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In reverse supply chain with IERs (Inspection Error Rates) and competition, which consists of one remanufacturer and two competing collectors, the two collectors collect the used-products from used-product market competitively, and then they carry out inspection activity with IERs. The competition means supply amount competition. Considering the competition, we study the optimal price decisions for reverse supply chain members by game theory. We present the optimal collecting prices for two collectors and the optimal reclaiming price for remanufacturer. By numerical example, we analyze the impacts of competitions on the optimal results under supply amount competition. The research results show that: under supply amount competition, when one collector reduces IERs, the other one can get small increasing of profits even though he does not reduce his IERs; the remanufacturer can get more profits.

In reverse supply chain under our study, there are four supply disruptions. As the source of the reverse supply chain, the supply disruption of used-products between end-consumers and collector will largely affect the profits of the reverse supply chain. In order to manage the profits of the reverse supply chain, we give an expanded stock-flow diagram with this supply disruption of the reverse supply chain by using system dynamics methodology, show the simulation results of collector's profit, disassembly center's profit, remanufacturer's profit and the mean of their profits under different disruption periods. By analyzing the simulation results, we present a strategy to ensure the members positive profits. The strategy is adding another channel of purchasing used-products for the collector. We show the simulation results of the members profits and their mean after using the strategy, and give the suitable range of purchase quantity of used-products for the strategy.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to present the collecting price decisions of used products in reverse supply chains based on the following cases: manufacturer for collecting and processing, third party for collecting and manufacturer for processing, retailer for collecting and manufacture for processing, and third party for collecting and processing.Design/methodology/approachThe paper considers a recycling channel whereby a manufacturer collects and processes the used products or delegates collecting (or processing) to the retailer or a third party; characterizes the steps of processing a returned used product; gives a collection function of used products which is an increasing function of the collecting price, since the quantity of returned used products is affected by the end customer's willingness and the end customer's willingness is affected by the collecting price. The optimal results were obtained by game theory.FindingsBy investigating the pricing decisions for different cases, the manufacturer prefers to collect the used products rather than delegate to others if manufacturer for processing, and a third party joining the reverse supply chains hopes to collaborate more deeply, not only collecting but also processing the used products.Research limitations/implicationsThe main implication is that the reusing ratio of the returned used products and the remanufacturing ratio of the key parts have impacts on the optimal pricing decisions of reverse supply chains.Practical implicationsThe paper describes a very useful method for managers to make collecting price decisions for reverse supply chains.Originality/valueThe paper provides the optimal results of collecting price decisions. The paper contributes to the reverse supply chains researches and managers who are responsible for the reverse supply chains.

The supply disruption of used-products between end-consumers and collector is one supply disruption of the reverse supply chain under our study. In order to analyze the impacts of this supply disruption on the reverse supply chain, we give an expanded stock-flow diagram with supply disruption of the reverse supply chain by using system dynamics methodology, show the simulation results of the collector's profit, the disassembly center's profit and the remanufacturer's profit, and analyze the simulation results and the mean of their profits. This simulation model and the results can help the members of the reverse supply chain make appropriate decisions to ensure positive profits under different supply disruption periods.

RFID-EPC plays an important role in Internet of Things which will be the new environment of application of the reverse supply chain. By using RFID-EPC, the reverse supply chain under Internet of Things will have some characteristics. In order to analyze the impacts of RFID-EPC on reverse supply chain, on the assumption that RFID-EPC can reduce the collection uncertainty of the used-products, we present a system dynamics model and show the changing of the inventories, the service levels, and the profits. By analyzing the simulation results of the reverse supply chain with and without RFID-EPC, we can obtain that the service levels and the profits of the collector, the disassembly center, and the remanufacturer will increase even though their inventories increase when RFID-EPC is used in reverse supply chain.

The Remanufacturer/Manufacturer will face some market risks when he sells the new and remanufactured products in the same market. There are two cases in the same market: Case I, the remanufactured product is indistinguishable from the new product; Case II, the remanufactured product is distinguishable from the new product. The different case has the different market risks. In this paper, we focus on the pricing decisions for new and remanufactured products considering the market risks in the same market. Based on the market risks, the optimal selling prices of the new and remanufactured products were given. In the end of the paper, a numerical example is given to illustrate the optimal results.