Search

Banco de la Republica's FX intervention policy is described, with a focus on its objectives and main features. Then, based on a survey of the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in Colombia, it is argued that this tool is not useful to cope with the challenges posed by medium term external factors such as quantitative easing in advanced economies, reduced risk premiums in emerging economies or high international commodity prices. The duration of the impact of sterilized intervention on the exchange rate (if any) is much shorter than the effects of those factors. Finally, it is argued that if sterilized FX intervention is effective due to the operation of the portfolio balance channel, it may also have an expansionary effect on credit supply and aggregate demand. In this case, the macroeconomic outcomes of intervention depend on the monetary policy response. This issue is studied with a small open economy DSGE. In general, FX intervention implies a volatility of credit and consumption that is higher than under a more efficient allocation and under alternative monetary regimes without intervention. Furthermore, the more inclined the central bank is to meet an inflation target, the stronger its response to the expansionary effects of the intervention and, consequently, the lower the impact of the intervention on the exchange rate.

We analyse three models to determine the conditions under which reserve requirements are used as a part of an optimal monetary policy framework in an inflation targeting regime. In all cases the Central Bank (CB) minimizes an objective function that depends on deviations of inflation from its target, the output gap and deviations of reserve requirements from its optimal long term level. In a closed economy model we find that optimal monetary policy implies setting reserve requirements at their long term level, while adjusting the policy interest rate to face macroeconomic shocks. Reserve requirements are included in an optimal monetary policy response in an open economy model with the same CB objective function and in a closed economy model in which the CB objective function includes financial stability. The relevance, magnitude and direction of the movements of reserve requirements depend on the parameters of the economy and the shocks that affect it.

The Colombian economy and financial system have coped reasonably well with the effects of the global financial crisis. Hence, unconventional" policy measures have not been at the center of the policy decisions and discussions. Nominal short term interest rates have remained the main monetary policy tool and "Quantitative easing" measures have not been central in the policy response. The one "unconventional" monetary instrument used by the Central Bank in Colombia has been changes in reserve requirements (RR) on financial system deposits. Interestingly, they were adopted before the global financial crisis, as a reaction to domestic credit conditions. The effects of RR on interest rate and interest rate pass-through in an inflation targeting regime are not as straightforward as those under a monetary targeting regime. Conceptually, those effects depend on the degree of substitution between deposits and central bank credit as sources of funds for banks and on the extent to which RR changes affect the risks facing banks. The empirical results for Colombia suggest that RR are important long run determinants of business loan interest rates and have been effective in strengthening the pass-through from policy to deposit and lending interest rates. "

The assessment of inflationary pressures in Colombia has faced two important challenges in the present decade. The first one occurred in 2006 and consisted of detecting an overheating economy in the midst of fast growing investment and increasing measured productivity. The second challenge took place in 2007-2008, when the economy was hit by a number of "supply" shocks and core inflation indicators sent diverging signals about the transmission of those shocks to macroeconomic inflation. An evaluation of the first episode shows that traditional indicators of productivity and unit labor costs were not sufficient to identify "supply" and "demand" movements. Thus, policymakers had to rely on a wider array of variables to gauge the state of the economy. Regarding the second episode, an evaluation of core inflation indicators according to standard criteria suggests that no particular measure seems to be clearly superior to the others. Hence, the assessment of inflationary pressures should not rely only on one or few core inflation indicators, since some signals could be picked by some measures and not by others. Moreover, this result suggests that the analysis of core inflation measures must be complemented with a careful examination of the persistence of the shocks and a close monitoring of their impact on inflation expectations. It is found that the latter are formed on the basis of past inflation, but that the inflation target also plays a role. In addition, inflation expectations partially move with "supply" shocks, an outcome that reflects a degree of credibility of monetary policy.

The Colombian economy experienced several shocks in the past ten years. The permanent fall of inflation, the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) and a financial crisis altered the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Low inflation and IT reduced inflation persistence and contributed to anchor inflation expectations. The evidence is less conclusive with respect to the changes of the responsiveness of inflation to domestic conditions (output or marginal cost gaps). Increased competition may have encouraged a higher degree of price flexibility, but a more stable inflation environment may have raised the sensitivity of aggregate supply to inflation surprises. The short-run money-inflation relationship was broken in the presence of low inflation, exogenous shocks to the demand for money and a policy regime that stabilized short-run interest rates. The sensitivity of aggregate demand to the interest rate varied with the indebtedness of private agents and the credit channel was severed after the financial crisis. The IT regime implied a stabilization of short-run interest rates, making the monetary policy stance and objectives clearer to the public. However, interest rate pass-through appears to be incomplete and seems to respond to the varying importance of the credit channel and the general state of the economy.

Explicit inflation targets have existed in Colombia since the early nineties1 . The Colombian authorities announced a quantitative in‡ation target for the first time in 1991. The announcement was made by the Minister of Finance, at a time when there was no clear distinction between the tasks of the central bank and those of the government with respect to macroeconomic management, nor there was any autonomy in the design and execution of monetary policy. In 1991, a new Constitution assigned the design and conduct of monetary, exchange, and credit policies exclusively to the Board of Directors of Banco de la Republica and made the central bank independent from the central government. According to the Constitution, ”The State, through Banco de la Republica must preserve the purchasing power of currency”. In addition to the constitutional mandate, in 1992 the Central Bank Law stated that the Board of Directors must announce each year a quantitative inflation target. The reduction of inflation in Colombia has faced several hurdles. To begin, the introduction of explicit inflation targets in Colombia had two special features. First, unlike other countries, the inflation target was not initially announced as part of a policy framework to achieve price stability. Second, there was a marked deviation between observed inflation and the first announced target. Thus, inflation targeting in Colombia started with low credibility and confusion about its nature and operational meaning.