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The neuraminidase inhibitor (NAI) oseltamivir is stockpiled globally as part of influenza pandemic preparedness. However, oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) resistance develops in avian influenza virus (AIV) infecting mallards exposed to environmental-like OC concentrations, suggesting that environmental resistance is a real concern. Herein we used an in vivo model to investigate if avian influenza H1N1 with the OC-resistant mutation NA-H274Y (51833/H274Y) as compared to the wild-type (wt) strain (51833 /wt) could transmit from mallards, which would potentially be exposed to environmentally contaminated environments, to and between chickens, thus posing a potential zoonotic risk of antiviral-resistant AIV. Regardless of whether the virus had the OC-resistant mutation or not, chickens became infected both through experimental infection, and following exposure to infected mallards. We found similar infection patterns between 51833/wt and 51833/H274Y such that, one chicken inoculated with 51833/wt and three chickens inoculated with 51833/H274Y were AIV positive in oropharyngeal samples more than 2 days consecutively, indicating true infection, and one contact chicken exposed to infected mallards was AIV positive in faecal samples for 3 consecutive days (51833/wt) and another contact chicken for 4 consecutive days (51833/H274Y). Importantly, all positive samples from chickens infected with 51833/H274Y retained the NA-H274Y mutation. However, none of the virus strains established sustained transmission in chickens, likely due to insufficient adaptation to the chicken host. Our results demonstrate that an OC-resistant avian influenza virus can transmit from mallards and replicate in chickens. NA-H274Y does not constitute a barrier to interspecies transmission per se, as the resistant virus did not show reduced replicative capacity compared to the wild-type counterpart. Thus, responsible use of oseltamivir and surveillance for resistance development is warranted to limit the risk of an OC-resistant pandemic strain.

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 virus was first detected in Egypt in late 2016. Since then, the virus has spread rapidly among different poultry sectors, becoming the dominant HPAI H5 subtype reported in Egypt. Different genotypes of the HPAI H5N8 virus were reported in Egypt; however, the geographic patterns and molecular evolution of the Egyptian HPAI H5N8 viruses are still unclear. Here, extensive epidemiological surveillance was conducted, including more than half a million samples collected from different poultry sectors (farms/backyards/live bird markets) from all governorates in Egypt during 2019-2021. In addition, genetic characterization and evolutionary analyses were performed using 47 selected positive H5N8 isolates obtained during the same period. The result of the conducted surveillance showed that HPAI H5N8 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b continue to circulate in different locations in Egypt, with an obvious seasonal pattern, and no further detection of the HPAI H5N1 virus of clade 2.2.1.2 was observed in the poultry population during 2019-2021. In addition, phylogenetic and Bayesian analyses revealed that two major genotypes (G5 and G6) of HPAI H5N8 viruses were continually expanding among the poultry sectors in Egypt. Notably, molecular dating analysis suggested that the Egyptian HPAI H5N8 virus is the potential ancestral viruses of the European H5N8 viruses of 2020-2021. In summary, the data of this study highlight the current epidemiology, diversity, and evolution of HPAI H5N8 viruses in Egypt and call for continuous monitoring of the genetic features of the avian influenza viruses in Egypt.

Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 viruses have established endemic status in Egyptian poultry populations since 2012. Recently, four cases of human H9N2 virus infections in Egypt demonstrated the zoonotic potential of these viruses. Egyptian H9N2 viruses obtained from 2011 to 2014 phylogenetically grouped into three clusters (1-3) within subclade B of the G1 lineage. Antigenically, a close clustering of the Egyptian H9N2 viruses with other recent G1-B like H9N2 strains and a significant antigenic distance from viruses outside the G1-B lineage was evident. Recent Egyptian LPAIV H9N2 showed a tendency to increased binding with erythrocytes expressing α 2,6-linked sialic acid which correlated with the Q226L amino acid substitution at the receptor binding unit of the hemagglutinin (Q234L, H9 numbering). Sequence analyses of the N2 neuraminidase (NA) revealed substitutions in the NA hemadsorption site similar to the N2 of prepandemic H3N2/1968, but no distinct antigenic or functional characteristics of the H9N2 NA associated with increased zoonotic potential could be identified., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Large-scale sequence analysis of Matrix (M) gene and its coding proteins M1 and M2 was performed for 274 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses H5N1 circulated in Egypt from 2006 to 2016. The aim is to study the amantadine-resistant markers distribution and to estimate the evolutionary rate. 246 viruses were obtained from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data base, and 28 additional viruses were sequenced. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) phylogenetic tree revealed that the M gene has evolved into two different lineages. Estimated Evolutionary analysis showed that the M2 protein possessed higher evolutionary rates (3.45 × 10 -3 ) than the M1 protein (2.73 × 10 -3 ). M gene encoding proteins revealed significant markers described to be associated with host tropism and increase in virulence: V15I, N30D, and T121A in M1 and L55F in M2 protein. Site analysis focusing attention on the temporal and host distribution of the amantadine-resistant markers was carried out and showed that vast majority of the M2 amantadine-resistant variants of clade 2.2.1.1 (n = 90) is N31 marker, in addition to G27 (n = 7), A27 (n = 5), I27 (n = 1), and S30 (n = 1). In 2010-2011, amantadine resistant frequency increased considerably resembling more than half of the resistant variants. Notably, all viruses of clade 2.2.1.1 possessed amantadine-resistant marker. However, almost all current circulating viruses in Egypt of clade 2.2.1.2 from 2014 to 2016 did not carry any amantadine-resistant markers.

Since 2006, in Egypt, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 has established endemic status in poultry. Bayesian evolutionary analysis sampling trees suggested an introduction date in the third quarter of 2005. Evolutionary dynamics using Bayesian analysis showed that H5N1 viruses of clade 2.2.1.1 evolved at higher rates than those of clade 2.2.1.2. Bayesian skyline plot analysis of the HA gene of 840 and NA gene of 401 Egyptian H5N1 viruses from 2006-2015 identified two waves of viral population expansion correlating with the stepwise emergence of the 2.2.1.1 variant lineage in 2008 and with the newly emerging 2.2.1.2 cluster in late 2014. H5N1 infections in human hosts in 2014-2015 were statistically linked to a contemporary poultry outbreak.

It is almost a decade since the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus (A/H5N1) of clade 2.2.1 was introduced to Egypt in 2005, most likely, via wild birds; marking the longest endemic status of influenza viruses in poultry outside Asia. The endemic A/H5N1 in Egypt still compromises the poultry industry, poses serious hazards to public health and threatens to become potentially pandemic. The control strategies adopted for A/H5N1 in Egyptian poultry using diverse vaccines in commercialized poultry neither eliminated the virus nor did they decrease its evolutionary rate. Several virus clades have evolved, a few of them disappeared and others prevailed. Disparate evolutionary traits in both birds and humans were manifested by accumulation of clade-specific mutations across viral genomes driven by a variety of selection pressures. Viruses in vaccinated poultry populations displayed higher mutation rates at the immunogenic epitopes, promoting viral escape and reducing vaccine efficiency. On the other hand, viruses isolated from humans displayed changes in the receptor binding domain, which increased the viral affinity to bind to human-type glycan receptors. Moreover, viral pathogenicity exhibited several patterns in different hosts. This review aims to provide an overview of the viral evolution, pathogenicity and vaccine efficacy of A/H5N1 in Egypt during the last ten years., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

A distinct cluster of highly pathogenic avian influenzaviruses of subtype A(H5N1) has been found to emergewithin clade 2.2.1.2 in poultry in Egypt since summer2014 and appears to have quickly become predominant.Viruses of this cluster may be associated withincreased incidence of human influenza A(H5N1) infectionsin Egypt over the last months.