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We characterise the evolutionary dynamics of influenza infection described by viral sequence data collected from two challenge studies conducted in human hosts. Viral sequence data were collected at regular intervals from infected hosts. Changes in the sequence data observed across time show that the within-host evolution of the virus was driven by the reversion of variants acquired during previous passaging of the virus. Treatment of some patients with oseltamivir on the first day of infection did not lead to the emergence of drug resistance variants in patients. Using an evolutionary model, we inferred the effective rate of reassortment between viral segments, measuring the extent to which randomly chosen viruses within the host exchange genetic material. We find strong evidence that the rate of effective reassortment is low, such that genetic associations between polymorphic loci in different segments are preserved during the course of an infection in a manner not compatible with epistasis. Combining our evidence with that of previous studies we suggest that spatial heterogeneity in the viral population may reduce the extent to which reassortment is observed. Our results do not contradict previous findings of high rates of viral reassortment in vitro and in small animal studies, but indicate that in human hosts the effective rate of reassortment may be substantially more limited.

Since 2013, there have been several alarming influenza-related events; the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses into North America, the detection of H10N8 and H5N6 zoonotic infections, the ongoing H7N9 infections in China and the continued zoonosis of H5N1 viruses in parts of Asia and the Middle East. The risk of a new influenza pandemic increases with the repeated interspecies transmission events that facilitate reassortment between animal influenza strains; thus, it is of utmost importance to understand the factors involved that promote or become a barrier to cross-species transmission of Influenza A viruses (IAVs). Here, we provide an overview of the ecology and evolutionary adaptations of IAVs, with a focus on a review of the molecular factors that enable interspecies transmission of the various virus gene segments., (© 2016 The Authors. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Influenza B virus causes significant disease but remains understudied in tropical regions. We sequenced 72 influenza B viruses collected in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 1995 to 2008. The predominant circulating lineage (Victoria or Yamagata) changed every 1 to 3 years, and these shifts were associated with increased incidence of influenza B. We also found poor lineage matches with recommended influenza virus vaccine strains. While most influenza B virus lineages in Malaysia were short-lived, one circulated for 3 to 4 years., (Copyright © 2015, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.)

The 1957 A/H2N2 influenza virus caused an estimated 2 million fatalities during the pandemic. Since viruses of the H2 subtype continue to infect avian species and pigs, the threat of reintroduction into humans remains. To determine factors involved in the zoonotic origin of the 1957 pandemic, we performed analyses on genetic sequences of 175 newly sequenced human and avian H2N2 virus isolates and all publicly available influenza virus genomes., (Copyright © 2015, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.)

The Asian highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus was first detected in the goose population of Guangdong, China in 1996. The viruses in this lineage are unique in their ecological success, demonstrating an extremely broad host range and becoming established in poultry over much of Asia and in Africa. H5N1 viruses have also diverged into multiple clades and subclades that generally do not cross neutralize, which has greatly confounded control measures in poultry and pre-pandemic vaccine strain selection. Although H5N1 viruses currently cannot transmit efficiently between mammals they exhibit high mortality in humans and recent experimental studies have shown that it is possible to generate an H5N1 virus that is transmissible in mammals. In addition to causing unprecedented economic losses, the long-term presence of the H5N1 virus in poultry and its frequent introductions to humans continue to pose a significant pandemic threat. Here we provide a summary of the genesis, molecular epidemiology and evolution of this H5N1 lineage, particularly the factors that have contributed to the continued diversification and ecological success of H5N1 viruses, with particular reference to the poultry production systems they have emerged from., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus was identified in Bangladesh in 2011. Surveillance for influenza viruses in apparently healthy poultry in live-bird markets in Bangladesh during 2008-2011 showed that subtype H9N2 viruses are isolated year-round, whereas highly pathogenic subtype H5N1 viruses are co-isolated with subtype H9N2 primarily during the winter months. Phylogenetic analysis of the subtype H9N2 viruses showed that they are reassortants possessing 3 gene segments related to subtype H7N3; the remaining gene segments were from the subtype H9N2 G1 clade. We detected no reassortment with subtype H5N1 viruses. Serologic analyses of subtype H9N2 viruses from chickens revealed antigenic conservation, whereas analyses of viruses from quail showed antigenic drift. Molecular analysis showed that multiple mammalian-specific mutations have become fixed in the subtype H9N2 viruses, including changes in the hemagglutinin, matrix, and polymerase proteins. Our results indicate that these viruses could mutate to be transmissible from birds to mammals, including humans.

A key observation about the human immune response to repeated exposure to influenza A is that the first strain infecting an individual apparently produces the strongest adaptive immune response. Although antibody titers measure that response, the interpretation of titers to multiple strains--from the same sera--in terms of infection history is clouded by age effects, cross reactivity and immune waning. From July to September 2009, we collected serum samples from 151 residents of Guangdong Province, China, 7 to 81 years of age. Neutralization tests were performed against strains representing six antigenic clusters of H3N2 influenza circulating between 1968 and 2008, and three recent locally circulating strains. Patterns of neutralization titers were compared based on age at time of testing and age at time of the first isolation of each virus. Neutralization titers were highest for H3N2 strains that circulated in an individual's first decade of life (peaking at 7 years). Further, across strains and ages at testing, statistical models strongly supported a pattern of titers declining smoothly with age at the time a strain was first isolated. Those born 10 or more years after a strain emerged generally had undetectable neutralization titers to that strain (<1:10). Among those over 60 at time of testing, titers tended to increase with age. The observed pattern in H3N2 neutralization titers can be characterized as one of antigenic seniority: repeated exposure and the immune response combine to produce antibody titers that are higher to more 'senior' strains encountered earlier in life.

Populations of seasonal influenza virus experience strong annual bottlenecks that pose a considerable extinction risk. It has been suggested that an influenza source population located in tropical Southeast or East Asia seeds annual temperate epidemics. Here we investigate the seasonal dynamics and migration patterns of influenza A H3N2 virus by analysis of virus samples obtained from 2003 to 2006 from Australia, Europe, Japan, New York, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and newly sequenced viruses from Hong Kong. In contrast to annual temperate epidemics, relatively low levels of relative genetic diversity and no seasonal fluctuations characterized virus populations in tropical Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. Bayesian phylogeographic analysis using discrete temporal and spatial characters reveal high rates of viral migration between urban centers tested. Although the virus population that migrated between Southeast Asia and Hong Kong persisted through time, this was dependent on virus input from temperate regions and these tropical regions did not maintain a source for annual H3N2 influenza epidemics. We further show that multiple lineages may seed annual influenza epidemics, and that each region may function as a potential source population. We therefore propose that the global persistence of H3N2 influenza A virus is the result of a migrating metapopulation in which multiple different localities may seed seasonal epidemics in temperate regions in a given year. Such complex global migration dynamics may confound control efforts and contribute to the emergence and spread of antigenic variants and drug-resistant viruses.

Variation in influenza incidence between locations is commonly observed on large spatial scales. It is unclear whether such variation occurs on smaller spatial scales and whether it is the result of heterogeneities in population demographics or more subtle differences in population structure and connectivity. Here we show that significant differences in immunity to influenza A viruses among communities in China are not explained by differences in population demographics. We randomly selected households from five randomly selected locations near Guangzhou, China to answer a questionnaire and provide a blood sample for serological testing against five recently circulating influenza viruses. We find a significant reduction in the frequency of detectable neutralization titers with increasing age, levelling off in older age groups. There are significant differences between locations in age, employment status, vaccination history, household size and housing conditions. However, after adjustment, significant variations in the frequency of detectable neutralization titers persists between locations. These results suggest there are characteristics of communities that drive influenza transmission dynamics apart from individual and household level risk factors, and that such factors have effects independent of strain.

Pandemic influenza has posed an increasing threat to public health worldwide in the last decade. In the 20th century, three human pandemic influenza outbreaks occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968, causing significant mortality. A number of hypotheses have been proposed for the emergence and development of pandemic viruses, including direct introduction into humans from an avian origin and reassortment between avian and previously circulating human viruses, either directly in humans or via an intermediate mammalian host. However, the evolutionary history of the pandemic viruses has been controversial, largely due to the lack of background genetic information and rigorous phylogenetic analyses. The pandemic that emerged in early April 2009 in North America provides a unique opportunity to investigate its emergence and development both in human and animal aspects. Recent genetic analyses of data accumulated through long-term influenza surveillance provided insights into the emergence of this novel pandemic virus. In this review, we summarise the recent literature that describes the evolutionary pathway of the pandemic viruses. We also discuss the implications of these findings on the early detection and control of future pandemics.

Interactions between host factors and the viral replication complex play important roles in host adaptation and regulation of influenza virus replication. A cellular protein, nuclear factor 90 (NF90), was copurified with H5N1 viral nucleoprotein (NP) from human cells in which NP was transiently expressed and identified by matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry analysis. In vitro coimmunoprecipitation of NF90 and NP coexpressed in HEK 293T cells or individually expressed in bacterial and HEK 293T cells, respectively, confirmed a direct interaction between NF90 and NP, independent of other subunits of the ribonucleoprotein complex. This interaction was prevented by a mutation, F412A, in the C-terminal region of the NP, indicating that the C-terminal of NP is required for NF90 binding. RNase V treatment did not prevent coprecipitation of NP and NF90, which demonstrates that the interaction is RNA binding independent. After small interfering RNA knockdown of NF90 expression in A549 and HeLa cells, viral polymerase complex activity and virus replication were significantly increased, suggesting that NF90 negatively affects viral replication. Both NP and NF90 colocalized in the nucleus of virus-infected cells during the early phase of infection, suggesting that the interaction between NF90 and NP is an early event in virus replication. Quantitative reverse transcription-PCR showed that NF90 downregulates both viral genome replication and mRNA transcription in infected cells. These results suggest that NF90 inhibits influenza virus replication during the early phase of infection through direct interaction with viral NP.

Background: Influenza A viruses are medically important viral pathogens that cause significant mortality and morbidity throughout the world. The recent emergence of a novel human influenza A virus (H1N1) poses a serious health threat. Molecular tests for rapid detection of this virus are urgently needed., Methods: We developed a conventional 1-step RT-PCR assay and a 1-step quantitative real-time RT-PCR assay to detect the novel H1N1 virus, but not the seasonal H1N1 viruses. We also developed an additional real-time RT-PCR that can discriminate the novel H1N1 from other swine and human H1 subtype viruses., Results: All of the assays had detection limits for the positive control in the range of 1.0 x 10(-4) to 2.0 x 10(-3) of the median tissue culture infective dose. Assay specificities were high, and for the conventional and real-time assays, all negative control samples were negative, including 7 human seasonal H1N1 viruses, 1 human H2N2 virus, 2 human seasonal H3N2 viruses, 1 human H5N1 virus, 7 avian influenza viruses (HA subtypes 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10), and 48 nasopharyngeal aspirates (NPAs) from patients with noninfluenza respiratory diseases; for the assay that discriminates the novel H1N1 from other swine and human H1 subtype viruses, all negative controls were also negative, including 20 control NPAs, 2 seasonal human H1N1 viruses, 2 seasonal human H3N2 viruses, and 2 human H5N1 viruses., Conclusions: These assays appear useful for the rapid diagnosis of cases with the novel H1N1 virus, thereby allowing better pandemic preparedness.

Pandemic influenza viruses cause significant mortality in humans. In the 20th century, 3 influenza viruses caused major pandemics: the 1918 H1N1 virus, the 1957 H2N2 virus, and the 1968 H3N2 virus. These pandemics were initiated by the introduction and successful adaptation of a novel hemagglutinin subtype to humans from an animal source, resulting in antigenic shift. Despite global concern regarding a new pandemic influenza, the emergence pathway of pandemic strains remains unknown. Here we estimated the evolutionary history and inferred date of introduction to humans of each of the genes for all 20th century pandemic influenza strains. Our results indicate that genetic components of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus circulated in mammalian hosts, i.e., swine and humans, as early as 1911 and was not likely to be a recently introduced avian virus. Phylogenetic relationships suggest that the A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 virus (BM/1918) was generated by reassortment between mammalian viruses and a previously circulating human strain, either in swine or, possibly, in humans. Furthermore, seasonal and classic swine H1N1 viruses were not derived directly from BM/1918, but their precursors co-circulated during the pandemic. Mean estimates of the time of most recent common ancestor also suggest that the H2N2 and H3N2 pandemic strains may have been generated through reassortment events in unknown mammalian hosts and involved multiple avian viruses preceding pandemic recognition. The possible generation of pandemic strains through a series of reassortment events in mammals over a period of years before pandemic recognition suggests that appropriate surveillance strategies for detection of precursor viruses may abort future pandemics.

In March and early April 2009, a new swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) emerged in Mexico and the United States. During the first few weeks of surveillance, the virus spread worldwide to 30 countries (as of May 11) by human-to-human transmission, causing the World Health Organization to raise its pandemic alert to level 5 of 6. This virus has the potential to develop into the first influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century. Here we use evolutionary analysis to estimate the timescale of the origins and the early development of the S-OIV epidemic. We show that it was derived from several viruses circulating in swine, and that the initial transmission to humans occurred several months before recognition of the outbreak. A phylogenetic estimate of the gaps in genetic surveillance indicates a long period of unsampled ancestry before the S-OIV outbreak, suggesting that the reassortment of swine lineages may have occurred years before emergence in humans, and that the multiple genetic ancestry of S-OIV is not indicative of an artificial origin. Furthermore, the unsampled history of the epidemic means that the nature and location of the genetically closest swine viruses reveal little about the immediate origin of the epidemic, despite the fact that we included a panel of closely related and previously unpublished swine influenza isolates. Our results highlight the need for systematic surveillance of influenza in swine, and provide evidence that the mixing of new genetic elements in swine can result in the emergence of viruses with pandemic potential in humans.

The highly pathogenic Asian H5N1 influenza virus that was first detected in Guangdong in the People's Republic of China (China) in 1996 is unique in having spread to humans and other mammalian species. To date, this virus has not consistently transmitted between any mammalian species but the continued spread and evolution of these viruses in domestic poultry across Eurasia presents a continuing pandemic threat. These viruses have caused devastation in domestic poultry and have killed over 60% of infected humans. The H5N1 viruses are unique in having evolved into multiple clades and subclades by reassortment with other influenza viruses in the epicentre of southern China, and accumulation of point mutations has resulted in antigenic differences between the clades. Three waves of spread have occurred, wave one to East Asia and Southeast Asia, wave two through Qinghai Lake, China, to Europe, India and Africa, and wave three to Southeast Asia again. This paper deals with the molecular epidemiology of the evolution of the multiplicity of H5N1 clades. The continuing evolution of these H5N1 viruses and the possible establishment of secondary epicentres in Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria present a continuing threat to poultry and people globally.

Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus has caused increasing human infection in Eurasia since 2004. So far, H5N1 human infection has been associated with over 50% mortality that is partly because of delay of diagnosis and treatment., Objectives and Methods: Here, we report that an H5N1 influenza virus infected a 31-year-old patient in Shenzhen in June 2006. To identify the possible source of the infection, the human isolate and other H5N1 influenza viruses obtained from poultry and wild birds in southern China during the same period of time were characterized., Results: Genetic and antigenic analyses revealed that the human H5N1 influenza virus, Shenzhen/406H/06, is of purely avian origin and is most closely related to viruses detected in poultry and wild birds in Hong Kong in early 2006., Conclusions: The findings of the present study suggest that the continued endemicity of H5N1 influenza virus in the poultry in southern China increases the chance for introduction of the virus to humans. This highlights the importance of continued surveillance of poultry and wild birds for determining the source for human H5N1 infection.

Avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses cause severe disease in humans, but the basis for their virulence remains unclear. In vitro and animal studies indicate that high and disseminated viral replication is important for disease pathogenesis. Laboratory experiments suggest that virus-induced cytokine dysregulation may contribute to disease severity. To assess the relevance of these findings for human disease, we performed virological and immunological studies in 18 individuals with H5N1 and 8 individuals infected with human influenza virus subtypes. Influenza H5N1 infection in humans is characterized by high pharyngeal virus loads and frequent detection of viral RNA in rectum and blood. Viral RNA in blood was present only in fatal H5N1 cases and was associated with higher pharyngeal viral loads. We observed low peripheral blood T-lymphocyte counts and high chemokine and cytokine levels in H5N1-infected individuals, particularly in those who died, and these correlated with pharyngeal viral loads. Genetic characterization of H5N1 viruses revealed mutations in the viral polymerase complex associated with mammalian adaptation and virulence. Our observations indicate that high viral load, and the resulting intense inflammatory responses, are central to influenza H5N1 pathogenesis. The focus of clinical management should be on preventing this intense cytokine response, by early diagnosis and effective antiviral treatment.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 is endemic in poultry in East and Southeast Asia with disease outbreaks recently spreading to parts of central Asia, Europe and Africa. Continued interspecies transmission to humans has been reported in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and China, causing pandemic concern. Here, we genetically characterize 82 H5N1 viruses isolated from poultry throughout Indonesia and Vietnam and 11 human isolates from southern Vietnam together with sequence data available in public databases to address questions relevant to virus introduction, endemicity and evolution. Phylogenetic analysis shows that all viruses from Indonesia form a distinct sublineage of H5N1 genotype Z viruses suggesting this outbreak likely originated from a single introduction that spread throughout the country during the past two years. Continued virus activities in Indonesia were attributed to transmission via poultry movement within the country rather than through repeated introductions by bird migration. Within Indonesia and Vietnam, H5N1 viruses have evolved over time into geographically distinct groups within each country. Molecular analysis of the H5N1 genotype Z genome shows that only the M2 and PB1-F2 genes were under positive selection, suggesting that these genes might be involved in adaptation of this virus to new hosts following interspecies transmission. At the amino acid level 12 residues were under positive selection in those genotype Z viruses, in the HA and PB1-F2 proteins. Some of these residues were more frequently observed in human isolates than in avian isolates and are related to viral antigenicity and receptor binding. Our study provides insight into the ongoing evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses that are transmitting in diverse avian species and at the interface between avian and human hosts.

Preparedness for a possible influenza pandemic caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza A subtype H5N1 has become a global priority. The spread of the virus to Europe and continued human infection in Southeast Asia have heightened pandemic concern. It remains unknown from where the pandemic strain may emerge; current attention is directed at Vietnam, Thailand, and, more recently, Indonesia and China. Here, we report that genetically and antigenically distinct sublineages of H5N1 virus have become established in poultry in different geographical regions of Southeast Asia, indicating the long-term endemicity of the virus, and the isolation of H5N1 virus from apparently healthy migratory birds in southern China. Our data show that H5N1 influenza virus, has continued to spread from its established source in southern China to other regions through transport of poultry and bird migration. The identification of regionally distinct sublineages contributes to the understanding of the mechanism for the perpetuation and spread of H5N1, providing information that is directly relevant to control of the source of infection in poultry. It points to the necessity of surveillance that is geographically broader than previously supposed and that includes H5N1 viruses of greater genetic and antigenic diversity.

Influenza A (H5N1) virus with an amino acid substitution in neuraminidase conferring high-level resistance to oseltamivir was isolated from two of eight Vietnamese patients during oseltamivir treatment. Both patients died of influenza A (H5N1) virus infection, despite early initiation of treatment in one patient. Surviving patients had rapid declines in the viral load to undetectable levels during treatment. These observations suggest that resistance can emerge during the currently recommended regimen of oseltamivir therapy and may be associated with clinical deterioration and that the strategy for the treatment of influenza A (H5N1) virus infection should include additional antiviral agents., (Copyright 2005 Massachusetts Medical Society.)

Avian H9N2 influenza A virus has caused repeated human infections in Asia since 1998. Here we report that an H9N2 influenza virus infected a 5-year-old child in Hong Kong in 2003. To identify the possible source of the infection, the human isolate and other H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from Hong Kong poultry markets from January to October 2003 were genetically and antigenically characterized. The findings of this study show that the human H9N2 influenza virus, A/Hong Kong/2108/03, is of purely avian origin and is closely related to some viruses circulating in poultry in the markets of Hong Kong. The continued presence of H9N2 influenza viruses in poultry markets in southern China increases the likelihood of avian-to-human interspecies transmission.

A highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, H5N1, caused disease outbreaks in poultry in China and seven other east Asian countries between late 2003 and early 2004; the same virus was fatal to humans in Thailand and Vietnam. Here we demonstrate a series of genetic reassortment events traceable to the precursor of the H5N1 viruses that caused the initial human outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 (refs 2-4) and subsequent avian outbreaks in 2001 and 2002 (refs 5, 6). These events gave rise to a dominant H5N1 genotype (Z) in chickens and ducks that was responsible for the regional outbreak in 2003-04. Our findings indicate that domestic ducks in southern China had a central role in the generation and maintenance of this virus, and that wild birds may have contributed to the increasingly wide spread of the virus in Asia. Our results suggest that H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential have become endemic in the region and are not easily eradicable. These developments pose a threat to public and veterinary health in the region and potentially the world, and suggest that long-term control measures are required.