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From naturally occurring disease threats to the deliberate creation of biological weapons, the field of biosecurity encompasses a broad swath of life science research and the associated risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies of H5N1 avian influenza viruses that had been genetically engineered to render them transmissible between ferrets have proved highly controversial. Divergent opinions exist about the importance of these studies of influenza transmission and about potential 'dual use' research implications. No consensus has developed yet about how to balance these concerns. After not recommending immediate full publication of earlier, less complete versions of the studies, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity subsequently recommended full publication of more complete manuscripts; however, controversy about this and similar research remains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the redaction commanded by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to publishers of journals on a dual-use research which shows the process of transmitting H5N1 avian influenza virus to mammals. It states that NSABB was doubtful to disseminate the research due to its risk for accidental release of lethal new virus. It adds that the NSABB's voting and non-voting members have deliberated and decided to fully publish the report in March 2012.

The article reports that a World Health Organization (WHO) group comprised of influenza (flu) scientists, public health officials, and journal editors from 11 countries have recommended the full publication of research that details a highly pathogenic bird flu virus rendered capable of being transmitted easily among mammals. According to the author, the group's recommendation ignores advice from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity regarding the release of key details only to individuals who have a need to know. Topics include an overview of research by two separate teams of scientists who genetically manipulated the H5N1 bird flu virus, making it easily transmissible to mammals through the air, and the WHO group's influence on the publication of the research papers.

The article presents an interview with virologist Ron Fouchier. He discusses his research paper that prompted concerns over the biosecurity of influenza studies, the 2012 declaration of a moratorium on research modifying the H5N1 avian influenza virus to increase its transmissibility among mammals, and his reaction to the position of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on the public health benefits of his work.

The article discusses the declaration of a 60-day moratorium on H5N1 avian influenza virus research in response to the debate over the potential biosecurity dangers posed by two 2011 studies that modified the virus to increase its transmission among mammals. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked the lead authors of each study, Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka, to redact sensitive data from their papers. The United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) plans to study the issue in order to balance the need for global collaboration in the eradication of the disease with biosecurity concerns.

The article reports that in December 2011 the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked that two research teams redact information papers on papers to be published in "Science" and "Nature" about methods for the engineering of the H5N1 influenza virus to increase its transmissibility between mammals. Critics of the move fear that increased government oversight will hamper vital research and information sharing on a global health concern, while proponents point to the importance of restricting access to sensitive data for bioterrorism prevention. The development of a system for the U.S. government to evaluate the safety of future dual-use scientific research is discussed.

The article discusses the controversy surrounding two H5N1 avian influenza studies, including one by virologist Ron Fouchier and colleagues at Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, showing how H5N1 can be engineered so that it is transmissible among mammals. Topics include a voluntary moratorium on H5N1 research, a recommendation by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) against publishing the studies, and a debate over whether such studies are worth the risk.