootics to other farms or pathogen persistence at the farm level. The present study was therefore designed to assess how long infectious A/H5 HP AIVs can persist in naturally or experimentally contaminated fecal slurry samples from ducks, with or without sanitization by lime treatment., (Copyright © 2020 Schmitz et al.)

Avian influenza A viruses are a major threat to animal and public health. Since 1997, several highly pathogenic H5N1 avian viruses have been directly transmitted from poultry to humans, caused numerous human deaths, and had considerable economic impact on poultry markets. During 2015-2016, a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak occurred in southwestern France. Different subtypes circulated, including the A/chicken/France/150169a/2015 H5N1 highly pathogenic virus, which did not possess the full set of genomic determinants known to promote transmission to humans. In order to evaluate the predicted absence of zoonotic potential, a quick method based on in vitro tests was developed to analyze some genetic and phenotypic host restriction determinants. A receptor-binding assay showed that the virus preferentially recognizes avian cell receptors. Temperature sensitivity revealed a cold-sensitive phenotype of the virus at 33 C as virus replication was reduced in contrast with what is expected for human influenza viruses, according to their primary infection sites. Altogether, our quick evaluation method suggests that the A/chicken/France/150169a/2015 H5N1 highly pathogenic virus has an avian phenotype in vitro, in accordance with in silico predictions based on genomic markers.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) clade 2.3.4.4 spread in France during 2016-2017. We assessed the biosecurity and avian influenza virus infection status of 70 backyard flocks near H5N8-infected commercial farms. One flock was seropositive for clade 2.3.4.4. Backyard flocks linked to commercial farms had elevated risk for H5 infection.

Several new highly pathogenic (HP) H5 avian influenza virus (AIV) have been detected in poultry farms from south-western France since November 2015, among which an HP H5N1. The zoonotic potential and origin of these AIVs immediately became matters of concern. One virus of each subtype H5N1 (150169a), H5N2 (150233) and H5N9 (150236) was characterised. All proved highly pathogenic for poultry as demonstrated molecularly by the presence of a polybasic cleavage site in their HA protein - with a sequence (HQRRKR/GLF) previously unknown among avian H5 HPAI viruses - or experimentally by the in vivo demonstration of an intravenous pathogenicity index of 2.9 for the H5N1 HP isolate. Phylogenetic analyses based on the full genomes obtained by NGS confirmed that the eight viral segments of the three isolates were all part of avian Eurasian phylogenetic lineage but differed from the Gs/Gd/1/96-like lineage. The study of the genetic characteristics at specific amino acid positions relevant for modulating the adaptation to and the virulence for mammals showed that presently, these viruses possess most molecular features characteristic of AIV and lack some major characteristics required for efficient respiratory transmission to or between humans. The three isolates are therefore predicted to have no significant pandemic potential., (This article is copyright of The Authors, 2017.)

A serological test for detecting N9-specific antibodies may be useful as a DIVA strategy to differentiate vaccinated from infected animals or simply for direct serological detection of infection with N9-subtype virus. The method currently recommended for the detection of antibodies against neuraminidase is neuraminidase inhibition (NI), which is a laborious method using toxic chemicals and has low sensitivity. The present study describes the development and validation of an N9-specific ELISA. Data obtained with this N9 ELISA were compared to those obtained with nucleoprotein-based ELISA, haemagglutination inhibition test using homologous antigen and NI assay. 785 sera from ducks and chickens were used, from flocks previously determined to be AI negative or from experimentally infected or immunized flocks. Sensitivity and specificity were evaluated, and a ROC curve and kappa values, which provide a comparison between methods, were calculated. The results obtained in this study indicate that the N9 based-ELISA is effective in detecting N9-specific antibodies with high specificity and with better sensitivity than the recommended NI method; using data from 177 common sera tested with N9 ELISA and NI assay both compared to NP-based ELISA, their specificity were evaluated at 93.6% and 91.5% respectively, and sensitivity at 90.8% and 39.2% respectively., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Following the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI), active surveillance of infections due to the H5 and H7 subtypes in poultry has increased and been made compulsory in Europe since 2002, by means of annual serological surveys using the haemagglutination inhibition (HI) test. Domestic anseriforms, particularly ducks and geese, are more frequently infected by H5 low pathogenic AI virus, often subclinically, and represent a threat for other terrestrial poultry. 1783 sera, mainly from ducks, have been used to evaluate and compare a commercial ELISA kit detecting H5 antibodies with the currently recommended HI test. Different approaches to calculating specificity and sensitivity have been used, including the original Bayesian method. Results were similar when data were analyzed at the individual and batch levels, and when using different methods of calculation. However, results showed that H5 ELISA had both a higher sensitivity and a lower specificity than the HI test. Given that sensitivity is the most important factor for a screening test, H5 ELISA could therefore be recommended for AI surveillance, followed in cases of positivity by molecular tests aimed at detecting the virus gene., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza A viruses (AIVs) subtype H5N1 (subclade 2.2) were detected in wild birds during outbreaks in France during winter 2006 and summer 2007 in la Dombes wetlands (eastern France) and in Moselle wetlands (northeastern France), respectively. Blood samples from apparently healthy wild birds were collected in 2006 and 2007 from the end of the outbreak to several weeks after the influenza A outbreak inside and outside the contaminated areas, and in 2008 outside the contaminated areas. The samples were tested for the presence and/or quantitation of serum antibodies to influenza A subtypes H5 and N1 using hemagglutination inhibition tests (HITs), a commercial N1-specific enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay kit, and virus neutralization assay. In the HIT, low pathogenicity (LP) and HP H5 AIVs (belonging to H5N1, H5N2, and H5N3 subtypes) were used as antigens. One hundred mute swans were bled in the la Dombes outbreak area in 2006. During 2007, 46 mallards, 69 common pochards, and 59 mute swans were sampled in the Moselle outbreak area. For comparison, blood samples were also collected in 2007 from 60 mute swans from the Marne department where no HP H5N1 influenza A cases have been reported, and in 2008 from 111 sacred ibises in western France where no HP H5N1 influenza A infections in wild birds have been reported either. Mute swans (irrespective of their origin and time of sampling) and sacred ibises (from an area with no known outbreaks) had the highest prevalence of positive sera in the H5 HIT (49-69% and 64%, respectively). The prevalence of anti-H5 antibodies in mallards and common pochards was lower (28% and 27%, respectively). Positive H5- and N1-antibody responses were also significantly associated in swans (irrespective of their origin and time of sampling) and in sacred ibises. However, in swans from the area without outbreaks, the HIT titer against an H5N1 LPAIV was significantly higher than against an H5N1 2.2.1 HPAIV, whereas no difference could be shown for swans from the outbreak areas sampled in 2006 and 2007. These results suggest that ibises and swans from areas without declared outbreaks had acquired humoral immunity after AIV infections with subtypes H5 and N1 but independently from HP H5N1 infection. However, for swans living in outbreak areas, it cannot be excluded that this immunity might result from either a subclinical or a nonlethal infection by HP H5N1.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of subtype H5N1 have spread since late 2003 in East and Southeast Asia. In April 2005, a large-scale outbreak of H5N1 infection that occurred in migratory waterfowl in Qinghai Lake nature reserve in western China, killing more than 6000 wild birds, appeared to be the beginning of a epizootic that caused outbreaks in domestic and wild birds in nearly 60 countries from Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The first case of Asian lineage HPAI H5N1 virus in France was described in dead wild ducks (Common pochard) in the east of France in mid-February 2006. Up to the end of April, 42 HPAI H5N1 viruses were identified from about 60 wild birds belonging to different species and one outbreak occurred in commercial turkeys. To establish genetic relationships with other HPAI H5N1 viruses, 12 selected viruses were subjected to phylogenetic analysis. Genotyping and genetic analyses revealed that the French viruses were very similar to those of the 'Qinghai-like' sublineage and belonged to clade 2.2. However, two related but distinct genetic subgroups were identified, indicating that two different viruses were circulating in France at the same time and in the same area. Viruses of one subgroup were highly similar to one identified in Bavaria in Germany (A/mallard/Bavaria/1/2006). More surprisingly, French viruses belonging to the other subgroup retained the cleavage motif PQGERKRKKR/G, which is unique among the known HPAI H5N1 viruses. Our results confirmed that multiple H5N1 genogroups were present in Western Europe in early 2006.